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Introduction: 
A Rock and a Hard Place 
 
‗Is the world we inhabit more, or less religious than it used to be? Do we witness a 
decline, redeployment or renaissance of religiosity?‘ (Bauman 1988, p. 56) 
 
Four Reflections on Public Theology Today 
1 In November 2012, German Chancellor Angela Merkel surprised many commentators 
when she disclosed that she was a practising Christian. She used an address to the synod of 
the Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (EKD) to commend the contribution of the churches 
to national life, and went on to claim that Christianity was the world‘s ‗most persecuted 
religion‘, and promising that the protection of religious freedoms would become German 
federal foreign policy (Merkel 2012).
1
  
This followed earlier revelations in a podcast session, when in response to a question 
from a theological student, she said:  
                                                          
1
 ‗Dennoch sind wir weltweit unendlich weit von einer wirklichen Anerkennung und 
Beachtung dieses global gültigen Menschenrechts entfernt. Fanatismus, Einschränkung von 
Glaubensfreiheit, Geringschätzung von Glauben – das alles ist Teil unserer 
Lebenswirklichkeit in der Welt. Man darf es, glaube ich, auch einmal sagen: Das Christentum 
ist die verfolgteste Religion auf der Welt. Deshalb haben wir uns in der Bundesregierung 
ganz bewusst entschieden, zu sagen, dass der Kampf gegen die Verfolgung von Menschen, 
die eine Religion ausüben – und damit auch von Christen –, Teil unserer Außenpolitik ist.‘ 
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I am a member of the Evangelical [Lutheran] Church. I believe in God, and religion is 
also my constant companion, and has been for the whole of my life … I find it very 
liberating that as a Christian, one can make mistakes, that one knows there is 
something higher than just human beings, and that we are also called on to shape the 
world in responsibility for others. This is a framework for my life, which I consider 
very important. (Warner 2012) 
 
2 In February 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, delivered a speech 
at the Royal Courts of Justice in London, entitled ‗Civil and Religious Law in England: a 
Religious Perspective‘. He used the lecture to address the status of shari‘a or Islamic law 
within the British legal system, arguing that the growth of religious pluralism made the case 
for greater recognition of religious considerations within an overarching system of statutory 
law. He suggested that for the state to have a legal monopoly flew in the face of modern 
democratic principles of human dignity, and that parallel jurisdictions might go some way 
towards acknowledging religiously-founded codes of conduct. 
The text of the lecture was released in advance to the press, and even before the 
lecture had been given, Williams found himself at the centre of a media furore. He was 
accused of calling for the introduction of shari‘a law in the UK and sanctioning legal 
immunity for Muslims from the universal rule of law. Even those who conceded that he was 
attempting to negotiate his way through a complex and nuanced set of questions about 
multiculturalism, religious freedom and the challenges of pluralism accused him of 
obscurantism and lack of clarity, amounting to a ‗disingenuous‘ (Parris 2008) failure to 
anticipate that his speculations would, inevitably, be misunderstood. 
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3 The Brotherhood of St. Laurence is an Australian faith-based organization engaged in 
research, advocacy and front-line welfare delivery. Founded as a religious order during the 
Great Depression in 1930, its stated aims are the prevention of poverty and social exclusion 
and political advocacy around these issues, as well as the development of new policies and 
programmes through research and innovative practice. ‗The Brotherhood, inspired by our 
Christian origins, seeks the common good through compassion, with a generosity of spirit and 
reliance on evidence.‘ (Brotherhood of St Laurence 2013a) The Brotherhood is one of a 
number of Christian charities in Australia involved in delivery of publicly-funded schemes and 
works with a range of collaborative partners across the commercial, public and third sectors 
(2013b).  
4 The Anglican Church in Kenya has a long history of social welfare provision, most of 
it independent of government funding and management. Its independence from the state, its 
ethnic diversity and its presence at all levels of society has granted it widespread credibility. 
Whilst its leadership and people are committed to addressing issues such as lack of 
participation in public policy making, poverty, HIV and AIDS, corruption and ethnic tension, 
it faces resistance from the policy-making elite in government which assumes that ordinary 
people cannot be involved in decision-making for themselves. The Church is thus working at 
grass-roots to facilitate greater capacity-building, such as workshops with women and young 
people living with HIV-AIDS (Ayallo 2012). It follows the pattern of churches in many other 
parts of Africa, which play decisive roles in democratic engagement and education of its 
membership in order to become better mobilized in policy-making and local civil society (de 
Villiers 2011). Indeed, the focus on congregational and neighbourhood-based activism may 
be a distinguishing feature of faith-based organizations the world over (Day 2012; Jacobsen 
2012). 
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Four vignettes, all of which reveal various aspects of the role played by religious faith and 
practice in the contemporary world; yet all of them invite further inspection. Angela Merkel‘s 
statements were not just a matter of personal profession, since no politician ever speaks 
purely as a private citizen. I have already noted in previous work that political leaders, 
especially in Europe and Oceania, often face difficulties in negotiating questions of personal 
religious belief in relation to their public images. The relationship between private conviction 
and public office can be fraught with difficulty, especially when opinion amongst the 
electorate at large is at all sceptical or suspicious of those who claim to ‗do God‘ in relation 
to political policy (Graham 2009a; 2009b). 
Certainly, Merkel‘s personal beliefs had been something of an open secret in 
Germany. Although she leads the country‘s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which 
historically has strong links with the Roman Catholic Church, she had always maintained a 
public discretion, to the point in 2009 when she barred the media from a visit she made with 
Barack Obama to the Frauenkirche in Dresden, during which they prayed together. What 
makes her recent profession of faith all the more extraordinary, however, is that Merkel was 
born and brought up in the German Democratic Republic, which as part of the Soviet bloc 
until 1989 was officially an atheist state, although her father was a Lutheran pastor. Even 
now, some estimates gauge that only 13.2 per cent of citizens of the former GDR believe in 
God, with 59.4 per cent reporting themselves as convinced atheists, compared with 54.2 per 
cent and 9.2 per cent respectively of their Western compatriots in the former Federal 
Republic (Smith 2012; Spiegel 2012). 
Merkel‘s case is an example of the delicate position of religion in much of Western 
public life, and it touches on a number of themes that I will hope to develop in further detail. 
These include how explicitly religious voices and interventions are ‗pitched‘ in political 
debate, and secular or non-religious reactions to that; the benefits or otherwise of the public 
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mobilization of religious social capital; the diversity across global, national and local contexts 
in religious observance and affiliation; and debates about religious freedom, tolerance and 
discrimination.  
Rowan Williams‘ speech on shari‘a has already received much attention already 
(Kim, 2011; Higton 2008; Chaplin 2008). Through the issues he raised, and the public 
reaction, are refracted other, vital but unresolved questions: the right of a faith leader to 
comment on matters of common concern; the increasing role of the media in managing 
‗public‘ opinion and debate; and how a nation forged from a particular religious tradition 
(with, in this case, the legacy of an Established Church) might accommodate greater religious 
pluralism into its legal, political and cultural institutions. 
The work of the Brotherhood of St. Laurence reminds us that faith-based care on the 
part of all major traditions for the poor and needy has always taken place. The organization 
itself is named after Lawrence of Rome (c. 225–58 CE), who was charged by the Church with 
special responsibility for the administration of alms to the poor. Yet this dedicated Christian 
organization, named after a third-century saint allegedly martyred during the persecution of 
the Roman Emperor Valerian, now competes in a secular arena of government welfare 
policy, seeking to reconcile Christian values of justice and compassion with statutory 
requirements. Throughout its history, however, in the changing circumstances of poverty, 
unemployment and family support, it has combined a tradition of practical care with 
campaigning for social justice.  
The Anglican Church in Kenya is using its dispersed presence in local communities to 
develop participatory methods of grass-roots organizing in a continent where the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic is more than a mere medical matter, but inextricably linked with questions of 
poverty, patriarchy, power and morality. It is committed to ‗bottom-to-top‘ (Ayallo 2012) 
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methods which set out to enhance the expertise of marginalized groups in order to facilitate 
greater public policy dialogue and genuine citizen participation. However, the threads of 
local, national and global are drawn tightly. The Christian tradition that sustains such 
activism is itself complicit in a complicated history of colonialism; and the tragedy of 
HIV/AIDS in Africa caught up in wider patterns of migration, trafficking and global health 
care (Bongmba 2007). 
 These cases are all about the interaction of religion and politics, but more specifically 
about the relationship between Christian theology and public life. They serve as case studies 
in the ways in which the public witness of Christians reflects (and embodies) understandings 
about God, human destiny and the societies in which they live: how faith translates into social 
action; how the sacred co-exists with the secular; how traditional beliefs respond to new 
challenges. What these case studies also reveal, too, is the way in which religion is 
increasingly practised in a world that is both inescapably underscored by, yet often resistant 
to, the demands of religious belief and practice. It is upon the future of public theology, in 
theory and practice, in such a contested and pluralistic context that I want to focus in this 
book.  
 
Post-Secular Society 
My interest in the future of public theology is prompted by consideration of the changing 
position of religion in the contemporary West, and in particular the way in which our 
everyday experience may no longer fit comfortably into existing conceptual frameworks. 
Chief amongst these paradigms, of course, since the 1960s, has been that of the secularization 
thesis, which argues that as Western society becomes more modern, more complex, it also 
becomes more ‗secular‘. Conventional secularization theories hold that as societies 
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modernize, so they become less ‗religious‘ according to a number of criteria: in terms of 
personal affiliation and belief; in terms of institutional strength of religious organizations; and 
in terms of the political and cultural prominence of religion in society. But now, the world 
appears to be turning on its axis in a new way and entering an unprecedented political and 
cultural era, in which many of these assumptions are being overturned.  
Associated with this, and originating in the religious wars of early modernity, the 
Enlightenment and democratic revolutions of Europe and North America in the eighteenth 
century, is the conviction that the modern democratic state must effect a separation between 
religion and government, between ‗faith‘ and ‗reason‘. This is associated with liberal thinkers 
such as John Rawls, whose Theory of Justice argued that equality of participation amongst 
citizens in the public domain was dependent on the ‗bracketing out‘ of matters of personal or 
subjective conviction (such as religious faith) on the grounds that these represented partial 
and partisan forms of reasoning, not universally accessible and therefore inadmissible as 
acceptable forms of political or moral reasoning. Hence, the separation of religion and 
politics, and the assumption that the modern democratic state would be functionally secular 
or at least neutral towards the manifestations of religion in public. Since the 1990s, and 
accelerating into the early twenty-first century, however, new perspectives have been 
emerging. They argue that we are witnessing an unprecedented convergence of two 
supposedly incompatible trends: secularization and a new visibility of religion in politics and 
public affairs.  
Whilst many of the features of the trajectory of religious decline, typical of Western 
modernity, are still apparent, there are compelling and vibrant signs of religious activism, not 
least in public life and politics: local, national and global. For example, in Western 
democracies such as the UK, faith-based organizations are experiencing a heightened public 
prominence as partners with government in the delivery of welfare and other public services 
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(Dinham, Furbey and Lowndes 2009). Religion continues to be a potent force in many 
aspects of global civil society and is increasingly cited by governments as a significant source 
of social capital and political mobilization. Interest in personal spirituality beyond creedal 
and institutional expressions of religion continues to be strong, not least in the way concepts 
of spiritual health and spiritual care are increasingly part of institutional provision and 
professional practice (White 2006; Cobb, Puchalski and Rumbold 2012; Erricker, Ota and 
Erricker, 2001). Global migration has fostered religious diversity and heightened awareness 
of the links between religious profession and cultural or ethnic identity. Within human rights 
legislation, the inclusion of categories of ‗religion and belief‘ alongside markers of identity 
such as ‗race‘ and ethnicity, gender, sexuality and dis/ability has given rise to a number of 
high-profile cases across Europe in which persons of faith have challenged the neutrality of 
the public square by insisting on special treatment, such as the wearing of particular religious 
clothing or symbols, or demands for particular dispensations of practice and conscience. 
These have proved quite contentious, however, since such cases represent a potential conflict 
between respect for freedom of belief (around religion) and recognition of universal human 
rights and liberties (around gender, disability, sexuality or race and ethnicity).  
Nevertheless, whilst the inevitability of secularization may now be open to question, 
this must not be thought of as a religious revival. Levels of formal institutional affiliation and 
membership in mainstream Christian and Jewish denominations continue to diminish across 
the Western world. In the UK, the national population censuses of 2001 and 2011 included a 
voluntary question which asked, ‗What is your religion?‘ The shifts within that decade are 
instructive: those identifying as ‗Christian‘ fell from nearly three-quarters (72 per cent) in 
2001 to less than two-thirds (59 per cent) in 2011. Those claiming ‗no religion‘ rose to 25 per 
cent in 2011 from 15 per cent ten years earlier. Whatever people think they mean by ‗no 
religion‘, it suggests that identification with institutional, creedal religion is diminishing. 
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Other evidence would appear to confirm that public scepticism towards religion is on the 
increase (Voas 2010). Religious observance is increasingly disaffiliated and individualized; 
religious institutions are viewed with distrust at worst, indifference at best. The greater 
prominence of those who profess no religious faith, or declare themselves secular humanists 
or atheists may have been given particular impetus through the popularity of works by the 
‗New Atheist‘ writers, who include the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, philosophers 
such as Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris and the journalists Polly Toynbee and the late 
Christopher Hitchens. As Charles Taylor has noted, ‗We no longer live in societies in which 
the widespread sense can be maintained that faith in God is central to the ordered life we 
(partially) enjoy‘ (2007, p. 531). 
Clearly, then, the secularization process is neither uniform, inevitable nor irreversible, 
since religion continues to exercise a global influence and has demonstrated a new public 
resurgence. There are many signs of religious vitality, but this does not amount to a 
restoration of pre-modern faith, at least not in the sense of the return to Western Christendom. 
A persistence of personal spirituality, for example, according to some theorists of 
secularization, is entirely consistent with modernization, since it is a symptom of the 
continued separation, or differentiation, between religion and politics, public and private. If 
religion persists, then, it has, as Grace Davie has argued, ‗mutated‘ into something more 
pluralist, heterodox and privatized (1994).  
This seemingly paradoxical co-existence of the religious and the secular takes us into 
uncharted territory, sociologically and theologically, and is giving rise to talk of the 
emergence of a ‗post-secular‘ society (Habermas 2008; Keenan, 2002; Bretherton 2010, pp. 
10–16). This has been acknowledged in the work of some leading social theorists, most 
notably Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Judith Butler and Jose Casanova. The latter speaks 
of ‗public religions in a post-secular world‘ (1994). Jürgen Habermas‘ recent work has 
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spearheaded this new turn in social theory and political philosophy, with his talk of the ‗post-
secular‘ as an expression of the newly prominent (yet problematic) role of religion in the 
public square, which represents a new departure from the classic assumptions of modern 
liberal thought towards the role of religion in the body politic (2008; 2011). Increasingly, 
political theorists of many kinds are asking questions about the self-sufficiency of the secular 
to furnish the public domain with sufficiently robust values for consensus. To that end, 
therefore, post-secular culture heralds a greater latitude towards religion, not only as a system 
of private beliefs but also a source of public discourse. 
In many ways, then, the kind of religious faith that is emerging at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, and which dominates the public imagination, is very different from what 
went before. It represents much less of a religious revival and much more a quest for a new 
voice in the midst of public debate that is more fragmented, more global, more disparate. It is 
a public domain in which the contribution of religion to the well-being of communities is 
welcomed by some, with new agendas and increasing enthusiasm; but at the same time, the 
very legitimacy of faith to speak or contribute at all is contested as vigorously as ever.  
But if modernity was characterized by a particular understanding of the public, 
rational sphere, one that insisted on its own neutrality and impartiality – and thus its own 
secularist agenda – what happens to our understandings of public life within the post-secular 
context? According to the logic of secularism and secularization, such resurgence of religion 
(global, national and local) should not be happening. Yet in its renewed sense of public 
prominence, for better and for worse, religion provokes wider discussion about the neutrality 
of the public square and the secular nature of liberal democracy, as well as the ‗public‘ and 
‗private‘ demeanour of its citizens. The new prominence of religion within a continuing 
trajectory of pluralism means that public discourse and public space becomes more 
differentiated but potentially more polarized, with a small but increasingly well-mobilized 
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religious minority operating alongside a majority of disaffiliated non-believers who may have 
little or no first-hand understanding of religious belief or practice. This has particular impact 
on the discourses and practices concerning citizenship and values within the public sphere. 
 
Local, National and Global  
In my discussion, I will occasionally indicate how the local, national and global dimensions 
of the changing fortunes of religion, as well as the corresponding responses of public 
theology, are inevitably intertwined. This makes the task of remaining rooted in a specific 
context whilst attempting to address a variety of audiences a tricky one. I shall be writing 
primarily from my own national context, within the United Kingdom and from inherited 
traditions of public theology that reflect a mainstream, Anglican perspective. I hope this will 
afford a depth and detail to my discussion without narrowing my focus. Whilst my particular 
corner of northern Europe is probably the most secular region in the world, and the exception 
rather than the rule when it comes to considering religion in the public sphere, the 
contradictions of resurgent religion in the form of multiculturalism, new legislative 
recognitions and the significance of religious activism for welfare reform, all provide vivid 
illustrations of the multi-faceted challenges of post-secular society. More generally, the aim 
of my discussion will be to use specific cases and contexts to illustrate a more general 
argument about the overall trajectory of contemporary society and the task of reformulating 
public theology in the light of that analysis.
2
 
In Chapter 1, I trace some of the contours of the new public visibility of religion, and 
through debates about the future of welfare and the controversies engendered by the inclusion 
of religion and belief in human rights legislation, point to ways in which the situation is 
                                                          
2
 For a general overview of global public theology, see Kim 2011. 
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unprecedented and problematic. What has raised the stakes about the post-secular in 
particular, and highlights the need for greater communication, is the growing gulf between 
people of faith and wider society in terms of a widespread deficit of religious literacy and in 
the objections of reasoned sceptics who question the very legitimacy of religious voices and 
the benevolence of faith-based interventions in equal measure. In Chapter 2, I focus on 
making the argument that the true significance of post-secular society is found not in the 
resurgence of religion per se, but in the changing consciousness of its public significance and 
complexity. ‗A society is ―post-secular‖ if it reckons with the diminishing but enduring – and 
hence, perhaps, ever more resistant and recalcitrant – existence of the religious.‘ (de Vries 
2006b, p. 3)
 
This takes us to the heart of the matter. The post-secular represents the 
emergence of a new kind of public square in which religion is newly resurgent, and yet its 
legitimacy as a form of public reason continues to be hotly contested. The political tension at 
the heart of the post-secular, therefore, is this: whilst the resurgence of religion is regarded by 
many as prompting a much-needed moral rejuvenation of secular society, for others this new 
eruption of faith continues to represent a dangerous breach of the neutrality of the public 
sphere. We are moving in uncharted waters: how does a liberal, pluralist democracy square 
that particular circle? How does this new dispensation of the sacred and the secular set up 
new conventions of identity, citizenship, governance and public discourse about the common 
good?  
 
Neither the hope of further secularization or secularism – whether as a bulwark 
against or an enabler of religious diversity – nor, to be sure, a simple return to 
forgotten religious values can fill this void. If any post-secular thought and political 
theology of Europe and the West there may be, we do not yet know what it is. (p. 67) 
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This new dispensation of ‗post-secularity‘ also presents novel challenges to the public 
witness of the Christian churches, and for the discipline known as public theology. This is the 
study of the public relevance of religious thought and practice, normally within Christian 
tradition. It is both academic discipline and ecclesial discourse, in that it seeks to comment 
and critically reflect from a theological perspective on aspects of public life such as 
economics, politics, culture and media. Traditionally, public theology sees itself as rooted in 
religious traditions, but strongly in conversation with secular discourse and public institu-
tions.  
 
Public theologians thus seek to communicate, by means that are intelligible and 
assayable to all, how Christian beliefs and practices bear, both descriptively and pre-
scriptively, on public life and the common good, and in so doing possibly persuade 
and move to action both Christians and non-Christians. (Breitenberg 2003, p. 66)  
 
In Chapter 3, I consider further the legacy of contemporary public theology and begin 
to chart some of its core characteristics in relation to a pluralist public domain. Some public 
theologians examine actual examples of interventions into public debate or political 
procedures by churches or other faith-based organizations. Others undertake a critique of the 
ways in which theological language, concepts and values are mediated into public debate, 
such as the common good, salvation, covenant, Trinity. Occasionally, public theologians 
contribute to the normative and formative reconstruction of communities of faith as they seek 
to exercise a public ministry in relation to questions of ecology, global finance, poverty or 
urban life and faith. Contemporary public theologians are also diversifying increasingly 
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beyond a focus on churches and political processes, to consider the wider cultural 
significance of religious motifs, values and practice – such as the media and popular culture. 
Following the work of Dirkie Smit on constructions of the public (2007a; 2007b) work has 
emerged to reconfigure dominant definitions from feminist, postmodern and post-colonial 
perspectives (McIntosh 2007; Beaumont 2011; Budden 2008; Sebastian 2007). 
Similarly, whilst public theology has mainly been concerned with a consideration of the 
terms and conditions under which religious traditions might engage in public debate and 
political programs, and also with evaluations of specific examples of engagement in moral 
and political on the part of religious institutions and leaders, there has been a growing interest 
in the public theological and moral voices of politicians and public intellectuals as another 
genre of theological reasoning mediated into public discourse (Storrar 2009; Graham 2009a). 
In a field that often intersects with ethnographic or anthropological methodologies, public 
theology studies the mobilization of ecclesial activism with emphasis on grass-roots and 
community organizing, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Kim 2008; Haire 
2007; Akper 2008; von Sinner, 2009). 
The work of the Roman Catholic theologian David Tracy has been foundational for 
mainstream public theology, both in its insistence that theology may be ‗personal‘ but never 
‗private‘ (1981, p. 6) and in its conviction that ‗a commitment to authentic publicness‘ (p. 5) 
on the part of theology is a necessary precondition for Christian values to exercise any kind 
of public influence. It owes much to his characterization of the ‗three publics‘ of the Christian 
theologian, and theology‘s accountability to academy, Church and society (1981). Public 
theology is also mindful of the work of Jürgen Habermas, who defines the public sphere as a 
discrete, modern dimension of social and political life characterized by communicative action 
through participatory, rational and transformational discourse (2008). 
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Conventionally, therefore, the notion of ‗public‘ has encompassed two meanings for 
public theologians. Firstly, it privileges the corporate, political and societal meanings of faith, 
in contrast to forms of religious belief and practice that confine faith to private and pietist 
intentions (Breitenberg 2003; Stackhouse 2007a). Secondly, it reflects a commitment on the 
part of public theologians to conduct debates about the public trajectories of faith and practice 
in ways that are transparent and publicly accessible and defensible (Breitenberg 2003). Public 
theology is less concerned with defending the interests of specific faith-communities than 
generating informed understandings of the theological and religious dimensions of public 
issues and developing analysis and critique in language that is accessible across disciplines 
and faith-traditions. 
However, the particular challenges of the post-secular condition suggest that if the 
Christian churches are committed to any kind of significant public role, the nature of public 
theological discourse must change. No longer is it speaking into a common frame of refer-
ence, in which the theological and moral allusions fall comfortably on waiting ears. The post-
secular describes a public square that is both more sensitive to and suspicious of religious 
discourse. Indeed, in a context where people‘s familiarity with any kind of organized religion 
is ever more tenuous, it places greater onus than ever on the importance of significant 
communication across the post-secular divide. It is therefore my contention that this new 
dispensation of ‗post-secularity‘ presents novel challenges for public theology and the public 
witness of the Christian churches. Public theology must learn to negotiate between the ‗rock‘ 
of religious revival and the ‗hard place‘ of secularism. 
Two challenges occasioned by the post-secular condition conspire to pose significant 
challenges to this received wisdom, however. On the one hand, ‗talk of God‘ in public is 
resisted by secular liberals, who challenge the right of explicitly religious beliefs and faith-
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based organizations to intervene in public debate or policy-making, least of all actual service 
delivery. On the other, a challenge comes from within the Christian community itself, since 
many theologians would argue that – especially given the demise of Christendom – no 
universal or trans-confessional dialogue of this kind is possible. In contrast to the dialogical 
tradition of public theology, there has emerged a different style of Christian politics, drawing 
inspiration from statements such as that from Karl Barth who argues that the primary task of 
the church is to be the church, in order that the world knows itself as the world: ‗[T]he church 
cannot simply derive an understanding of its political vision from outside of Christian belief 
and practice ....‘ (Bretherton 2010, p. 17). 
One further response, then, to the challenges of post-secular society has been the 
articulation of new kinds of theological ‗identity politics‘ rooted more in the specifics of 
ecclesial practice than in the dialogical processes of public intelligibility. For such a 
perspective, to be yoked to a secular regeneration programme, or the agenda of welfare 
provision, is a distraction from the essential and primary task of the Church, which is simply 
to ‗be‘ church on its own terms. It challenges the modernist neutrality of the public domain, 
as a space in which the sacred is inevitably ‗bracketed out‘, and argues that it is not a 
question of the Church getting involved in politics but of being its own polis. The Church 
must not conform to the parameters of acceptable speech and action based on the 
compromises of secular reason; there is no such commensurate common wisdom, and the 
Church must have the courage to model itself on the exemplary narratives of Christ‘s passion, 
death and resurrection. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I survey and evaluate the emergence of forms of ecclesial and 
confessional public theology, exemplified both in academic discourse (such as post-
liberalism and Radical Orthodoxy) and more popular movements (such as those emanating 
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from conservative evangelical pressure groups and campaigns). I will examine their claims 
and conclude that they represent inadequate responses to contemporary challenges. In their 
attempts to return to a pristine ecclesial identity and their suspicion towards a theologically-
grounded concern for the ‗common good‘, they fatally undervalue the necessity of a public 
theology rooted not only in the traditions of ecclesial practice but in a dialogical and inclusive 
understanding of common grace and natural law. 
The theologian should indicate the place from which they speak, but they need also to 
pay attention to those to whom they speak: in what terms, by what authority? And, more 
crucially perhaps, is it incumbent upon them also to listen? It would be strange not to 
consider how and in what language, such ‗public speaking‘ might take place, and especially 
whether theology acknowledges ‗secular‘ or non-theological sources of wisdom as objects of 
its address, or even as a legitimate part of God‘s own way of ‗addressing‘ the world. Whilst 
critics of liberalism are right to demand that theology consider how its integrity may have 
been compromised by secular modernity and to locate itself more firmly in specifically 
Christian sources and practices, rumours of the demise of dialogical, public and apologetic 
dimensions of theological discourse are premature. 
Amongst many conservative evangelicals, opposition to the liberalization of laws on 
homosexuality, abortion and divorce has tended to be articulated in moral and biblical terms, 
but with the advent of new equality and diversity legislation in the early twenty-first century, 
there has been shift of rhetoric towards the language of rights. Yet the paradox is that in 
invoking the rights of traditional religious conscience, conservative religious groups have 
been required to adopt similar political and legal strategies to those whose rights they seek to 
limit or reverse. In that respect, the incursion of such evangelical identity politics reflects 
another dimension of the post-secular dilemma: the recognition of the legitimacy of religious 
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conscience to oppose the secular liberal extension of citizenship and equality beyond the 
boundaries of ‗traditional‘ lifestyles. 
In contrast, traditions of public theology have always been mindful that coherent and 
convincing Christian speech in public must always be prepared to put itself to the test of 
public scrutiny. Such transparency and accountability implies a respect for, but not 
necessarily a capitulation to, the insights of secular reason. This is intimately connected to the 
question of the relationship between the language of faith and wider public discourse:  
 
Public theologians must then find a way to avoid the horns of the following dilemma: 
if we speak our distinctly religious perspective, our voice is too particular to be 
comprehensible beyond our religious community, whereas when we adopt commonly 
accepted terms, we seem no longer to have anything distinct to contribute. (Doak 
2004, p. 14) 
 
What is needed, arguably, is a form of public theology capable of building and sustaining 
such a dialogical sensibility. The voices of public theology may still need to intervene in 
public debate on specific issues or policies, but they should also cultivate a clearer rationale 
for their very right to speak at all. Public theologians face the challenge not only of 
articulating theologically grounded interventions in the public square, but of justifying and 
defending the very relevance of the Christian faith in a culture that no longer grants automatic 
access or credence. In other words, the proponents of public theology – ranging from Church 
authorities, public intellectuals to local activists and campaigners – should contribute 
critically and constructively to public debate, but must be more attentive than ever to the 
tasks of justifying and articulating the theological well-springs of these commitments. 
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Hence my interest in the function of public theology as a form of Christian 
apologetics. Here, I have drawn on the work of the North American public theologian Max 
Stackhouse. In common with other public theologians, Stackhouse‘s vision of public 
theology rests on three particular convictions. Firstly, religion is never simply a matter of 
personal or private devotion, but carries over into the believer‘s life in all aspects of the 
public domain, such as economics, civil society, the State and culture. (Note, then, amongst 
other things, that ‗public‘ is wider than merely ‗political‘.) Secondly, if ‗public‘ for 
Stackhouse is anathema to notions of a spiritualized, privatized faith for the individual, the 
corollary is an emphasis on the public significance of religion‘s impact: 
 
… theology, while related to intensely personal commitments and to a particular 
community of worship, is, at its most profound level, neither merely private nor a 
matter of distinctive communal identity. Rather, it is an argument regarding the way 
things are and ought to be, one decisive for public discourse and necessary to the 
guidance of individual souls, societies, and, indeed, the community of nations. (2006, 
p. 165)  
 
Thirdly, in the face of alternative forms of theological fideism or confessionalism, 
Stackhouse insists that theology must be a fully public, dialogical discourse, in terms of being 
prepared to defend its core principles in public. The apologetic dimension of public theology 
for Stackhouse, then, appears to be one of defending the right of religious discourse in 
general, and Christian theology in particular, to be a legitimate voice in the public square:  
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if a theology is to be trusted to participate in public discourse it ought to be able to 
make a plausible case for what it advocates in terms that can be comprehended by 
those who are not believers ... It should be able to articulate its core convictions in 
comprehensible terms across many modes of discourse, explaining its symbolic and 
mythical terms ... in ways that expose their multiple levels of meaning. (2007a, p. 
112)  
 
In Chapter 6 therefore, I consider whether this may now be the time to recover a more 
apologetic dimension to public theology. Christian apologetics may be defined as ‗the 
various ways in which thoughtful Christians, in different ages and cultures, have striven ―give 
a reason for the hope that is within them‖ (cf 1 Peter 3.15)‘ (Dulles 1971, p. xix). Christianity 
has from its very origins been a missionary faith, centred around the proclamation of the life, 
death, resurrection and Lordship of Jesus Christ. From the very beginning, however, it has 
also been charged with an apologetic task. It has needed to defend and commend its claims 
against a variety of non-believers, detractors and persecutors: Jews, pagans, sceptics and 
Emperors. It is clear that some of the most significant and foundational events and texts of 
early Christianity were apologetic in nature insofar as they defended the philosophical 
credence of the Gospel. But they were often also quintessentially pieces of public theology, in 
that they were conducted in public assemblies, religious or civic, subjecting themselves to 
universal scrutiny and were also often petitions directed at the political authorities. They 
concerned the relationship of Christians to imperial and secular authority as well as matters of 
belief. However, I am less convinced that contemporary apologetics, which is often focused 
around the debating of propositional and abstract doctrines concerning the existence of God 
and the historicity of the resurrection, does complete justice either to the historical legacy or 
to contemporary demands. 
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In contemporary apologetics, the term has become somewhat attenuated, to denote a 
justification by appeal to rational, propositional argument with a view to leading another to 
their own profession of faith. Apologetics is understood as ‗the scholarly reflection on 
Christian apologetic witness and dialogue as the intellectual justification of the truth and 
relevance of the Christian faith‘ (van den Toren 2011, p. 27), my emphasis. It is often 
regarded as a branch of evangelism, a prelude to conversion in which the aim is to win the 
argument. Or as Avery Dulles puts it, ‗the apologist is regarded as an aggressive, 
opportunistic person who tries, by fair means or foul, to argue people into joining the church‘ 
(1971, p. xv). But a problem with this kind of modernist propositional apologetics is that in 
attempting to argue for the distinctiveness of Christian faith it has capitulated to secular, 
positivist criteria of empirical verification.  
 
Abandonment of the Cartesian assumption that all inferential knowledge must be 
founded on self-evident, noninferential insights … is in fact a great boon, not only to 
apologetics, but to philosophy itself and to the whole human effort to get clear about 
what it means to know … But it is being abandoned not to suit the convenience of 
theologians but because it fails adequately to account for the world and our relation to 
it … (Oakes 1992, pp. 51–2) 
 
Forms of ‗imaginative apologetics‘ which embody alternatives to scientific rationalism as a 
mode of reasoning, may however offer fruitful ways forward for apologetics as a public 
undertaking. They consider how the creative arts, popular culture and media might constitute 
shared spaces of creative exchange in which questions of meaning can be explored. Such an 
epistemology of apologetics configures faith as a kind of ‗practical wisdom‘ that gives shape 
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to the world and orientates Christians in their actions and behaviours. So apologetics points 
not to propositional, but transformational truth; the invitation is not to ‗believe‘ but to 
embrace a world-view which ‗unless it is also shown in action it is not adequately shown at 
all‘ (Davison 2011, p. 26). To translate that into public theology might mean a demonstration 
of the difference faith makes to citizenship and public values, or offering an explanation to 
other citizens of the reasoning behind a particular public stance. This does not necessarily 
discount the significance of framing a defence of faith in theological terms or even arguing – 
as these contributors do – that the Christian world-view is a fulfilment of alternative 
understandings. But in contrast to contemporary evangelical apologists, who seem to regard 
apologetics primarily as being about the priority of belief in propositional truths, this model 
regards the object of apologetics as a paradigm shift of one‘s basic premises and assumptions, 
what Andrew Davison calls ‗axioms‘ (2011, p. 14). These form the basis of the ‗reckoning‘ 
offered to the rest of the world, in terms of the difference it makes to inhabit such a world-
view.  
Such an ‗apologetics of presence‘ (Murphy-O'Connor 2009) embodies a number of 
motifs. After Duncan Forrester, I locate public theology as concerned primarily with ‗the 
welfare of the city‘ (Jer. 29.7), responding to the agenda of the world and contributing 
critically and constructively (in word and action) to a flourishing public square (Forrester 
2004). This is consistent with the bilingual and dialogical nature of public theology, that it 
should seek to be accountable to a broader reality which transcends any single institutional 
self-interest. Secondly, post-secular public theology must maintain its vocation to ‗speak 
truth to power‘, in continuity with the first Christian apologists who addressed political rulers 
in their defences of faith. Yet such an apologetic does not simply uphold the privileges of the 
Church, but challenges and prescribes in the interests of our common humanity. The calling 
of Christian apologetics to speak ‗truth to power‘ invites consideration of the prophetic 
29 
 
dimensions of public theology, and I will suggest that this requires the adoption of a stance of 
advocacy with the poor and marginalized, what Gustavo Gutiérrez terms the ‗non-persons‘ of 
history (Gutiérrez 1983). He contrasts this with the Church‘s mission to the ‗non-believer‘, 
which resonates with my insistence on reclaiming apologetics as more than a merely 
cognitive or propositional activity. Christian apologetics is in part a demonstration of its 
practical commitment to those who find themselves on the underside of history.  
An apologetics of presence must also be capable of justifying itself in reasoned 
debate. Indeed, one of the ways in which public theology might promote the welfare of the 
city is to contribute towards a civil, inclusive space of public debate and action in which 
everyone is welcome to cultivate the skills of active citizenship. Nowhere is this more 
important than within the Church itself, in terms of fostering the secular vocation of the laity, 
as ‗Ambassadors for Christ‘ (2 Cor. 5.20). Post-liberalism has been valuable in reminding 
public theology of the necessity of grounding Christian practice in a lucid narrative of faith. 
Public theology arguably remains most effective through the grass-roots witness of local 
communities, as bearers of transformative social capital, with a corresponding imperative to 
support the quotidian witness of the laity as ‗the Church in the world‘. Max Stackhouse‘s 
emphasis on the vocational dimension of public theology should encourage us to ask how 
well ordinary lay people are equipped to ‗give an account‘ of themselves within a post-
secular society. This means that traditions of public theology that have concentrated on the 
statements of church leaders need to be augmented by a more sustained approach to building 
up the grass-roots practices of discipleship that spill over into active citizenship. This 
impinges on aspects of Christian formation and catechesis as well, since it also makes a 
priority of the cultivation of the skills of theological literacy amongst the laity, not least in 
order to maintain the reservoir of theological reflection on which continued faithful 
engagement depends. 
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The challenge for public theology is to find ways of negotiating a path between the 
‗rock‘ of religious resurgence and the ‗hard place‘ of institutional decline and secularism. My 
analysis of post-secular society will serve, I hope, to accentuate the relevance of questions not 
only of actual procedures of engagement but the very theological, philosophical and 
metaphysical concepts that underpin and inform faith-based engagement in public issues. My 
aim in this book, then, is to sketch out the anatomy of something that might be termed ‗post-
secular‘ society as a major driver of the context with which public theology and the social 
witness of the Christian churches might be engaging. I will insist that this cannot be 
conceived merely as the return of Christendom or the simple‗ re-enchantment‘ of modernity. 
It requires us, rather, to rethink the terms on which religious voices might contribute to 
debates about values in public life and faith-based activism and how they might help 
rejuvenate the practices of citizenship. But for good reasons, these incursions need to be 
justified in the face of widespread scepticism. Will the new visibility of religion and religious 
values enrich our stock of social capital, re-orientate our moral compass, reinvigorate the 
networks and connections of civil society; or will it merely deepen social divisions and 
aggravate distrust? A climate of political debate that is both more sceptical and more 
pluralist, and yet in some respects is more receptive to the language of values, will require a 
more explicit level of self-justification on the part of religious actors. 
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Part 1 
Post-Secular Society 
  
32 
 
1 
The Turning of the Tide 
How Religion ‘Went Public’  
 
Religion in the 1980s ‗went public‘, in a dual sense. It entered the ‗public sphere‘ 
and gained, thereby, ‗publicity.‘ Various ‗publics‘ – the mass media, social 
scientists, professional politicians, and the ‗public at large‘ – suddenly began to 
pay attention to religion. The unexpected public interest derived from the fact 
that religion, leaving its assigned place in the private sphere, had thrust itself 
into the public arena of moral and political contestation (Casanova 1994, p. 3).  
 
Introduction 
We are undoubtedly witnessing fluid and shifting boundaries between categories of belief and 
non-belief, and corresponding revisions in taken-for-granted understandings of the 
relationship between ‗politics‘ and ‗religion‘. In this chapter, I will examine some of the key 
pressure points and begin to identify what is at stake. It seems that the current situation, 
particularly in the West, is one of simultaneous religious decline, mutation and resurgence. 
There are plenty of signs of what Jose Casanova (1994) terms the ‗deprivatization‘ of religion 
and its renewed public significance, although this is further complicated by continuing 
deinstitutionalization of religious and spiritual belief. 
Mathew Guest has summarized the cultural condition of religion in the UK as 
follows:  
a more uncertain, fragmented culture, in which Christianity appears as a minority 
pursuit, no longer at the heart of civic unity, instead a media curiosity, inspiring fierce 
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defence among some, open mockery among others. This framework suggests neither 
inexorable decline on the one hand, nor naïve optimism about Christian vitality and 
influence on the other. (2012, p. 60) 
 
If this diagnosis is accurate, then it has particular implications when we focus on the public – 
and therefore institutionalized, organizational – dimensions of religious belief and practice. 
The mutation of traditional religious activity and belief into alternative, more privatized, 
expressions is further evidence that this cannot be conceived of as any kind of reversal of 
religious decline, but rather its re-orientation, albeit within newly modest and straitened 
circumstances. But the unprecedented co-existence of multiple forms of belief and non-belief 
(and all points in between) may require a reorientation of the conventions by which Western 
democracies have demarcated religion and politics, as well as many of the legislative 
conventions governing the mediation of religion into the public square. Part of the 
contemporary condition appears to be an impending collision between the ‗immovable 
object‘ of religious activism and the ‗irresistible force‘ of secularism. 
 
New Visibility 
Is it possible to measure the fortunes of religious faith in the world? In reviewing a range of 
statistical data, I should remark that I am looking for trends and patterns of growth or decline, 
rather than static snapshots; and that whilst a global picture is valuable, regional and cultural 
variations matter also. Whilst many surveys on religion record patterns of affiliation and 
institutional strength as well as individual belief, my main focus is on religion as a cultural 
and political force, and how personal faith is mediated into the public domain. This is 
because any analysis of the role of public theology needs to take into account both formal, 
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institutional interventions (official statements, policies and provision) and individual 
conviction (as expressed in voting habits, patterns of volunteering, moral attitudes, and so 
on). 
Research from the Pew Research Center‘s Forum on Religion & Public Life 
(conducted in 2010) offers a comprehensive snapshot of global religious observance, drawn 
from over 2500 censuses and surveys worldwide. Globally speaking, over eight out of ten 
people identify with a religious group, with religious affiliation distributed as follows: 
Christian   32 per cent 
Muslim  23 per cent 
No affiliation  16 per cent 
Hindu   15 per cent 
Buddhist  7 per cent 
‗Folk Religion‘ 6 per cent 
Jewish   0.2 per cent  (Pew Forum 2012, p. 9) 
 
Summary by Region, 2010 
Region    Population Christian Muslim Unaff Hindu Budd Folk  Other  Jewish 
(millions) 
Asia-Pacific 4,054.99    7.1  24.3  21.2  25.3 11.9  9.0  1.3  <0.1 
Europe    742.55  75.2   5.9  18.2   0.2   0.2  0.1  0.1   0.2 
Latin America/ 
Caribbean  590.08  90.0   0.1   7.7   0.1 < 0.1  1.7  0.2  < 0.1 
Middle East/ 
North Africa  341.02     3.7  93.0   0.6   0.5   0.1  0.3 < 0.1   1.6 
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N. America 344.53  77.4   1.0  17.1   0.7   1.1  0.3  0.6   1.8 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa   822.72   62.9  30.2   3.2   0.2 < 0.1  3.3  0.2 < 0.1 
World 6,895.89 31.5  23.2  16.3  15.0   7.1  5.9  0.8   0.2 
(Source: Pew Forum 2012, p. 50) 
 
Regional variations are significant, however. Whilst there are signs of religious growth in 
China, for example, it remains the world‘s largest centre of religiously unaffiliated people 
(700 million, or 52.2 per cent of the population and 62 per cent of all religiously unaffiliated 
people in the world). Those who identify as religiously unaffiliated are significant, since one 
of my concerns is to consider how relationships between those of faith and none are worked 
out across different dimensions of public life. This group is not, of course, homogenous: it 
includes atheists, agnostics and people who simply do not choose to identify with any 
organized creed or institutional faith. This is not to say, however, that many of them would 
not hold religious or spiritual beliefs, or participate in forms of religious ritual. Pew records 
that:  
 
… belief in God or a higher power is shared by 7 % of unaffiliated Chinese adults, 
30% of unaffiliated French adults and 68 % of unaffiliated U.S. adults‘ and that ‗7% 
of unaffiliated adults in France and 27% of those in the United States say they attend 
religious services at least once a year. And in China, 44% of unaffiliated adults say 
they have worshiped at a graveside or tomb in the past year. (Pew Forum 2012, p. 24).  
Trends in some countries, especially in Western Europe, however, suggest both increasing 
religious diversity coupled with a growing divide between those who identify with a religious 
faith and those who do not. The results of the 2011 Census in the United Kingdom indicate a 
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continuing drift away from Christianity and an increase in religious disaffiliation. For the 
second time, the census asked people to choose a religious identity, although the question
3
 
was voluntary. Results showed that whilst Christianity was still the largest religion, with 33.2 
million people, or 59.3 per cent of the population, this had fallen from 71.7 per cent in 2001. 
The second largest religious group was Muslims, whose numbers grew from to 1.5 million to 
2.7 million people (3.0 per cent to 4.8 per cent). Significantly, there was a marked increase in 
those reporting no religion (from 14.8 per cent to 25.1 per cent). The Census question gives 
us no insight into religious attitudes or into opinions about the public role of religion, but 
other polls do offer further information in this respect. A poll conducted by YouGov in 2011 
recorded that 40 per cent of adults interviewed professed no religion, 55 per cent were 
Christian and 5 per cent of other faiths. Age made a major difference, with only 38 per cent 
of the 18–34s being Christian and 53 per cent having no religion; whereas for the over-55s 
the figures were 70 per cent (Christian) and 26 per cent (no religion) respectively. 11 per cent 
of respondents claimed to attend a religious service once a month or more, 27 per cent less 
often, and 59 per cent never. Non-attendance was higher among the young (62 per cent for 
the 18–34s) than the old (54 per cent for the over-55s); higher among manual workers (62 per 
cent) than non-manuals (56 per cent) (YouGov 2011). 
 In November 2012, ComRes, on behalf of ITV News, conducted an online survey of 
2,055 Britons aged 18 and over. 79 per cent agreed with the statement that religion is a cause 
of much misery and conflict in the world today; 11 per cent disagreed. 35 per cent agreed that 
religion is a force for good in the world, but 45 per cent disagreed, dissentients being more 
numerous among men (50 per cent) than women (41 per cent). 
 
                                                          
3
 ‗What is your religion?‘ 
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All in all, these data point to a society in which religion is increasingly in retreat and 
nominal. With the principal exception of the older age groups, many of those who 
claim some religious allegiance fail to underpin it by a belief in God or to translate it 
into regular prayer or attendance at a place of worship. People in general are more 
inclined to see the negative than the positive aspects of religion, and they certainly 
want to keep it well out of the political arena. (ComRes 2012) 
 
‘Generation SBNR’ 
Even amongst those who profess no religious affiliation, not surprisingly, there is pluralism. 
Census data and other surveys suggest it is not simply a matter of ‗no faith‘ but a continuum 
of attitudes towards the possibility of ‗God‘, the nature of spiritual or non-material existence, 
the credibility or otherwise of religious belief, and so on. Thus, there are atheists, agnostics, 
freethinkers, secularists, humanists, extending to non-realist theists who would deny the 
existence of a personal, objective God but maintain some form of religious affiliation. Some 
are active in Humanist or Secularist organizations; many more are opting for ‗secular‘ 
funerals, marriages or civil partnerships and other rites of passage; still more are reading and 
debating the works of ‗New Atheists‘ such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Polly Toynbee 
and Christopher Hitchens. In many ways, they are the inheritors of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment, arguing that human flourishing and advancement demands that we are 
liberated from any form of divinely or supernaturally-invested authority, since that prevents 
us from being free to exercise our reason. Religion is by its very nature an outmoded, 
irrational force, which has no place in a modern, technological and rational society.  
Of course, atheism itself has a history. The philosopher Socrates argued against the 
pantheon of divine figures within popular Greek religion, in the name of a higher, purer 
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transcendent principle. Ancient thought was familiar with those who criticized forms of 
religion in which gods were simply a projection of human whims and characteristics, in 
favour of a purer, more transcendent presence. The Reformation saw the emergence of a 
vocabulary of unbelief to describe those who appeared deficient in matters of piety and 
observance; ‗atheism‘ denoted more a matter of outward practice than inward doubt. 
However, atheism as such was essentially a product of modernity, and begins to emerge as a 
systematic world-view from the middle of the seventeenth century (Hyman 2010, pp. 5–6). 
What may be unique to contemporary times, however, is the emergence of atheism as a 
popular belief, rather than a minority option amongst ‗the educated intellect‘ of an elite 
(Buckley 1987, p. 28). In that case, then the greater prominence of new atheism and other 
forms of religious scepticism is not unrelated to other sociological and theological shifts 
associated with secularization and the decline of institutional religion, including the erosion 
of nominal observance and a corresponding embrace of informal and personalized 
spiritualities and world-views. 
The rise in recorded statistics in the West of those who subscribe to ‗no religion‘ is 
probably due to a number of factors. Many are indifferent to religion – the so-called 
‗apatheists‘ (Rauch 2003). Others follow the scientific and rational denial of a transcendent, 
personal God as espoused by Dawkins and others. Others, however, may feel more of a sense 
of alienation from organized, creedal religion out of a combination of moral ambivalence 
towards institutional religion‘s abuses of power and a wish to follow a more autonomous 
spiritual journey. What unites them would appear to be a dislike of religious organizations 
and dogma, and a commitment to the values of human dignity and autonomy. Many do so out 
of attachment to scientific principles and a strong positivism or empiricism towards the 
known world. It is often used to denote life stance that rejects traditional organized religion as 
the best means of furthering spiritual growth. Others may reject creedal and institutional 
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religion, but choose to embrace forms of spirituality or alternative therapies. Whilst 
eschewing involvement in traditional, corporate religious organizations, many participate in 
alternative rituals, associated perhaps with the passing of the seasons, such as Solstice; or in 
expressions of vernacular celebration and mourning, such as the establishment of roadside 
shrines for victims of motor accidents (Woodhead 2012).  
Some census evidence suggests a high correlation between age and religiosity, with 
younger people less likely to identify themselves with an organized religion, and to describe 
themselves as spiritual. According to Robert Fuller, as many as 33 per cent of people in US 
identify as ‗Spiritual but not Religious‘ (Fuller 2001). Again, religious non-affiliation appears 
more prevalent amongst younger generations. A Pew Research Center survey in the US in 
2010 recorded 25 per cent of adults born after 1980 (so-called ‗Generation Y‘, or under 30s) 
as unaffiliated, describing their religion as "atheist," "agnostic" or "nothing in particular." 
This compares with less than one-fifth of people in their 30s (Generation X, at 19 per cent), 
15 per cent of those in their 40s, 14 per cent of those in their 50s and 10 per cent or less 
among those 60 and older (Pew Forum 2010). The differences appear to be a feature of this 
particular generation, rather than explained by people becoming more religious as they grow 
older: so the under-30s were significantly more unaffiliated than members of Generation X 
were at a comparable point in their life cycle (20 per cent in the late 1990s) and twice as 
unaffiliated as Baby Boomers (born between 1945 and 1960) were as young adults (13 per 
cent in the late 1970s). Might we also designate Generation Y as ‗Generation SBNR‘ with all 
that this may mean for the public fortunes of organized religion in the future? 
‗Spiritual‘ and ‗religious‘ are interchangeable in some respects. Both connote belief in 
a Higher Power, a desire to connect with transcendent reality. But the differences seem to lie 
in the extent to which the latter is organized, institutional, formed around historic creeds, 
practices and rituals, and the former more loosely-defined, less corporate or communal, and 
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more ‗eclectic‘ or diverse in its choice of influences. So spiritual has gradually come to be 
associated with a private realm of thought and experience, whereas religious tends to be 
connected with the public realm of membership in religious institutions, participation in 
formal rituals, and adherence to official denominational doctrines.  
There are many good things about thinking in terms of a ‗spiritual‘ capacity or aspiration that is 
present in all people, regardless of creed or formal status. However, it also serves to reinforce the 
sense that the relationship between ‗believing‘ and ‗belonging‘ is very blurred. What about those 
within the churches who would want to leave room for doubt in relation to orthodox belief, or express 
frustration at religious authorities? In terms of the role of religious faith in public life, this may simply 
perpetuate a dichotomy of public and private, and merely begs the question as to where we look for 
those who bear the continuity of religious teachings and ethics and manifest and communicate them 
into the public domain.  
As we shall see in Chapter 2, however, even secular philosophers like Jürgen Habermas 
are beginning to ask whether western society in particular can really do ‗believing‘ without 
‗belonging‘, or whether the gradual attrition of deinstitutionalization will result, eventually, in 
public religion ‗running on empty‘. If we conceive of a relationship with God as simply about 
my personal spirituality and well-being, then what happens to corporate practices, to 
traditions of social justice, service in the community, not to mention the public voice and 
presence of faith? This alerts us to the fact that the public prominence of religion remains 
dependent on the viability of continuing institutional and corporate expressions of faith 
beyond the personal. For many persons of faith, the corporate – and therefore ethical and 
social – dimension is not an option:  
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Being privately spiritual but not religious just doesn't interest me. There is nothing 
challenging about having deep thoughts all by oneself. What is interesting is doing 
this work in community, where other people might call you on stuff, or heaven forbid, 
disagree with you. Where life with God gets rich and provocative is when you dig 
deeply into a tradition that you did not invent all for yourself. (Daniel 2011) 
 
Religious Literacy 
As a normative Christian, church-going culture waned through the middle of the twentieth 
century, a more heterodox and pluralist post-Christian culture emerged, ‗involving the 
emergence of cultural forms of ―non-religion‖, the consolidation of new religious sub-
cultures and the circulation of new cultural constructions of ―religion‖ (Brown and Lynch 
2012, p. 331). In other words, a society both more and less religious, but also less 
homogenous and far more differentiated between those groups of the very religious, the 
notionally religious and the anti-religious. Along with the growth of forms of public 
scepticism and non-belief, and the consolidation of religious identity as consciously counter-
cultural, therefore, comes the de-institutionalization of religion, with its increasing mediation 
through popular culture and the practices of everyday life. 
If the trends of religious decline in the West are accurate, it means that whilst religion 
is visible in some, often unexpected respects, it remains (or becomes increasingly) marginal 
to most people‘s everyday concerns and beyond their direct experience. In that case, then, 
who and what are the vehicles by which religious and theological concerns are brought to 
public consciousness? I would contend that, as creedal and institutional religion declines, 
most people are likely to encounter religion vicariously, such as via media representations of 
religious issues and personnel. Is this a further example of the way in which non-religious 
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stakeholders become vicariously responsible for the mediation of religious images, values 
and representations? Does this assist, or distort, attempts at greater ‗religious literacy‘, which 
is also a feature of contemporary public deliberation?  
The new mobilization of religion, its re-entry into social policy and equalities and 
human rights discourses contrasts with its diminishing visibility as a part of daily life. Hence 
the emergence of the language of ‗religious literacy‘ as a means of bridging the divide. The 
term originated in the US with the work of Stephen Prothero and the debate as to whether 
religion could be taught in public or state schools (2007). In the British context, 'religious 
literacy' is concerned more with how to foster greater understanding across the growing gulf 
between an increasingly secular political class and much of the grass-roots community 
activity that goes on in the name of faith. Talk of ‗religious literacy‘ originates in state or 
public education, where it is considered one of the objectives of religious education in 
schools (Carr 2007). In the UK, a daily act of collective worship and some form of religious 
instruction have been required by law since 1944; but as British society has become more 
diverse religiously and culturally, such provision is less about the observance of a shared 
Christian heritage and more about negotiating the pluralism of religious beliefs and practices 
in a multi-cultural society. 
More broadly, however, the new public visibility of religion has extended the use of 
the term ‗religious‘ or ‗faith‘ literacy to apply to the training of government and public 
services personnel. Recent changes to equal opportunities legislation in the United Kingdom 
have proved something of a catalyst. The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations of 2003 and the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010 represent the extension of basic 
protection against discrimination to questions of ‗religion and belief‘ (see later in this 
chapter). But what is religious or ‗faith‘ literacy? And how is it communicated, learned or 
taught? What are its essential features, and its potential benefits – and for whom? Stephen 
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Prothero‘s discussion of the phenomenon ends with a call for programmes of religious 
literacy in public schools as a tool of ‗empowered citizenship‘ (2007), and represents a 
commitment that ‗some broad acquaintance with the great religious narratives of humankind 
... is an educational sine qua non‘ (Carr 2007, p. 668). 
  
The ‘Mediatization’ of Religion 
As a Report from the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the UK suggested, 
however, if the promotion of religious literacy is entering the consciousness of public 
institutions and service-providers, it may be that media and popular culture are as influential 
as more formal sectors such as education (Woodhead 2009). Such a suggestion is reinforced 
by trends in contemporary scholarship in religion, media and culture which argue that popular 
culture and media perform a correspondingly formative role in articulating and constructing 
people‘s perceptions and orientations to the sacred. The Norwegian sociologist of religion 
Stig Hjarvard argues that as formal religious affiliation declines, the media assume greater 
prominence as conduits of religious ideas (2008). This he terms the ‗mediatization‘ of 
religion, meaning that media become increasingly more powerful sources of representations, 
understandings and experiences of faith for many consumers of media. This has its post-
secular manifestations as well:  
 
Studying the ways religion interconnects with the media provides evidence of 
tendencies of secularization and of re-sacralization, and it may be possible that both 
tendencies are at work at the same time – although in different areas and aspects of 
the interface between religion and media. (p. 10, my emphasis) 
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More broadly, however, the new public visibility of religion has extended the use of the term 
‗religious‘ or ‗faith‘ literacy to apply to the training of government and public services 
personnel. Recent changes to equal opportunities legislation in the United Kingdom have 
proved something of a catalyst. The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 
of 2003 and the Equality Act of 2006 represent the extension of basic protection against 
discrimination to questions of ‗religion and belief‘. Since employers and service providers are 
now required to be more aware of religious factors affecting employees and clients, there has 
naturally been a greater sensitivity towards matters of faith in relation to everyday practice 
and the law.  
According to this analysis, the production and consumption of different kinds of 
popular culture – films, news and other broadcasting, internet, new social media – serve not 
so much to report or depict religion as a priori but to construct our very understandings of the 
nature of ‗religion‘ itself. This has serious consequences for religious bodies. As 
secularization detaches them from first-hand exposure to the general public, they are required 
to engage with the media as surrogate or vicarious agent to ensure the maintenance of a 
public profile (Graham 2011). Yet the very same logic of secularization that makes them 
dependent on the media requires them to conform to the logic of the media:  
 
Presence in the sphere of public discourse is a socio-political currency now controlled 
by the contemporary guarantors of the public sphere: the media ... Public religion 
finds itself desperately needing presence in the public sphere, yet it must surrender 
control over its own construction, its own subjectivity, in order to have access here. 
(Hoover 1996, p. 261) 
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If such analysis is correct, that popular culture and media perform an increasingly influential 
role in articulating and constructing people‘s perceptions and orientations to the sacred, then 
attention needs to be paid to the ‗mediatization‘ of religion as a significant public reality. This 
reflects the way in which religious belief and practice has become displaced away from 
public, corporate institutions into other, diverse – and potentially more privatized – forms of 
ritualized and sacred spaces and environments, physical, imagined or virtual, as the everyday 
contexts for people‘s exploration of religious and spiritual dimensions of identity, meaning 
and action (Graham 2011).  
The mediatization of religion illustrates perfectly how new forms of public 
engagement with religion are emerging in a context in which society experiencing the co-
existence of secularizing and sacralizing tendencies. It reflects the extent to which sources of 
religious information and involvement are relocated away from dedicated institutions into the 
realms of business and entertainment, and to the reorientation of religious practice into a form 
of consumption as much as meaning-making or voluntary activity. It indicates the way in 
which religion is not disappearing as a source of personal meaning or even, necessarily as a 
reservoir of cultural meanings and spiritual practices. Yet along with the growth of new 
forms of religion, it shows how the public face of religious belief and practice is becoming 
more differentiated, more ‗liquid‘ (Bauman 2000) in its manifestations. But what does all this 
mean for the way in which, traditionally, religious values and actions have manifested 
themselves in public? 
 
Religion in Public Life: Secularism and the Liberal ‘Firewall’  
46 
 
Western democracies have inherited a particular settlement by which religion and politics co-
existed. Historically, such an understanding emerged from the European religious wars of 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in which political power and legitimacy was tied up with 
theological and ecclesiastical orthodoxy. With the development of the modern state, and 
especially following the Democratic Revolutions of late eighteenth century in France and the 
United States, political theory rested on the idea that the state, the nation and government 
were creations of popular will, and not divine right. This had as its starting point the plurality 
of value systems in a modern society, and the conviction that government ruled by popular 
consent. Political, moral and religious diversity is good, since it is the outworking of that 
essential freedom of self-determination independent of external constraint. Religion, on the 
other hand, is regarded as a potential source of contention and it is better for all of our 
welfare – and for the sake of a healthy democracy – if it is not the basis of political power or 
used to determine policies and principles by which a pluralist society is governed.  
This is enshrined in the Jeffersonian separation of Church and State under the First 
Amendment of the US constitution, which states that ―Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof‖ (First Amendment to US 
constitution). Note, however, that this is not a question of the exclusion of religion from 
public life, but simply the intention to ensure that no expression of religion is given particular 
privilege, such as would occur with the establishment of a national Church, for example.  
The paradox is, however, that despite this separation, the United States remains one of 
the most religious nations in the world; and culturally speaking, its citizens appear more 
receptive than most of their European counterparts to explicit religious language and 
sentiments on the part of their political leaders.  
So ‗secular‘ in this context essentially means the separation of Church and State, 
functionally, as signalling no privileged position for one particular confession of faith. An 
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alternative model, however, would be that of France, with its tradition of laïcité and the 
prohibition on any public display of religion. Here, secularism denotes a more thorough-
going evacuation of references to the sacred in public whatsoever. There are two dimensions 
to the liberal secular state, therefore: no privileged affiliation to any single religious tradition; 
and the inadmissibility of any manifestation or confession of religion in public. Charles 
Taylor characterizes the commitment to a ‗secular‘ state as shaped by the historic principles 
of the French Revolution of ‗liberté, egalité et fraternité‘: liberty, as the freedom to believe or 
not to believe; equality, in refusing privilege for any one creed; and fraternity as the desire to 
see that all voices (including the religious) have a stake in the body politic (Taylor 2010, pp. 
24–5).  
The functional separation of religion and politics is often associated in contemporary 
debate with the political philosopher John Rawls. Rawls‘ classic position is that the limits of 
public reason must be honoured by all reasonable (reason being a great arbiter) citizens in 
their public discourse concerning fundamental political questions. As people committed to 
public consensus, yet knowing that they affirm a diversity of moral, religious and 
philosophical doctrines, they should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to one 
another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with 
their freedom and equality (Rawls 1971).  
This presents a challenge for the State to balance competing world-views in order to 
prevent any one sectional group (religious or otherwise) from imposing restrictions on public 
discourse and the exercise of citizenship. One solution is to place the authority of the state 
above and beyond religious or any other partial conviction, so that political power could be 
equitably shared amongst citizens and that no-one should be afforded undue privilege or 
excluded from exercising citizenship. But this necessitates the ‗bracketing out‘ of any form of 
religious or theological reasoning from public discourse, on the grounds that they cannot 
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reasonably be shared universally across the population. In the name of universal access to 
political influence and power, then, historically religious speech was deemed inadmissible in 
democratic debate: on decisions about whether to go to war, to legalize abortion or 
homosexuality, how to maintain law and order, and so on. 
A staple principle of modern political liberalism, therefore, is that political power is to 
be shared equitably amongst citizens and that no-one should be afforded undue privilege or 
excluded from exercising citizenship. Whereas secular reasoning is available to all citizens by 
virtue of its being rooted in universal human reason, any theologically-derived reasoning is 
understood to be partisan and divisive, since it silences those who do not hold to that faith or 
who are not conversant with its vocabulary. Essentially, therefore, the fault-line between 
public and private in a liberal polity also means the establishment of some kind of ‗firewall‘ 
between the secular and the religious, since it presupposes cultural pluralism and the 
autonomy of the secular – or at least the non-confessional – public space. Rawls‘ critics 
argue, however, that this represents an unacceptable division between ‗public reason‘ and 
‗private faith‘ – a privatization of religion, essentially – and offers an insufficiently ‗thick‘ 
account of the moral roots of political debate:  
 
The standard view of religion in the modern world is that it is an add-on which, when 
peeled off, leaves us with a thick enough body of principles for living our lives 
together. (Wolterstorff 2008, p. 675) 
 
Critics such as Nicholas Wolterstorff have replied that no-one – particularly those of faith – 
who thinks about public issues from a basis of values and fundamental principles can be 
expected to put these beliefs to one side. To do so would be radically to attenuate and distort 
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their contribution. It would be a breach of natural justice. Furthermore, it fails in its attempts 
to be inclusive since it represents a curtailment of religious reasoning and a restriction on the 
freedom not of secular, but of religiously-minded, citizens. The liberal democratic public 
square is by its very nature pluralist and contentious and will be all the more robust and 
democratic for being so. In place of the public reason model, therefore, commentators have 
advanced a model based on ‗dialogic pluralism‘, a place of rich exchange of views and 
justifications for matters of common concern (Williams 2012; Katwala 2006). 
This suggests that the religious roots of political reasoning cannot be excluded from 
the democratic body politic, and that it is in the interests of secularists and pluralists to admit 
the legitimacy and benevolence of moderate religious citizens, since the quickest way of 
driving them into the arms of so-called extremists is to disavow any alternative to theocracy 
or secularism.  
 
What are you going to make of the claim that atheists make better citizens than 
theists, or the fantasy of strangling the last king with the entrails of the last priest, or 
the notion that believers are essentially irrational and intolerant, or the idea that the 
purpose of a liberal education is to produce as many democratic secularists as 
possible, or the dream of a day when faith has passed from the face of the earth, or the 
advice that you should, in all fairness, keep your religious convictions behind the 
church door while secularists pursue their long-term objectives? (Stout 2008, p. 540). 
 
So a new phase of debate is emerging which challenges the notion of secularism as neutrality, 
of a ‗firewall‘ between politics and religion. In later work, Rawls himself has conceded much 
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of the argument, suggesting that citizens should be entitled to draw upon their own genuine 
convictions, in the interests of what he terms an ‗overlapping consensus‘ (Rawls 1987). The 
functioning of a liberal democratic state depends on certain universally-acknowledged social 
goods: human rights, equality, rule of law; but people may come to these from very different 
fundamental convictions, including humanist and theist. The state‘s role is to uphold the core 
ethic but can still remain neutral towards any specific value-system. The contemporary and 
emergent challenge, then, is how to balance the functional neutrality and pluralism of the 
public realm with respect for cultural and religious diversity.  
 
The problem is that a really diverse democracy can‘t revert to a civil religion, or 
antireligion, however comforting this may be, without betraying its own principles. 
We are condemned to live in an overlapping consensus. (Taylor 2010, p. 33) 
 
In reality, argues Stout, historical campaigns for social reform in Europe, South Africa and 
the United States have always been coalitions of secularists, religious liberals and often 
politically-active evangelicals. This would suggest that the pluralist, contentious public arena 
of debate, such as proposed by Wolterstorff, is not such an unfamiliar or unprecedented 
reality as some might imagine. On the other hand, Wolterstorff concedes that many religious 
groups prefer to pursue special interest politics rather than indulge in forms of capacity-
building of such a shared space of public interchange, and lack the will or the (theological 
and political) skills to serve as advocates for their own particular views on justice and the 
common good.  
 
51 
 
For the dialogic pluralism model to work, we the people must be open to both 
religious and secular voices of various sorts presenting their views on issues of public 
policy and explaining why they hold these views. But conversely, for the model to be 
applicable, those who are religious must be willing and able to engage in the dialogue. 
They must be willing and able to present how they think about the issues, and willing 
and able to listen attentively and openly to alternative views. But of course they can 
present what they as religious persons think about the issues only if they do in fact 
have serious thoughts about the issues. If they don‘t, my model of dialogic pluralism 
is beside the point. (Wolterstorff 2008, p. 676, my emphasis) 
 
Nevertheless, many commentators still argue against religion playing any role in public life, 
since for them it represents an undesirable intrusion or imposition of religion on the pluralist 
body politic. According to this view, religion is inherently inimical to democracy, since it 
will brook no degree of dissent or pluralism from its own view of divinely-sanctioned 
authority. For Sam Harris, even religious moderates, and anyone prepared to accommodate 
modernist and pluralist world-views are invidious, since they deflect attention away from 
more extreme versions. Religious conservatives are more honest by refusing to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of values drawn from beyond their own tradition: tolerance, human rights and 
pluralism. Yet any kind of theistic belief, taken on its own terms, will result in repressive and 
intolerant behaviour, since such commitments can never countenance pluralism or dissent 
(Harris 2005). Moderates may appear acceptable but in reality cloak the true nature of their 
more devout (and more consistent) co-religionists. Non-believers and secularists should be 
wary of entering into alliances with moderate theists, since all will result in the victory of 
theocracy.  
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The question is, however, whether such a secular – as in evacuated of all references to 
the sacred – public domain is possible, let alone desirable. It is highly unlikely that people of 
religious conviction would tolerate such a circumscription of their beliefs; and as Jeffrey 
Stout notes, short of coercion, no democratic system would be able to dissuade religious 
groups from intervening, and any statutory attempt to restrict their involvement in public life 
as people of faith would in all likelihood prove counter-productive:  
 
If, by some miracle, laws were passed to constrain the hateful preachers whom 
secularists love to hate, and judges were installed to uphold these laws, what would 
become of those preachers? The most courageous of them would go proudly to jail as 
martyr-patriots, clutching a Bible in one hand and a copy of the Bill of Rights in the 
other. A day later, their churches would contain multitudes. (Stout 2008, p. 539) 
 
Similarly, writing about the emergence of conservative religious pressure groups such as the 
overtly Christian Family First Party in Australia, Marion Maddox argues that secularism, 
where religious conviction is excluded from or overlooked in public debate, may serve as 
poor defence against religiously-motivated politics. The danger is that by refusing to admit 
any kind of religious or metaphysical reasoning into the debate, protagonists in liberal 
democracies never give themselves the opportunity to subject it to critical interrogation. As 
Maddox suggests, it continues in a subterranean or coded fashion, never breaking the surface 
of public scrutiny, implying not only that the metaphysical dimensions of public values are 
unworthy of rational interrogation, but also that democratic debate devoid of reference of 
values or principles is sustainable (Maddox 2007), 
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Instead, at least one possible outcome of public religion vacating the public square is 
that a residue remains of often less publicly visible, but nevertheless influential, 
religion with anti-democratic tendencies and even theocratic overtones. While 
Australia has a history of churches operating as independent voices in the public 
sphere, the space for such participation has been dramatically curtailed in recent years 
by a government determined to quarantine itself from church criticism. But, over the 
same period, government actions – from policy shifts such as school funding to more 
symbolic gestures like senior government figures appearing at conservative 
megachurch and parachurch events – conveyed the impression of endorsing an 
alternative, highly privatized model of Christianity in which individual economic 
aspiration replaces collective concern for social justice, while coded language of 
―dominion‖ and Christian supremacy transforms Australia‘s traditionally tolerant 
public culture. (p. 91) 
  
Quite the contrary, in fact, should a minority of conservative explicitly-religious pressure 
groups take it upon themselves to influence the wider political culture according to their own 
convictions. This she terms a ‗subterranean dominionist‘ tendency of the government, and 
argues that it shows how neither a secular state nor secularist public rhetoric is necessarily 
any protection against religiously-motivated politics. The only condition of course, is that 
religious people have to be ‗willing and able‘ – and secularists have to be prepared to trust 
them. How the terms of such an engagement might be framed will form the basis of later 
discussion. 
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Religion in Public: The Case of Religion and Welfare  
Another feature of contemporary religion in the UK perfectly illustrates the contradictions of 
increased prominence (and heightened expectation) alongside continuing institutional 
fragility, and it is the debate about faith-based involvement in the restructuring of welfare. 
The ideal of the neutral secular state as a means of framing a public space free of 
ecclesiastical privilege and ensuring a process of free communication in which all citizens 
can participate, which is one of the hallmarks of Western liberal democracy, serves in many 
respects as the benchmark of our considerations, as the re-emergence of religious identity 
throws out new challenges to our construals of citizenship, freedom and belief. One 
expression of the paradox may be in the way in which the State is no longer the neutral 
arbiter of public space, but active in encouraging faith-based activism back into the realms of 
civil society through the ministrations of care and welfare at the margins of the state. If we 
have learned to regard the modern democratic State as one of the ‗firewalls‘ between 
religious and secular, what happens, for example, when government actively champions 
faith-based organizations as the vanguard of a rejuvenated ‗third sector‘ in the context of neo-
liberal welfare reforms?  
Debates about faith-based welfare go back to George W. Bush hiring Marvin Olasky, 
advocate of what was termed ‗compassionate conservatism‘ which represented a reduction of 
direct public funding for welfare and diversion of responsibility to voluntary and community 
groups such as faith-based organizations. As born-again evangelical Christians, Olasky and 
Bush were kindred spirits in their tendency to see issues such as poverty and family 
breakdown as symptoms of dysfunctional behaviour, fuelled in part by welfare dependency. 
Insofar as religious agencies combined practical care with programmes of moral re-education, 
they were regarded as addressing both symptom and cause, and helping to reduce society‘s 
burden of welfare expenditure.  
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It is now commonplace in the UK to include faith-based organizations in the delivery 
of welfare provision: in projects with young offenders, new schools and inner-city academies, 
residential and day care for the elderly, addiction services and neighbourhood regeneration 
(Dinham, Furbey and Lowndes 2009). Religious organizations are seen as rich in what is 
known as ‗social capital‘ (human resources, the ability to forge networks, to mobilize 
resources, and to espouse the values that foster altruism and community service). (Bretherton 
2010, pp. 31–58) As public expenditure has come under increasing pressure, the role of the 
voluntary or ‗third‘ sector assumes greater prominence: as stakeholders or partners in 
government initiatives, or even as an arm of service delivery. However, the new role of 
religion in welfare provision is not entirely novel if viewed in historical perspective.  
From medieval times, welfare provision was a Christian ideal, with responsibility for 
poverty relief, education and care of the sick regarded as the province of religious 
foundations. As social democratic parties came to power in Europe, and began to build an 
infrastructure of statutory welfare systems, Christian churches and church leaders were glad 
to hand over responsibility to the State, which was regarded as the embodiment of popular 
will. At their zenith, post-war welfare societies such as in Scandinavia and the UK had 
assumed a much more secular character, and embodied belief in technocratic measures to 
stem poverty; alliance with forms of progressive politics such as feminism and socialism; an 
egalitarian, democratic spirit – all conspired to weave a narrative that was ‗optimistic, 
progressive and utopian‘ (Woodhead 2012, p. 10).  
However, as churches moved with the dominant political culture, they experienced 
loss of distinctiveness. The religious roots of humanitarianism, philanthropy and welfare 
reform were forgotten. ‗There was no need for religion once the promises of heaven had been 
translated to earth‘ (p. 15). As ‗welfare utopianism‘ assumed the characteristics of a secular 
faith, it had no need for other kinds of – religious – faith to sustain it.  
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Religious engagement in welfare provision and social policy found itself marginalized 
when the tide began to turn in the late 1970s. As greater financial retrenchment slowed and 
then reversed the growth of welfare systems, however, and with the rise of neo-conservative 
ideologies, the gradual decline of this secular faith both reflected and engendered a loss of 
confidence in all the grand narratives of progress, science, humanism and collective action. In 
some respects, this gave faith-based interventions a renewed sense of relevance, especially 
for public theology, since the churches could speak in defence of a universal, benevolent and 
interventionist state against attempts to rein back its influence and reduce public expenditure 
(Archbishop's Commission on Urban Priority Areas 1985).  
Concern to involve churches and other faith-based organizations in the delivery of 
public services, is not, of course, the invention of the current coalition government, but dates 
to the first term of the New Labour government in the late 1990s. What has re-emerged over 
the two or three decades since then has been a turn to a more market-oriented, entrepreneurial 
ethos amongst faith-based organizations. If they have a relationship to the state, it is more as 
partners, as part of civil society or under the auspices of charitable activities: a return to a pre-
war arrangement, but (once again) not immune to secular, albeit neoliberal, considerations of 
such things as competitive tendering, the contract culture, service-level agreements – all in 
the name of ‗social entrepreneurship‘ as the new interface between religion and state. So 
religion has reflected the broader social trend been towards more market-driven philosophies.  
But whilst there may be benefits across the political spectrum in mobilizing ‗faith‘ as 
part of a rejuvenated third sector, activists themselves see dangers (Dinham 2012). The 
language of social capital risks buying into the commodification of welfare services. It also 
threatens to instrumentalize faith-based contributions, thereby distorting and narrowing their 
concerns. Faith groups are in danger of colluding with agendas imposed from above rather 
than being free to articulate those of their own stakeholders, and especially their core values 
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around empowerment, well-being and community development. Faith-based organizations 
may be regarded as providing ‗warm hearts and safe pairs of hands‘ from government‘s point 
of view, then, but are not granted the independence to challenge or negotiate with their terms 
of engagement (Dinham 2012; Archbishops' Commission on Urban Life and Faith 2006). 
British Muslims in particular are concerned at the ‗securitization‘ of religion, in the way in 
which initiatives such as Prevent Violent Extremism often seem to cast local religious 
institutions as agents of social control or surveillance within their own communities (Bleich 
2010).
 Here we begin to glimpse the ‗tensions, if not direct contradictions, between a liberal 
benevolence towards religious diversity and a growing fear that religious identity could 
present a serious threat to community cohesion‘ (Smith 2004, p. 198). Governments are 
Janus-faced: ‗good‘ religion is rewarded for its functional effectiveness in delivering social 
cohesion; but beneath that are anxieties about extremist or fundamentalist ‗beliefs‘ as divisive 
and anti-social. 
This contradiction between the mobilization of ‗faith‘ as an imagined variety or 
category of social capital, and its institutional fragility (or its vulnerability to co-option by the 
State) serves to illustrate the problems inherent in a greater visibility of religion in public that 
is often decoupled from its traditional, mainstream institutional expressions such that ‗the 
inspiration, motivation and effectuation of political theologies no longer lie within the 
cultural and institutional, ecclesial or communal heritage of the major religions or within the 
modern forms of political sovereignty with which their theologically ... driven politics were 
historically, geographically, empirically, and conceptually linked.‘ (de Vries 2006b, p. 9) The 
loosening of established, institutional ties is evidenced by the ‗increasingly delocalized, 
deterritorialized, and volatile mobility‘ of religion (p. 8). The flows of secularization 
engender the de-institutionalization of religion, whilst at the same time, State intervention co-
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opts organizational structures and bureaucracies in ways that threaten to instrumentalize and 
‗hollow out‘ the distinctive values of religious belief and practice.  
 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
One telling instance of the new visibility of religion in Western society, and thus the shifting 
boundaries between the sacred and the secular, has been the incorporation of the categories of 
‗religion and belief‘ into human rights legislation. Since the middle of the twentieth century, 
there have been articles pertaining to religious freedom which have been well-enshrined 
within national, European and international law. What is newer, however, is the constitutional 
inclusion of religious equality alongside other principles of anti-discrimination, such as race 
and ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and disability. Whilst this may be seen as a 
straightforward extension of anti-discriminatory practices, however, sensitivity towards 
religious conscience and identity has sometimes conflicted with more general considerations 
of public welfare. It raises the question of whether there is in fact a hierarchy between 
different kinds of protected characteristics, and how the exercise of public jurisdiction can be 
managed without passing judgement on the nature of belief itself.  
 
The emergence of equality and non-discrimination as important constitutional values, 
as well as the expansion of the protected grounds of non-discrimination to sexual 
orientation, has raised the prospect of a conflict, or at the very least significant 
tension, between these goals. There is also a widespread public perception that an 
increase in the protection of equality through human rights and discrimination law has 
led to an increase in ‗conflicts‘ between different social groups. (Malik 2011, p. 22) 
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In Chapter 5, I will focus on the cases of conservative evangelical Christians who have either 
been prosecuted for breaking the law (such as the hoteliers who refused to let a room with a 
double bed to a same-sex couple in a civil partnership), or who have taken their employers to 
court for discriminatory practices (such as the airline worker and health-care professional 
dismissed for wearing crosses in breach of uniform regulation, the registrar who was 
disciplined for refusing to officiate at civil partnerships, and the counsellor dismissed for 
refusing to give sex therapy advice to a same-sex couple), and how these are symptomatic of 
the outworkings of a particular kind of evangelical (public) theology. 
Before that, however, it is worth making a more general examination of how legal 
provision for cherished Western democratic liberties such freedom of expression and belief is 
faring in the face of demands by religious believers to manifest their convictions in public 
through the wearing of symbols, mode of dress or through particular stances on moral issues, 
such as sexuality. How far ought religion to be incorporated into such legislation: is it a 
welcome expansion of essential rights that should be afforded to all citizens; or an example of 
abuse of privilege in order to introduce unwelcome and disruptive markers of particularity 
that will eventually undermine the coherence of a shared public domain? 
As I have already outlined, the principles of freedom of belief, conscience and 
religion were amongst the first tenets of Enlightenment liberalism, as for example in the First 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which declared that 
‗Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof‘(Gunn 2012). Whilst the First Amendment was designed to put an end to any 
state-sanctioned coercion, therefore, it also enshrined religious liberty – presumably, both 
belief and practice – within a body politic that was not so much secular as non-confessional.  
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The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 (1948) 
expressed a commitment to freedom of conscience and belief in the wake of the 1939–45 
World War: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance. (United Nations 1948) 
  
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) follows similar principles:  
9.1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
9.2 Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. (European Declaration of Human 
Rights 1950) 
 
This guarantees an absolute right to hold a religious belief, but sets more conditional criteria 
in relation to the ways in which such beliefs might be manifested. A belief does not have to 
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be a religious conviction, and can indeed be an absence of belief. Article 9 also endeavours to 
differentiate between mainstream belief-systems and those that may be more ephemeral or 
trivial. Thus, Lord Nicholls in R(Williamson) v SS Education and Employment [2005] 2 AC 
246 at paragraphs [23] and [24] ruled that a 'belief' within Article 9 (i) must not be trivial (ii) 
must be consistent with basic standards of human dignity or integrity and (iii) must be 
coherent, in the sense of being intelligible and capable of being understood. 
In the UK, the first formal anti-discrimination legislation was the Equal Opportunities 
Act, passed in 1975, pertaining to gender discrimination. It created certain exemptions, 
including religious organizations and certain professions, in which discrimination on the 
grounds of gender was not illegal. Subsequent acts, in 2003, 2006 and 2010 extended 
legislation to something called ‗religion and belief‘4 and enshrined the terminology of 
‗equality and diversity‘.5 A person can claim discrimination if it can be proved that they have 
been treated less favourably solely on the grounds of their religion. ‗It is unlawful for a 
person to operate a practice which would be likely to result in unlawful discrimination if 
applied to persons of any religion or belief.‘ (2006, para 53) 
                                                          
4 Part II of the 2006 Equality Act, paragraphs 44 and 45, frames the legislation around 
‗religion and belief‘. Paragraph 44 of the legislation states: (a) ―religion‖ means any religion, 
(b) ―belief‖ means any religious or philosophical belief, (c) a reference to religion includes a 
reference to lack of religion, and (d) a reference to belief includes a reference to lack of 
belief. 
5 By 2010, the ‗protected characteristics‘ were defined as follows: a) age; b) disability; c) 
gender reassignment; d) marriage and civil partnership; e) pregnancy and maternity; f) race; 
g) religion or belief; h) sex; i) sexual orientation. 
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 What is it about religion, belief and religious identity that might give it privileged or 
protected status, such that it pre-empts the neutrality of public legislation? In a context in 
which religion is both more visible and more contested, the conventional demarcation 
between private conviction and public manifestation is breaking down, and nowhere more 
controversially than in the field of legislation that seeks to apply universalist criteria of 
freedom – which now must include religious freedom as a public fact – and differential 
considerations of religious conscience and behaviour.  
However, the law has struggled with the connection between a ‗belief‘ and its 
‗manifestation‘, on the grounds that it may be difficult to judge whether an act is a true 
manifestation of belief or not. For example, in the UK it was ruled that a Sikh student was 
entitled to wear a Kara bangle (one of the five symbols of Sikh observance) at school as a 
legitimate manifestation of their beliefs, whereas an evangelical Christian wishing to wear a 
silver ring as a sign of sexual abstinence before marriage was not (R (P) v Governors Millais 
School). This suggests that behaviours inspired by a religion or belief are not necessarily 
manifestations of that religion or belief (see Williamson per Lord Nicholls at paragraph [35]. 
In the Williamson verdict Lord Nicholls acknowledged this tension but defended the 
distinction:  
 
It is against this background that article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights safeguards freedom of religion. This freedom is not confined to freedom to 
hold a religious belief. It includes the right to express and practise one's beliefs. 
Without this, freedom of religion would be emasculated. Invariably religious faiths 
call for more than belief. To a greater or lesser extent adherents are required or 
encouraged to act in certain ways, most obviously and directly in forms of communal 
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or personal worship, supplication and meditation. But under article 9 there is a 
difference between freedom to hold a belief and freedom to express or 'manifest' a 
belief. The former right, freedom of belief, is absolute. The latter right, freedom to 
manifest belief, is qualified.‘ He continued, ‗in a pluralist society a balance has to be 
held between freedom to practise one's own beliefs and the interests of others affected 
by those practices. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd050224/will-1.htm, 
paragraph 16–17.  
 
Similarly, once an appellant has established that something is a legitimate manifestation of 
belief, there are still further obstacles before they can prove interference. Steadman v UK 
(1997) 23 EHHR CD 168 and Copsey v WWB Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932 both 
ruled that claims for wrongful dismissal from workers who had refused to work on Sundays 
were not successful in proving an interference under Article 9. A worker who voluntarily 
accepts employment which involves Sunday working has no recourse to Article 9. If 
alternative provision is available, Article 9 is not breached: so (R (Begum) v Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15) and (R (X) v Y School [2007] EWHC 
298 (Admin) both ruled that there had been no interference in prohibiting Muslim girls from 
wearing jilbab and niqab traditional dress, since they had the option of attending other 
schools with more flexible uniform regulations.  
 Arguably, however, this perpetuates a dichotomy of belief and practice and an 
assumption that ‗private‘ belief cannot be allowed to intrude into the world of ‗public‘ 
practices and legislation. It grants unconditional freedom to the rights of conscience but 
remains unable to adjudicate on how, or even whether, that might be translated into action. 
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This is still evident in the way in which judicial decisions remain resolutely agnostic on 
questions of the nature and origins of beliefs in question. This is most acute in cases where 
religious conviction conflicts with issues of sexual discrimination, since ‗there is very little 
social consensus that allows us to determine how we should develop and police the 
boundaries of what constitutes a legitimate sphere of inner religious belief or lawful 
manifestation of that belief.‘ (Malik 2011, p. 25) It is a perspective which regards religion as 
a voluntary activity – ‗just another set of preferences and lifestyle choices‘ (Plant 2011, p. 12) 
– rather than the deepest well-spring of one‘s values and as part of an identification with a 
community of faith, neither of which can be abandoned or compromised at will.  
So, for example, Article 9 of the European Court legislation (to which many of the 
UK-based cases go on appeal) rests on a dichotomy between belief and practice, between 
inner and external expression, which reflects a modernist, post-Enlightenment distinction 
between freedom of individual conscience and the non-coercive, non-confessional nature of 
the public square. Yet commentators note that it is often difficult to separate one from the 
other, and ‗in particular, the way in which restrictions on action can have an important impact 
on the inner dimension of religion and belief.‘ (Malik 2011, p. 24). 
 
The protection of an absolute right to freedom of belief and freedom of conscience 
has been a great achievement of liberalism but it has very often assumed that such 
beliefs and conscientious behaviour is to be seen as essentially private. (Plant 2011, p. 
10) 
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Referring to Watkins-Singh v Aberdare Girls’ High School Governors concerning a Sikh‘s 
right to wear the Kara or silver bangle, Whistler and Hill argue that there are signs that courts 
are beginning to judge on the wearing of religious symbols as a practice which transcends the 
forum internum of personal conscience. This may indicate a shift towards understanding 
wearing of religious symbols and dress not as expressions of prior religious beliefs but as 
cultural practices that delineate public identity. It represents a greater emphasis on the 
‗participation function‘ of religion, away from symbols simply being outward ‗signs‘ of inner 
belief – a property of the forum internum of an individual‘s world-view. The open wearing of 
a marker of religious allegiance serves as a ‗token‘ (Whistler 2012, p. 4) of an individual‘s 
participation in a community; and, potentially, begins to conceive of religion not as belief, or 
practice, but as an expression of identity – thereby transposing into the forum externum of the 
public sphere. It also suggests a greater openness towards regarding the significance of 
religious symbols as resting in their capacity to tie individual believers into a community of 
faith: an expression of belonging, rather than believing (Whistler 2012, pp. 46–7). A stress on 
religious identity as an integral whole, rather than belief which is then applied in practice or 
behaviour renders religion more comparable to forms of identity such as gender, disability, 
race or sexuality, which inherent or ascribed, but not chosen. In some respects, this runs 
counter to other post-secular trends which suggest a greater privatization of religion, as 
measured in institutional affiliation or even in indices of spiritual orientation.  
 
Citing an identity does not conclude an argument about legal privilege and obligation. 
Rather it marks the opening of a debate – a debate that is normative rather than 
empirical. (Plant 2011, p. 14)  
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However, court judgements so far have failed to generate a conclusive consensus on the 
extent to which an individual can legitimately expect the workplace to be a forum in which 
they can exercise freedom of conscience in the manifestation of belief and identity, or 
whether their duties as employee must require them to subordinate religious values to 
corporate policy. This becomes more complex if, for example, faith-based organizations are 
called upon to deliver public services and receive public funding. Must they be expected to 
observe equality and diversity legislation, notwithstanding the well-established principles of 
derogation? The view is that under these circumstances the ‗contracting out‘ principle would 
prevail, and such organizations would be required to withdraw.  
 
Although the belief-conduct distinction is not an ideal conceptual device, where there 
is a conflict between religion or belief/culture and sexual orientation discrimination 
there may be a need to respect the rights of belief and conscience, whilst at the same 
time taking a strict approach to discriminatory conduct by limiting the scope of 
exceptions as well as evaluating the impact of these exceptions in practice. (Malik 
2011, p. 38)  
 
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that Article 9, and other equality legislation, has never 
been the only tool for the protection for religious belief, if its potential prohibition or 
curtailment is seen as violating other aspects of a person‘s rights. There is actually a range of 
measures by which religion and belief can be protected. For example, the Religious and 
Racial Hatred Act 2006 prohibits the stirring up of racial hatred; and the Equality Act 2006 
also guarantees the existence of faith schools, so that children of a particular faith tradition 
can be educated separately in accordance with its teachings. Similarly employers may be 
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required to make arrangements of ‗reasonable accommodation‘ to facilitate religious 
observance, even on an individual basis, if requested. 
In a report monitoring instances of religious organizations and individuals 
complaining ‗of ―cultural‖ discrimination, including prejudice, misunderstanding, 
indifference or ignorance about religion‘ (Woodhead and Catto 2009, p. 15), the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission recorded a mixed picture. Whilst incidents of religious beliefs 
and believers ‗being misunderstood, denigrated, ignored, trivialized, distorted or ridiculed, 
including by the media, in education, and in public discourse‘ (2009, p. 15) do not amount to 
direct discrimination in terms of the tangible withholding or misdirection of physical goods 
and services, they do expose the tension between liberal principles of freedom of expression 
– including the right to challenge the beliefs and actions of others – and respect for cultural 
difference, including religious practices and identities. This is perhaps not surprising, and as 
precedent is developed, courts may establish clear criteria for passing judgement. For the 
time being, however, the difficulties of finding appropriate balance between respect for 
religion and belief and other criteria of equality and diversity within the legislation continue. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Religion remains a significant part of global culture although that is subject to significant 
differences across regions and societies. In this chapter, I have been concerned to map these 
global trends but also to begin to engage in a diagnosis of some of the most remarkable shifts 
and new trends in the public profile of religion. I have focused on what is happening in the 
Western context, given that historically the emergence of modern liberal democracy in these 
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societies established particular conventions regarding the relationship between religion and 
the public sphere. But given the relative decline of religious affiliation in the West, and new 
signs of political engagement elsewhere, it is clear that many of the rules of engagement may 
be in need of revision.  
Whilst religion may be returning to the public square, both as source of social capital 
and informing the new search for ‗values‘, this is not a reversal of secularization or mere 
religious revival, since secularist discourse is still buoyant and many influential voices 
continue to question the legitimacy of any kind of religious contribution. Indeed, a recurrent 
thread in this chapter has been how difficult it is to draw definitive fault-lines between 
‗belief‘ and ‗unbelief‘ and how relationships between institutional religion and a secular 
public domain are similarly intimately intertwined. As Charles Taylor argues, the option to 
believe is, for modern people, irrevocably conditioned by the awareness of the possibility of 
non-belief (2010). Similarly, even for those who remain religiously faithful, the prospects for 
effective interventions by religion in the public domain are affected by the widespread loss or 
deficit of religious literacy. The shift from public faith to private belief has considerable 
bearing on the way public theology communicates with constituencies that do not share its 
immediate concerns.  
The re-emergence of religion, especially in aspects of legal and social policy, raises 
significant challenges to a conventionally modernist separation of religion and politics. To 
what extent could religious conscience or principle ever become a regulating, even an over-
riding factor in a person‘s public behaviour, even if that conflicted with prescribed attitudes 
or behaviour in relation to discrimination on grounds of sexuality? This accentuates the 
problems of how a liberal democracy should go about accommodating a diversity of values 
and lifestyles in a pluralist society, whilst allowing religious voices and interventions to 
operate with integrity.  
69 
 
In my next chapter, then, I will consider the more theoretical dimensions to our 
contemporary situation. According to the sociological orthodoxy of the secularization thesis, 
the resurgence of religious activism across a number of public contexts is impossible under 
the conditions of modernity. How do we conceptualize this: by maintaining a narrative of 
European exceptionalism, or retaining a distinction between ‗the West and the rest‘? Or is it 
necessary to rethink the universalism and inevitability of secularization? If so, what do we 
put in its place?
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2 
The Unquiet Frontier 
Mapping the Post-Secular 
Britain now finds itself in a situation in which old and new forms of commitment, 
power and organization co-exist and compete with one another … why Britain can be 
religious and secular; … why the majority of the population call themselves Christian 
but are hostile or indifferent to many aspects of religion; why governments embrace 
‗faith‘ but are suspicious of ‗religion‘; why public debate swings between 
‗multiculturalism‘ and ‗integration‘; why religion is viewed as both radical and 
conservative; why we build multi-faith spaces … but can no longer speak of God in 
public. (Woodhead 2012, p. 26) 
 
Secularisation is happening, yet secularisation theory is wrong. (Brown 2001, p. viii) 
 
Against many of the predictions of twentieth century Western secularization theory, which 
foresaw the gradual disappearance of religion from the public domain, evidence has emerged 
in recent years of the persistence of religious faith as a public and political phenomenon. 
Justin Beaumont has argued that ‗the public resurgence of religion is arguably one of the 
defining features of the twenty-first century, contrary to the modernist and secularist 
assumptions of much of the twentieth
'
 (Beaumont 2010, p. 8). Empirically speaking, the 
resurgence of religious activism around the world serves as counter-evidence to any forecast 
that religion is losing its public impact. Yet it is involved with a revision of theoretical 
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frameworks as well, in the shape of the narrative of secularization, in which modernity and 
social differentiation herald a decline of religious institutions and beliefs. 
Some of this is to do with global socio-cultural dynamics, with a growing politicization 
of faith and its re-emergence as a shaper of cultural, sociological and economic processes. 
New manifestations of public religion are emerging, especially in the global South, calling 
into question the universality of normative Western models of religious decline. Yet even in 
Europe – increasingly coming to be seen as the exception not the rule of secularization – 
religion is returning to public prominence. These are the trends that are informing revisionist 
perspectives on the sociological orthodoxy that religion is disappearing from public life and 
ceasing to have political significance. In a reformulation of his original secularization thesis, 
Peter Berger has claimed that it is now more accurate to talk about a process of 
‗desecularization‘ (Berger 1999):  
 
The world today…is as furiously religious as it ever was, and is some cases 
more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and 
social scientists loosely labelled ‗secularization theory‘ is essentially mistaken. 
(p. 2) 
 
Yet there are reasons to believe that we are not witnessing a linear process, a religious 
revival or reversal of secularization, which is what ‗desecularization‘ implies. This rather 
more ambivalent situation is captured in Linda Woodhead‘s characterization of some of the 
contradictory and unresolved attitudes towards the place of religion in public life. Certainly, 
there is legitimate talk of the ‗new visibility‘ of religion frequently conditioned by the impact 
of global diasporas and global political forces; and yet in many quarters, the classic trajectory 
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of ‗secularization‘ as denoting the decline of long-established faith traditions and the 
marginalization of religious and theological language and values from the public mainstream 
still predominates. Most acutely, for example – especially in Europe – public scepticism 
towards religion, often reflecting secularist views inherited from the Enlightenment, is 
stronger than ever. Public disquiet regarding the legitimacy of religious and theological 
discourse – or the influence of faith-based organizations as providers of education, social care 
and other forms of welfare, for example – within a free society reflects continued unease that 
this breaches the neutrality of the public realm, so necessary for maintaining the conventions 
of liberal democracy.  
If, as many commentators conclude, what distinguishes our contemporary situation is 
the renewed awareness of religion in public, then the chief challenge is how to respond to its 
changing presence, and to manage the interface between sacred and the secular. The current 
condition may therefore be better framed in terms of the simultaneous and dialectical 
presence of re-enchantment and secularized and secularizing socio-cultural trends. This 
transcends the binary of mere religious revival or sociological revisionism, and represents the 
unique juxtaposition of both significant trends of secularism and continued religious decline 
(not only in Northern Europe, but certainly undeniably so), and signs of persistent and 
enduring demonstrations of public, global faith. A cluster of social and political theorists, 
amongst them the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, are also now speaking of the ‗post-secular‘ 
public square, and acknowledging that religious values may have a role to play in what he 
calls ‗the ethics of citizenship‘ (2006).  
 Whilst it is a contested concept, what characterizes post-secularity is, in my view, its 
very paradoxical and unprecedented nature. The emergence globally and nationally of re-
vitalized religious activism as a decisive force, alongside the continuing trajectory of 
institutional religious decline accompanied by robust intellectual defence of secularism in 
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Western societies, takes us into new territory, empirically and theoretically. All to greater or 
lesser extent hinge on the legitimacy of religious institutions to intervene in public affairs, 
and how public authorities arbitrate between competing accounts of citizenship and the 
common good. 
In this chapter, I want to consider some of the ways in which the paradox of the post-
secular might be felt, at what Charles Taylor has called ‗the unquiet frontiers‘ of modernity 
(2007, pp. 711–27), and what that means for our established conventions of negotiation 
between the two supposedly incompatible fields of religion and the public square. The ideal 
of the neutral secular state as a means of framing a public space free of ecclesiastical 
privilege and ensuring a process of free communication in which all citizens can participate, 
which is one of the hallmarks of Western liberal democracy, serves in many respects as the 
benchmark of our considerations, as the re-emergence of religious identity throws out new 
challenges to our construals of citizenship, belief and the nature of the public realm itself. 
What traction is gained on our understanding of the role of religion in the world – and 
especially the shifting dynamics of ‗public‘ and ‗private‘ – by adopting the alternative 
terminology of the post-secular? Can secularization continue after the secular? Is the West 
experiencing a resurgence of traditional forms of religion; or its reinvention and mutation 
(Davie 1994) into unprecedented manifestations of a newly-sacralized world?  
But finally, I want to ask whether the associations some people make of the post-
secular with the deconstruction of some of the binaries of modernity – private/public, 
faith/reason, sacred/secular – offers opportunities to revisit the ways in which dominant 
understandings of modernity were constructed, not least as a gendered phenomenon. Religion 
in the lives of women has thus been scandalously overlooked and under-theorized within 
secular feminist thought, so something like the post-secular may actually create new space to 
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think of ways in which both religion and secularity are evident in relation to women‘s 
participation in the public realm.  
The re-emergence of religion in public, in areas such as politics, urbanization, social 
policy and law, may well turn out to the defining characteristic of our generation. The 
question is, whether our conceptual frameworks are fit for purpose, and whether discourse of 
the ‗post-secular‘ possesses sufficient clarity and explanatory weight to meet the challenge. I 
will close this chapter, therefore, by considering how appropriate the terminology of post-
secularity may be for advancing enquiry into the nature of public faith. My conclusion will be 
that we may be seeing the end of the hegemony of secularization, but not necessarily the total 
demise of secularism or of some aspects of secularizing social and cultural tendencies. Any 
new frame of reference needs to embrace the deeply contradictory and unresolved nature of 
post-secular turns in political discourse and their accompanying challenges for public 
theology.  
 
After Secularization 
Who still believes in the myth of secularization? Recent debates within the 
sociology of religion would indicate this to be the appropriate question with 
which to start any current discussion of the theory of secularization…Armed 
with ‗scientific‘ evidence, sociologists of religion now feel confident to predict 
bright futures for religion. (Casanova 1994, p. 11) 
 
One way of locating the emergence of talk about the post-secular is to regard it as part 
of the revisionist agenda of the secularization thesis: the theory which posits a process by 
which religion gradually ceases to be the primary authority for individuals and societies. If 
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secularization refers to the process by which religion declines in significance, the basic 
premise behind that is a theory of modernization. Secularization as understood within 
sociological studies is essentially a narrative about the inevitable decline of religion in 
modern cultures, occasioned by the dynamics of modernity itself: modernization, the rise of 
technology, rational and bureaucratic procedures, liberal democracy, urbanization and 
industrial capitalism (Bruce 2002, pp. 2–5).  
Classic definitions of secularization such as that advanced by Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann speak of ‗the progressive autonomization of societal sectors from 
the domination of religious meaning and institutions‘ (1966, p. 74). Similarly, Bryan 
Wilson characterizes secularization as a process by which ‗religious institutions, 
actions and consciousness, lose their social significance‘ (1982, p. 49). The public 
profile and influence of religious values and institutions is the main focus of my 
discussion, since my concern is for the relationship between theology and practice, 
belief and citizenship. Nevertheless, the broader question of the erosion of the ‗sacred 
canopy‘ of axiomatic belief and the resulting marginalization of public religion is also 
of deep significance: 
 
Secularization relates to the diminution in the social significance of religion. Its 
application covers things as, the sequestration by political powers of the 
property and facilities of religious agencies; the shift from religious to secular 
control of various erstwhile activities and functions of religion; the decline in 
proportion of their time, energy, and resources which men devote to super-
empirical concerns; the decay of religious institutions; the supplanting, in 
matters of behaviour, of religious precepts by demands that accord with strictly 
technical criteria; and the gradual replacement of specifically religious 
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consciousness by an empirical, rational, instrumental orientated; the 
abandonment of mythical, poetic, and artistic interpretation of nature and 
society in favour of matter-of-fact description, and, with it, the rigorous 
separation of evaluative and emotive dispositions from cognitive and positivistic 
orientations. (Wilson 1982, p. 149) 
 
Classic definitions of secularization tend to focus, therefore, on the dwindling social 
prominence of religion as indicated by three key variables: the decline of formal, institutional 
religion; its increasingly marginal status in public life; and its diminishing significance for 
personal conduct and meaning. Steve Bruce elucidates this three-dimensional perspective in 
the following terms: 
 
In brief, I see secularization as a social condition manifest in (a) the declining 
importance of religion for the operation of non-religious roles and institutions 
such as those of the state and the economy; (b) the decline in social standing of 
religious roles and institutions; and (c) a decline in the extent to which people 
engage in religious practices, display beliefs of a religious kind, and conduct 
other aspects of their lives in a manner informed by such beliefs. (2002, p. 3) 
 
Possibly more profound than the public marginalization of religious interventions in the 
public square, or the attenuation of religious authority in matters of moral or political 
judgement, is the displacement of the ‗sacred‘ as lying at the heart of reality and the 
‗disenchantment‘ of quotidian experience. Invoking Peter Berger‘s famous concept of the 
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sacred canopy (1990), Grace Davie highlights the impact of this very dimension of 
secularization on people‘s phenomenological apprehension of everyday life: 
 
For the great majority, serious convictions are not only rejected from a personal point 
of view, they become difficulty to comprehend altogether … Notably absent is the 
over-arching sacred canopy, an all-encompassing religious frame expressed 
organizationally as the universal church. This no longer makes sense in the modern 
world. (2001, p. 25) 
 
Despite its having become a somewhat ‗unfashionable theory‘ (Bruce 2010), its proponents 
continue to defend the claims of the classic secularization theory in Western society, 
especially when it comes to evidence which continues to point to the social and cultural 
marginalization of religion, the dissolution of clear patterns of religious socialization and the 
plummeting of attendance, membership and institutional viability of mainstream Christianity. 
Commentators such as Bruce would not deny that some of these currents flow faster than 
others, or that some indicators of decline might be temporarily retarded by migration, local 
revivals or forms of identity politics. Nevertheless, the thesis still has its defenders, who 
argue that such evidence is insufficiently convincing and that the predominant trend for 
religion in global society – not simply the West – is still one of secularization.  
The most apocalyptic accounts of secularization base themselves on quantitative 
indicators of the fortunes of mainstream Protestant and Reformed traditions. Steve Bruce 
predicts that by 2031 the Church of England will be ‗reduced to a trivial voluntary 
association with a large portfolio of heritage property‘ (2002, p. 74) and that smaller 
denominations such as the Methodist Church will have vanished altogether. Callum Brown 
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concurs with this apocalyptic prognosis, arguing that ‗the culture of Christianity is gone in 
the Britain of the new millennium. Britain is showing the world how religion as we have 
known it can die‘ (C. Brown 2001, p. 198, my emphasis). 
However, Brown‘s evocation of religion ‗as we have known it‘ throws up one of the 
complexities to the debate. It may be relatively straightforward to map the quantitative, 
institutional decline of formal religious affiliation, but less easy to trace the changing 
contours of personal faith and privatized spirituality, especially if the very paradigms of 
belief, practice and identity, and their manifestation as collective or individual phenomena are 
themselves evolving.  
Secularization has been contested, therefore, on both empirical and theoretical grounds. 
One revisionist approach to secularization adopts the evidence of the proliferation of new 
religious practices and affiliations, and deduces that this is a reflection of enduring forms of 
spirituality that represents a ‗re-enchantment‘ or ‗re-sacralization‘ of the world. Such a view 
would claim that religion has not disappeared but has been displaced from the public into the 
private. A characteristic of this relocation is that it is not a return to old ways of being 
religious but an emergence of new ways of being religious.  
 
The situation appears to be less one of secularization and more one of the 
relocation of religion. In other words, we will conclude that, as mainstream 
religion loses authority, new forms of significant religion will evolve to 
compensate. (Partridge 2005, p. 39)  
 
Whilst this may offer reassurance that non-traditional forms of religion will fill the vacuum 
caused by the decline of older, institutional expressions as a form of ‗compensation‘, it also 
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implies that religious sentiment is merely ‗displaced‘ from one to the other, without loss of 
social prominence or cultural significance.  Yet for public theology, such a 
deinstitutionalization or privatization of religion represents a potential diminution of its 
ability to engage at a structural and organizational level with other aspects of public life.  
 
Genealogies of the Secular 
Others, however, disagree with the very premises of secularization on conceptual and 
theoretical grounds as much as an empirical basis. Jose Casanova has advanced a similar 
three-fold model of secularization to that of Bruce as denoting the declining social 
significance of religion; the structural differentiation of religious and secular spheres; and the 
privatization of religion (1994, p. 7). However, he expresses his scepticism towards what he 
termed the ‗myth‘ and ‗fallacy‘ of secularization, grounded in his identification of 
secularization as an artefact of a particular theory of Western modernization, in which 
spheres subsequently deemed ‗secular‘ – the state, economy, civil society and science – were 
disaggregated from the over-arching realm of Christendom. Casanova questions whether 
these different dimensions of religious decline and marginalization are indivisible – and 
hence part of a unitary process – or whether they function as independent variables, and thus 
experience, potentially, different trajectories. Casanova‘s conclusion is that the homogeneity 
of modernization has been framed through a Eurocentric lens, thus obscuring the possibility 
that, for example, a process of ‗differentiation‘ might be distinguished from that of 
‗privatization‘ (pp. 38–9).  
Other commentators, too, choose to regard secularization as a social construction 
associated with the rise of Western modernity, and by that virtue by no means inevitable or 
exportable to the rest of the world. In short, the secular has a history, a ‗genealogy‘ (Asad 
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2003, p. 192). Craig Colhoun challenges the perception of the secular and the doctrine of 
secularism as ‗absence‘ or subtraction, or as an axiomatic, ontological concept.  
 
Whether we see it as an ideology, a worldview, a stance toward religion, a 
constitutional approach, or simply an aspect of some other project ... secularism is 
something we need to think through, rather than merely the absence of religion. 
(2010, p. 34) 
 
Traditional versions of the secularization thesis would consider modernization to be a 
universal, unilinear process, associated with the emergence of industrial capitalism, the 
growth of cities and the expansion of technologies. This generally posits a close, causal 
relationship between modernization and secularization or rationalization. Whilst the effects of 
secularization have only been felt most acutely in the twentieth century, the roots of the 
process are held to go back to the Reformation, which engendered the rise of rationalism and 
individualism (Bruce 2002; Casanova, 1994). The Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth 
century and the democratic revolutions of eighteenth century, plus the massive social and 
economic changes associated with the Industrial Revolution, hastened these trends whereby 
the bonds of social convention were loosened, and the forces of free enquiry and scientific 
rationality went to work on the traditional thought-forms and social structures of 
Christendom. 
What is important to note is the extent to which this process is associated with the 
European and North American Enlightenments of the eighteenth century, which celebrated 
the self-determining and emancipatory powers of human reason, unfettered by the bonds of 
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autocracy, tradition or superstition. Insofar as religious institutions and dogmas inhibited free 
enquiry and critical reasoning, they were to be regarded as enemies of Enlightenment. 
However, as many historians have pointed out, there were many forms of expression of 
Enlightenment, some of which were explicitly atheist or secularist, but others which 
anticipated the emergence of suitably rationalist and freethinking forms of religion to 
accompany the flowering of human intellectual achievement in the arts, natural sciences and 
political economy (Calhoun 2010, pp. 40–1). 
This is not to deny the existence of a world-view that might be deemed ‗secular‘, one 
governed by rational, this-worldly and empirical, rather than supernatural referents or 
magical or ritual practices. Western modernity was marked by the emergence of spheres such 
as the market, the state and the person that are not governed by belief in divine agency but in 
human autonomy, reason and technical regulation. The ‗social imaginary‘ (p. 36) of activities 
such as business, industry, medicine and government is conceived according to this- and not 
other-worldly criteria.  
Another significant contribution to this debate has been Charles Taylor‘s recent work 
A Secular Age (2007). In common with many of the secularization theorists, Taylor portrays 
secularization as a multi-faceted phenomenon, with three particular dimensions. The first 
refers to the diminishment and marginalization of the public role of religion; the second 
denotes a decline in religious affiliation. The most significant of the three for Taylor, 
however, refers to changes in belief and unbelief, whereby belief in God shifts from being a 
taken-for-granted assumption to becoming ‗one option among others‘ (2007, pp. 2–3). For 
Taylor, this third trend had Christian roots, rather than simply being the inevitable 
outworking of modernization. The secular age is characterized neither by an inevitable and 
universal declension of religious belief, nor by a clash between sacred and profane, but by a 
‗back and forth‘ dialectic between secular wisdom and religious faith.  
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Taylor is concerned to tell the story of the historical and cultural conditions under 
which unbelief became possible – indeed, more tenable, more taken-for-granted than belief. 
Taylor‘s thesis would suggest both that the seeds of secularism were always present within 
religious traditions, and that the eclipse of the latter by the former is by no means inevitable. 
He argues that secularism and secularization are as much the result of internal dynamics and 
discourses, especially within Christianity, as the result of external, socio-economic or cultural 
factors. He rejects what he terms ‗subtraction‘ theories of secularization, in which ideas of 
transcendence, or religious affiliation, are simply ‗stripped away‘, leaving the rest of people‘s 
symbolic and material lives untouched. Nor is it a matter of shedding an anachronistic and 
deluded supernaturalism, leaving an enlightened, secular humanism in its place. Instead, a 
new view of the world came to predominate in the eighteenth century, in the shape of a kind 
of immanent humanism characterized by what Taylor calls the ‗buffered self‘, the 
differentiation between public and private spheres, and the disenchantment of the universe, in 
the shape of naturalistic and empiricist epistemologies. Similarly, whether one is atheist or 
religious, the complicity of belief and unbelief requires everyone to adopt a reflexive and 
relativistic stance towards their own convictions. With an element of optional choice, Taylor 
argues, comes a shaking of the foundations of the universal, axiomatic, involuntary nature of 
belief.  
However, Taylor‘s relevance to the debate about post-secularity rests on his interest in 
the factors that facilitate the persistence of belief, rather than simply the circumstances that 
propel its decline. His account of secularization attempts to conduct itself from an alternative 
set of premises, although he has been accused of being ‗slanted regrettably in favour of 
Christian theism‘ (Kerr 2010, p. 321). 
If there is such a concept as the ‗post-secular‘, then, it must be recognized that 
secularization and the secular are in themselves already complex and diverse terms, and have 
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histories that enable us to see them not as fixed shibboleths, but as heuristic and conceptual 
frameworks that may now be in need of reconstruction. The secular has a history, therefore: 
one that is complicit with modernity, which set in train a range of economic, political and 
cultural ‗projects‘ to do with ‗constitutionalism, moral autonomy, democracy, human rights, 
civil equality, industry, consumerism, freedom of the market … that generate new 
experiences of space and time, of cruelty and wealth, of consumption and knowledge‘ (Asad 
2003, p. 13).  
Since many people have assumed that modernization is a universal process, advocates 
of secularization have assumed that secularization, too, would be a worldwide and globally-
uniform phenomenon. However, processes of modernization might unfold in different parts 
of the world in various ways, depending on how they were generated (for example, whether 
they were contingent upon economic transformation, as in Western Europe, or imposed by 
colonialism, as in Africa, or introduced by political elites, as in Japan and Turkey) and when 
they were transmitted (for example, if a society encountered capitalism in its early stages or 
in its advanced stages of production). Thus, as Shmuel Eisenstadt argues, it may be more 
appropriate to talk of ‗multiple modernities‘, all of which interact with religious belief and 
practice in different ways (2000, p. 593). 
One version of secularization theory that attempts to take account of this is the ‗co-
existence‘ theory. This acknowledges that some forms of religion are not declining, but 
growing, even in Western societies; and begins to develop a framework which places greater 
emphasis on contextual circumstances, and the fortunes of religion as an independent 
variable, rather than an epiphenomenon of modernization. In his critique of ‗subtraction‘ 
theories of secularization, Charles Taylor argues that they mistakenly assume that religion 
can simply vanish from the social or political domain without corresponding impact on any 
other variable. One might say that it has already bought into secularization or the modernist 
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separation of secular and religious by regarding religion as dispensable and epiphenomenal in 
that way. Instead, as Linda Woodhead argues, analyses of its changing futures must take 
account of the fact that religion is integrally tied up with changes in political economy, 
welfare, globalization, gender roles, cultural change and the law, all of which shape its 
changing contours in relation to wider society (Woodhead, 2012). Thus, changing contexts 
and circumstances engender new trajectories for religious belief and practice in ways that 
result in more nuanced relationships between religion and wider society:  
  
Theories of secularization indicate how religion, and specifically Christianity, 
relinquishes (and/or is deprived of) its hold on the central structures of power… 
the question then becomes whether this process is contingent, i.e. dependent on 
specific circumstances, notably those that have been obtained in Europe, or is a 
necessary and an inevitable part of social development. (Martin 1990, p. 295) 
 
One corollary of this might be a greater flexibility and diversity in the futures of religion, 
such that whilst in some contexts religion is in decline there are other contexts in which it is 
growing. Hence, secularization is not a universal or inevitable global process but contingent 
upon particular circumstances. Talal Asad is concerned to expose the artifice of secularism 
via a kind of ‗genealogy‘ (2003, p. 192) which sees it as founded on a system of binary 
thinking between ‗belief and knowledge, reason and imagination, history and fiction, symbol 
and allegory, natural and supernatural, sacred and profane – binaries that pervade modern 
secular discourse, especially in its polemical mode‘ (p. 23). In particular, the rise of global 
Islam as a political force exposes the limitations of conventional narratives about the fate of 
religion as equated with the eclipse of Christendom. Noting that ‗the contemporary salience 
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of religious movements around the globe‘ attracts both positive and negative responses, Asad 
calls for a re-evaluation of the very premises of secularism. 
Asad‘s argument is that ‗secularism‘ constructs ‗religion‘ as its negated Other in order 
to establish its own coherence. The ‗secular‘ brands religion as a matter of belief relating to 
an ontological category of the ‗supernatural‘, whereas secularism by contrast deals with the 
natural and the social, in which the citizen is supreme public reality, and anything to do with 
transcendence or the non-material is consigned to the private and the interior. Yet this 
categorization is historically and culturally contingent, and emerged out of particular 
practices of reading the scriptures, discourses of religious experiences and of course ways of 
configuring the relationship between Church and State. In particular, the use of torture by the 
State was both a way of taxonomizing and controlling the human body, but also represented a 
displacement of the supernatural and divinely-constituted authority by an autonomous State.  
Ivan Strenski‘s thesis is, similarly, that attempts to segregate the spheres of two 
discrete phenomena known as ‗politics‘ and ‗religion‘ are futile, and rest on historically and 
culturally contingent grounds (2010). This is particularly apparent, he argues, when we try to 
understand what is happening, globally, in places such as Iran, Pakistan and parts of Africa, 
where religiously-motivated political activity is burgeoning. To observers in the West, it 
contradicts a generation of sociological thinking whereby religion, relegated to the private 
sphere, would inevitably die out; but the persistence and revival of religion in the public 
square also requires us to rethink our conceptual frameworks; and Strenski‘s contention is 
that by classifying ‗religion‘ and ‗politics‘ as separate and distinct, we lose valuable 
explanatory power. He therefore aims to challenge narrow definitions of ‗religion‘, ‗politics‘ 
and ‗power‘, avoiding arguments which either claim them to be empty, meaningless 
categories or deterministic paradigms in which one sphere of life is seen as ‗using‘ or 
‗corrupting‘ another – as he says, rather like a hammer to a nail. In relation to contemporary 
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political phenomena, especially in the Middle East, he argues, only a subtle and complex 
synthesis of theological world-view and the exercise of political power will render a 
sufficiently thick description of religiously-motivated actors in changing contexts.  
Strenski argues that historically, people were ruled by a combination of religious and 
‗secular‘ powers, in which the theologically-informed auctoritas of Church acted in a 
‗unified field‘ with the exercise of temporal potestas. When the two are decoupled, he argues, 
then potestas takes over, relegating religion to a private, subjective sphere. The value of 
continuing with the demarcation between politics and religion is, for Strenski, merely 
heuristic. Reductionist accounts which insist that a religious tradition such as Islam has 
‗nothing‘ to do with Middle Eastern politics are as inadequate as those which denounce it as 
inherently and irreducibly violent. Rather, we need to consider how religious factors help to 
‗make sense‘ of people‘s actions – especially if they themselves offer religious explanations. 
Does religion offer causal links that cannot be observed in any other way? Does it offer a 
better explanation than any other paradigm? 
Thus, who speaks, to whom, and by what means, on behalf of religious bodies or 
traditions, is far from clear. This raises the question of how far public authorities, indeed the 
population at large, should be expected to be familiar with the concepts, knowledge and 
vocabulary by which to talk about religion or to empathize with those of faith. Whilst some 
sections of that majority may hold a strongly secularist position, arguing that religion should 
claim no legitimate place in public discourse, others may argue that pragmatically speaking it 
is necessary to reach a degree of accommodation with faith-based perspectives. At the heart 
of this, therefore – and why Habermas is so pivotal – lies contested and often fraught debates 
about the proper role of religious faith in relation to the public sphere. This extends from the 
proper relationship between the exercise of citizenship and personal conviction in 
determining matters of conscience and civil conduct; to the constitutional position of 
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religious representatives; through to the basis on which faith-based organizations might 
participate in the delivery of welfare and social care.  
 
Theorizing the ‘Post-Secular’: Jürgen Habermas 
Talk of the post-secular owes its greatest boost to the intervention of the social theorist and 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas. His long career is characterized by a concern for the nature of 
the public sphere under modernity. In earlier years, his Marxist convictions steered him 
towards a broad sympathy with a classic Rawlsian position which required the creation of a 
non-confessional public space in order to ensure the most equitable conditions for the 
articulation of a rich and non-partisan discourse of citizenship and communicative 
democracy. From the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, Habermas‘ perspective 
begins to change, and he has called for a re-evaluation of the secular nature of the public 
square and the introduction of religious sources of reasoning (albeit mediated or moderated 
via processes of ‗translation‘ into common terms) as an enrichment of our social and political 
imaginary. It is, for him, a means of incorporating ‗what‘s missing‘ namely religious values – 
into a renewed vocabulary of civic virtue.  
In recent writing, Habermas has conceded that religious reasoning can and must be 
included in the ‗flows of public communication‘, since they constitute powerful and 
irreducible sources of ‗the creation of meaning and identity‘ (2008, p. 131). For Habermas, 
the global resurgence of religion, coupled with significant critiques of the sovereignty of 
reason, make the case for constructing a ‗postmetaphysical‘ account of communicative reason 
and of public discourse. He has conceded that religious reasoning can and must be included 
in the ‗flows of public communication‘, since they constitute powerful and irreducible 
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sources of ‗the creation of meaning and identity‘ (2008, p. 131). The ready identification of 
modernization with secularization was, he realizes, too simplistic an account. 
At a seminar with theologians at the University of Chicago in 1989, Habermas had 
already begun to advance an immanentist or non-realist political theology, in which hope in 
God serves as the grounding for pragmatic moral action, providing inspirational visions of 
human solidarity and ‗thick descriptions‘ of hope and obligation (1992). In conversation with 
members of the Jesuit School of Philosophy in Munich in 2007, Habermas alluded to a kind 
of melancholy in late modernity, a sense of lack within secular communicative reason – as he 
says, ‗an awareness of what is missing‘ (2010), namely any sort of metaphysical or 
transcendental grounding of its commitment to things such as justice, progress and human 
dignity.
6
  
What does the post-secular mean for Habermas? A time when religious beliefs and 
institutions return from their somewhat marginal position in Western modern societies and 
undergo a process of renewed public visibility. Post-secular may denote, then, ‗at most a 
revision of a previously over-confident secularist outlook, rather than a ―return‖ of religion to 
a stage on which it had once been absent‘ (Harrington 2007, p. 547). It may then be a 
reinterpretation of the logic of modernity, signifying the persistence of religion throughout 
what was formerly conceived to be a period of visible and inexorable decline. Yet how far 
might such a perspective surrender any critical purchase to be gained in understanding how 
the role of religion as institutional phenomenon and public presence has shifted in importance 
for everyday life? Or is Habermas wishing to revise his earlier contention that the after-life of 
religious influence on secular moral reasoning, rather than simply dissolving into the 
                                                          
6
 The impact of advanced technologies, especially in the biosciences, represents for 
Habermas a particularly acute challenge in this respect. See Habermas 2003. 
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atmosphere of secular society, must always be embodied in the contemporary practices of 
particular faith traditions? 
It is clear that Habermas regards the relationship between religious and secular forms 
of reasoning as complementary. Despite the seeming imbalance between religious and non-
religious citizens in requiring the former to ‗translate‘ their values into universally 
comprehensible terms, Habermas regards all voices – albeit suitably mediated – as legitimate 
contributions to pluralist public debate: 
 
To be sure, the content of religious expressions must be translated into a universally 
accessible language before it can make it onto official agendas and flow into the 
deliberations of decision-making bodies. But religious citizens and religious 
communities retain influence precisely in those places in which the democratic 
process originates in the encounter between religious and non-religious sections of 
the population. As long as politically-relevant public opinion is fed by this reservoir 
of the public use of reason by religious and non-religious citizens, it must belong to 
the collective understanding of all citizens that deliberatively formed democratic 
legitimation is nourished also by religious voices and confrontations stimulated by 
religion. (Mendieta 2010, pp. 12–13) 
 
Only one month after 9/11, on 14 October 2001, he gave an address at the Paulskirche 
in Frankfurt, on the topic of ‗Faith and Knowledge‘, on the occasion of his acceptance of the 
Peace Prize, awarded annually by the German publishing industry in recognition of 
outstanding contribution to intellectual life. It is significant, then, that he used the opportunity 
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to indicate a new direction in his thought, which had to date shown little interest in the role of 
religion in public life. It was followed by a much-publicized dialogue in 2004 with Joseph 
Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI), and then by two further more extensive volumes: An 
Awareness of what is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age (2008) and the 
proceedings of a colloquium in New York, entitled The Power of Reason in the Public Sphere 
(2010). What prompted Habermas‘ new departure; what does it signal about the position of 
religion in social theory at the beginning of the twenty-first century; and how does it shape 
the debate about the post-secular?  
A post-metaphysical consciousness consists of ‗an agnostic, but non-reductionist 
philosophical position‘ which ‗refrains on the one hand from passing judgement on religious 
truths while insisting (in a non-polemical fashion) on drawing a strict line between faith and 
knowledge.‘ (Habermas 2006, p. 16; see also Mendieta 2010, p. 5) This indicates, I think, that 
Habermas‘ conception of the post-secular does in no way entail the assumption that post-
Kantian Enlightenment thinking is about to be overturned. On the other hand, it rejects 
narrow conceptions of reductionist reason that devalue statements which cannot be 
represented in naturalistic or empirical terms.  
In fact, one reviewer argues for a greater continuity between the ‗later‘ and ‗earlier‘ 
Habermas (Gordon 2011), observing that Habermas‘ work has always been propelled by the 
question of how a truly democratic public space might be constructed and upheld. For 
Habermas, the non-reductiveness of human communicative reason underpinned and 
guaranteed the possibility of genuine public consensus and procedural justice. The question 
is, how human beings are driven towards a commitment to common reason and consensus, 
and how culture inculturates us into an awareness of values. Unlike the Rawlsian liberal–
contractual model, in which we must extract ourselves from a particular cultural or ethical 
system or world-view in order to function as disinterested citizens, Habermas follows the 
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Frankfurt School in seeing human beings as always already imbued with inherited values that 
may transcend, or be irreducible to, the protocols of communicative reason. Whilst the 
critical scrutiny of reason requires a degree of reflexivity towards supernatural sources of 
morality, which relativizes such claims and reveals them as human constructs, the realization 
that ultimate moral commitments are prerequisites for civilization and the common good 
remains.  
Habermas has thus always been ready to acknowledge that ostensibly secular 
democracies rely on world-views not reducible to secular reason; that concepts of justice and 
human rights may have various roots; and that religious or theological principles may 
continue to nurture and inform public debate. The question would then be, however, as to 
how far this is to be considered legitimate, and here, Habermas notes that religion may be an 
under-valued well-spring of progressive, democratic values, and there may be points at which 
the irreducibility and transcendence of religious principles can point to a depth of moral 
reasoning unavailable to secular understandings: ‗Among the modern societies, only those 
that are able to introduce into the secular domain the essential contents of their religious 
traditions which point beyond the merely human realm will also be able to rescue the 
substance of the human.‘ (2010, p. 5) However, there are still certain conditions under which 
such religious values can enter public discourse; and Habermas speaks of a process of 
‗translation‘ by which explicitly theological precepts might feed into common consciousness.  
 
Religious citizens who regard themselves as loyal members of a constitutional 
democracy must accept the translation proviso as the price to be paid for the neutrality 
of state authority toward competing worldviews. For secular citizens, the same ethics 
of citizenship entails a complementary burden. By the duty of reciprocal 
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accountability toward all citizens, including religious ones, they are obliged not to 
publicly dismiss religious contributions to political opinion and [moral] formation … 
as mere noise, or even nonsense, from the start. Secular and religious citizens must 
meet in their public use of reason at eye level. (2011, p. 26) 
 
Of course, this is still vulnerable to some of the criticisms of a classical Rawlsian position, in 
that religious citizens still must ‗bracket out‘ their deepest convictions; here, the compromise 
is that they must ‗translate‘ religious reasons into a common language, which is governed by 
criteria of comprehensibility and credibility that are not of their making. Similarly, one 
reason for Habermas‘ acknowledgement of the enduring legitimacy of religious moral 
reasoning is that it may be capable of engaging with dimensions of human experience not 
immediately accessible to a discourse of pure reason; yet it is still the conventions of the 
latter by which such public contributions are to be judged.  
The boundary established by the Enlightenment, between the public sphere of 
economic and political processes, and the private realm of faith, is thus dissolving under the 
paradoxical currents of religious resurgence and enduring secularism. Similarly, there is a 
crisis of secular modernity which appears to have lost ‗its grip on the images, preserved by 
religion, of the moral whole – of the Kingdom of God on earth – as collectively binding 
ideals.‘ (Habermas 2010, p. 19) Some people would regard the ideal of the Kingdom of God 
on earth as a secularized version of a complex theological teaching anyway, but Habermas‘ 
point is that mere pragmatism is not enough to sustain a global vision of human dignity and 
to move secular, materialist citizens to an awareness of what is missing: ‗the violations of 
solidarity throughout the world … of what cries out to heaven‘ (p. 19). 
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If we want to avoid a clash of civilizations, we must keep in mind that the dialectic of 
our own occidental process of secularization has not yet come to a close.‘ A proper 
understanding of the eruption of religious violence upon the world, symbolized by the 
attacks on New York the previous month, would require a deal of humility and self-
criticism on the part of the West to avoid any simplistic bifurcation of the world into 
peaceable, secular West and barbaric, religious others, not least because, due to global 
migration, Europe is no longer culturally (or religiously) homogenous. Whilst at no 
point does Habermas gesture in the direction of religious revival, he shows himself 
mindful of the impact of religious pluralism, not to mention the argument – generally 
advanced by conservative politicians and theologians, including Pope Benedict – that 
the very idea of Europe itself is premised on its being a Christian civilization (Gordon 
2011, p. 4). 
 
As Peter Gordon points out, however, this is not the same as conceding that widespread 
religious revival is guaranteed or that the precepts of secularism will be reversed: this is a 
misunderstanding of what Habermas meant when he alluded to the ‗missing‘ element of 
modernity, which was not religion per se but the ultimate infallibility of human reason itself.  
Habermas inherits the distrust of the Frankfurt School towards a particular ‗dialectic 
of Enlightenment‘ which instrumentalizes reason to ideological ends. Thus, he maintains an 
agnostic attitude towards the benefits of religion, observing that for the purposes of a truly 
inclusive public square, and for the pursuit of a genuinely self-critical communicative reason, 
secularism must avoid triumphalism and keep open the possibility that religion can nurture 
human solidarity. Ultimately, the welfare of a functioning democratic body politic has no 
need of ‗the intolerance of a religiosity that is … certain that it retains exclusive ownership 
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rights on human morality‘, but equally nor does it have much time for ‗the intolerance of a 
secularism that is dogmatically certain of its independence from religion‘ (Gordon 2011, p. 
8). What can be noted, however, is that the premises of communicative reason on which 
much of Habermas‘ philosophy rests are deeply humanist and humanitarian in their faith in 
the deep structures of human discourse to effect mutuality and consensus.  
Habermas‘ consideration of the role of religion continued to be prompted by world 
events unfolding around him. The crisis of the global economy during 2008–9 has 
exacerbated material and structural inequalities and puts ameliorative efforts beyond the 
reach of the social democratic nation-state. Such globalizing trends ‗degrade the capacity for 
democratic self-steering‘ (2001, p. 6) and renders all the more urgent the rejuvenation of a 
democratic political economy and a vigorous culture of public deliberation. Essentially, the 
logic of the market has ‗hollowed out‘ any normative consideration of social justice.  
 
To me, global modernity looks like an open arena in which participants, from the 
viewpoints of different paths of cultural development, struggle over the normative 
structuring of social infrastructures that are more or less shared. It is an open question 
whether we will succeed in overcoming the atavistic condition of the social-Darwinist 
―catch as catch can,‖ still dominant today in international relations, to the point at 
which capitalism, globally unleashed and run wild, can be tamed and channeled [sic] 
in socially acceptable ways. (Mendieta 2010, p. 8) 
 
Habermas is thus further motivated to consider where potential sources of a renewal 
of civic virtue might be found. We might ask why he looks to metaphysical or moral ideals, 
95 
 
when a simple, pragmatic solution might have rested in the recovery of techniques for the 
cultivation of communicative reason, via the re-formulation of democratic political values 
derived, perhaps, from ancient (possibly Aristotelian) or modern (such as humanist or 
Enlightenment) philosophies. The answer seems to rest, once again, in the capacity of 
religious and metaphysical accounts of the dignity of the human person to serve as 
foundational reference-points.  
Habermas has thus suggested that religion might be potentially emancipatory and 
progressive, rather than inherently antipathetic to human rights and a pluralist public 
discourse. This new regard for religion has led him to coin the term ‗post-secular‘. However, 
we should always note that he is not interested in the phenomenon in terms of what we might 
call its ‗internal‘ dynamics – in terms of what is happening to religious belief, affiliation and 
practice. Nor is he interested in the changing discourse or adaptive strategies that people of 
faith might be adopting in order to respond to the new visibility of ‗faith‘ in the public 
domain. Rather, as Michelle Dillon points out, it is entirely of a piece with his enduring 
concern for the fate of the Enlightenment project. If the ‗post-secular‘ and the readmission of 
overtly religiously-derived forms of moral reasoning, ensures the rejuvenation of a fading 
Enlightenment project: one whose susceptibility to instrumentalized and absolutist forms of 
technical–instrumental reason was foreseen by his mentors within the Frankfurt School. ‗The 
post-secular denotes that the secular, like the Enlightenment, fell short of its originally 
intended destination. It is not that secularization has not occurred; it is just that there are some 
complications that the persistence of religion has thrown on its tracks.‘ (Dillon 2012) 
Habermas points to the complex and contradictory nature of post-secular societies. 
Referring to Europe, he insists that secularization and deinstitutionalization of religion 
continue. What has changed, he says, is ‗the continued existence of religious communities in 
an increasingly secularized environment.‘ This is due to the novelty of religious pluralism 
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occasioned by immigration, to the indirect impact of global fundamentalisms and to the new 
visibility of faith-based organizations in the wake of the restructuring of traditional social 
democratic state welfare systems (which may in their way represent a return to pre-twentieth-
century and pre-modern societies in which the Church was a significant source of charitable 
and philanthropic activity) (Mendieta 2010, p. 10). So the post-secular, for Habermas, does 
represent a new departure, insofar as ‗religion maintains a public influence and relevance, 
while the secularistic certainty that religion will disappear worldwide in the course of 
modernization is losing ground‘ (2008). I would like to pick up some of these threads in my 
analysis later: it reflects (a) an apprehension that the forecasts of the secularization thesis may 
be misplaced; (b) an acknowledgement that the equation of modernization and secularization 
– and the genealogy of the secular – may therefore also require revision; but (c) whilst the 
inevitability and universality of the secular may be in doubt, elements of secularism and the 
logic of secularization still condition the conduct public discourse.  
  
Mapping the Post-Secular 
Whilst the terminology of the post-secular came to public prominence in the early years of 
the twenty-first century, James Beckford has argued for a much longer pedigree, beginning 
with an article published in 1966 by the Roman Catholic sociologist of religion Andrew 
Greeley (Beckford 2012, p. 2). Nevertheless, it is a term that has assumed prominence since 
the late 1990s; but it is Beckford‘s contention that there has been such a proliferation of usage 
since then that the very currency of the term has become irredeemably devalued. He offers a 
typology of no less than six major interpretations of the concept. They embrace the 
contention that the persistence of religious belief and practice belies the existence of anything 
called ‗secularization‘; more modestly, a revisionist stance vis-a-vis secularization which 
notes both the reality of secularism and its limitations as any kind of meta-narrative; the re-
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enchantment of the secular, especially evident in the return of the sacred in popular culture; 
the deprivatization of religion and its resurgence as a public and political force; the 
reassertion of neo-orthodox world-views; and an eschewal of the very categories of ‗secular‘ 
and ‗sacred‘ (pp. 3–12). Some represent the view that secularism and secularization are now 
redundant; some that the post-secular represents a more modest and localized version of 
secularization; others that the post-secular is a reversal of secular trajectories (p. 12). 
Essentially, Beckford is setting these out as ideal types in a heuristic exercise, but I 
am not convinced that his survey fully highlights what is emerging as the true essence of the 
post-secular: its ambivalent, paradoxical quality. Perhaps his second type is closest to my 
own perception: of the post-secular as ‗building on‘ the secular, in which elements of secular 
modernity endure, and continue to suffuse public life, which nevertheless displays signs of 
resurgent and new expressions of religious belief and practice. But whereas he talks about 
‗building on‘ the analysis of secularization, or ‗assimilating‘ the ‗errors of secularization 
theories‘ into the academy, or ‗integrating‘ the post-secular into feminist theory, I would wish 
to stay with the dissonance between these seemingly co-existent currents of disenchantment 
and re-enchantment. So it is my intention to work within a hypothesis of the post-secular as 
an awkward and contradictory space, where – particularly in relation to religion and public 
life – significant aspects of the new context are not easily or comfortably reconcilable.  
For many, the language of the post-secular may evoke resonances with other 
concepts: post-modern, post-colonial, post-structuralist or post-human. Each of these terms 
has their own specialist discourse and complex genealogy, but one common feature appears 
to be the way in which the prefix ‗post‘ is deployed in each. Does it denote a successor phase, 
temporally or chronologically speaking, in which one epoch or paradigm follows another? Or 
is the term being deployed to question the very stability and coherence of its associated 
concept? For example, postmodern may indicate merely the era after modernity or an 
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architectural or aesthetic style after modernism – as in ‗―That was then, this is now‖‘ (Hayles 
1999, p. 6). Alternatively, it may signal the very reappraisal of the assumptions underlying 
the modern. For Bruno Latour, modernity rests on processes of categorization by which 
elements such as nature and culture, human and non-human, immanence and transcendence, 
are judged as ontologically distinctive. To acknowledge that ‗we have never been modern‘ 
(1993) is to acknowledge that the axioms of modernity are not givens but contingent upon 
particular epistemological conventions. 
Similarly, in my work on the ‗Post/Human‘ I adopted the slash or oblique precisely to 
arrest attention, to argue that it ‗should be read as an interrogative marker, a critical cue, for 
questions concerning the authors, objects and political implications of appeals to ―humanism‖ 
and ―human nature‖‘ and to expose the ‗categorical instability‘ of such terms (Graham 2002, 
pp. 36–7; Badmington 2004). The question is actually how the boundaries between humans, 
machines and nature have been established and policed. With the post-secular, therefore, it is 
open to question whether secularization has experienced a reversal, or religion a revival, 
which is because the very categories of ‗religious‘ and ‗secular‘ are themselves constructed, 
with the latter occupying a particular public space independent of ecclesiastical control, and 
through which particular fields of law, politics, welfare and human rights are established.  
 
What’s Missing? Gender and the Post-Secular7  
One way of conceiving of the post-secular is as a kind of ‗third space‘ between secular reason 
and religious revival. It certainly causes us to re-evaluate the uncritical hegemony of secular 
reason not least in the way it served to occlude the experiences, contexts and identities of 
those excluded from the Enlightenment project. Jürgen Habermas has suggested that there is 
                                                          
7
 Parts of this section first appeared as ‗What‘s Missing? Gender, Reason and the Post-
Secular‘, Political Theology 13.2 (2012), pp. 233–45. 
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something ‗missing‘ to secular reason in the shape of transcendental and metaphysical values; 
but it seems to me that we are in danger of neglecting the central role of gender – so integral 
to the conceptual and political formation of modernity – in our rethinking of the symbolic of 
the postsecular. Therefore, religion is not the only factor that‘s ‗gone missing‘ in the 
postsecular reconfiguration of religion, civic identity and the body politic, since a major 
oversight in much theorization about the post-secular has been its highly gendered character.  
As feminist theorists have long been reminding us, many of the same processes that 
gave birth to modernity‘s elevation of public reason, impartial and non-contingent 
subjectivity and models of the free, self-actualizing autonomous agent facilitated by the 
formation of liberal democracy, were not actually neutral or universal; but highly gendered. 
They rested on binary representations of women and men‘s differential nature; and they 
conceived of differential and gendered division of labour which often precluded women‘s 
claiming full humanity, let alone full and active citizenship. So gender, and women, are also 
in danger of disappearing from this new post-secular chapter in the debate about religion, 
politics and identity. 
The silence of western feminist theory on religion is surprising, but not if one 
considers the affinities, historically, between feminism and the Enlightenment and its view of 
religion as the antithesis of progress and human self-determination. Yet this is an ambivalent 
heritage, as many contemporary feminists, quick to see how postmodernism opened up 
critical spaces for the interrogation of the very constitution of modernity along gendered 
lines. Whilst post-Enlightenment first- and second-wave feminism certainly benefited from a 
modernist appeal to autonomy, freedom from external constraint and self-determination, 
postmodern feminists have highlighted the extent to which concepts of subjectivity, Reason 
and personhood were androcentric. However, what feminists have been slower to realize is 
the extent to which Enlightenment feminism also unconsciously bought into a secularist 
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agenda, with the consequent neglect on the part of most Western feminist scholarship of 
religion and theology. 
Feminist historians have long been arguing, however, that many of the same processes 
which gave birth to modernity‘s elevation of public reason, impartial and non-contingent 
subjectivity and models of the free, self-actualizing autonomous agent facilitated by the 
formation of liberal democracy, were not actually neutral or universal; but highly gendered. 
They rested on binary representations of women and men‘s differential nature; and they 
conceived of differential and gendered division of labour which often precluded women‘s 
claiming full humanity, let alone full and active citizenship. 
 
The Gendered Nature of Modernity  
As Jane Flax has observed, ‘Few writers appear to notice that the dominant stories about 
modernity and modernization have necessary but repressed or split-off gendered 
components.‘ The coherence and normativity of modernity rests on ‗what is not explicitly 
articulated or included ... upon the unacknowledged and unexcavated elements remaining 
disturbed. (1993, p. 75). (Or as I might venture, on ‗what is missing‘ from modernity‘s 
account of itself: in this context, its roots in a particular context of gender relations and 
representations). 
Flax and other feminist philosophers such as Genevieve Lloyd have identified the 
characterization of Enlightenment writers such as Kant, Hegel and Rousseau as a 
fundamentally gendered narrative about modernity, in which women and men represent 
(stand for) particular relationships to reason, self-actualization and freedom. Echoing binary 
and gendered constructions of nature and culture, body and spirit, affect and reason that can 
be traced back to Pythagoras, reason is coupled with transcendence and control over the 
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things of nature, and thus construed as the antithesis of the feminine (Lloyd 1984). The 
distinction between form and matter in Platonic and Aristotelian thought was similarly 
gendered and hierarchical, and shaped Western Christian thought to the Scientific 
Revolution. Nature has endowed the sexes with differential properties, including the 
endowments of Reason that guarantee the advancement of humanity to Enlightenment.  
Morality and virtue pertains not to the individual but to the public corporate sphere 
and universalized rational principles. In gendered terms, this externalization of the self in 
order to discover self takes place in the world beyond domestic, familial, affective 
relationships. The vision of the rational, self-actualizing subject did not extend to women, 
who were still regarded as governed by nature. If the critical power of reason dethroned 
privilege, superstition and tradition and paved the way to a new social order governed by 
principles of freedom, human perfectibility and self-improvement, then anything regarded as 
its antithesis – emotion, superstition and religion – was labelled as suspect, by virtue of its 
appeal to unexamined authority and supernatural truth. 
Women may be the guardians of the world of affect and sensuality – along with that 
of reproduction – but the advancement of reason is a male task. If men are to attain to the 
highest exercise of Reason, they must abandon the world of nature, embodiment and emotion, 
which are the preserves of women as befits their roles as carers and nurturers. By the early 
modern period, a similarly gendered demarcation of public and private is beginning to 
emerge, in which the responsibilities of women and men are separate, but complementary. 
For women to participate in the public realm would disrupt this arrangement, since private 
concerns must not threaten public virtue. Women must live vicariously through the men on 
whom they are dependent. Thus the philosophes of the Enlightenment wove an implicitly 
gendered narrative into their analysis of the relationship between the cultivation of Reason 
and the advancement of public virtue and good citizenship. This presupposes a gendered 
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subjectivity, in which the human project is all about breaking with the infantile ties with the 
maternal in order to achieve an autonomous, reasoning and independent self. 
As Flax remarks of Kant, 
 
Modernization ... depends upon and reinforces a series of splits and renunciations. 
The world is split into two private spheres: the world of work and the family and two 
public spheres: the world of scholarship/knowledge and the state ... The family guards 
children until they are able to develop the capacities of reason and autonomy. It is 
primarily a world of duty and obedience marked by the absence of reason. (1993, pp. 
80–1). 
 
Does this mean that the Enlightenment was irredeemably rooted in a gendered and patriarchal 
narrative? One answer would be that on the contrary, feminism emerged as a movement of 
modernity and, despite these critiques, it shares the core principles of Enlightenment. 
Certainly, an early feminist such as Mary Wollstonecraft called for such principles to be 
equally open to the aspirations of women, protesting against the triviality of women‘s 
ambitions and the harmful effects of their being made to bear the burdens of virtue on behalf 
of men. This was the true crime against nature. The Introduction to A Vindication of the 
Rights of Women establishes her claim to ‗consider women in the grand light of human 
creatures who, in common with men are placed on this earth to unfold their faculties.‘ 
(Wollstonecraft 1796, p. 5) 
Wollstonecraft was using the logic of Enlightenment thinking to expose its own 
contradictions. She argued that the confinement of virtue into the private and domestic sphere 
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impoverished the ambitions of the public domain, which could benefit from it. If women 
were permitted to be active citizens, they could humanize society more effectively than 
simply being restricted to domestic and intimate affairs. Both the domestic bourgeois sphere 
and the public world are distorted and one-dimensional. 
Other feminist theorists, of course, took a different view, challenging the assumptions 
underlying Enlightenment humanism, and in particular its privileging of the virtues of 
individual autonomy, of transcendent and sovereign reason and the goals of self-
actualization, not to mention its neglect of difference and context. Feminism has always been 
divided, therefore, towards the achievements of modernity and especially the legacy of the 
binary configurations of public and private, reason and affect, universalism and contingency. 
The Enlightenment, the scientific and democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century may 
have liberated humanity and emancipated individuals in the name of reason and self-
determination, but its legacy in terms of affording women the status of free and active 
citizens has been ambivalent. 
 
Feminist Critiques of Religion: Modern and Postmodern  
In its rejection of authority that rested on the power of things other than scientific evidence 
and popular consent, Reason was both source of critique and arbiter of freedom. It dethroned 
privilege, superstition and tradition and paved the way to a new social order governed by 
principles of freedom, human perfectibility and self-improvement. In commending a neutral, 
universal uncontingent public realm, the Enlightenment was politically if not theologically 
‗secular‘. Similarly, in their protest against the confinement to the private, domestic world of 
affect and piety, modern second-wave feminists saw themselves as continuing and expanding 
the Enlightenment commitment to emancipation and self-improvement. Hence much of 
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Western second-wave feminism was secular, or anti-religious, seeing religion (at least in its 
orthodox, institutional forms) as a primary source of control of women, of the defence of 
their roles as ‗natural‘ and God-given and thus as a major protagonist in perpetuating 
gendered division of labour and women‘s subordinate status to men. 
 
As the secular and rebellious daughters of the Enlightenment, feminists were raised 
on rational argumentation and detached irony. The feminist belief system is 
accordingly civic, not theistic, and is viscerally opposed to authoritarianism and 
orthodoxy. (Braidotti 2008, p. 3) 
 
But there were always exceptions to that, and from the 1960s feminist studies of religion 
attempted to reintegrate the ‗missing‘ elements of religion, theology and spirituality into 
feminist theory. It worked at developing ‗post-patriarchal (re)interpretations of religious 
texts, traditions, practices, representations and histories‘ (Reilly 2011, p. 13). Similarly, by 
the end of the twentieth century, strands of postmodern feminist theory emerged – including 
of course, feminist Continental philosophy – that did anticipate the turn to the ‗post-secular‘. 
I am thinking of the neo-Lacanian psychoanalysis of Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, not to 
mention the neo-vitalist and decidedly Catholic sensibilities of Donna Haraway‘s post-
humanist feminism. These contradicted the conventional stance of Western feminism which 
claims exclusive descent from European Enlightenment and its critique of religious autocracy 
and superstition. They may not be conventionally theistic, but they did re-introduce concepts 
of the divine, transcendence and spirituality back into mainstream feminist theory (Joy 2003; 
Jantzen 1998). 
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Nevertheless, most of the traffic between feminist theory and feminist studies of 
religion has been one-way. Sometimes, exceptions are made when it comes to considering 
women in the two-thirds world, or in acknowledging the inescapable themes of spirituality 
and faith in much post-colonial feminist and womanist thought. However, it leaves the 
default position of most Western feminism unchallenged, rendering religion and religiousness 
as the province of those ‗marked by ―religiousness as difference‖ or vis a vis contexts that 
have yet to ―modernize‖.‘ (Reilly 2011, p. 7). Such a perspective inhibits new explorations of 
how globalization affects feminism as a political project and as a movement which proclaims 
and upholds human dignity and freedom, by insisting that religion is always and everywhere 
an enemy of autonomy, authentic identity and progress. It grants little credibility or political 
credit to faith-based movements both in the West and in the global South that struggle against 
autocratic power in the name of religion. 
Yet just as Daniel Whistler and Anthony Paul Smith warn against the post-secular 
becoming a triumphalist return of reactionary theology (Smith 2010), so too we must be 
aware of the risks of the post-secular simply to become squeezed between the irresistible 
force of secularism and the immovable object of religion, especially religious 
fundamentalism. And one of the tests of that, I would argue, is the way that both can be seen 
to inscribe themselves on the bodies and lives of women. Neither position provides 
sympathetic spaces for feminism, since one promotes reason, autonomy, individualism at the 
expense of lived experiences of contingency, embodiment and spirituality, whilst the other 
seeks to limit women‘s freedom in the name of obedience to traditional or ‗natural‘ ways of 
life. 
Part of the public anxiety over Islam, for example, has been its ability to disrupt 
assumptions about a secular public sphere. The veiled Muslim woman who brings her 
religious faith into her public, civil identity is targeted and demonized as the symbol of 
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irrational fundamentalism. Judith Butler has criticized occasions when progressive causes 
have invoked secularist arguments for religious tolerance in ways that are dismissive, even 
defamatory, of religious minorities and serves as a sanction for state violence (2008). The 
spirit of human autonomy at the heart of Enlightenment, paradoxically, actually colludes with 
racist and Islamophobic politics to deny Muslim women the right of self-determination: of 
the freedom to wear or not to wear traditional Islamic dress as a gesture of self-
determination. 
 
[T]he post-secular turn challenges European feminism because it makes manifest the 
notion that agency, or political subjectivity, can be conveyed through and supported 
by religious piety, and may even involve significant amounts of spirituality. (Braidotti 
2008, p. 1) 
 
Tina Beattie has attempted to make a specifically feminist theological response to the ‗new 
atheism‘, observing that very often the ‗God‘ against whom Dawkins and co. protest has 
already been deconstructed by feminist, queer and other liberationist critiques. She describes 
the debate as ‗a small clique of white English-speaking men staging a mock battle about 
rationality and God‘ (2007, p. 10) and wonders whether the enemies and defenders of ‗good 
old God‘ are simply playing the same game, as mirror-images of one another, trying to prove 
their sexual potency.  
On the other side too, it is the bodies of women that are the sites of the resurgence of 
anti-modern religion. Issues of sexuality and abortion are frequently the signature campaigns 
for the religious right, as well as other issues that impinge on reproduction such as stem-cell 
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research (Gupta 2011). For many women around the world, then, the post-secular does seem 
to leave them between ‗a rock and a hard place‘: between the global resurgence of religion 
and multi-cultural appeals to difference and tolerance, and the imperative to protect the well-
being and self-determination of women and girls in the face of authoritarian theologies.  
Religion in the lives of women has thus been scandalously overlooked and under-
theorized within secular feminist thought. But the post-secular, with its narrative of 
contradictory co-existence of faith and reason, of religion as continuing to exercise a strong 
influence on people‘s lived experience, may bring greater freedom of analysis. More nuanced 
understanding of the complexities of what happens when faith enters the public space may 
actually rehabilitate women of faith into the body politic as active citizens capable of 
directing spiritually– and theologically-grounded reasoning toward inclusive, constructive 
and emancipatory causes. However, since the post-secular continues to call for critical, 
reflexive and nuanced accounts of the actual relationships between faith, reason, gender and 
power, it will continue to expose ways in which religion continues to be an inhibiting force 
for women, as well as a powerful source of agency.  
 
Without the prop of secularization as inevitable, and challenged by postmodern 
critiques of the oppressive discursive logic of the secular–religious binary, there is an 
onus on defenders of secularism to own its status as a purely normative political 
principle. This means clearly defining the purpose of secularism and justifying its 
operation in specified contexts. It also entails moving away from a defence of 
secularism as a foundational principle [an absolute] and refocusing attention instead 
on its place in an emancipator, inclusive account of the democratic polity. From this 
perspective, the principle of secularism is invoked to underpin the conditions of 
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human freedom, including, among other things, respect for religious pluralism (Reilly 
2011, p. 25). 
 
It has been my contention that the post-secular invites us to think about ‗what‘s missing‘ 
about secular reason; but it is also an opportunity to acknowledge and correct the (often 
hidden) gendered nature of our thinking about faith and reason, private and public, sacred and 
secular, tyranny and freedom. Just as feminist interventions into the discourse of the Western 
Enlightenment were so much a part of critical debate about the nature and trajectory of 
modernity, so now ‗post-secularism offers the opportunity more openly to discuss and expose 
the dualisms ... that have so hobbled women‘s lives, from a sociological, spatial and spiritual 
perspective.‘ (Greed 2011, p. 108) In respect of gender, the post-secular thus invites us to 
consider empirical questions about the state of religion in the world (and especially its 
mobilization in the public realm) and conceptual questions about the extent to which scholars 
have had to correct their neglect of religion in their theorizing. Analysis of post-secular 
society must make space for theorizing in a sophisticated or meaningful way about the role of 
religion in women‘s lives, and de- and recontextualizations of the relationship between 
religion, culture and gender. It will be open to religious and secular roots (if the two can be 
properly kept separate) of authoritarian abuses of power, as well as within global 
emancipatory movements and the exercise of women‘s agency. It is about the ways both 
‗faith‘ and ‗reason‘ might inform discourses around the construction of gender identity, 
relations and representations (Graham 1995). 
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Conclusion  
The secularization thesis presupposed a zero-sum game between the ‗religious‘ and the 
‗secular‘, as if they were incapable of co-existing, or even that elements of one might not 
suffuse the other. As this paradigm has come under increasing pressure, the search for an 
alternative conceptual framework has generated terms such as ‗desecularization‘, ‗re-
enchantment‘ or the ‗deprivatization‘ of religion. However, these fail to capture the 
complexity of social and cultural developments in which significant marks of religion and 
irreligion are evident, and actively shape our everyday life in varied and sometimes 
unexpected ways. 
Religion may be returning to public prominence, although some of that may reflect its 
greater degree of instrumentalization by a bureaucratic, secular state. Yet there is evidence to 
suggest that some forms of religious expression never actually went away, especially when it 
comes to its more vernacular, heterodox and non-affiliated manifestations. This has some 
significance for a study of religion in public, however, since even if it can be cited as 
evidence of the persistence of religion, it suggests that, if they endure, religious beliefs, 
practices and identities are relatively privatized and deinstitutionalized; which may still 
represent an attenuation of the public, structural profile of religion in a post-secular society. 
On the other hand, evidence for other patterns of institutional participation – trade unions, 
political parties, voluntary associations – would suggest that other parts of civil society are 
just as fragmented and fluid as religion.  
Yet this is a situation that is ‗post- secular‘ since the relative eclipse of religion under 
modernity is undeniable. As Charles Taylor argues, Westerners cannot not live, on a 
quotidian basis, often at a quite unconscious level, within the ‗immanent frame‘ of secularity. 
Similarly, at a more theoretical, intellectual level, the dominance of secularization as the 
major conceptual framework for the study of religion under the conditions of Western 
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modernity means that it cannot simply be disinvented. Any alternative approach still has to 
contend with the after-life of secularization, even as it searches for a new paradigm: 
‗Secularization is now so established that it has shaped the entire field: how agendas are set, 
research questions asked, survey questions framed, data collected and analyzed.‘ (Woodhead 
2012, p. 3)  
The difference is that now ‗the secularization thesis‘ can be seen as one perspective, 
one paradigm, amongst many. No longer a neutral lens but one way of ordering some of the 
evidence; as Woodhead observes, ‗we are dealing with something more fundamental than a 
dispute over evidence: fundamental commitments are at stake as well‘ (2012, p. 3). 
Sociologists of religion are well-known for keeping their distance from ‗normative‘ 
judgements in relation to the truth-claims of the systems they study; but here, apparently, it 
seems that advocates and opponents of secularization hold their relative positions with 
something approaching religious conviction: ‗So theories of secularization, bound up with 
secular commitments, may be just as value-laden and passionately held as theories of de-
secularization.‘ (p. 4) 
In truth, the categories of ‗secular‘ and ‗religious‘ co-exist in complex inter-
relationship: neither is unitary or monolithic; both have histories, which are mutually 
intertwined; both have genealogies that need to be traced and analysed; both serve political, 
religious and heuristic ends. Nor are the reasons for rival theories that one focuses on 
European exceptionalism, whilst the other draws upon global evidence. It is global and local, 
theoretical and conceptual (Martin 2012, pp. 376–7).  
Certainly, a world-view that is naturalistic and rational has replaced a more 
supernatural one, and modernity is characterized by empiricism, autonomy, liberalism and 
democracy. However, this is not a simplistic victory of enlightenment over ignorance. Rather, 
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religious identities can be mobilized in some times and places; religion may work to give 
meaning and purpose; it can support innovative social and cultural movements, or it can 
oppose them. But this begins to sketch a reality in which flexibility of interpretation, attention 
to context and above all to the agency of critical actors are required, in order to engender an 
analysis free of the binary and zero-sum expectations of secular/religious. ‗Once you abandon 
the idea that religion stands on a preordained downward slope, a space opens up for 
alternative modes of modernity, some religious and some not‘ (Martin 2012, p. 377). 
Linda Woodhead‘s contention is that at the height of the secularization thesis, an 
assumption that religion was irrevocably on the decline created a vacuum for many new kinds 
of religious expression to proliferate, as it were, ‗under the radar‘ of both governmental and 
theoretical attention: a diversification of religion in more non-Christian, deinstitutionalized, 
feminized, neo-liberalized directions. When circumstances conspired to render these forms 
more visible, statutory authorities had no clear strategies for managing them; and so long as 
the secularization thesis occupied the theoretical high ground, neither did the academy. This 
sense that old paradigms are no longer fit for purpose, and that new ways of thinking are 
necessary, certainly resonates with many of the issues that will inform this book and which, 
in part, inform its title of A Rock and a Hard Place. Religion is no longer privatized, but 
demands attention in the public square. The conventional settlements of establishing 
boundaries between faith and reason, sacred and secular, religion and politics, have not 
moved with the times. Yet we struggle, still, to find new, equitable and imaginative ways of 
moving forward.  
 Looking at the UK context, it is clear that the current situation is characterized above 
all by complexity and ambivalence. I am clear we are not talking about religious revival, and 
yet equally I am not convinced that the resurgence of religious discourse and practice is but a 
blip on an otherwise undisturbed trajectory of modernity. Similarly, whilst the resurgence of 
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'religion' and things of the spirit may be interpreted as posing a challenge to modernity's 
emphasis on rationality, contemporary discourses founded on the continuing triumph of 
reason and science continue to maintain a vigorous defence of secularism in many quarters. 
Religion is both more visible and invisible: more prominent and more vicarious; more elusive 
institutionally (and intellectually, theologically), and yet more cited, more pervasive. So this 
new dispensation represents significant challenges to existing assumptions about the way 
religious voices are mediated into public spaces. Faith-based organizations and secular civil 
government alike must learn to navigate a path between the ‗rock‘ of religious revival and the 
‗hard place‘ of secularism, with little in the way of established maps or rules of engagement 
to guide them. 
 
The apparent triumph of Enlightenment secularization, manifest in the global spread 
of political and economic structures that pretended to relegate the sacred to a strictly 
circumscribed private sphere, seems to have foundered on an unexpected realization 
of its own parochialism [not least what other scholars term the ‗particularism‘ of 
European secularism] and a belated acknowledgement of the continuing presence and 
force of ―public religions‖. (de Vries 2006a, p. ix) 
 
What de Vries and Sullivan underplay, however, is the paradoxical and novel nature of the 
post-secular. It is more than simply religious revival or sociological revisionism, in that it 
consists of a unique juxtaposition of both significant trends of secularism and continued 
religious decline (especially in Northern Europe), and signs of persistent and enduring 
demonstrations of public, global faith. For the post-secular defies simple talk of a reversion of 
secularization, since religious observance and participation is still on the decline – at least in 
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terms of its de-institutionalization in much of Europe – and yet vigorously resurgent; maybe 
not in the same time and the same place all at once, and often, at least as far as the West is 
concerned, indirectly via the influence of global diasporas and transnational political 
loyalties.  
One of the implications of the phenomenon of the post-secular, therefore, is that the 
conventional demarcations of ‗public‘ and ‗private‘, ‗secular‘ and ‗religious‘ are breaking 
down, along with the protocols governing the nature of public discourse and civil activism in 
liberal democracies. It is not clear, for example, that non-theological reasoning is any the less 
subjective or partial than any other form of public discourse. Similarly, the expectation that 
only people of faith might ‗bracket out‘ their deepest moral convictions is no longer viewed 
as the ideal condition for participation in political life – on the contrary, it is increasingly 
regarded as a restriction on the exercise of free citizenship. Moreover, it is the case that 
churches and other faith-based organizations have, historically, been closely involved in 
affairs of state, governance, welfare and political mobilization without violating restrictions 
on non-establishment of religion. Finally, the emergence of global religious movements that 
refuse to recognize the separation of public and private, Church and State, has highlighted the 
difference faith makes to the lives and motivations of communities and individuals. All these 
factors provide the context in which public theology carries out its work, and shapes its 
expectations, procedures and objectives – not to mention its social and cultural reception and 
effectiveness. However, there are other factors which shape public theology‘s own discourse 
and future priorities, and it is to those I shall now turn in Chapter 3. 
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Post-Secular Public Theology 
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3 
Lost in Translation? 
The Dilemmas of Public Theology 
 
The voice of God has been marginalized. Now we are being asked to enter into the 
arena of action again, but with some uncertainty about whether the voice is being 
heard in the new context.‘ (Dorey 2008, p. 43) 
 
Introduction 
Over the past two chapters, I have been tracing how the emergence of post-secular society 
signals that the conventional demarcations of ‗public‘ and ‗private‘, ‗secular‘ and ‗religious‘ 
are dissolving. With that goes a series of shifts in the relationship between the discourse and 
practices of faith and the contours of liberal citizenship. It is not a foregone conclusion, for 
example, that non-theological reasoning is any the less subjective or partial than any other 
form of public discourse. Similarly, the expectation that people of faith should suspend their 
religious convictions is increasingly regarded as symptomatic of the hollowing out of the 
moral dimensions to public debate. Furthermore, it is already the case that churches and other 
faith-based organizations have, historically, been closely involved in affairs of state, 
governance, welfare and political mobilization without violating restrictions on non-
establishment of religion. Finally, the emergence of global religious movements that 
transcend the separation of public and private, Church and State, has highlighted the 
continuing contribution of faith to the lives and motivations of communities and individuals.  
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Where does public theology stand in all this? Public theology has reached a decisive 
stage in its development – as Storrar puts it, a ‗kairos‘ moment (Storrar 2007) in terms of its 
current challenges. It faces the collapse of Christendom in the West, the loosening of ties 
between Christian observance and wider culture. Yet even if Christianity‘s ‗discursive power‘ 
(Brown 2001) is waning, other manifestations of religious influence and activism in public 
still endure. As Christendom passes away, then, public theology has to come to terms with 
the fact that it no longer speaks from a position of privilege, but also that its contribution, 
whilst not immediately comprehensible to non-theological publics, is undergoing renewed 
scrutiny. The ‗really existing dynamics of globalization cannot be grasped or guided without 
studying the relationship of faith to culture, culture to societies, and societies to the formation 
of a new public ... We need a theology wide and deep enough to interpret and guide this new 
public‘ (Stackhouse 2007a, p. 33). How, then, can public theology undertake this task of 
speaking into a plural public square? Are the conventions and assumptions on which it has 
depended appropriate to these changing times?  
Public theology sets itself two main objectives: firstly, of ‗defining and defending a 
public role for theological discourse in a religiously pluralistic society‘ against the 
privatization of religious belief; and secondly, of promoting a ‗societal commitment to 
maintaining the quality of our public life and to pursuing a common good‘ (Doak 2004, p. 9). 
So a concern for the very health of the body politic, and the cultivation of civic virtue, has 
always been at the very heart of public theology. Public theology also ‗attempts to illuminate 
the urgent moral questions of our time through explicit use of the great symbols and doctrines 
of the Christian faith‘ (Hollenbach 1976, p. 299) – of course, this is what all theology seeks to 
do in some respect, but the distinguishing feature of public theology is that it draws its 
agenda from matters of public concern beyond the Church and, similarly, seeks to 
communicate its deliberations back into wider society. As Kathryn Tanner puts it, public 
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theology rejects ‗an idea of the Christian religion that would restrict theological inquiry to 
purely spiritual questions of individual salvation‘, aiming instead ‗to draw out the 
implications of Christian symbols and doctrines for issues of general socio-economic and 
political moment‘ (1996, p. 79). However, as I shall indicate, this dual emphasis on public 
debate and Christian tradition, whilst a hallmark of public theology‘s raison d‘être, is in fact 
the focus of much discussion, and takes us to the heart of issues of theological method, 
epistemology and mission. This only serves to accentuate the relevance of questions not only 
of actual procedures of engagement but interrogations of the very theological, philosophical 
and metaphysical concepts that underpin and inform faith-based engagement in public issues. 
From where does the (public) theologian speak? How immersed does she need to be in the 
orthodoxies of the institutional Church? What is entailed in the process of ‗translation‘ from 
the doctrines and practices of the Church into the vernacular of social media, journalism, 
public policy and everyday Christian witness? Amidst the pluralism and scepticism that 
characterizes post-secular Western culture, can there be any guarantee that religious voices 
will be heeded anyway? 
As its proponents and critics would argue, in speaking to and from multiple ‗publics‘ 
– including academy, Church and society – rests ‗theology‘s strength and no little of its 
confusion‘ (Tracy 1984, p. 230). In seeking to engage with a range of contemporary ‗publics‘ 
that appear, ostensibly, more hostile to ‗religion‘ yet seemingly amenable to matters of 
‗faith‘, public theology faces particular challenges. It will be required to be more articulate 
about itself as well as being more sensitive to the realities of pluralism. How will that be 
done? Should public theology continue to communicate in the magisterial language of 
academy and institutional church bodies; or will it be more convincing to take a more 
confessional, performative turn, in the shape of the counter-cultural witness of insurgent 
grass-roots communities? In a way, this is another sense in which public theology is caught 
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between a rock and a hard place: of fidelity to its own traditions and world-views alongside 
an openness to a diverse and critical public domain. Arguably, the characteristically 
dialogical, transparent nature of public theology is all the more important given the 
emergence of cultural and religious pluralism in the context of global civil society. 
 
Origins and Characteristics  
Public theology is the study of the public relevance of religious thought and practice. It may 
variously refer to ‗a body of literature, a form of discourse, a way of doing theology and 
ethics, a tradition within the Christian church, and a field of study‘ (Breitenberg 2010, p. 4). 
It is both academic discipline and ecclesial discourse, in that it seeks to comment and critic-
ally reflect from a theological perspective on aspects of public life such as economics, 
politics, culture and media. Whilst it is important to appreciate the breadth and diversity of 
the discipline, it is also striking that there is a strong consensus as to its core features: a 
concern to relate Christian teaching to corporate, societal, as well as individual conduct; and a 
commitment to a particular kind of theological method, which is prepared to submit to the 
procedural norms of public discourse. 
Whilst the term ‗public theology‘ may have very recent currency (Marty 1974), the 
issues and activities which this particular term is trying to elaborate have, arguably, existed in 
Christian tradition since its very beginnings: in the documents of the early Church such as 
Pauline and other epistles which sought to negotiate the relationship between Church and 
world and to adjudicate for the faithful between the conflicting loyalties of Church and state. 
It has always been concerned with the Church‘s relationship to the world, to political power, 
to economic problems, to governance, to moral questions, to citizenship and national identity, 
which figure consistently throughout Christian history. 
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From the mid-twentieth century, for example, in South Africa under the Nationalist 
Apartheid regime, many of the churches were active in resistance to the State through popular 
campaigns and theological debate. Theology was not incidental to the battle for hearts and 
minds: in 1982, the Dutch Reformed Mission Church issued a ‗confession‘, proclaiming 
apartheid a heresy. In September 1985, in response to the government‘s declaration of a state 
of emergency, a group of South African churches issued the Kairos Document, which 
contrasted different types of theology according to their political function. State theology 
colludes with the status quo, primarily through a literalist reading of Romans 13; and Church 
theology relies on generalized platitudes but makes little social impact. However, ‗prophetic 
theology‘ is biblical and contextual, and harnesses a liberationist theology to issue a message 
of hope and a call to action.  
 
The Church should challenge, inspire and motivate people. It has a message of the 
cross that inspires us to make sacrifices for justice and liberation. It has a message of 
hope that challenges us to wake up and to act with hope and confidence. The Church 
must preach this message not only in words and sermons and statements but also 
through its actions, programs, campaigns and divine services. (The Kairos Document 
1985, p. Section 5.6) 
 
Post-apartheid, the South African churches have developed their public presence 
through reconstructive programmes of welfare and regeneration, accompanied by rich 
resources of theological reflection, public statements and publications (Koopman 2003, p. 4). 
It  is clear how public theology is engaged in a number of these activities at any given time. 
Within the academy, for example, study centres such as the Beyers Naude Centre for Public 
Theology in Stellenbosch are engaging many secular agencies around issues of democracy, 
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social justice, poverty, whilst other networks focus on training activists around health care, 
land use, campaigning; or theological education and Biblical literacy for lay Christians. Yet 
there is another, more congregationally-focused form of public theology, which is simply 
aimed at equipping church communities in disadvantaged areas to participate in social 
transformation, using models of theological reflection and Bible study to facilitate deeper 
consciousness of issues such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, domestic violence and land use (de 
Gruchy 2007, pp. 37–9). John de Gruchy gives examples of what he regards as good practice 
in public theology, which spans  media comment, the education of church leaders and laity in 
public affairs and the ministries of hospitality and social justice within marginalized 
communities. These, and many others, he argues, illustrate how public theology works across 
the boundaries of academy, Church and society. From these examples, de Gruchy deduces 
that the best kinds of public theology do not seek to silence other voices but to facilitate open 
and accessible dialogue; that public theology must make the connections for ordinary 
Christians between the biblical witness and contemporary issues; that it must exercise a 
preferential option for the poor, both in its praxis and its spirituality. 
One major strand of contemporary public theology originates from the United States 
of America and the work of Martin Marty at the University of Chicago, who is widely 
credited as the first person to use the term. Marty was at pains to identify a tradition in 
theological thought that was less philosophical and speculative than empirical: rooted in the 
realities of religious individuals‘ and communities‘ behaviour, and in particular in their 
characteristic engagement in public and social issues. Marty referred to the ‗public church‘, 
characterized in particular by the mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic denominations in 
the US and distinguished by a commitment to ‗relate private faith to public order‘ out of its 
own traditions and teachings. In part, this can be seen as a refusal by these churches to allow 
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the constitutional separation of Church and State to privatize religion, but also to regard 
themselves as a full and participating constituency of the body politic (1981, pp. 98–9). 
Marty also notes the significance of individual contributions to the development of a 
distinctive Christian social witness in exemplary figures such as the urban pastor and socialist 
activist Walter Rauschenbusch (1861–1918) – advocate of the ‗Social Gospel‘ in the early 
twentieth century – and the public intellectual and Christian ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–
1971) (Marty 1974). Marty‘s main concern is to distinguish between what he regards as these 
mainline Protestant traditions – plus that of the Roman Catholic John Courtney Murray – and 
evangelical traditions of personal conversion and piety. Theologically, this strand of social 
activism and comment articulated an important insight that institutions and organizations 
needed to be called to account, and that some kind of theological reflection on their role in 
shaping public affairs was needed. Christianity is more than simply about personal salvation 
or ‗spiritual‘ questions at the expense of temporal or worldly concerns. It has a public bearing 
that went further even than thinking about the ‗public‘ impact of the Church as institution, 
and reflects a conviction that it is acceptable, even essential, for theology to engage in matters 
to do with the ordering of our common life; and to be concerned with the ordering of life 
beyond the ecclesial, to embrace the whole of society; and to introduce a theological 
perspective into public debate. It is theology that speaks from within a religious tradition, 
addressing questions of public significance, seeking to influence a wider culture and helping 
to shape the way problems and policies are addressed. 
So Martin Marty is credited with bringing the term public theology into the 
vocabulary, although he, like others, would say that its hallmarks of identifying a social and 
collective dimension to the Christian Gospel, of the need to incorporate rigorous analysis of 
socio-economic conditions and of there being a ‗public‘ role for the churches and theological 
comment to contribute to the good of society, are evident in many thinkers before that. 
122 
 
Alongside the North American tradition there is a strong European, especially British, 
strand of public theology, represented by Anglicans such as William Temple, Ronald Preston 
and Rowan Williams, and Presbyterians such as Duncan Forrester and William Storrar. These 
traditions emerge markedly from the established positions of the Churches of England and 
Scotland, articulating a strong tradition of incarnational theology coupled with strong 
localism via the parochial and congregational systems. Will Storrar relates how the 
renaissance of Scottish nationalism was served by an activist public theology based at the 
University of Edinburgh. In 1989, the Church of Scotland sponsored a report on Scottish self-
government, and the churches joined with secular and non-aligned lobbies during the 
referendum on constitutional reform in 1997, which led to the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament in 1999 – which, whilst it awaited the completion of its new headquarters at 
Holyrood, met in New College, the home of the University‘s Faculty of Divinity and the 
venue for the Church of Scotland‘s General Assembly. Storrar characterizes this as a form of 
‗postmodern politics‘: peripatetic, consciously participatory, cross-party, with a deliberate 
emphasis on democratic capacity-building. The contribution of the Scottish Reformed 
tradition – theologically orthodox and politically radical (Storrar 2007, p. 19) – was a crucial 
element in forging this broad-based partnership. Storrar concludes that public theology 
should aspire to be ecumenical, global and local, rooted in global civil society as well as the 
churches, collective and inclusive, and transnational in its collaboration between its various 
international agencies (p. 25). 
The growth of a global guild of public theology has been greatly facilitated by the 
creation of the Global Network for Public Theology in 2007 and the establishment of the 
International Journal of Public Theology. Traditions from Africa, Asia, Oceania and Latin 
America are emerging with distinctive contextual approaches; but in general, they share the 
common features of investigations into the public significance of religious discourse, a 
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commitment to pluralist constituencies and contextual approaches and to render its language 
accessible to non-theological audiences (Jacobsen 2012). At the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, however, the dominance of the mainstream Protestant churches that gave birth to 
these traditions of public theology is being eclipsed by numerical decline and the 
politicization of evangelical Christianity such as New Christian Right as well as emerging 
public activism of forms of Pentecostalism in Latin America. This is one reason why we may 
have to consider the future of public theology in the face of its own diminution and 
secularizing forces as well as the pressure of alternative styles of Christian engagement. 
 
Catholic Social Thought: Common Good and Virtue  
The relationship between Roman Catholic social thought and public theology is a little more 
complicated. The democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth century, especially the French 
Revolution of 1789 represented a major privation for the Roman Catholic Church, as it saw 
its traditional privileges abolished; and this shaped the attitude of the Church to democracy 
and popular government for over a century, epitomized, perhaps, by the notorious Syllabus 
Errorum (Syllabus of Errors) issued by Pius IX in 1864, which condemned rationalism, 
communism, science, higher criticism and freemasonry. This may be explained by the greater 
ambivalence towards liberal democracy within the Roman Catholic Church, which would not 
have recognized the legitimacy of the modern state and thus failed to see why magisterial 
pronouncements would need to address secular powers. It is a matter of debate, then, as to 
whether Roman Catholic social teaching was inhibited from adopting a more ‗public‘ mode 
of discourse due to the equivocal nature of its attitude toward modernity, liberalism and 
democracy. 
Nevertheless, the beginnings of an identifiable tradition of Papal social teaching may 
be traced to the publication in 1891 of the encyclical Rerum Novarum, in which, in response 
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to industrialization and the exploitation being endured by industrial workers, Pope Leo XIII 
called for major changes in the socio-economic order and for the recognition of workers‘ 
rights and trade unions. After 1891, an identifiable tradition of Catholic social thought (rather 
than the terminology of public theology) emerges, communicated in the main through Papal 
encyclicals but also present in regional Bishops‘ documents, including those from the Latin 
American Bishops‘ gatherings in Medellin in 1968 and Puebla in 1979 (Hennelly 1990). We 
should not forget, however, the influence of Roman Catholic teaching in many European 
countries such as Holland, Germany, France, and Austria upon Christian democratic parties 
and trade unions, as well as the writings of public intellectuals such as John Courtney Murray 
and the influence of Roman Catholic pressure groups. All this represents a significant 
resource for the churches, ecumenically speaking, in relation to matters of economics, politics 
and culture, and some of the features of CST are worthy of note at this stage.  
In contrast to earlier documents castigating modernist thought and secular institutions, 
Rerum Novarum offers a more measured evaluation of the particulars of political and 
economic life, advancing ‗an increasingly clear analysis of human rights and responsibilities, 
the positive role of the state and the importance of civic organizations‘ (Carr 2012, p. 239). A 
recurrent thread in this and subsequent encyclicals is the repudiation of the extremes of 
unregulated power on the part either of the state or the market. This was a theme notable, 
particularly, in the encyclicals of John Paul II (Laborem Exercens, 1981 and Centesimus 
Annus, 1991). 
CST advocates the doctrine of ‗subsidiarity‘ as a way of valuing mediating 
institutions and as representing an important principle to ensure full participation in social 
institutions (Ivereigh 2010, pp. 168–9). It has also traditionally manifested a decidedly 
personalist emphasis which places high premium on human dignity (pp. 21, 162–3). By dint 
of humanity‘s created, interdependent nature, human flourishing assumes a decidedly 
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interpersonal rather than individualistic quality. In contrast to modern, liberal, contractual 
conceptions of justice, for example, CST has argued that it is rooted in the reality of our 
common humanity and interdependence and is hence about pursuing a flourishing common 
life. In light of such a theological anthropology, politics cannot be merely about facilitating 
private choice or individual freedom. Rather, it is about building up a flourishing common 
life in which everyone can share in public goods; and the task of Church, civil society and 
state alike is to cultivate public and intrapersonal virtues in such a way that all citizens realize 
– in both senses of the word – such a vision of the common good (Hornsby-Smith 2006).  
To obey the imperatives of God‘s justice, Christians draw on visions of the good 
which inform discourses of public life. This entails the formation of people of civic virtue 
who hold fast to this vision and who embody – incarnate – it in their lives. In collaboration 
with others of good will, Christians are called to participate in the practices of shaping 
opinion and policy making. However, a consistent thread is the insistence that the social 
teaching of the Church has little credibility unless it is translated into action (Ivereigh 2010, 
pp. 28–30). 
In contemporary terms, therefore, many of the features of Roman Catholic social 
thought would seem familiar to Protestant and Reformed public theologians: whether it can 
be restricted to the pronouncements of the magisterium, or official church authorities, or 
whether it exists in the writings of public intellectuals and consciences of politicians; the 
significance it affords to the grass-roots activism of congregations; and the acknowledgement 
given to the natural and social sciences in shaping theological reflection on matters of 
economics, poverty, bioethics and medical research, marriage and sexuality, and so on (Davis 
2011). 
However, since the Second Vatican Council, CST has articulated theological and 
ecclesiological understandings which reflect a greater ‗respect for the legitimate autonomy of 
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other social institutions .... acceptance of some responsibility for the well-being of the wider 
society ... commitment to work with other social institutions in shaping the common good of 
the society‘ (Himes 1993 , p. 2). This is especially evident in documents such as Gaudium et 
Spes, in which there is an essential affinity between ‗the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the 
anxieties of the men [sic] of this age especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted …‘ 
and ‗… the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ.‘ (Gaudium et 
Spes, section 1). 
Such theology acknowledges the presence of God at work in history as well as within 
the Church, as well as prefiguring the later emphasis within theologies of liberation of the 
‗preferential option for the poor‘. Similarly, Pacem in Terris (1963) is framed in the language 
of natural law and addresses itself not simply to the Church but to all people of goodwill. It is 
widely held, however, that since the accession of Benedict XVI, the Church has moved 
further towards an exclusivist position, in which the Church is the primary mediator of 
revelation and moral guidance (Verstraeten 2011). Nevertheless, documents such as Deus 
Caritas Est (2007) still stress that the function of CST is to educate the consciences of the 
faithful and to offer principles by which a just social and economic system might be ordered.  
An example of contemporary Roman Catholic social teaching at work may be seen in 
the substance of the document issued by the Catholic Bishops‘ Conference of England and 
Wales in advance of the last General Election in the UK (Bishops‘ Conference of England 
and Wales 2010). Choosing the Common Good was prepared primarily for the ordinry lay 
voter but also, as Archbishop Vincent Nicholls comments in his Preface, to introduce wider 
society to some basic tenets of Roman Catholic social teaching. Typically of much public 
theology, then, this is a report by church leaders addressed to Church and nation. In its 
diagnosis of the banking crisis of 2007–8, the Report argues that above all it was the 
breakdown in trust that brought the global economy to its knees. In that respect it corresponds 
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with much of Catholic social thought in its critique of unregulated institutions in pursuit of 
profit with no heed for the human implications. In response, the Bishops argue that society as 
a whole needs to ‗rediscover the centrality of personal responsibility and the gift of service to 
others.‘ (Bishops‘ Conference of England and Wales 2010, p. 8) 
The report argues that the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church contains the 
concept of the ‗common good‘ which can assist in this moral reorientation. This is a rich 
tradition of Christian social ethics, not confined to the Catholic tradition, but in this context it 
is interesting to see how the Bishops frame it within a wider context of natural law and virtue 
ethics. The common good expresses the highest flourishing of all people (as a collective), 
echoing the philosophers‘ understanding of the life best-lived as that which aspires to attain 
the fulfilment of our deepest nature as God‘s creatures. Thus we are interdependent with one 
another, and it follows therefore that any pursuit of the common good will enhance the bonds 
of solidarity and mutuality, countering the corrosive effects of atomism and self-interest.  
 
A society that is held together just by compliance to rules is inherently fragile, open to 
further abuses which will be met by a further expansion of regulation. This cannot be 
enough. The virtues are not about what one is allowed to do but who one is formed to 
be. They strengthen us to become moral agents, the source of our own actions ... The 
Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity root our human growth in the gifts of God 
and form us for our ultimate happiness: friendship with God. (Bishops‘ Conference of 
England and Wales 2010, p. 12)  
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To be schooled in the virtues of the common good is about more than abiding by moral rules. 
Rather, it is to learn the habits of the good life, and to internalize them so that we are 
independent of external regulation. The virtues of prudence, courage, justice and temperance 
serve as antidotes to a culture of hedonism, opportunism and atomism; and although the 
Report does not take this route, one is left to assume, I think, along with other proponents of 
virtue ethics, that the practices of faith and immersion in a community with traditions, core 
precepts and distinctive ways of life, are the means by which such a habitus of faith is 
communicated. 
This is reminiscent of the spirit of Vatican II, in terms of articulating a framework 
within which secular vocation of the laity might be formed. Yet in turn, it places the onus on 
the institutional church, via such instruments as its catechetical formation, to be serious about 
equipping people for this kind of citizenship. We might want to question, however, whether a 
Church that models a hierarchical and centralized model of authority and obedience would 
ever see that the cultivation of a greater moral autonomy might also be the logical outcome of 
such an understanding of virtue. Nevertheless, Choosing the Common Good also models 
other classic features of contemporary public theology in that it sets out its stall on the basis 
of a central tenet of Christian (in this case Roman Catholic) social teaching, but in such a way 
as to establish common territory with a wider tradition of moral philosophy which is, 
currently, also rediscovering the language of virtue in relation to political economy (Sandel 
2010; Stiglitz 2009). 
The Report gestures towards other traditional bulwarks of Roman Catholic moral 
teaching, such as abortion, marriage and the family which in stand in stark contrast to the 
generally progressive flow of mainstream public opinion. This might lead us to ask, whose 
‗common good‘ is being upheld, exactly? Is it negotiable, or even discernible beyond the 
boundaries of a particular tradition, or enshrined simply within the outworkings of extant 
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tradition? Here, therefore, are areas in which there would be clear conflict over the precise 
substance of the ‗common good‘; and unless such contradictions were confronted, the term 
can only remain at the level of a fairly abstract moral axiom with little actual purchase on 
specific matters of policy. Nevertheless, this example of recent public theology in the UK 
gives some demonstration of an intervention into a public process from an institutional 
Church that counts itself as part of the wider civil society yet acknowledges the importance of 
speaking from its own tradition, and which sees the report as contributing to the cultivation of 
moral discernment and civic vocation amongst its own members. 
 
The Scope of Public Theology 
Public theology takes place in a variety of contexts and has a range of practitioners. In our 
short book on urban theology, Stephen Lowe and I identified three main genres: ‗the type of 
public theology that engages with issues of public policy from a faith-based perspective‘, 
such as church reports or public statements; ‗the processes of guidance or formation that 
equip Christians … to exercise faithful witness in relation to the secular world‘: directed 
more, perhaps, to an internal audience of church members who wish to reflect theologically 
on matters of public issues; and the ‗study of how a faith-commitment might [in]form the 
public conduct of politicians‘ and other public figures: in other words, how private conviction 
transforms into public policy (Graham and Lowe 2009, pp. 4–5). 
Writing from the South African context, Dirkie Smit identifies three modes of 
understanding and practising public theology: that ‗related to the public sphere in the sense of 
a normative vision underlying contemporary democratic life in democratic societies‘; a 
second strand which focuses more on practical activism, ‗ranging from reflection on and 
active involvement in church, state and politics (such as apartheid) to faith, theology and 
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economic life‘ (Smit 2007b, pp. 443–5), with particular emphasis on the role of Marty‘s 
‗public church‘ in civil society and social action. Thirdly, is ‗nothing more than a value-free 
description of the fact that they have specific publics in mind in their theological activities‘ – 
a more comprehensive area, denoting any kind of theological comment that has a public 
bearing or audience (p. 446). 
E. Harold Breitenberg, similarly, identifies writing by theologians and church leaders; 
work that defines and refines the discipline itself (such as this volume); and a more normative 
and constructive element, intended to facilitate forms of individual and congregational 
witness. Rather than thinking about its authors or practitioners, other writers focus more on 
the various functions of public theology. Max Stackhouse speaks variously of the normative, 
constructive and critical or apologetic modes of public theology; and of the three-fold task of 
‗defining the operating values and norms that dominate a social or cultural ethos …‘ 
determining ‗what values and norms are right‘ and the constructive dimension of ‗calling 
upon people to enter into the reconstruction of the social or cultural ethos‘ (Stackhouse 
2007a, p. 231).  
In delineating the various sub-genres of public theology in this way, Stackhouse holds 
open the possibility that one particular expression of public theological practice – such as a 
church report or programme of social action – might itself have a variety of modes of address 
and function: from an interpretative or diagnostic stage, to a critical and normative voice as 
well as prescriptive or constructive dimensions. This also corresponds quite well to other 
fields such as practical theology and theologies of liberation, which articulate a methodology 
of ‗practice–theory–practice‘ or the four-fold model of the Pastoral Cycle, based on a 
hermeneutic of ‗see–judge–act‘. In turn, this alerts us to the importance of holding together 
modes of critical and constructive discourse as well as blending the modes of critical, textual 
debate and comment with that of performative praxis in a synthesis of ‗theologically 
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grounded and informed interpretations of and guidance for institutions, interactions, events, 
circumstances, policies and practices, both within and outside the church‘ (Breitenberg 2003, 
p. 64). This is also evident in the way in which, increasingly, a perspective of virtue ethics is 
informing the work of public theologians (thus linking with perspectives in pedagogy and 
practical theology) by which ordinary persons of faith may be equipped theologically to read 
‗the signs of the times‘ and apprehend a larger set of meanings amidst economic, cultural, 
political and global trends (Schweiker 2010; Paeth 2010). 
 
Whose Public? 
When public theologians talk about the ‗public‘ it is not synonymous with party politics or 
simple matters of government. Rather, as Max Stackhouse put it, ‗the public is prior to the 
republic‘, since ‗the moral and spiritual fabric of civil society is and should be more 
determinative of politics than politics is for society and religion‘ (2007a, p. 101; see also 
Tippett 2004). Public theology is more comprehensive than political theology, since the well-
being of societies rests on more than matters of State and encompasses the economy, legal 
systems, voluntary and charitable activity, media and , crucially, faith-based organizations. If 
political theology is concerned with political processes and institutions and the relationship 
between models of temporal authority and divine rule, public theology seeks to interpret the 
moral, metaphysical and theological dimensions of a society‘s economic, cultural and 
intellectual milieu. In that respect, it is concerned with the material realities of social 
institutions and a sphere of normative ideals, constituted by informed public opinion, 
characterized by freedom of speech and expression; a ‗specifically discursive sphere of 
interchange in civil society … the sort of deliberation in common that shapes a responsible 
citizenry‘ (Tanner 1996, p. 80).  
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In considering the scope of the ‗public‘ itself, the most influential voice for public 
theology has been David Tracy, who identified the task of Christian theology as addressing 
three distinct constituencies, or ‗publics‘: Church, society and the academy. Writing in 1981 
about the ‗social portrait of the theologian‘ he argued that all theology emerges from a 
number of contexts to which the theologian is accountable. The pluralism of modern society 
requires anyone, including the theologian, to take into account a variety of perspectives and 
sources on the nature of human understanding, what makes a good society, how people will 
make moral decisions and so on.  
Because of this diversity of constituencies, it is a fallacy, then, to believe that 
theology is ‗solely a self-expression of the church‘s own self-understanding‘ (Tracy 1984, p. 
230). Theology, as talk about God, endeavours to speak about the whole of reality – even 
when these different publics are difficult to reconcile – because it is asking profound and 
enduring questions. Theology is not only preoccupied with interpreting its own classics for 
the sake of the tradition itself, but to interpret the religious dimensions of a culture ‗at the 
limits of human inquiry and human experience‘ (p. 232). These are questions that all 
individuals and all cultures ask themselves, and religious classics represent one major source 
of a response to such ‗limit-questions‘. 
 
The pluralism of cultural worlds has enriched us all with new visions of our common 
lives and new possibilities for an authentic life. Yet it does so at a price we can 
seldom face with equanimity. For each of us seems to become not a single self but 
several selves at once. Each speaks not merely to several publics external to the self 
but to several internal publics in one‘s own reflections on authentic existence. The 
fundamental questions are indeed questions by and to a single one. An individual 
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answer, however passionate or tentative, is ultimately also singular and deeply 
personal. Yet the addressees of our reflections, including the conflicts of the 
addressees in each self, are several. (1981, pp. 4–5) 
 
Tracy's concern for the public character of theology is motivated by his perception that 
religion, like much of culture, has become so privatized in contemporary life that theology 
has been confined to, or retreated into, a world of interiority, or ‗reservations of the spirit‘ (p. 
13). But resistance to such privatization is impelled by the ‗universal character of the divine 
reality‘, that is the ‗God as understood by the Jewish, Christian and Muslim believer, [who] is 
either universal in actuality or sheer delusion … Any authentic speech on the reality of God 
which is really private or particularist is unworthy of that reality‘ (p. 51). So, religion is never 
simply a matter of personal or private devotion. It carries over into the believer‘s life in all 
aspects of the public domain, such as economics, civil society, the State and culture. 
Similarly, if ‗public‘ is anathema to notions of a spiritualized, privatized faith for the 
individual, the corollary is an emphasis on the significance of religion‘s impact on public 
discourse: 
 
… theology, while related to intensely personal commitments and to a particular 
community of worship, is, at its most profound level, neither merely private nor a 
matter of distinctive communal identity. Rather, it is an argument regarding the way 
things are and ought to be, one decisive for public discourse and necessary to the 
guidance of individual souls, societies, and, indeed, the community of nations. 
(Stackhouse 2006, p. 165)  
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Like David Tracy (1981), Max Stackhouse insists on the ‗public-ity‘ of theology. In a 
pluralist (and increasingly globalizing) culture, theology must address multiple publics. To 
Tracy‘s three publics, Stackhouse adds a fourth public, of economics and the market, and 
summarizes these four areas of public life as respectively concerned with ‗holiness, justice, 
truth and creativity‘. These are values implicit in the theological canon which public theology 
seeks to promote in relation to these various publics of Church, society, academy and market 
(2006, p. 166). The first of the publics, ‗holiness‘ corresponds to Tracy‘s ‗church‘, and refers 
to the ‗authentic religious public‘, and the theological questions here concern the nature and 
content of religious teaching: ‗What can and should be preached and taught among those who 
seek faithful living and thinking according to the most holy, and thus the most 
comprehensive, righteous, and enduring, reality to which humans can point‘ (p. 166)? This is 
a theology that addresses communities of faith, and considers how their members may be 
nurtured in their vocations in relation to their lives as voters, volunteers, campaigners, 
parents, students, consumers, workers?  
Secondly, is justice, pertaining to the ‗political‘ public, and again the theological 
issues at stake relate to the values – ‗the moral and spiritual fiber‘ (p. 166) – by which a 
healthy civil society might be maintained. ‗What can provide those in authority with a vision 
of and motivation for just institutions in society so that the common life can flourish‘ (p. 
166)?  
Thirdly is the ‗academic public‘ – and note that this is the realm of ‗truth‘, and the 
Church – which is the forum for mutual, critical dialogue amongst scholars. ‗What can offer 
reasons and withstand critical analysis, offering convincing arguments, warrants, and 
evidence for the positions it advances in the context of serious dialogue amongst scholars?‘ 
(p. 166)  
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A fourth public, of economic life, addresses questions of labour, work and production: 
‘What allows human life to flourish, to be relieved of drudgery, and to contribute to material 
well-being by encouraging creativity in production and distribution?‘ (p. 166) – to which we 
might add, ‗consumption‘ as a critical focus for our incorporation into late modernity‘s 
further ‗publics‘ of consumerism, media and leisure. In keeping with Stackhouse‘s concern 
for the impact of globalization on economics and civil society, too, it may be necessary to 
consider the global aspects of all forms of ‗creativity‘ as a matter for public theology.  
Overall, however, public theology itself recognizes the pluralism and autonomy of 
these domains of the public in contemporary society. We can see, then, how far such a 
sensibility has travelled from any kind of assumption that public theology operates in an era 
of Christendom, since it demonstrates a respect for autonomy of political processes and 
public domain whilst being prepared to share responsibility for building and sustaining a 
healthy public realm – perhaps in theory (by asking questions about the nature of 
participation, pluralism, what makes a good society); and in practice (by nurturing the virtues 
of effective citizenship amongst Christians and others). Certainly, public theology seeks to 
influence public debate, whilst maintaining awareness of pluralist nature of society. It is not 
about trying to ‗convert‘ non-Christians or to impose an ecclesial monopoly or theocracy on 
society.  
Dirkie Smit also adopts a four-fold definition of public life, to encompass politics, 
economics, civil society and public opinion (increasingly, managed through various forms of 
media) (2007b). He is following Habermas‘ demarcation of four spheres of the democratic 
public: formal institutions and processes of governance, including political parties, judiciary, 
civil service, regulatory agencies appointed by the state; the market and labour, what 
Habermas terms the ‗customers‘; the ‗suppliers‘, or voluntary and community organizations; 
and fourthly, public opinion. Sebastian Kim further elaborates on this, to advance six 
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dimensions of the public: state, media, market, religious bodies, academy and civil society 
(2011, p. 13). The interactions between these different spheres will be complex and 
contextually determined; but it serves further to highlight the extent to which public theology 
increasingly speaks into and is itself shaped by, multiple and changing constituencies. These 
are subject to a range of factors that include the activities of transnational corporations and 
non-governmental organizations, transcontinental patterns of migration and diaspora, as well 
as local economic factors and expressions of civil society.  
 
The ‘Oscillating’ Public Sphere 
Any attempt to define the prevailing use of the terminology of the ‗public‘ in public theology 
must take account of debates about its very coherence. Like definitions of the secular, it is a 
constructed and contingent category. As I argued in Chapter 2, modern assumptions about the 
scope of the public have been much criticized by feminist scholars, who argued that the 
public–private distinction was often overlain with gendered assumptions which implicitly 
enshrined unequal power relations and established a political and cultural ontology of gender 
that assigned women and men to separate spheres, thereby making it problematic for women 
to achieve full and equal agency in public life. 
As I have already argued, the gendering of public and private formed part of the 
configuration of modernity and one of the processes of the post-secular reconfiguration is to 
challenge the automatic conceptual and political alignments of women with the private, 
familial, domestic and non-political. Yet in practical terms, public theology has yet fully to 
integrate a constructive feminist analysis into its canon in such a way as to privilege women‘s 
voices and perspectives. The issue of women‘s rights in Church and society is clearly of 
relevance to public theology, but it is something that has attracted comparatively little 
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attention until recently (McIntosh 2007). As Heather Walton memorably argued, Duncan 
Forrester‘s dismissal of some forms of theology as only interested in the ‗domestic 
housekeeping‘ (Forrester 2001, p. 127) affairs of the churches may represent a robust rebuttal 
of a particular kind of ecclesial introversion, but it unconsciously adopts a gender bias 
whereby ‗the public is often differentiated from the feminized environment of both the 
church and the domestic sphere‘ (Walton 2010, p. 31).  
In general, the various categories of ‗public‘ deployed by public theologians have 
tended to follow a broadly Habermasian route, in which the emergence of the modern, 
democratic public sphere depends on the creation of a specific sphere of activity, the ‗life-
world‘, free of colonization by the market or the state. Yet that, too, may be changing with 
late modernity, as the boundaries between production, reproduction, symbolic and material 
activity, between the state, the market and civil democracy, interpenetrate. Discussion of the 
relationship between the ‗public‘ and the ‗private‘ often uses metaphor in order to express the 
distinction and to emphasize its binary nature. These include a contrast between that which is 
hidden or withdrawn and that which is revealed and accessible (Weintraub 1997b, pp. 4–6). 
Alternatively, Sheehan characterizes the dichotomy in terms of knowledge and disclosure 
about an individual, and the extent to which ‗others have limited access to information about 
them, to the intimacies of their lives, to their thoughts or bodies‘ (2002, p. 22) 
Whilst our particular notions of public and private emerged as a result of the 
formation of particular institutions such as the state, capitalism and the individual within 
modernity, understandings of the two as distinct realms is not unique to contemporary 
society. For example, Hannah Arendt‘s work highlighted the distinction between the public 
and the private as a fundamental feature of Classical Greece (1958). However, participation 
in the bios politikos was only open to adult males, and not women or slaves, and this gives us 
a clue to its roots in the material circumstances of political economy and the division of 
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labour. For the Ancient Greeks, the relationship between public and private emerged from the 
rise of the city state, which enabled people to conceive of a life apart from and beyond their 
domestic and familial life in the household (oikos). For Arendt, this corresponded with a 
distinction between the realm of work and labour on the one hand and that of action on the 
other. The realm of the oikos was driven by the basic necessities of survival: of material 
subsistence, of producing and reproducing human life. According to Arendt, the private 
sphere was understood in terms of its very ‗privation‘: it was deficient in those things that 
made us truly human, which rested in a capacity to transcend natural needs and contingencies 
and to achieve self-determination and freedom (Arendt 1958, p. 58ff; Weintraub 1997b, pp. 
10–12). 
As Europe‘s economy developed from an agrarian, subsistence pattern into industrial 
capitalism, the relationships between public and private spheres, the organization of 
production and the nature of political life began to shift. From the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, activities that had once been carried out in the confines of the household and the 
family transferred into new social spaces of production, differently regulated, and creating 
new social classes and interest groups. The burgeoning capitalist economy was supported by 
new economic forms of regulation, such as the market and capital investment – banking, 
entrepreneurs and profit-holders – as well as the development of the modern nation-state. Yet 
the early modern period was also characterized by the development of a new commons of 
public information, opinion and debate, such as newspapers, tracts and journals: which, as the 
history of the popular press at this time has documented, was not just for the political and 
economic elite. This represented an intermediate ‗public‘ space between the state and the 
market and the private realm of the family and consisted of citizens, who, of course, 
understood themselves increasingly according to the workings of the state, concepts of 
suffrage and the vicissitudes of the economy. 
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This is the context for Jürgen Habermas‘ work on the origins of the public sphere in 
early modernity, which he understands as a distinctive communicative space characterized by 
dialogue and open debate. It owes much to the Classical Greek notions of the bios politikos 
set apart from the world of necessity and aspiring to an ideal of civic virtue by means of the 
exercise of reason and freedom of expression. Yet as well as its gendered dimensions, such a 
model of the autonomous, democratic public square presupposes that the commonwealth of 
communicative reason is free and open to democratic control, and that the space of civil 
society is free from the encroachments of either state or market. When it comes to debating 
the nature of free expression in contemporary global society, however, it is clear that politics 
and media alike are vulnerable to government control and commercialization. Is the ‗public‘ 
therefore losing its independence, and disappearing into the pocket of the market than 
remaining in the open space of democratic civil society? ‗Critical debate among citizens is 
replaced by a staged debate in a studio that is carried out in their name.‘ (p. 55) 
The classical model of the relationship between public and private may need to be 
significantly rethought in order to accommodate the role of communications media as not just 
reflecting or reporting news but actually constructing the very nature of ‗public‘ debate; 
indeed the constitution of the public sphere itself: 
 
This idea of the private sphere as a physical space like the home – an idea that was 
integral to the way that the Ancient Greeks thought about the private realm – is 
unsustainable in a world where information and communication technologies have 
transformed the ways that information is disseminated, accessed and controlled. (p. 
62) 
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When we begin to consider the various ‗publics‘ into which public theology may be speaking 
and intervening, then, we may need to be aware of the extent to which they are fluid and 
contested. It may require us to think again about the integrity of Jürgen Habermas‘ 
democratic communicative space of the public realm, which may be vulnerable to incursion 
and adulteration by the state and the market – and increasingly bear the imprints of global 
capital.  
Unfortunately, the autonomy of the public realm and the viability of civil society as 
an independent space of active citizenship appears increasingly compromised in late capitalist 
post-welfare societies. Robert Putnam‘s analysis in Bowling Alone suggested that within the 
voluntary associations of civil society in the US, patterns of participation and activism are on 
the wane. Hardt and Negri argue that a symptom of late capitalism is the whole-scale 
privatization of public space, such as the conversion of urban plazas to shopping malls and 
community housing to gated settlements (2000). This is not just about the restriction of 
movement, but the way in which many public services (such as hospitals, prisons, schools 
and leisure facilities) are falling under the auspices of commercial providers. The market is 
being used to manage demand for public goods such as health, education and social care. 
Michael Sandel refuses to accept this trend as merely a matter of fiscal convenience, but 
regards it instead as a moral issue, which denotes ‗the corrosive tendency of markets‘ (2012, 
p. 8). To put a price on everything reduces any statement of public value to a purely monetary 
one. It fails to acknowledge any sense of a society‘s public goods as transcending the status 
of commodities and eventually undermines the nature of democratic society itself. He invites 
us to consider 
 
what‘s troubling about a world in which market thinking and market relationships 
invade every human activity. To describe what‘s disquieting about this condition, we 
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need the moral vocabulary of corruption and degredation. And to speak of corruption 
and degredation is to appeal, implicitly at least, to conceptions of the good life. (pp. 
186–7) 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter in his discussion of the post-secular, however, 
Habermas has been one of the main theorists concerned to challenge the hegemony of the 
global market, insisting upon the necessity of a robust public sphere in countering the 
ideology of neo-liberalism. Indeed, it is the amorality of the global market, plus its apparent 
inability to save itself from imminent collapse, that leads him to turn to religious values as 
one potential source of alternative global values. Thus, for Habermas, the notion of the 
communicative public sphere gains renewed relevance as a means of alleviating the worst 
symptoms of neo-liberalism and globalization. Yet it would appear that the capacity of civil 
society as a buffer-zone between the forces of the state and the market is itself under 
pressure.  
Whilst writers such as Habermas have indicated how our experiences of public and 
private were the products of modernity, and especially the by-products of particular modern 
forms of assembly or public literature, therefore, it also needs to be remembered that these 
spheres and the demarcation between them continue to evolve not only in the light of new 
forms of political economy but in the face of new technologies, such as computer-mediated 
communication. Indeed, some scholars suggest that computer-mediated communications may 
be ‗eroding the boundaries between ―publicity‖ and ―privacy‖ in fundamental ways‘ 
(Weintraub 1997a, p. xi) 
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Computer-Mediated Communications and Democracy 
Let us continue, then, to consider how the acceleration of virtual technologies and computer-
mediated communications are reshaping understandings of what is hidden or private; how the 
postmodern, post-secular citizen is constituted as an actor in the public domain; what forces 
mediate such action and participation; how this impacts on our sense of self and self-in-
relation; whether concepts such as a political commons or shared space of dialogue is 
possible. To begin with, it is one thing to say that the boundaries between the public and 
private are shifting and another to argue that they no longer exist, or are meaningless. 
However, it may be that we are entering a time in which – rather like the boundaries between 
the sacred and the secular – inherited conventions governing the fault-lines between the 
public and the private are being displaced by new understandings, new practices of everyday 
life, requiring us to learn a new vocabulary of public and private in relation to self and 
society. It means that we need to give more attention to the ways in which shared spaces of 
communicative and deliberative exchange are constituted, how decisions shape our lives and 
where they are made and by whom, and the impact of emergent technologies upon all that. 
We may need to turn our attention, therefore, away from a model of political 
engagement as equated with the conventions of parliamentary democracy with its 
infrastructure of voter behaviour, party membership, political campaigning and so on, and 
focus instead on a more less centralized and formalized understanding of the practices of 
citizenship, 
 
more attuned to the potential changing perceptions of citizens less inclined to be 
dutiful and open instead to a more personalized and self-actualizing notion of 
citizenship … The playful repertoires of innovative YouTube videos, mobile texting 
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language, protest music and the celebration of trivia may all be regarded as aspects of 
the political. (Loader 2011, p. 761) 
 
In particular, there is the question of whether new technologies really enable 
alternative grass-roots perspectives to emerge as significant opinion-formers, or whether 
public debate, including the internet and social media, is still dominated by corporate 
interests, dictated not by considerations of a truly autonomous public sphere but by the 
imperatives of the market. Joanna Redden‘s research into media representations of global 
poverty and discussions of international aid and development in Canada and the UK suggests 
that although the overwhelming bias is towards corporate, neo-liberal solutions, there are 
discursive spaces in which social media and other online networking can infiltrate public 
consciousness in order that the voices of those at the grass-roots may be better represented 
(2011). 
Another question is whether new technologies help to build up a broader constituency 
of politically involved citizens. Henrik Serup Christensen and Asa Bengtsson‘s research in 
Finland concludes that it is more the case that it is those who are already politicized and 
actively involved who are extending their campaigning strategies into online domains; but 
evidence suggests that these campaigns are then recruiting new participants, thus broadening 
in a limited but tangible way, the scope of political engagement (2011). 
This debate is about levels and modes of participation in a realm of politics and civil 
society, albeit requiring a degree of reorientation on our part concerning what is meant by the 
‗political‘. But it may be important to consider how understandings of ‗public‘, and our very 
identities as premised on a clearly-demarcated distinction between public and private, may be 
changing. The evolution of communication from print to radio and television to the internet 
and social networking, has altered the very nature of the public, the private and the relations 
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between them; and of public communication from that of ‗broadcasting‘ to more interactive 
and decentralized modes. Both the public and the private have been reconstituted as spheres 
of information and debate that are largely detached from physical locales and identifiable, 
authoritative sources, creating a much more fluid situation in which the boundaries between 
public and private are blurred, porous and subject to constant negotiation. A world in which 
communication, identity and the management of information is simultaneously ‗publicly 
private and privately public‘ (Lange 2007) evokes our experiences of an inversion of our 
inner, private and public, visible selves. Social networks such as Facebook, MySpace and 
YouTube are formed through the linking of personal profiles into sprawling social webs of 
connection, making personal information publicly available to a potentially infinite range of 
contacts. This is the way we manage our identity, public persona and private relationships, 
which may be intimate but never, online, completely ‗private‘.  
 
Globalization  
As public theology develops its global and multi-cultural perspectives, it is concentrating 
more on the faith-based aspects of global civil society and on the praxis of grass-roots 
organizations across cultural and religious boundaries, often in global urban contexts. It is 
thus well-placed to consider how religious belief and affiliation, perhaps uniquely, is 
expressed and reconfigured within the interstices of local, national and global currents 
(Beaumont 2011). Globalization has become the new context within which all future 
priorities of public theology will be determined (Storrar 2011). The demonstrations in Seattle, 
USA in December 1999 were largely responsible for bringing the term ‗globalization‘ to 
public attention. They also represented the first showings of sustained critique of 
globalization, which have perhaps been most graphically continued by the worldwide 
‗Occupy‘ movements in 2011 which mobilized against global finance and the subordination 
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of other economic and political priorities in favour of corporate bail-outs in the face of bank 
insolvency (Rieger 2012).  
Sociologists such as Roland Robertson and Anthony Giddens define globalization as 
an ideal type in terms of the compression of space and time in the face of new technologies 
and transport infrastructure. Yet the prominence of the ‗global‘ also conditions what is 
happening at the local and national:  
 
Globalization can be located on a continuum with the local, national and regional. At 
one end of the continuum lie social and economic relations and networks which are 
organized on a local and/or national basis; at the other end lie social and economic 
relations and networks which crystallize on the wider scale of regional and global 
interactions. Globalization can be taken to refer to those spatial–temporal processes of 
change which underpin a transformation in the organization of human affairs by 
linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents. Without 
reference to such expansive spatial connections, there can be no clear or coherent 
formulation of this term. … A satisfactory definition of globalization must capture 
each of these elements: extensity (stretching), intensity, velocity and impact. (Held 
1999, p. 15) 
 
The development of the global economy is associated with the rise of trans-national 
corporations and multi-national trade and fiscal agreements such as the European Union, the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Whilst 
globalization might be considered as a product of economic drivers, however, it has 
widespread cultural dimensions, in terms of global communications, tourism and population 
migration. In 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified four basic aspects of 
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globalization: trade and transactions, capital and investment movements, migration and 
movement of people and the dissemination of knowledge. The greater global mobility of 
capital (and to a certain extent labour markets, or at least the way one labour force can be 
substituted for another) has a number of effects. It affects the autonomy and significance of 
the nation-state. National economic and legal jurisdiction may, for example, be over-ruled by 
regional or trans-national institutions such as the European Union, the World Trade 
organization, the United Nations, the Group of Eight (G8) and its larger sibling, the G20. 
Similarly, it is a truism of globalization that many of the world‘s biggest commercial 
corporations have larger gross national product than many nation-states; and the power of 
such major businesses to invest or relocate will have significant impact on an entire country‘s 
economy. 
At the time of writing, protests and boycotts against several large multi-national 
corporations are taking place in the UK against these companies‘ use of legislative loopholes 
in European tax law, which enable them to avoid paying tax on income earned within a 
particular national jurisdiction. Finally, the very liquidity of capital and money has shifted the 
centre of gravity of the global economy away from production towards financial trading of 
stocks, futures, currencies and virtual commodities. Such trading, was, of course, at the root 
of the global financial crisis of 2008, further demonstrating how no single national monetary 
market or trading system was immune from the spread of so-called ‗toxic‘ finance.  
However, global non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also been growing in 
size and influence and may serve as a counter-weight to global capital and conventional 
political processes. Whilst global NGOs are not new, their global reach has extended, as has 
the global infrastructure of organizations that link specific interest groups with transnational 
institutions such as the World Bank or United Nations. Whilst such bodies extend activities 
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across national boundaries, focusing their energies on humanitarian and development 
projects, however, statistics suggest that membership and control remains concentrated in a 
few hands. For example, 60 per cent of international NGOs are based in the EU and one third 
of their membership is drawn from Western Europe (Union of International Associations 
2000). 
Global civil society ‗both feeds on and reacts to globalization‘ (Anheier 2003, p. 7). 
The expansion of the global economy and governmental connections provides the ‗supply 
side‘ of global civil society in terms of trade, investment, travel and communication that 
facilitates access to a global public sphere on the one hand. On the other, global civil society 
acts as a ‗demand pull‘ for mobilizing those who find themselves excluded from privileged 
global networks (ibid). In that respect, global civil society is an ambivalent concept, serving 
both to displace the power and influence of the nation-state in favour of neo-liberal solutions, 
and to stimulate alternative forms of political, economic and civic processes.  
Nevertheless, the prevailing attitude towards globalization appears to be a largely 
uncritical acceptance of a broadly neo-liberal political economy, including ‗a strong 
preference for free trade, the demand for broad governmental deregulation so that corporate 
decision making and the flow of capital may be less inhibited, balanced budgets as the norm 
for governments, and the assumption that technological innovation and the latest models of 
global communication networks are the sine qua non for a country‘s economy‘ (Gillett 2005, 
p. 16). 
Amongst public theologians, Max Stackhouse has been at the vanguard of 
considerations of globalization, and seeking a ‗third way‘ to the polarization between 
globalization‘s most enthusiastic advocates and its demonizers (2000; 2007). Religion has 
played a role, historically, in the evolution of a global society, and its influence is still crucial, 
especially in fostering autonomous ‗publics‘ beyond the purely economic. In its potential to 
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transform the world‘s poorest communities, and to facilitate a new era of human unity, 
globalization is, for Stackhouse, truly an occasion of ‗grace‘ (2007). Stackhouse may appear 
at times too sanguine as to the destructive and impoverishing effects of global capitalism (in 
economic and cultural terms) although his insistence that religious traditions must participate 
fully in debates about globalization and not be driven to the margins is also important. 
Significantly, also, such debates provide an opportunity for public theology in the Christian 
tradition to engage in sustained dialogue with other faith perspectives – something under-
developed in public theology to date.  
However, as global connections have strengthened, via bodies such as the Global 
Network for Public Theology (founded 2007), the discipline is gradually becoming more 
attuned to its own global diversity and to ways in which developments associated with 
globalization, such as wealth and poverty, media and communication, neo-colonialism and 
global politics, have an impact. The paradoxical effects of globalization are also felt in terms 
of the simultaneous homogenization of global diversity and the resurgence of localism (albeit 
often manufactured or romanticized). This can be frustrating to nascent expressions of 
contextual theology, which at their very point of emergence are confronted by ‗a totalizing 
ideology … which does not take sufficiently seriously the production and practice of local 
knowledges‘, and find themselves overwhelmed, once more, ‗by the domineering nature of 
metanarratives‘ (Sebastian 2009, p. 264). The dynamics of globalization compress and 
dissolve expressions of diversity, as local voices are engulfed by the norms of imported 
mega-churches and the effacement of indigenous cultures and spiritualities (Pearson 2007, p. 
154). From a post-colonial point of view, therefore, globalization can appear as nothing more 
than the perpetuation of neo-colonialism. 
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Where can the poor in this world sleep? ... In a world, marked by a technological and 
computer revolution and also by a globalization of economy…will there be room for 
those who are poor and excluded and today are trying to liberate themselves from 
inhuman conditions that trample on their identity as human beings and children of 
God? (Gutiérrez 1996, p. 116) 
 
This question of glocalization is developed by Clive Pearson in relation to public theology in 
Oceania, the ‗liquid continent‘ – literally and metaphorically, in terms of its geographical 
location, cultural diversity and fluid demographics. Pearson considers the nature of public 
theology in a context in which globalization threatens to overwhelm vulnerable indigenous 
cultures. Even the language of ‗public theology‘ may be an imposition. In Oceania, it is 
emerging as a forum of commentators wishing to comment on public issues and 
distinguishing their work from civil religion, insofar as there is a critical tension between 
Church and rituals of national life. Yet it still remains halting, fragmented (2007, pp. 163–5). 
Furthermore, there is the question of how inherited theological traditions actually get put to 
work in such a way as to be ‗unequivocally‘ contextual (p. 167). Even the interchanges 
within participants of a global network in public theology, then, reflect and reproduce the 
conflicting forces of homogeneity and diversity: how to sustain a common discourse for the 
purposes of mutually informing the other, without simply reproducing a dominant set of 
protocols and approaches? (pp. 167–9) 
Voices from the global south also point to the close association of public theology in 
US and Europe with a Habermasian notion of public realm, pointing out that whilst other 
contexts have thriving traditions of civil society and extra-governmental protest (often with 
the churches in the vanguard), there is a danger that this gets universalized. The danger is also 
that notwithstanding a preferential option for the marginalized, public theology refuses to 
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acknowledge that their claims fall outside the remit of conventional publics, or represent 
spaces squeezed by the encroachments of global capital.  
 
If … public theology is defined … only where the conditions of participation are, to a 
greater or lesser extent, already met, then vast regions of society in the great majority 
of existing nations cannot be the context for public theology. (Cochrane 2011, p. 55) 
 
As globalization blurs the boundaries between global, national and local, it is important, 
therefore, to consider where the public spaces are opening and closing. Something like HIV-
AIDS concerning as it does the intimacy of sexual relations, may also fall beyond the 
conventionally ‗public‘. Yet in contexts such as South Africa, its impact is felt in all aspects 
of life: of children, families, workplaces, health care, churches as well as government policy. 
Add to that its disproportionate effect on women, and the urgency of rethinking the 
conventional distinctions of public and private, is self-evident (Landman 2011; Ayallo, 
2012). 
Public Theology in Brazil took much of its inspiration from Liberation Theology that 
emerged from 1960s, and which based itself on the principle of the preferential option for the 
poor as a ‗practical and epistemological locus from where theology is to be developed‘ (von 
Sinner 2007, p. 340). It began with the reality of extreme poverty, often analysed through the 
lenses of Marxism and dependency theory and pioneered by the basic ecclesial communities. 
As Liberation Theology diversified, however, to embrace the dynamics of race, gender, 
sexuality as well as class, it also struggled to keep up with political and economic changes of 
late 1980s and 1990s. Liberation theology has gravitated towards the development of a 
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theology of citizenship, and as its economies develop and urbanization takes hold, there has 
to be a shift of emphasis from the land and rural communities to urban activism (von Sinner 
2007; 2009). 
Public theology needs to be aware, therefore, of the ‗oscillations‘ (Storrar 2009) of the 
public sphere and the challenges and opportunities that this might present. The democratic 
public sphere has both ‗contracted and expanded‘ (Storrar 2009, p. 249) under the 
encroachments of neo-liberal markets and the insurgent potential of new social media and 
grass-roots organizations. This is of particular significance to a discipline such as public 
theology which may have a self-understanding of its own identity and spheres of intervention 
that do not keep pace with changing understandings of the nature of the public and private, 
the particular exclusions and biases they may embody, and how that reflects on 
understandings of concepts such as the ‗common good‘. 
 
The Theology of Public Theology  
To recap, then, public theology is not simply concerned about the public, but concerns itself 
with a particular kind of theological method in relation to the public. It cannot simply be 
comprehensible to those who share its Christian reference-point, but offered into the pluralist 
public domain in the interests of a common good that transcends the sectional interest of any 
given religious creed or tradition. Public theology is public because, methodologically, it 
observes procedural criteria associated with dialogue within a pluralistic public sphere: ‗it is 
willing to encounter secular, philosophical and non-Christian religious orientations to the 
world and to explain its claims in their language‘ (Stackhouse 2007a, p. 107). The discipline 
inhabits the boundary between the religious and the secular and its language undertakes an 
act of ‗translation‘ in order to communicate to a non-specialist audience. Furthermore, it is 
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public because it believes it has a contribution to make to a wider audience beyond the 
boundaries of faith; and finally, because it takes seriously a responsibility to assist with the 
cultivation of civic discourse. 
David Tracy‘s work has been foundational for mainstream public theologians in this 
respect. Firstly, he unequivocally articulates concern for the corporate, political and societal 
meanings of faith, in contrast to forms of religious belief and practice that confine faith to 
private and pietist intentions (Breitenberg 2003; Stackhouse 2006). As we have seen, public 
theology refers to the ways in which religion interacts with questions of economics, media, 
politics, law, globalization, social justice and environment; and whilst these disciplines and 
world-views are diverse, they converge within a commitment to a shared realm of political 
and civic action: 
 
A key point is that while public theology is theologically informed discourse, its 
warrants and method of argument are not restricted to those that are specifically 
religious, such as Scripture and church teachings. Instead, explicitly theological 
sources and criteria are joined with insights and warrants drawn from other sources of 
insight; together these are brought to bear on issues, institutions, and interactions of 
society in ways that can be grasped and evaluated by all and who may also possibly 
be moved to action. (Breitenberg 2010, p. 5) 
 
Tracy argues that the public realm is necessarily characterized by a ‗shared concept of 
reason‘; in other words, it could not function without agreed procedures of communicative 
discourse by which competing claims are subjected to public deliberation, and decisions 
153 
 
reached by democratic means. According to Tracy, issues are interrogated according to 
shared norms such as intelligibility, truth, rightness and reciprocity. Tracy‘s understanding of 
public theology derives from his understanding of the generic significance of the ‗classics‘ of 
religious traditions which themselves deal with universal human questions (1981). 
This further enshrines Tracy‘s commitment to facilitate the public trajectory of faith 
and practice in ways that are transparent and publicly accessible and defensible (Breitenberg 
2003). Public theology is less concerned with defending the interests of specific faith-
communities, than generating informed understandings of the theological and religious 
dimensions of public issues and developing analysis and critique in language that is 
accessible across disciplines and faith-traditions. It seeks to be accessible and comprehensible 
to those within and outwith the Christian tradition, including the ‗cultured despisers‘ of 
religion. ‗Every theology ... has to meet the test of public reception.‘(Stackhouse 2007a, p. 
84) This is an important ideological and methodological element, since it suggests not only a 
level of accessibility to a general audience but a degree of accountability too. ‗[I]f theology is 
to be trusted to participate in public discourse it ought to be able to make a plausible case for 
what it advocates in terms that can be comprehended by those who are not believers‘ (p. 112). 
In order to continue making truth claims the theologian must develop public criteria for such 
affirmations. All authentic theology is public discourse, meaning ‗discourse available (in 
principle) to all persons and explicated by appeals to one's experience, intelligence, 
rationality, and responsibility, and formulated in arguments where claims are stated with 
appropriate warrants, backings, and rebuttal procedures‘ (Tracy 1981, p. 57). 
Elsewhere, Tracy talks about theology emerging from a dialogue or correlation 
between religious classics, which address persistent and fundamental questions of human 
concern, the nature of God, and so on, and ‗common human experience and language‘: that 
by virtue of our humanity we share powers of reason, we are capable of moral action, we 
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glimpse something of the good. Theology proceeds by means of ‗mutually critical 
correlations between two sets of interpretation: an interpretation of the Christian tradition and 
an interpretation of contemporary experience‘ (Tracy 1984, p. 235). The role of theology in 
the public realm is to interpret its own classic texts in the light of the situation in which it 
finds itself. However, the process is mutually critical, in that the context itself raises 
questions and poses challenges to which the tradition must respond. A critical correlation 
may produce relations of identity, analogy or conflict between different sources, although in 
general the conversation will produce analogy, or ‗similarity-in-difference‘. But even in cases 
of conflict, it is often the theological tradition that will be in need of corrective. The end of 
such correlation, however, is the imperative to relieve suffering and affirm human dignity. 
This is also an important principle for public theology: that it is possible to hold a 
conversation based on shared principles of rational moral discourse and believe that religious 
tradition point to elements of human experience that are held in common and thus achieve 
consensus. 
Public theology speaks of itself as ‗bilingual‘ in drawing from the resources of its own 
tradition whilst listening to, and being comprehensible by, non-theological disciplines. This is 
only right if it is not only to address the interests of the Church but the well-being of the 
world. The aim is engagement, and public theology tries to practise what it preaches in 
conducting its researches dialogically and in public, through colloquia, consultation and 
dialogue with policy-makers and activists. Hence, public theologians speak of the bilingual 
nature of the discipline, its discourse attempting to root itself in ‗religiously informed 
discourse that intends to be intelligible and convincing to adherents within its own religious 
tradition while at the same time being comprehensible and possibly persuasive to those 
outside it‘ (Breitenberg 2003, pp. 65–6).  
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As one means of bridging the two worlds, public theology has adopted the method of 
middle axioms, which emerged in the mid-twentieth century in the work of Oldham, Temple 
and Preston. Will Storrar characterizes them as ‗mediating moral directives that have a key 
function in the middle ground between the shared beliefs and related ethical principles of 
Christianity, and the very specific judgements that Christians … must be free to make …‘ 
(Storrar, 2004, p. 38) Whilst grounded in theological principles, they function as provisional 
and interim norms to guide further deliberation. As a result, they are not necessarily explicitly 
theological; rather, they have to occupy a middle ground, but are heuristic, provisional and 
‗derivative‘ and not ‗primary‘ (Temple 1942, p. 67). However, it is debatable whether they 
are intended to be the sum total of Christian social thought, or rather opening gambits sent to 
facilitate public conversation and manufacture a shared space of discourse.  
 
Temple divided his list of guiding principles into two levels. The primary Christian 
social principles, of God‘s purpose, and of the place of humanity in the world, are 
relatively stable and are ‗principles on which we can begin to act in every possible 
situation‘. The ‗derivative‘ principles (freedom, social fellowship, and service) are 
also still useful, but in the early twenty-first century‘s situation of religious and moral 
plurality they need re-examination. Some of these principles will remain constant, but 
others may develop and change with time. Temple‘s earlier writings provide the 
resources to do exactly that. So, to work adequately with ‗middle axioms‘, one must 
go behind and beyond them. (Dackson 2006, p. 245) 
 
This suggests that public theology espouses middle axioms or strategies of bilingualism as 
attempts to embody a synthesis of Christian theology and broader political principles. 
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However, it never intends these categories to be any more than particular contextually-
orientated representations of more enduring tradition. Duncan Forrester attempts another 
approach to the mediation of theological language into public discourse. In most of the 
industrialized West it is no longer possible to assume a Christian culture or an automatic 
place for the churches to speak in public. Thus, the task of theology is to offer ‗―fragments‖ – 
insights, convictions, questions, qualifications – some of which may be acknowledged as true 
and as necessary complements or modifications or enlargements of conventional and 
commonly accepted accounts of justice‘ (Forrester 2001, p. 3). These fragments originate in a 
tradition that has an internal integrity and coherence of its own, although it cannot be 
transported wholesale into the pluralist discourse of public debate. Fragments are best 
because they do not claim to represent absolute, reified truths, but are rather offered as 
pragmatic insights from a particular community which may prove ‗illuminating‘ for the wider 
body politic. 
Fragments are parts of a whole that has been shattered. Does this reflect a prelapsarian 
world-view of a perfect time prior to the Fall? In using this metaphor, Forrester is clearly 
acknowledging the kind of analysis of a ruptured public sphere in which all grand narratives 
have lost their purchase. Forrester‘s public theologian forages for useful fragments, hoping to 
find beauty and illumination in the ‗pieces of glass or gems that catch the light and display 
[their] wonderful colours‘ (2001, p. 157). Nevertheless, like those who pan for gold or the 
poor of the two-thirds world who earn a pittance sifting refuse from land-fill sites, hunting for 
buried treasure involves discarding a lot of rubbish. For many, the fragments of tradition are 
far from liberating, inflicting instead ‗the unhealed wounds of homophobia, gynophobia, 
domestic abuse, sectarianism, personal guilt‘ (Walton 2010, p. 33). Such retrieval and 
rehabilitation of the tradition is arduous and ambivalent and may yet yield little of value. Is 
the Church simply living off the fragments of the past or reworking them as ‗dangerous 
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memory‘ for the sake of witnessing to the world? Do new narratives and resources of hope 
and obligation need to be engendered? What if we characterize, instead, the modest witness 
of contemporary public theology as partial, prototypical, proleptic: awaiting the actions of 
divine grace to transform them from a mere work in progress to its ultimate fulfilment? 
Objections to mainstream public theology‘s strategy of bilingualism, mediation or 
dialogue are premised on an understanding that any attempt to find common ground, or to 
speak truth to power, represents a fatal dismantling of the integrity of Christian witness. 
Take, for instance, Michael Northcott‘s critique of what he calls Duncan Forrester‘s strategy 
of ‗infiltration‘ via use of ‗fragments‘ of Christian tradition: ‗his aim is to bend the ear of the 
Powers in such a way as they may hear an element of Christian truth quarried but necessarily 
detached from, the realms of Christian faith and practice. The idea of fragments as the core of 
a public theology carries with it the clear implication that theologians have no business to tell 
the story of the Gospel in the public square in a secular or postmodern society.‘ (2004, pp. 
218–19). Northcott invokes instead the radical reformed tradition of John Howard Yoder to 
argue for a counter-cultural Christian witness that lives according to its own distinctive 
mores, uncompromising in its indifference to dialogue with secular powers. There is, argues 
Northcott, no point in ‗trying to gain a public hearing for particular truths culled from the 
Christian tradition‘ since that inevitably means they will be ‗distanced from the narratives of 
God‘s way with God‘s people‘ (p. 219; my emphasis: Northcott‘s point is made all the more 
strongly by his use of the metaphor of ‗culling‘ in relation to the factory-farming of salmon.). 
The answer is not to attempt some kind of civic Esperanto but to form communities of 
practice whose calling is ‗to follow Christ and to witness to Christ‘s Lordship … to do the 
business of Jesus ...‘ (pp. 220–1). To work at one remove from the practices of the Christian 
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community is to adulterate and dilute its integrity. The practices of the Church must speak for 
themselves, uncompromisingly and unapologetically.  
 
Conclusion: Public Theology Beyond Christendom and Secularism 
Conventions in public theology such as bilingualism, mediation and middle axioms all reflect 
this enduing commitment to articulate a form of discourse which whilst rooted in the pract-
ices and traditions of Christian theology is also accountable to wider debate. In different 
ways, all these approaches defend the right both of theology to speak about and into public 
issues, and to advance the conviction that theology must do its reflection in public as a trans-
parent and generally accessible form of discourse. In that respect, they articulate a theological 
reading of the secular as a legitimate sphere for God‘s self-revelation and salvific grace. 
However, if this means adopting a rather sloppy assumption that ‗there is … 
something inherently progressive in theological discourse per se when coherently and 
rationally expressed, which usually means avoiding references to God in any form that could 
be recognized by the untrained reader‘ (Walton 2010, p. 25), then public theology has failed 
both to keep faith with the well-springs of its own tradition, and to be true to the realities of 
the contexts and publics in which they find themselves – and above all, to bring forth 
resources that make a difference. 
In this chapter, I have identified how public theology locates itself in relation to a 
number of ‗publics‘ or spheres of common life; how it may assume a variety of roles such as 
prophecy, advocacy and solidarity; how its interventions as a form of public discourse may 
be performative, liturgical and sacramental or discursive (reflecting its multiple ‗publics‘ and 
interlocutors). However, I have also argued that public theology has to make a theological 
argument for its own long-term relevance in the face of three major challenges. Firstly, that 
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of addressing an increasingly complex, pluralistic set of global and local ‗publics‘, 
characterized amongst other things by the paradoxes of post-secularity; secondly, whether or 
not it can rely on the continued existence of a common good of shared, deliberative 
discourse; and thirdly, of its being able to sustain a convincing theological discourse that is 
not ‗lost in translation‘. In a world beyond both Christendom and secularism, in which no 
single world-view predominates, and the spaces of shared discourse may be few, the 
dialogical task of public theology assumes a heightened significance. If the articulation of 
values is foundational to the construction of viable civil society in a globalized context, then 
the ability to negotiate and mediate becomes all the more urgent.  
 
Our challenge is to develop a public theology that remains based in the particularities 
of the Christian Faith while genuinely addressing issues of public significance. Too 
often … in the process [of mediation] the distinctive substance and prophetic ―bite‖ of 
the Christian witnesses are undermined. On the other hand, theologies that seek to 
preserve the characteristic language and patterns of Christian narrative and practice 
too often fail to engage the public realm in an effective and responsible fashion … If 
Christians are to find an authentic public voice in today‘s culture, we must find a 
middle way between these two equally unhappy alternatives. (Thiemann 1991, p. 19) 
 
The debate is also tied up with understandings of the coherence of a shared space in which 
rational communication about ends, aims and substance of public life can be conducted. As I 
discussed earlier in this chapter, if there is no longer a neutral public realm in which rational 
subjects debate according to universal procedural norms, but is instead a fragmented, re-
enchanted and contested collection of ‗publics‘, then the idea that there is a common frame of 
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reference or principled public realm beyond the pragmatism of our instrumentalized actions 
into which public theology can interject seems unlikely. What is at stake, then, even if at 
times it appears to be more a matter of degree, is firstly, whether apologetics are possible; 
whether theology acknowledges ‗secular‘ or non-theological sources of wisdom as legitimate 
conversation partners; and whether non-Christian ways of reading the world are constitutive 
of theological discourse, not only as a deconstructive or critical tool, but as a substantive 
voice in a reconstructive project. In sum, then, this is a question about the self-sufficiency of 
(public) theology, and the permeability of the boundaries between Church and world: a 
question, no less, about the nature of God‘s self-revelation and the sources of the values on 
which Christian public identity and practice are founded in post-secular society.  
Postmodernity, and the pluralization and relativization of public discourse, together 
with critiques of pure reason, have opened up a range of what are often known as ‗post-
liberal‘ or neo-orthodox theologies which look to Christian tradition and the practices of the 
Church for their identity. In response, liberal theologians have acknowledged the importance 
of remaining rooted in normative Christian tradition, but have held fast to the promise of a 
dialogical, apologetic and public quality to their reconstructive task. Most commentators 
agree, though, that public theology is faced with a difficult balance between adopting the 
language of wider society and potentially risking a loss of any distinctively theological 
grounding, and insisting on specifically Christian terminology, which fails to connect. ‗Can a 
theologian speak faithfully for a religious tradition, articulating its ethical and political 
implications, without withdrawing to the margins of public discourse, essentially unheard?‘ 
(Forrester 2001, p. 31) In the next chapter, then, I will turn to a more comprehensive critique 
of critics of the revisionist or bilingual approach, and consider whether a return to traditional 
orthodoxies, rooted in a distinctive and privileged culture of ecclesial practice and Scriptural 
obedience, represents a more adequate response to the post-secular condition. 
161 
 
4 
Public Speaking 
Secular Reason and the Voice of the Church 
 
The true church is not entirely confident of its own faithfulness and not quite certain 
of its own boundaries ... Ironically, then, the true church manifests itself precisely 
among those who cannot quite see the world as ―the World‖ because they cannot quite 
see themselves as ―the Church‖. (Biggar 2011, p. 82) 
 
Introduction 
‗From where does the theologian speak?‘ (Ward 2005, p. 4) So asks Graham Ward, referring 
to the encounter between theology and contemporary culture. Since the emergence of 
contextual theologies at the end of the twentieth century, this is a highly pertinent question 
for all those who deal in the production and distribution of theological knowledge. 
Acknowledgement of standpoint, and the impossibility of a neutral, disembodied and 
detached subject reflects the transition from modernity to post-modernity, from a world-view 
premised on objective, pure reason to one of reflexivity and contextuality. It is a reminder 
that there is no ‗view from nowhere‘; we all need to acknowledge the vantage points from 
which we see, interpret and communicate.  
Such a question also heralds, however, the emergence into public theology at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century of new strands of theological discourse which reject 
largely modernist, liberal theological models. Whilst this new wave contains a diversity of 
theological perspectives, for ease of analysis I will group them into ‗post-secular‘ and/or 
‗post-liberal‘ approaches, insofar as they take their point of departure from that broadly 
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mainstream tradition which I began to outline in Chapter 3. Post-liberal theology, associated 
with writers such as George Lindbeck, Hans Frei and Stanley Hauerwas, and those associated 
with ‗Radical Orthodoxy‘ (John Milbank, Graham Ward, Catherine Pickstock, Daniel Bell 
and Phillip Blond) are all dismissive of attempts to engage in constructive apologetics in a 
pluralist public realm. Such perspectives lament what they regard as the capitulation of 
theological liberalism to modernity, and seek to exercise forms of Christian witness that will 
restore the cultural and theo-political primacy of Christendom. 
Those who would identify with the discipline of public theology have long been 
exercised by the question of how theology ‗goes public‘, and how to balance the demands of 
pluralism and resistance to religious speech in public with the imperatives of speaking 
convincingly and coherently from a position of faith. Whereas post-liberals are concerned 
with giving a normative self-description of the beliefs of particular faith communities, 
liberals set out their stall according to a ‗fully critical theological reflection‘ and the 
apologetic exercise of defending Christianity‘s intellectual and rational credibility in the 
public square (Kamitsuka 1999, p. 14). In the past, I have characterized these contrasting 
approaches as representing, respectively, theologies of ‗discipleship‘ and ‗citizenship‘ 
(Graham and Lowe 2009; Brown, Pattison and Smith 2012, p. 187). 
At the heart of the matter is the question of the extent to which public theology should 
‗translate‘ its language of origin into speech acceptable and intelligible to a non-Christian 
audience in order to make any significant impact. This in turn rests on a particular theological 
understanding of the nature of revelation and common grace, and of the possibility of a 
shared space in which rational communication about the ends, aims and substance of public 
life can be conducted. 
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Whilst this has been the precept of mainstream public theology, contemporary critics 
of liberal or revisionist stances argue that it is impossible to translate Christian faith 
comprehensively and without remainder into another world-view on the basis of an appeal to 
any kind of generic or universal religious experience, unmediated by culture or language. The 
end of modernity in the shape of postmodernity signals the ‗post-secular‘ collapse of liberal 
theology‘s project to construct an apologetic in the face of secular reason. It heralds a new 
kind of theological intervention into public discourse, which eschews what its proponents see 
as the doomed attempts of liberal theologians to influence public morality or political policy 
by means of some kind of accommodation to secular mores and procedures. This new mood 
also owes something to Alasdair Macintyre‘s recovery of virtue ethics by reconstituting the 
polis and any concept of civil society as dependent on the cultivation of the virtuous 
community. After all, the original meaning of the term ekklesia is of a political assembly, the 
body of Christ that is also a body politic. Hence, the public speaking of a theologian is 
sanctioned by its faithfulness to a distinctive ecclesial ethic, rather than a quest for public 
coherence or relevance. No wonder, then, that George Lindbeck himself once observed, 
‗[p]ost-liberals are bound to be sceptical ... about apologetics‘ (1984, p. 129). 
To return to Graham Ward‘s original question, we find he is looking to clarify the 
relationship ‗between Christian discursive practices and the production and transformation of 
public truth‘ (Ward 2005, p. 5): or how the traditions of one particular community can be 
mediated into a wider, possibly pluralist and public domain; indeed, whether it is permissible 
or legitimate even to venture that one may have a bearing on the other. At one level, we may 
see this as a call for the kind of intellectual transparency to which any scholar interested in 
the integrity of their work might aspire. Yet at another, for Ward it is a prolegomenon for a 
discussion of the essentially apologetic nature of theological engagement, in order that ‗an 
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account be given of the relationship between Christian living (and talking) and the implicit 
values of public consciousness‘ (Ward 2005, p. 2).  
Given that Ward has been one of the prime movers behind one of the theological 
movements I want to consider, namely Radical Orthodoxy, and given that one of the 
theologians of the twentieth century to have influenced the turn against liberal apologetics is 
Karl Barth, it is interesting that Ward rejects Barth‘s dismissal of apologetics. However, I am 
not convinced that this represents a whole-hearted embrace of apologetics on Ward‘s part. He 
clearly believes in giving an account of the relationship between Christian values and those of 
wider culture, and commends a process of ‗reading the signs of the times‘ as an apologetic 
process. In that respect, he is saying no more than that theology needs to take its context 
seriously. But if we define apologetics as ‗any publicly intelligible attempt to redeem the 
theoretical credibility of Christian belief‘ (Kamitsuka 1999, p. 46), then this commits the 
theologian to some form of communication which, in turn, rests on an assumption of 
accountability to the non-theological: to convince, to commend, and to construct a publicly-
accessible discourse by which theology can defend its values to those beyond its own speech-
community. It raises the question of how theology is to be effective in influencing the public 
domain: if it speaks, from whatever vantage-point, what guarantee is there that anyone is 
listening? Is it enough to say, in a post-secular society, that the practices of the Church 
constitute sufficient persuasion? 
I will consider this further by looking, first, at the work of Phillip Blond, a writer who 
stands in the Radical Orthodox tradition and who has attempted to influence public debate 
through his think-tank, ResPublica. For one whose professional and academic training has 
been in Christian theology, Blond appears surprisingly reluctant to declare the theological 
roots of his political convictions. It is possible that this is an entirely pragmatic strategy, 
concerned not to alienate a largely secular audience that is suspicious of religious voices in 
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the public square. However, it appears to have been self-defeating, since Blond‘s silence on 
the matter has simply excited a critical response from those who accuse him of some kind of 
sleight of hand. In refusing to ‗go public‘, Blond omits to indicate the sources of the 
traditions and practices which will actually inform a renewed political and cultural economy 
of virtue and severs himself from the very theological roots that, supposedly, nurtured his 
political convictions in the first place. 
I turn then to two further theologians who would both identify themselves as speaking 
from forms of ecclesial polity, although their strategies for speaking into the public square 
vary. Graham Ward is closely identified with the Radical Orthodoxy group, and is deeply 
informed by Barth‘s theology (albeit critically so), and yet has called for apologetics to be a 
central part of theology‘s mission. Whilst his project of cultural transformation is rooted in 
theological tradition, therefore, a facility to engage in cultural critique also requires an ability 
to read and deconstruct prevailing cultural values theologically. The transformative task, in 
turn, emanates from the sacramental, doxological and political practices of the Church; but 
what is less clear from Ward‘s work is how far he is willing to allow such practices and the 
traditions that inform them to be subject to mutual critique and revision from sources outwith 
the Church.  
Luke Bretherton‘s discussion of this locates the debate more firmly in concrete 
political engagement. How is the Church, framed and disciplined by its core narratives and 
traditions, to behave in public? Who are its allies? Where are its no-go areas? Where can it be 
found, and what are its political objectives? In his analysis of church-related local political 
activism he shows the complexity of the relationship between different parts of the public, 
which always already includes ‗church‘. In stressing the autonomy of the Church and an 
ecclesially-centred social ethic within an autonomous civil society, Bretherton stresses the 
irreducibility of the Gospel to just another form of secular politics. He finds however, that in 
166 
 
order to be true to its mission, such an ecclesial public theology necessarily finds common 
cause with its ‗others‘. Bretherton‘s discussion of the public speaking and acting of the 
Church in public thus locates the debate more firmly in concrete political engagement, and 
concludes that one of the tasks of a public theological praxis may be to nurture the very 
integrity of the public space in which both discipleship and citizenship can be exercised.  
 
Liberal Theology and its Critics 
In Chapter 3, I began to address Tracy‘s answer to the question, ‗What is the self-
understanding of the theologian?‘ (Tracy 1981, p. 5). In a situation of pluralism, the 
theologian faces the challenge of public credibility; and if they are to speak with any degree 
of effectiveness and conviction, they must contend with the fact that their ‗claims to meaning 
and truth may seem doubtful to a wider public‘ (p. 3). At no point does Tracy deny that such 
a concern for wider accountability necessitates an abandonment of the particularities of 
Christian tradition, but simply a requirement to show how they correspond or resonate with 
the beliefs of others. Certainly, the specific texts of Christian theology represent cultural 
‗classics‘ insofar as they address or illuminate generic human experiences – from thence 
derives the potential for their communicability – but their insights must also be accessible to 
those from other traditions and world-views. 
Tracy is therefore a prime example of those who advocate the defence of Christian 
theology according to ‗publicly intelligible‘ criteria, and who strongly affirm the notion of 
defending Christian claims in the context of a pluralist public realm. The work of the 
theologian consists of listening to the insights of the wider world using hermeneutical, 
historical and empirical tools in the service of a tradition that unfolds dialogically. The 
theologian thus weighs up ‗the demands and plausibility structures‘ (1981, p. 28) of the 
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multiple publics, searching for analogies and contradictions via a process of ‗analogy‘. 
Exposure to a plurality of sources and appropriate humility in the face of the other lie at the 
very heart of this theological method, and reflect the contention that truth is analogical rather 
than univocal or monistic. Yet it is not an absolute folding of one thing into another but a 
play of difference that may adopt many modes: ‗confrontation, argument, conflict, 
persuasion‘ (Tracy 1981, p. 446), ‗listening‘ and collaboration (p. 447). Such conversation 
proceeds from a place of particularity: ‗each Christian theology can now continue to intensify 
the journey of intensification into its own particularity only by its willingness constantly to 
expose itself as itself to the really other‘ (p. 448).  
Tracy‘s own position has developed over time (Tanner 1996; Kamitsuka 1999; Heyer 
2004). He began by articulating a classic liberal perspective, in his understanding of the 
nature of religious experience. In Blessed Rage for Order (1975), he argued that theological 
reflection emerges from the correlation of ‗common human experience and language‘ with 
the sources of Christian tradition. Later, in light of postmodern criticisms of modernist 
axioms such as the transparency of language, the neutrality and atomism of the rational 
subject and the universalism of cultural expressions, he comes to question any claim to a 
‗common unified essence‘ to religious experience (Tracy 1989). He acknowledges the 
contextual nature of religious traditions, and the extent to which no experience comes 
unmediated through language, symbol or cultural representation of some kind. So the 
‗classics‘ of Christian tradition have to be recognized as artefacts of particular times and 
places, albeit conditioned by human historicity. Nevertheless, even in their specificity, he 
would hold that religious ‗classics‘ have a power to evoke truths which are capable of 
transcending their own particularity to evoke analogical responses in others. Furthermore, as 
an interpreter of a tradition, the theologian must acknowledge their own reflexivity, as 
conditioned by their own hermeneutical lenses. Thus, any process of correlation is always 
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already conducted from, within and between specific communities of discourse; dialogue can 
only proceed by analogy, toward what can only be a provisional position of solidarity with 
concrete others (1981, p. 446ff.)  
 
Beyond reason: theology in post-liberal and post-secular mode  
Contemporary liberal theology may owe its roots to the eighteenth and nineteenth century, 
but the contemporary challenge rests in whether it has the resources to summon a response to 
the criticisms of twentieth and twenty-first-century theology, beginning with Barth and 
continuing with his successors in movements such as post-liberalism and Radical Orthodoxy. 
In objecting to a model of theology as dialogical and apologetic, these perspectives would 
assert the incommensurability of theological and non-theological discourse and the 
impossibility of a benign and neutral public realm uncontaminated by the implicit violence of 
an anti-theological secular reason. In that respect, such anti-liberal theologies are continuing 
Barth‘s project to resist the hubris of liberal humanism and return to a definitive theological 
narrative by which a distinctively Christian identity may be asserted, repudiating any 
expectation that it should be beholden to secular authorization.  
Liberal theologians such as David Tracy and Schubert Ogden have, according to their 
critics, ‗so accommodated to modern culture for apologetic purposes that it no longer brings 
its particular word to the world but simply reinforces secular culture by providing it with a 
balm of transcendent security‘ (Kamitsuka 1999, p. 18). The Church cannot conform to the 
parameters of acceptable speech and action based on the compromises of secular reason; 
there is no such commensurate common wisdom, and the Church must have the courage to 
model itself on the exemplary narratives of Christ‘s passion, death and resurrection. Thus, 
‗the primary political role of Christians ... is not to engage and transform the state, but to 
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build up the Church as the only true polis with a genuine justice and peace that cannot be 
found elsewhere‘ (Doak 2007, p. 373). 
 Such a perspective argues that liberals‘ appeal to universal religious experience is a 
denial of the particularity of a Christocentric soteriology. It is feared that liberal theology 
tries to make Christian faith so accessible to secular people that they import unquestioned 
concepts at the expense of the integrity of the scriptural world and Christian practice 
(Kamitsuka 1999, pp. 177–8). It represents a resistance to the expectation that theology 
needed to accommodate to secular epistemologies, and advances instead a more ‗dialectical‘ 
or antithetical relationship between Christian revelation and wider culture. It seeks to defend 
the integrity and particularity of theology against a liberal apologetic strategy that seemed to 
privilege its credibility in the eyes of Christianity‘s ‗cultured despisers‘ (Schleiermacher 
1996) over its obedience to traditional Christian orthodoxy.  
This also owes a debt to the theology of Karl Barth, and the contrast he drew between 
‗religion‘ as a human construct and ‗revelation‘ as divine event. Religion represents 
humanity‘s futile attempt to undertake an autonomous quest for salvation and truth; but the 
fallenness of humanity and the limitations of human reason render this fruitless. It is only 
through God‘s own self-revelation (in Christ) that it is possible to grasp the truth; in the light 
of revelation, all truth-claims of religion are relativized. Barth characterizes this contrast as 
the difference between speaking and listening, between taking and receiving (1936, p. 302). 
For Barth, the theologian speaks from, and to, the Church. It was not, however, a matter of 
the Church staying out of politics – Barth would never have condoned a two kingdoms 
theology – but simply that when the Church spoke to a wider public, it could only ever be in 
the language of faith:  
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Therefore the language of faith, the language of public responsibility in which as 
Christians we are bound to speak, will inevitably be the language of the Bible … One 
thing is certain: that where the Christian Church does not venture to confess in its own 
language, it usually does not confess at all. (1966, p. 31)  
 
This refusal of theology in public should not, however, be misunderstood as a refusal of 
Christian political engagement. It is, rather, an expression of scepticism to theological 
discourse which attempts any degree of correspondence to ‗secular‘ criteria of authenticity, 
beyond the norms of its own canonical boundaries. This theology is practised and as such 
demonstrably rooted in particular places and times, and as Kristin Heyer points out, does not 
‗indicate retreat from responsibility to the concerns of wider society but rather a different 
model of social ethics‘ (2004, p. 322).  
For post-liberal theologians, this proceeds from a rejection of objective, universal 
‗foundations‘ that are generically accessible to everyone. George Lindbeck advances a 
‗cultural linguistic‘ model of theology, which, after Wittgenstein, argues that language 
proceeds according to particular paradigms of ‗language games‘. Language draws its 
meaning not from some correspondence with an objective reality, but from its functioning 
according to particular grammatical conventions. Language constructs and narrates a world-
view, not the other way around. Rather, all knowledge begins in a set of antecedent (pre-
existing) beliefs about the world; no knowledge exists without some prior belief. Truth 
cannot be translated or universalized, since there is no single, eternal truth to which it 
corresponds. All belief-systems are sealed from one another, but each set of beliefs is 
justified from within its own socio-cultural or linguistic framework.  
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Post-liberals would draw their core moral beliefs from what they term (after Hans 
Frei) the ‗plain sense‘ of Scripture (Kamitsuka 1999, p. 17). Biblical tradition narrates and 
guides Christian communities‘ accounts of building and inhabiting a scriptural world and 
represents a ‗thick description‘ of the truth-claims embodied in a community‘s practices. This 
means that Christian doctrine is ‗regulative‘ rather than descriptive or expressive. Truth is 
defined in terms of its coherence within the canon of Christianity rather than by its 
relationship to an external arbiter, such as history, or reason, or fact. Theological discourse 
serves as a communal norm (as opposed to propositional truth or representation of universal 
experience) for the facilitation of Christian identity. Scripture – and most particularly, 
‗intratextual‘ interpretations of Scripture – represents the authoritative source from which 
regulative ideals, and thus normative understandings of Christian identity, is drawn. Symbols 
and signs gain meaning according to the way ‗they fit into systems of communication or 
purposeful action, not by reference to outside factors‘ (Lindbeck 1984, p. 114). For post-
liberals, doctrine functions in a highly pragmatic or performative fashion: David Kelsey goes 
as far as identifying the praxis of the Christian community as ‗primary theology‘ and the 
work of the theologian as ‗secondary‘. Whilst it is open to revision, Kelsey would still argue 
that doctrine – such as, for example, the Trinitarian nature of God – serves as the ultimate 
hermeneutical measure for understanding culture, morality or human nature (2009). 
Similarly, Lindbeck focuses on the development of a theologically ‗skilful‘ Christian 
community, charged with developing an account of ‗how life is to be lived and reality 
construed in light of God‘s character as an agent as this is depicted in the stories of Israel and 
Jesus‘ (1984, p. 121). However, should we infer that such an interpretive process resembles 
some kind of naïve reading in which texts are ‗applied‘ to contemporary experience, 
Lindbeck insists that theological understandings are derived from ‗intratextual norms of 
faithfulness‘ (p. 122) which accommodates the fact that the social contexts and assumptions 
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of Christians vary greatly across cultures and throughout history. Furthermore, this is an 
intratextuality that is entirely open to critical methods and mindful of its exercise within a 
wider canon that is often contested (pp. 122–3). 
Lindbeck does concede, however, that in some circumstances arguments from beyond 
the theological tradition could be used to establish certain principles which might be of use, at 
least as background theories, for forms of ‗ad hoc‘ apologetic exchanges, such as general 
philosophical arguments for theism (Werpehowski 1986). This creates the possibility for 
some kind of dialogue, although the language-systems involved would always remain 
incommensurable. Rather than putting the burden of evidence on ‗an unqualified 
metaphysical claim about God as the logically necessary and unique condition of all moral 
activity‘ (Kamitsuka 1999, p. 83), and looking for forms of correlation or equivalence, the 
terms of engagement are about analogous relationships between Christian beliefs and other 
moral principles. 
The strength of this perspective for public theology is that such a process of 
interpretation is always contextual: whilst the Scriptural perspective is held to be primary, the 
task is to consider how it speaks to varying and complex everyday worlds of the believer. In 
talking of ‗skills‘ of interpreting not only biblical texts but living human contexts, Lindbeck 
also privileges the quotidian and concrete nature of theological reflection as something 
orientated towards the formation of identity. It reflects an Aristotelian formulation of moral 
reasoning as that which issues in the life well-lived.  
Hence the emphasis on ecclesiology, and the priority of ecclesial practice and virtue 
for post-liberal theologians. For example, Stanley Hauerwas‘ approach to Christian ethics 
departs from what he terms ‗quandary ethics‘, or an episodic consideration of moral 
dilemmas, in favour of a discipline which cultivates an ethic of character, circumscribed by 
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the definitive narrative of Scripture. This is embodied and nurtured in the Church, which is 
‗God‘s New Language‘ (Hauerwas, 1987), a living manifestation of the peaceable Kingdom, 
and it is called to be a beacon of hope in contrast to the secular world of violence and 
competition. It exemplifies ‗Christian theology as a form of ecclesial service‘ (Kamitsuka 
1999, p. 174) and embodies the ethics of Jesus, as revealed in the Scriptures. Herein lie the 
marks of its faithfulness to God. This is not, however, to obviate a vision of theology‘s end as 
informing its service to the world, simply that Hauerwas argues that the Church serves the 
world best not by offering a theological gloss to secular affairs, but by living up to its own 
calling:  
 
The church … must act as a paradigmatic community in the hope of providing some 
indication of what the world can be but is not … The church does not have, but rather 
is a social ethic. That is, she is a social ethic inasmuch as she functions as a 
criteriological institution – that is, an institution that has learned to embody the form 
of truth that is charity as revealed in the person and work of Christ. (1977, p. 143) 
 
The Church‘s public face, and the public nature of its theology, must rest first and 
foremost in its fidelity to its own revealed tradition. As Lindbeck has remarked, ‗Only when 
the songs of Zion are sung for their own sake will they be sung well enough to gain currency 
in society at large.‘ (1989, p. 54) Controversially, of course, this can be heard as an arrogant 
statement about the superiority of Christian practice. It is certainly intended to be radically 
non-conformist, especially in the writings of those such as John Howard Yoder, William 
Cavanaugh and Stanley Hauerwas, in which the Church models itself on the sacrificial and 
iconoclastic ministry of Jesus. The outworking of a radical Christocentric rule of life is the 
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principal calling of a ‗public‘ Church, as well as its chief witness. Sustained by its definitive 
narratives in Scripture and its exemplary practices in its Sacramental worship, the Church 
puts into practice its vision of a restored human community in the transforming death and 
resurrection of Jesus. Thus, Cavanaugh describes how the Eucharist is a form of public 
theology: ‗a Christian practice of the political is embodied in the Eucharist‘ (1998, p. 2). 
Cavanaugh also contrasts the Christian view of human society with that premised by 
the modern secular state. Whereas the former posits the essential unity and harmony of 
humanity (notwithstanding the realities of sin), the latter assumes an atomistic and 
competitive model of human nature, in which the power of the state must be exercised in 
order to protect people from themselves. But in order for the state to gain and maintain 
legitimacy, it must discount the Christian narrative as public truth, establish itself as the 
temporal authority and relegate the Church to a privatized and spiritual realm. In liberal 
democracies, therefore, the Church is struggling against both its own privatization and its co-
option into a secular vision of human welfare. This is not an evasion of the responsibilities of 
citizenship, but rather the discharge of these responsibilities through the practices of 
discipleship. ‗The role of the Church is not merely to make policy recommendations to the 
state, but to embody a different kind of politics, so that the world may be able to see a truthful 
politics and be transformed.‘ (2004, p. 404)  
The fear of many critics, however, is that the counter-cultural element, the refusal to 
play by the rules of the secular state, means the Church loses any foothold whatsoever in the 
public realm. Similarly, as Cavanaugh himself admits, ‗it is by no means always clear in 
practice where the boundaries of the church lie‘ (p. 405). Those who belong to churches also 
live lives of ‗secular vocation‘; and although membership of a church may be of a different 
order to belonging to a gym, or a supermarket loyalty scheme, or even a political party, are 
Christians not called to participate in shaping other institutions in the interests of common 
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grace? Beyond a demonstration of its self-evident, counter-cultural virtue, how does the 
Church actually intervene effectively in public life? Perhaps there is a difference between 
distinctiveness and exclusiveness in these matters; but as we will see later, the boundaries 
between Christian identity and values and those of others may not be so absolute in actual 
practice.  
 
Radical Orthodoxy 
Radical Orthodoxy is another contemporary theological movement that has turned to a 
retrieval of distinctively Christian practices and traditions in order to distance itself from the 
cultural vacuum of modernity and from the perceived marginalization of theology as a form 
of public truth. Yet it neither withdraws from nor capitulates to modernity but seeks to ‗out-
narrate‘ it. Radical Orthodoxy is bold in its attempt to discover a ‗new theology‘ which 
renounces the timidity and compromises of so-called modern theology in order to recover an 
Augustinian vision of the heavenly city. It represents a comprehensive Christian perspective 
that promises to supersede secularism, in its modern and postmodern varieties.  
This is less interested with the task of critiquing and informing the praxis of local, 
national or transnational religious institutions and leadership in relation to established 
structures of governance, so much as narrating a habitus of (often Scripturally-based) faithful 
witness and discipleship. It challenges the modernist neutrality of the public domain, as a 
space in which the secular is constructed as implicitly anti-metaphysical and anti-theological. 
Hence, theology must approach the post-secular through ‗a theological grammar which has 
never accepted an autonomous secularity and allied itself with the modern to its detriment.‘ 
(Ward 2000b, p. 105)  
If post-liberalism emphasizes the authority of Scripture, then Radical Orthodoxy 
places a higher authority on the continuity of the Church, using the language of ‗faith‘ or 
176 
 
‗participation‘ and advocating a return to its patristic and medieval roots, a retrieval of a 
premodern, Augustinian vision of all knowledge as divine and a recovery of the essentially 
sacramental, embodied nature of authentic Christian presence. This emerges from Radical 
Orthodoxy‘s critique of the foundations of secular modernity as based on fundamentally anti-
theological premises. In its separation of faith and reason, modernity relegates theology to the 
margins of acceptable discourse. Using the tools of post-modern philosophy, which unmasks 
the ideological and contingent nature of secular modernity, Radical Orthodoxy seeks the 
retrieval (or reconstruction) of ‗a fully Christianized ontology and practical philosophy 
consonant with authentic Christian doctrine‘ (Milbank 1999, p. 2).  
Secular reason always conceals an ‗ontology of violence‘ that is anathema to 
Christianity‘s ‗ontology of peace‘. Phillip Blond‘s introduction to Post-Secular Philosophy: 
Between Philosophy and Theology, published in 1996, exposes the hubris of secular 
humanism in the following terms:  
 
... unable to disengage themselves from whatever transcendental schema they 
wish to endorse, these secular minds are only now beginning to perceive that 
all is not as it should be, that what was promised to them – self-liberation 
through the limitation of the world to human faculties – might after all be a 
form of self-mutilation. (1998, p. 1) 
 
God‘s ‗erasure from human experience‘ has resulted in a crisis of modernity and philo-
sophical outlooks which attempt to ‗conceal the manifestation of transcendence‘ (p. 21). The 
secularism of late modernity sees no need for God; there is no need for moral realism either, 
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since there is no objective good. Relativism and pragmatism hold sway but without 
fundamental values, no authoritative account of the world, there is no political vision.  
 
However, without true value, without a distinction between the better and the worse, 
of course the most equal and the most common will hold sway. Of course the lowest 
common denominator will be held up to be the foundation of human civic life. What 
yardstick then for such a society, what measure do the public who must measure 
themselves require? (p. 2) 
 
The project of Radical Orthodoxy is thus to 'reclaim the world by situating its concerns and 
activities within a theological framework', including ‗the Trinity, Christology, the Church and 
the Eucharist‘ (Milbank 1999, p. 1). The need for any kind of ‗public‘ theology that engages 
with non-theological disciplines is obviated since there is no autonomous or common space 
to which all forms of discourse contribute freely and equally. For post-liberalism and radical 
orthodoxy, ‗going public‘ represents a surrender to secularism, since it entails an 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the non-theological, a denial of the implicit biases of 
Enlightenment rationalism as inherently anti-theological. Instead, theology must ‗out-narrate‘ 
secular reason by exposing its ideological basis as a discourse founded on the effacement of 
the sacred. ‗In short, there is no secular, if by ‗secular‘ we mean ‗neutral‘ or ‗uncommitted‘; 
instead, the supposedly neutral public spaces that we inhabit – in the academy or politics – 
are temples of other gods that cannot be served alongside Christ.‘ (Smith 2004, p. 42) This 
offers us perhaps the clearest idea so far of how Radical Orthodoxy as public theology would 
supersede modern forms of political engagement, since Milbank states that the Church is no 
less than ‗a new social body which can transgress every human boundary, and adopts no law 
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in addition to that of ‗life‘ . . . [and] is attendant upon a diverse yet harmonious, mutually 
reconciling community‘. (Reno 2000, p. 42). 
Radical Orthodoxy polarizes the theological community, and attracts supporters and 
critics with equal vehemence. The main areas of contention most relevant to a discussion of 
public theology include: Radical Orthodoxy‘s characterization of the ‗secular‘ as representing 
an effacement of the transcendent such that it is impossible to consider non-theological 
sources as in the least bit generative of the knowledge of God; the critical and constructive 
task of Radical Orthodoxy itself, including its use of postmodern theory and its claim to rest 
on an Archimedean point of Christian tradition from which to stage its rehabilitative project; 
and its understanding of the Church, which often seems to allude to an idealized rather than 
historically and contextually located ecclesiology. To continue the metaphor of my opening 
section, however, if we were to ask Radical Orthodoxy from whence it speaks, we have 
questions about the admissibility of secular discourse into its self-understanding; the nature of 
its own authority (ecclesial, Scriptural or whatever); the precise location of the Church that is 
premised as source and arbiter of theological truth; and its processes of mediation from divine 
speech into political and public intervention. But first, let us consider what actually happens 
when a theologian who identifies with Radical Orthodoxy attempts to engage in public 
discourse. It is an attempt to answer the standpoint question: ‗from where does the theologian 
speak?‘ and to examine the connection between theology, political values and public 
interventions. 
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Public Speaking: the case of Red Tory (2010)8 
This is the story of what happens when an academic theologian enters the world of think-tank 
politics. What does this particular form of tradition-centred, ecclesial, anti-modern theology 
look like when it ‗goes public‘? Author of Red Tory, Phillip Blond has been called ‗the only 
significant thinker in the Cameron entourage‘ (Gray 2010). Trained as a theologian at Exeter 
and Cambridge, he has abandoned academia in favour of politics and public punditry, and is 
the founder of ResPublica, which describes itself as ‗an independent, non-partisan think-
tank‘. There is no doubt as far as John Milbank himself is concerned that Blond‘s excursions 
into politics are an entirely legitimate outworking of the theological agenda of Radical 
Orthodoxy. Milbank is on the board of ResPublica, has shared a public platform with Blond 
at political events and announced the political coming-of-age of Radical Orthodoxy in 
Blond‘s work in approving terms:  
 
In Great Britain, Phillip Blond is developing a crucially important new mode of Red 
Toryism, which might in my view be seen as a kind of traditionalist socialism. This is 
already having a profoundly transformative effect upon British politics and, in effect, 
marks the political translation of the paradox of Radical Orthodoxy and the beginning 
of its entry upon the political stage. (Suriano 2009, p. 5) 
 
Blond‘s book, Red Tory: How Left and Right have broken Britain and how we can fix it 
(2010) may be seen as part of a realignment of the centre of British politics at the end of the 
                                                          
8
 Parts of this section first appeared in ‗From Where Does the Red Tory Speak? Phillip 
Blond, Theology and Public Discourse‘, Political Theology 13.3 (2012), pp. 292–307. 
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New Labour rule. As its subtitle suggests, it casts a plague on recent governments of both 
complexions, calling for a sea-change not only in political policy but in the very climate of 
morality of contemporary culture. Superficially, it represents a fusion of left-wing 
communitarianism and distaste for unregulated corporate capitalism with a zeal to break the 
stranglehold of welfare dependency and centralized state intervention. Beneath that, however, 
lies an ambition for the repair of political and civil culture ‗at the ontological level‘ 
(Engelkele 2010) – especially in its thoroughgoing repudiation of the individualism, 
amoralism and secularity at the heart of neo-liberal consumer capitalism.  
The establishment of the Welfare State in the UK after 1945, argues Blond, destroyed 
the more mutualist and co-operative forms of working-class self-help. The result was the 
creation of a dependent, ‗supplicant‘ (2010, p. 15) working-class, stifling ambition and 
upward mobility and enshrining a ‗benefits culture‘ which fatally undermined collective 
mobilization. There must be a recovery of value of culture and tradition, of institutions such 
as family and ‗little platoons‘ of civil society. He singles out the problems of individualism 
and loss of community at the heart of modern liberalism, which has no ‗account of the social‘ 
(2008). Red Toryism‘s ability to span both ends of the political spectrum is apparent in 
Blond‘s antipathy to the centralized State, as well as to monopoly capital, since both have 
been allowed to grow unregulated at the expense of intermediate associations.  
Crucially, however, the erosion of the infrastructure of civil society reflects a deeper 
crisis, one that is moral, not economic or political. Blond‘s chief concern is the decline of 
social mores, brought about by ‗the triumph of a perverted and endlessly corrupting 
liberalism‘ (2010, p. 139).9 A generation has been schooled in the belief that there is no such 
                                                          
9
 In November 2011 Blond spoke at a conference of Christian Concern (formerly Christian 
Concern for Our Nation), a faith-based political lobby best known for its defence of 
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thing as objective truth, preferring relativism or any kind of shared values. ‗[A] nihilistic 
liberalism has over a long period of time almost completely eclipsed classical and Christian 
traditions of political life and argument, which always rested on a dispute about what was ob-
jectively good, and about the practice of virtue required to realize them.‘ (2010, p. 139)10  
Blond argues, therefore, for a recovery of ‗a politics of virtue‘ (p. 35)11 via the 
cultivation of the values and conventions of active citizenship. This cannot be effected by the 
State; it has to be ‗organically embedded‘ in particular organizations: ‗the restoration of civil 
society, of intermediary associations and alongside them a culture of reciprocally interlocked 
rights and duties‘ (p. 173). In calling for a reorientation of the education system away from 
technocratic, state-controlled education towards classical models, Blond commends ‗Plato‘s 
idea of learning as recollection and Augustine‘s idea of learning as illumination‘ (p. 177). In 
virtually his only reference to religion, he notes the particular success of faith schools, as a 
means of communicating a clear narrative of objective truth and what it means to be human. 
‗It is for this reason that religious ideas of a transcendent God seem to be uniquely able to 
achieve both a sense of objective truth and to sustain an educational balance between child 
and teacher.‘ (p. 171, my italics). Quite a modest claim; but since many people now associate 
education and formation on the part of the Church with abuses of power, or with anti-social 
segregation of children, it is a highly contentious proposal for the repair of broken Britain. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Evangelical Christians who regard themselves as disadvantaged by equal opportunities and 
anti-discrimination legislation. See http://www.christianconcern.com/our-
concerns/social/phillip-blond-argues-that-secular-liberal-values-fail-to-deliver. For more on 
Christian Concern and similar lobby groups, see Chapter 5. 
10 Ibid. my italics. Blond does not attach a timescale to the onset of degenerate liberalism. 
11 See also pp. 269–70. 
182 
 
Similarly, as Blond himself acknowledges, ‗... it is one thing to establish the case for virtue 
and a hierarchy of virtuous persons and values, it is another to create its content and initiate 
and shape its practices.‘  (p. 171) Exactly so: yet Red Tory never gets around to identifying 
the actual sources and agents of virtue, or how is it to be nurtured and communicated. 
There is still, then, a puzzling silence at the heart of Phillip Blond‘s political stance. 
How does religious conviction and theological discourse figure in his thinking? Who and 
where is his constituency? Whom is he trying to influence? Where does he stand? What are 
we to make of the mutual ‗separation and hidden co-dependence‘ (Coombs 2011, p. 79) of 
theology and political philosophy? Is it a necessary form of strategic rhetoric to win support 
in a political culture otherwise suspicious of religious discourse in public? Or a deliberate 
cloaking of controversial political theological influences? Or resignation in the face of the 
growing gulf between the discourse of religious belief and practice and the everyday world of 
the functionally secular citizen? Conservative quarters are full of commentators calling for a 
return to Christian or religious values; but what most of them do not address is the question 
of what will inspire a turn away from individualism and self-interest towards a new political 
and cultural economy of virtue. In effect, theology gets buried and is transformed into the 
language of ‗virtue‘, ‗open, honest and good behaviour‘ ‗internal ethos‘, ‗trust‘. Whereas 
post-liberal theologians would speak – as does Blond – of the necessary cultivation of the 
virtues, rooted in the specific narratives and practices of a confessing community, and would 
regard the schooling in the habits of discipleship as the paramount task of theology, Blond 
never identifies who the agents or midwives of his much-anticipated moral and cultural 
revival might be. What are the roots of such exemplary citizenship? What traditions, 
narratives and institutions nurture it? Where is the school of civic virtue and who are the 
bearers of renewed cultural values? These are questions on which Blond is remarkably 
agnostic; but why is this? 
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It may be a matter of strategy. The British public is judged to be strongly suspicious 
of politicians and public figures who profess a religious faith. In the words of Alastair 
Campbell, Tony Blair‘s former press secretary, ‗we don‘t do God‘ in public life (Graham 
2009b). There is evidence to suggest that towards the end of his time office, even Campbell‘s 
boss had lost confidence in articulating his own religious convictions, for fear of being 
associated with the policies and world-view of George W. Bush and hence labelled as a 
‗nutter‘ (Graham 2009b). It may be, therefore, that in order to avoid alienating potential 
supporters, Blond has decided that discretion is the better part of valour. As one critic 
concludes, Blond ‗cannot move in the think-tank world by talking about metaphysics and 
presence, still less – this being Britain – by talking about God ... [The] double register of 
Radical Orthodoxy and Red Toryism is a near perfect encapsulation of the paradoxical 
location of religion in British politics: best hidden in plain view.‘ (Engelkele 2010) 
A further explanation for the absence of theology in Red Tory has been advanced by 
Nathan Coombs, who argues that Blond‘s political strategy is not an omission of theology but 
a fulfilment of the ambitions of Radical Orthodoxy, whose aim is to obscure its theological 
roots in the name of an esoteric political theology founded on hierarchy and the restoration of 
form of theocracy in which the Church assumes many of the functions of the secular state. 
For Radical Orthodoxy, such a strategy ‗aims to exacerbate a hidden duality, the full 
understanding of which remains the preserve of the few.‘ (Coombs 2011, p. 90) According to 
this view, the theology of Red Tory must remain ‗hidden in plain view‘, since it does not 
regard its task as one of explanation or persuasion beyond its own terms of reference.  
Rather than subverting the Rawlsian separation of religion and politics and the 
neutrality of the public square, however, Blond‘s approach actually serves to perpetuate it. 
Whatever the reason, Blond‘s ‗coyness‘ (Bunting 2010) towards his theological background 
184 
 
has only succeeded in baffling and alienating many of his critics, who are fully aware of the 
theological connections but suspect some kind of ‗sleight of hand‘ at work. 
Far from demonstrating one of the central elements of Radical Orthodoxy, namely the 
ontological unity of faith and reason, then, Blond fails to make the connections. Blond‘s 
enigmatic approach relieves him from the burden of having to defend the plausibility of his 
theology, but he also fails to articulate a secure vantage-point from which to defend his ideas. 
Despite the emphasis on speaking out of the specificities of tradition against the corrosive 
effects of malignant universalism, we look in vain for signs of any kind of praxis of faith in 
Radical Orthodoxy, and struggle to discern who might be the bearers of renewed social 
capital. In failing to speak from anywhere in particular he is, arguably, more vulnerable, not 
less, to the piecemeal encroachments and appropriations of the policy-makers who care little 
for the integrity of his political theology (Brown 2012).  
 
Surfing the Zeitgeist: Graham Ward on cultural apologetics  
Graham Ward was one of the original editors, together with John Milbank and Catherine 
Pickstock of Radical Orthodoxy. In more recent work, he has ventured further into the realms 
of contemporary culture, urban theology and Christian discipleship, to consider the 
implications of Radical Orthodoxy as a form of ‗cultural criticism‘ (2005). Of all his 
colleagues, Ward is most alert to the resurgence of theological and spiritual sensibilities in 
late modernity, and to the re-emergence of the sacred amidst ‗the hyperrealisms, the 
cyberspaces, the gnosticisms [sic], and the faux mysticisms of postmodernity‘ (2000, p. 110). 
He examines cultural practices (including symbolic practices of representation) around art, 
nature, politics, consumption and sexuality, and offers a theologically-informed response 
which culminates in proposals for the practices of the Church. 
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Concerned as he is with Radical Orthodoxy‘s project of ‗the rigorous rethinking of the 
Christian tradition and its significance for reading the world‘ (Ward 2000b, p. 103), Ward is 
also interested in how cultural transformation takes place: how particular ‗discourses of truth‘ 
become credible, in terms of transforming their cultural milieus, and how Christian practices 
relate to ‗public truth‘. It is thus a theology closely engaged with ‗the implicit values of 
public consciousness‘ (2005, p. 2), the institutions and cultural mores that generate 
authoritative forms of truth and meaning, and is thus on similar territory to that 
conventionally occupied by public theology. How, then, for Ward, does such cultural and 
public engagement and transformation take place? Back, then, to Ward‘s question I posed at 
the start of this chapter: from where – and perhaps on whose behalf, to what ends – does the 
theologian write and speak? What difference does Christian discourse make in the world?  
Ward argues that if theology is to be truly authentic, it must be contextual; if it is to be 
contextual, then that must involve reading ‗the signs of the times‘: 
 
To ask what time it is is [sic] to work with social and critical theorists, grasping and 
evaluating their methods, assumptions, conclusions and observations about living in 
various parts of the globe today. To ask what time it is requires taking cultural studies 
seriously. (2005, p. 3) 
  
When it comes to defining ‗culture‘, Ward describes it as ‗a symbolic world-view, embedded, 
reproduced and modified through specific social practices‘ (2005, p. 5). It is symbolic and 
redolent of meaning, but also circulates in material cultures, social institutions and embodied 
actions. Similarly, ‗discourse‘ is essentially a series of communicative actions, mediated 
through performative practices as well as semiotic systems. Discursive acts are ‗what is 
involved in the production of believing‘ (2000, p. 97). In the case of the theologian, 
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discursive interventions might include ‗writing sermons and treatises, church attendance, the 
living out of a Christian ethic, liturgies, acts of piety, etc.‘ (2005, p. 12).  
This is not a dispassionate or idealized critique which deludes itself into believing it is 
immune from the circumstances of its own cultural production, however, since: ‗we cannot 
reject the cultural Zeitgeist that situates and contextualizes us.‘ (Ward 2000b, p. 104) 
Kulturkritik is ‗a cultural negotiation between the revelation of Christ to the Church … and 
the ‗signs of the times‘ (2005, p. 9, my emphasis), requiring attention to ‗both the character of 
that Word and the character of the world (p. 10). The critical task of a Christian cultural 
critique involves being attentive to cultural discourses and how particular beliefs are made 
and legitimized through discourse, and, in turn, how theological discourse might make 
meaningful intervention in contemporary culture. 
Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice sets out a method for ‗the negotiation 
between Christian living and thinking and the contemporary world‘ (Ward 2005, p. 4)  
Ward presents a new agenda for the ‗engagement of the theologically informed practices of 
the Christian with the larger social world that contextualizes him or her: a new apologetic 
task … This will be a public discourse, inscribing a cultural ethics, in which the theological 
finds its place as a voice already engaged in contributing to the production of public truth.‘ 
(p. 173, my emphasis). 
Yet if the theologian speaks critically, s/he also speaks therapeutically, redemptively; 
and Ward is adamant that that the public interventions of post-secular theology can only 
speak from the vantage-point of tradition, uncontaminated by the hubris of modernity. The 
theologian is committed to reading the signs of the times, but advances a critical, 
transformative cultural critique which cannot but read through the lens of its own alternative 
poesis of desire. Any address on the part of theology must be made on the assumption that 
there is a shared basis of discourse – or ‗social imaginary‘. It proceeds from our shared 
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humanity and ‗the relational nature of being human itself‘ (2005, p. 120), which is always 
already culturally manifested and mediated. In turn, the work of theologically-derived 
cultural transformation takes place through the reschooling of the imaginary, through acts of 
poiesis and the articulation of desire – for God, oneself and neighbour (p. 152), exercised 
through everyday cultural practices of sociality. 
 
Theological discourse relates then to the productive transformation of culture by 
directing such transformation towards a transcendent hope. It works not only to 
participate in but to perform the presence of Christ. In and through its working the 
cultural imaginary is changed, and alternative forms of sociality, community and 
relation are fashioned, imagined, and to some extent embodied. (p. 172)  
 
So, in the postmodern urban context in which global economics and virtual reality have 
dissolved communities and bodies, Christianity can correct this drift away from materiality 
with an account of an alternative body, inscribed within its own eucharistic theology. The 
dynamic is thus one of anatomising one set of cultural ideologies, which serve the 
postmodern values of atomism, misdirected desire and rhetorical violence, and counterposing 
an alternative narrative that points uniquely to the city of God. Eucharistic practices represent 
the liturgical site of transformation, in which desire is re-educated and redirected.  
Ward challenges Barth‘s rejection of apologetics as entailing any kind of ‗negotiation‘ 
in relation to itself and any other discourse. He was not prepared to contemplate any such 
concession since for him, it implied an accountability, an acknowledgement of common grace 
that was alien to his theology. For Barth, the only kind of apologetics is that which proceeds 
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from the Church‘s own dogmatic, exegetical and practical theology. True theology cannot 
represent itself in any other kind of derivative language, since an absolute gulf exists between 
human reason and revelation.  
Against that, Ward contends that not even Barth was immune from the cultural 
circumstances of his own biography and thought. His antipathy to culture originated in a 
reaction against a form of Hegelian Kulturprotestantismus that conflated religion with the 
highest ideals of cultural progress. The only conversation is between the life of the Church 
and God‘s self-revelation, and not with the non-theological. Barth would deny that 
theological discourse needs to engage with other forms of cultural expression; his view of 
revelation would not accept that it depends on the terms of its own cultural production. Ward 
challenges this, arguing that all theology speaks from a habitus – a ‗system of dispositions‘ 
(2005, p. 18) – which organize and situate its discourse, and which shape its reception and 
interpretation. Christian theology cannot transcend the cultural conditions of its own 
discourse.  
However, is Ward saying any more than that theology is always to some extent 
influenced and mediated by its surrounding culture? What are the terms and conditions of that 
‗negotiation‘? How fundamentally does culture shape and inform – even reform – the 
theologian‘s cultural pronouncements? What are the means by which a culture comes to 
know its redemptive potential: are there values and discourses already inherent within it that 
contain the seeds of transformation, or is it entirely dependent on the regenerative words of 
the theologian?  
On the one hand, Ward gestures towards a more revisionist, liberal stance by adopting 
the language of Christian apologetics to describe the nature of his cultural critique. He argues 
that apologetics must take account of the worldliness of the Church, and Christians are in, if 
not of, that quotidian world (2011). This is the place from which they speak, albeit informed 
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by the gospel of Christ. It is certainly important to engage in cultural critique to understand 
the preoccupations and desires of surrounding culture, in order to understand better the 
‗social imaginary‘. Then theology undertakes deeper cultural hermeneutics, in order to reflect 
back to the cultural imaginary both its own dynamics and a transformed, Christocentric 
reading: ‗Theological discourse is necessarily involved in the wider cultural dissemination 
and exchange of signs … Christian theology is, then, implicated in cultural negotiations, and 
to that extent is always already engaged in an ongoing apologetics.‘ (2005, p. 53) This is both 
a matter of proclamation and transformation: 
 
[A]pologetics orientates theological discourse towards a specific cultural and 
historical negotiation concerning public truth. Its task is evangelical and doxological. 
Upon the basis of apologetics rests, then, the Christian mission not only to 
disseminate the good news, but to bring about cultural and historical transformations 
concomitant with the coming of the Kingdom of God … [Apologetics] ‗makes 
manifest the polity of the Christian gospel, its moral, social and political orders. (p. 9). 
 
This talk of orientation implies a programme of attention to the signs of the times, but really 
says nothing about the apologetic task as one of commending or explaining, as traditionally 
understood. Similarly, negotiation is suggestive of some degree of interchange between 
world-views, but in addressing the cultural malaise it sees around it, is the theologian in 
communicative mode, or reparative, redemptive mode? Perhaps Ward sees no difference; for 
Barth, God‘s ‗address‘ to the world would not be apologetic or conversational but always 
already a call to repentance. But there is no sense, yet, that theology learns from culture, even 
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in the process of fulfilling culture‘s own quest ‗to understand its own aspirations and 
limitations‘ (2005, p. 59).  
Of necessity, theologians are caught up in the prevailing cultural discourse, with the 
requirement to engage in dialogue rather than delivering dogmatic pronouncements. 
Theology cannot evade responsibility for cultural engagement by regarding itself as 
possessing eternal, objective truth; there is no ‗view from nowhere‘, but only the ‗naming of 
a direction.‘ (Ward 2005, p. 88) This seems like a generous acknowledgement of the integrity 
of cultural insights to contribute to public truth, but Ward still retains a perception of ‗the 
Word and the world‘ as essentially of a different order, ontologically, to one another. 
Certainly, the necessarily mediated nature of all knowledge, including religious experience, 
means that it is impossible to escape from culture or to isolate theological discourse from 
cultural analogy. Whilst culture ‗might suggest certain amendments‘ (2011, p. 117) to 
theological discourse, it does not have the authority to engage in more fundamental revisions. 
The ‗sovereignty of God‘ is set over and against such worldly considerations as ‗tolerance, an 
ongoing conversation between Christ and the world or the continuing relevance of theology 
to a secular landscape‘ (p. 117), as if they bore no resemblance or equivalence to Christian 
virtue.  
On the other hand, however, Ward‘s notion of apologetics also remains rather elusive. 
He is certainly keen to depart from a view of apologetics as rationalist, a correspondence with 
propositional truth, something he regards as no longer adequate ‗with respect to the situation 
we inhabit‘ (2005, p. 71). Ward opts for a more pragmatic (or performative) and contextual 
criteria, in terms of looking to Christianity‘s ability to furnish us with ways of life that are 
critical of dominant ideologies and which incorporates people into a community which 
exemplifies alternative, more redemptive values (pp. 135–7).Traditionally, it is defined as a 
work of commending the Christian Gospel to the sceptic or non-believer, and involves a 
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process of dialogue and persuasion. Yet this has historically presupposed that to some degree 
the apologist enters into the world of their interlocutor. As we shall see in Chapter 6, whilst 
the apologist may be intending to demonstrate the extent to which Christianity completes or 
fulfils other truth-claims there is still an attempt to respect the other, to mediate the 
theological into the world of the other, that is absent from Ward‘s rhetoric. Clearly, Ward 
intends the entirety of his diagnosis of contemporary culture to be normative and theological; 
but are there no redeeming virtues in the prevailing Zeitgeist; nothing to be celebrated about 
life outwith the sacred canopy? 
Ward characterizes the (public) theologian speaking from a liminal place, between the 
Church and secular culture: ‗at its open western door – on the threshold between the world 
and the east-facing altar; as ready to serve in one direction as in the other.‘ (2005, p. 59) This 
suggests, at first reading, a mutual encounter on equal terms, but in fact, the traffic is all one-
way. The theologian remains ensconced inside the Church, looking ‗back into the church 
[from which] the order of life is presented‘ (p. 59). Whilst the Church is the space of order, 
the (outside) world is contradictory and disordered, over-run by simulacra and synthetic 
thrills: the space of ‗high points and squalid allies, neon-lights, plasma-screens, crowded 
tenements, seductions, excitements and destitutions‘ (p. 59). This is an arresting image, of a 
world both full and empty at the same time; but there is no sign that it may contain the seeds 
of its own redemption, even if even if that needs further cultivation at the hands of Christian 
values. Instead, the Church‘s role is to bestow peace and reconciliation on a degenerate 
culture, whilst never appearing to require words of insight, healing or forgiveness in return. 
There seems no possibility, either, that theology might speak from profane places as well as 
from the sanctuary of the conventionally sacred.  
But even if we accept Ward‘s placement of the theologian in the Church, addressing 
the world, we are still confronted with the criticisms levelled at Radical Orthodoxy, that in 
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the absence of a sufficiently pristine tradition, it speaks from an idealized ecclesiology: where 
is this Church from which Ward‘s theologian speaks? Is it any more than an idealization? 
Who are the agents of this apologetic? Is it an individual task at the boundary of Church and 
world; is it about the collective praxis of the Eucharistic community, practising a counter-
cultural ethic; is the theologian the foremost spokesperson of the new apologetic – in which 
case, how do they speak and to whom, in what form? Where are the points of intervention 
into the political and cultural imaginary, and does that include policy?  
Ward is aware of the danger of inscribing everything as a ‗text‘ to the neglect of 
material cultures and cultural practices, and the reality of institutions. Nevertheless, he seems 
to privilege discursive and representational forms of culture, and references to concrete 
instantiations of the transformation of the public realm are few. How does theology become a 
‗transformative public practice‘? (p. 61). Where are the ‗structures of engagement‘ (p. 113) 
for theology with respect to culture? Similarly, does the quest for a 'more aesthetic, more 
erotic' (Radical Orthodoxy, p. 3), Christianity eclipse a more politically engaged version? 
Despite his calls for a concrete cultural poesis rooted in the everyday practices of the Church, 
there is little indication of how these discursive acts are generated or how, strategically, they 
would be transferred into public debate.  
 
Paying Attention: Luke Bretherton and the praxis of citizenship  
Luke Bretherton, a British theologian based until 2011 in London, writes about the role of 
Christian witness in the public square from a perspective broadly in sympathy with Radical 
Orthodoxy and post-liberal theology. He summarizes the central issue at stake in these terms:  
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A key problem in contemporary Christian political thought is whether the church has 
a distinctive politics and is itself a particular polity or whether it is best understood as 
a constituency within civil society whose politics takes the form of democratization 
and a commitment to the liberal state ... In recent years, a growing number of 
theologians have emphasized that the first task of the church is to be a [the?] church. 
For them, it is not the business of the church to invest itself in one particular form of 
temporal political order – namely liberal democracy ... Figures such as Milbank, 
Cavanaugh, and the O‘Donovans rightly contend that the church cannot simply derive 
an understanding of its political vision from outside of Christian belief and practice ... 
in one way or another, they envisage different aspects of Christian worship as a 
counter-performance of social and political relationships to those conditioned by the 
modern state and the capitalist economy. (Bretherton 2010, p. 17) 
 
This quotation neatly draws together many of the characteristics of this stance: ecclesial life 
as ‗counter-performance‘ in the face of secular liberalism, the practices of the Christian 
tradition as the well-springs of an alternative to the perniciousness of secular modernity and 
the sterility of the neutral public square, and the self-sufficiency of theological readings of the 
human condition. Bretherton‘s journey into the implications for public theology take him 
along a different route, however: and arguably, to quite a different destination. A major 
reason for this may be that as a theologian he speaks not only from the academy, but from his 
own involvement in London Citizens, a broad-based, multi-agency (and multi-faith) grass-
roots community organization. Christian voices and energies are amongst the most prominent 
in this organization; but the register of such engagement is one of pragmatism amidst 
pluralism. Whilst the spiritual capital of Christian conviction forges a distinctive habitus 
which practices and narrates a proactive public faith in resistance to the privatization of 
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religion and the modernist instrumentalization of the Church by the State, Christians also 
need to ask themselves how they ‗negotiate a common life with various non-Christian others 
in relation to the state and the market.‘ (p. 17)  
It leads Bretherton to advocate an ad hoc pragmatic political strategy founded on 
strategic partnerships, since current political demands necessitate dialogue in pursuit of 
shared goals which does not pretend to correspond perfectly or absolutely with partners‘ 
world-views, but which ‗within the contingent flux of prevailing political conditions‘ (p. 20) 
achieves the objective of effective political mobilization. The principles which emerge, then, 
are these: the nurture of fragile civic activism is to be valued in the pursuit of common goods; 
and the witness of the Church is always contextual and may require ‗the ability to improvise 
faithfully‘ (p. 21) in order to be most authentic.  
Bretherton‘s inspiration for this draws upon Augustine‘s understanding of the 
relationship between the earthly city and the heavenly city. Ostensibly, the two cities share 
the same cultural space, but operate according to very different logics: the earthly city is a 
parody of the city of God and can be read as a perverted imitation that is therefore subject to 
Christian critique. For the city of God, as the representative of eschatological reality, 
relativizes and corrects the meaning and use of the earthly city and is ultimately only 
apprehended through its need for redemption by the values of the heavenly city. 
Bretherton commends a strategy of what he calls ‗double listening‘ (p. 99) in relation 
to churches‘ involvement in local community activism. This is for Bretherton a consequence 
of living as citizens in Augustine‘s saeculum, in which the realities of the two cities exercise 
their own particular jurisdictions. Christians have to live between the resurrection and the 
eschaton, anticipating the establishment of the city of God, whilst accepting the earthly city 
as the place in which faith is to be practised, however imperfectly.  
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Augustine‘s juxtaposition of the city of God and the earthly city suggests they are 
historically or temporally co-terminous yet governed by different values. Is church part of the 
decaying world or a herald of new emergent forms of political association? The truth is more 
complex. The Church cannot claim to be the exclusive enclave of love of God, just as the 
altruistic actions of those beyond its boundaries refute any view of the world as mired in self-
love and without redeeming qualities.  
 
Augustine acknowledges that members of the city of God share with members of the 
earthly city a common interest in temporal goods – above all, justice – and a 
sufficiently common reading of them to permit a measure of public agreement. At the 
same time, it is clear that without love for God there is no true or perfect justice. 
(Biggar 2011, p. 43)  
 
This is, in part, about forging a Christian identity and community for the interim, but also 
acknowledging the prefiguration of the coming Kingdom within the earthly city, which 
includes a recognition of those who, whilst not Christian, share a concern for justice, human 
flourishing and justice. But in stressing the task as one of ‗listening‘, Bretherton reminds us 
of the Barthian insistence that humanity listens to God‘s revelation: the Word spoken in 
Christ and testified to in Scripture. Yet his experience leads him to suggest that Christians are 
called also to speak less and listen more, and to apply a degree of attention not only to God‘s 
word but to one‘s neighbours. ‗It is a way of paying attention to others … and so stepping out 
of one‘s own limited perspective and enable new understanding to emerge.‘ (Bretherton 
2010, p. 87). 
196 
 
 The pragmatic basis of political collaboration is founded on identifying and pursuing 
such ‗common objects of love‘ (p. 83); but such hopeful engagement with the world, with 
many compromised and flawed institutions, prepared to respect and tolerate difference, is not 
a betrayal of Christian integrity but the very conditions of its realization. Christians should 
welcome the fact that they share common ground with others, as fellow recipients of grace 
and forgiveness as well as fellow citizens. The moral ambiguity of the world does not make it 
irredeemable or negate its potential for good. 
Returning to a theme he explored in an earlier work, Bretherton likens this to a 
sensibility of hospitality – not an attempt to construct an abstract or sterile neutrality, but a 
commitment to ‗dwell together in a given and shared … space … whereby one makes room 
for another‘ (p. 88). He sees this ethic as one profoundly enshrined in biblical tradition and 
Christian history, carrying a rich narrative in which Christians can locate themselves: of 
welcoming the sojourner and entertaining Christ in one‘s care for the prisoner, the homeless 
or dispossessed (Matt. 25). Yet it is also embedded in other religious traditions, and thus has 
the potential to resonate and unite across many urban communities. We begin to see how 
Bretherton starts with a paradigm of the distinctiveness of Christian values and finds that 
view moderated and expanded – inter-textually, one might suggest – by the question, ‗who is 
my neighbour?‘: 
 
… when confronted with moral problems the church develops specific patterns of 
thought and action. However, the response of the church is not developed in isolation 
from the life together of its neighbours. As it develops its response, the church will be 
engaged with the life of those around it, who will inevitably be involved with and 
inform its discernment. In conjunction with the life of its neighbours, the church will 
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also seek to establish patterns of sociality which bear witness to how a particular 
moral witness is transfigured by the actions of God. (2006, p. 197) 
 
Bretherton‘s advocacy of a kind of pragmatic hospitable social ethic as the basis of Christian 
involvement with politics reflects much of the post-liberal critique of church-related public 
engagement as dangerously disconnected from its ecclesial, biblical roots. Yet it retains a 
kind of Christian realist commitment to the incarnational imperative to give oneself up to the 
world, however ambivalent and flawed it may be, whilst remaining rooted in a particular 
tradition and vantage-point. Yet the tradition itself, in ‗making room‘ for others, finds sources 
of correction and renewal: ‗in seeking the welfare of the city, even though it is Babylon, not 
only do we find our own welfare, but also we encounter God in new and surprising ways.‘ 
(2010, p. 87) Whether he is consciously doing so or not, Bretherton‘s language here evokes 
Duncan Forrester‘s characterization of a (public) theology that ‗seeks the welfare of the city 
before protecting the interests of the Church‘ (2004, p. 6). 
This acknowledges particularity amidst pluralism in a creative tension. It suggests that 
religiously-informed reasoning does not have to be indistinguishable from any other in order 
to facilitate forms of active citizenship. Attention to ‗others‘ helps build the trust and capacity 
that is the very bedrock of a functioning public realm, to the endorsement of ‗democratic 
politics as a proper vehicle of faithful discipleship‘ (Bretherton 2009, p. 15). 
 
Discussion: the Baby and the Bathwater 
Radical Orthodoxy and post-liberal theology both set themselves the task of articulating a 
more distinctively Christian ethic, founded on a recovery of a more distinctively theological 
discourse. It may be helpful, then, to differentiate further between those two phases of 
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critique and reconstruction: the distancing from theology‘s perceived accommodation to 
secular modernity, and the construction of a distinctive vantage-point from which renewed 
speech and praxis might take place. Whilst much of mainstream public theology may be 
culpable on its susceptibility to the idols of the passing Zeitgeist, I would dispute that the 
solutions advanced by these self-styled post-secular theologies are as radical or as orthodox 
as they claim.  
For Radical Orthodoxy, even this move from critique to reconstruction, via the 
appropriation of philosophy – pre- or post-modern – represents a paradoxical process. Having 
adopted a post- or anti-foundational critique in order to deconstruct modernity, how can 
Radical Orthodoxy defend its recapitulation in pursuit of orthodoxy (Hanvey 2000, p. 162)? 
This, in turn raises questions about how one embarks on such a rehabilitative programme, and 
all about speaking from, within and into: does one appeal to an historic ‗default position‘ 
from which theology proceeds; does the desire to speak from a distinctive or authentic 
perspective become confused with a collapse into an exclusivist position; does the concern to 
speak necessarily involve the injunction to listen, with respect?  
From where does the theologian speak, then: is it simply in relation to their own tradition 
with no further reference to what is beyond the received canon? Here, Radical Orthodoxy is 
vulnerable to the charge that their retrieval of historical tradition in the pursuit of a 
reconstructive post-secular theology adopts a somewhat partial approach to their sources. 
They appear to commend a return to a point of authority uncorrupted by modernity as a fixed 
Archimedean point, but do not take into account how that is always already a particular 
reading of that source – effectively collapsing the hermeneutical distance between the 
contemporary theologian (who cannot disentangle themselves from their own modern and 
post-modern context, however disaffected they may be) and the exemplary sources of the 
past.  
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Radical Orthodoxy cannot invent the flesh and blood of a Christian culture, and so 
must be satisfied with describing its theoretical gestalt, gesturing, in postmodern 
fashion, toward that which was and might be …. Christian faith and practice must be 
raised to a level of purified abstraction so that it can be saved from its own failure to 
make Christ present in the Church and in society. (Reno 2000, p. 44) 
 
Reno‘s criticism is that in its search to locate the exemplary tradition, Radical Orthodoxy 
ends up constructing an idealized past, which is highly selective towards the past. 
Dissatisfaction with the unsatisfactory reality of the institutional church led liberal 
theologians to privilege experience and context over the constraints of orthodoxy. Yet 
equally, Radical Orthodoxy feels the constraints of a compromised tradition and is required to 
remake it in its own image via recourse to what Eric Hobsbawm has termed ‗invented 
tradition‘: 
 
'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly 
or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate 
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies 
continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish 
continuity with a suitable historic past ... However, insofar as there is such reference 
to a historic past, the peculiarity of 'invented' traditions is that the continuity with it is 
largely fictitious. In short, they are responses to novel situations which take the form 
of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory 
repetition. (Hobsbawm 1983, p. 1) 
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When it comes down to it, Radical Orthodoxy seems to suffer from an ‘allergy to the 
particular‘ (Reno 2000, p. 43) and its critics have struggled to discern how it really connects 
with the actual inhabited context of ecclesial life. This may be a theology that claims to speak 
from the Church – but exactly which Church? It does not actually speak from an inherited 
tradition present in any specific historical era, but must rely on a theological heritage which is 
rather ‗an invention, a determined culling from the past, an act of imaginative recovery‘ (p. 
9).  
Related to this is a further point, which concerns the degree to which the Church (as 
ecclesial alternative ethic or source of reparative praxis of modernity) is above criticism. 
Certainly the ethics of Christians cannot be entirely separate from the life and wisdom of the 
Church, ‗sustained as a kind of free-floating wisdom‘ (Forrester 2010, p. 176). But does this 
mean that there is no salvation, or not justice, peace or love outside the Church; or that the 
credibility of the Gospel is entirely dependent on the probity of the Church?  
The problem comes when the life of the Church loses its moorings in the sufferings of 
the world, and the cultivation of ecclesial virtue becomes too self-sufficient or introverted 
that this fuller vocation to the world is discounted. There appears to be little 
acknowledgement of encountering God in the practical, quotidian, ambivalent dimensions of 
human experience, or of a way of doing theology which entails ‗a wrestling with the 
intractable complexities and conflicts of history, ethical life, and politics‘ (Ford 2001, p. 394).  
From where does the theologian speak, then: can it ever be in conversation with a 
pluralism of sources from which theological discourse might draw? In practice, even 
theologies which offer ‗normative descriptions of Christian communal beliefs‘ (Kamitsuka 
1999, p. 14) find it impossible not to engage with its surrounding culture. After all, Christian 
doctrine has always emerged dialectically out of engagement with its surroundings, and does 
so because such dialogue leads theology to modify elements of its own tradition. The history 
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of Christian doctrine shows a succession of influences from non-theological sources, and the 
biblical witness itself frequently subverts any sense of a secure elect and repeatedly witnesses 
to an enlargement of God‘s covenant to embrace unexpected people and places. Critics of 
Radical Orthodoxy‘s appropriation of Aquinas, for example, point to his absorption of 
Aristotelian and Arabic philosophy, and thus the historical continuity of non-Christian 
influences on the evolution of Christian thought (Hanvey 2000). This was never a substitute 
for orthodox constructive theology, but an aid and providential partner. This is not to appease 
secular reason but to demonstrate how theology always speaks from and into particular 
occasions and contexts which are more like ‗blurred encounters‘ (Reader 2005) than 
confrontations with degenerate secularism. 
In defence of a post-liberal critique of secular reason, Kamitsuka perceptively 
wonders whether, in repudiating extra-theological authorities, they are aiming at a tendency 
to appropriate an entire secular metanarrative devoid of theological critique, whereas in 
practice the appropriation of non-theological sources on the part of liberal theology more 
closely resembles a heuristic use of social science (p. 181). This is what Werpehowski terms 
‗ad hoc apologetics‘ (1986), in which common ground is articulated in the interests of 
constructing a shared discursive space in which an interim ethic can be agreed, but without 
assuming that all differences are unconditionally dissolved. It is similar to Bretherton‘s 
pragmatic approach to Christian activism, which understands the creation of contextual 
strategies for mutual civic engagement as a worthy outworking of post-secular Christian 
activism. 
The public theologian does indeed stand at the threshold of Church and world, of 
sacred and secular. But if some post-secular theologies are to be believed, this can never be to 
risk such blurred encounters, or even to exercise hospitality to the un-churched by 
encouraging greater traffic between the two worlds: to invite the secular into the sanctuary, 
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where it might even shed much-needed light in dark corners. For Graham Ward, rather, the 
theologian speaks from the steps of the Church, but only to nail his manifesto to the door and 
then retreat inside. Yet,  
 
… we should recall that the actual world is not always divided starkly into believers 
and unbelievers, into Church and World. More often than not, it comprises a melange 
of dogmatically certain believers, dogmatically uncertain believers, and infinite 
gradations in between of more-or-less believers and more-or-less unbelievers. (Biggar 
2011, p. 69) 
 
From where does the theologian speak, then: from an imagined or evolving tradition? From 
the quotidian praxis of the Church in the midst of the world; or from an Archimedean 
perspective above and beyond any critical scrutiny?  Such a vision falls short of any 
conception of apologetics as a communicative activity capable of seeing beyond its own 
frame of reference. The licence of the theologian to speak is nothing more than a self-
fulfilling prophecy: 
  
The theologian is a heroic redeemer, a visionary, a genius. Intellectual virtuosity 
eclipses ecclesial obedience as the key to renewal. Theology becomes creative and 
inventive rather than receptive and reiterative. Intensely sensible of the failures of the 
modern Church and its modern theology, the proponents of Radical Orthodoxy seek 
to render Christian truth so perspicuous, so clear and evident at the level of theory, 
that the nihilistic temptation of secularity will be impossible, and Radical Orthodoxy‘s 
peaceful consequences will be made plain. Here, without doubt, Milbank & Co. are 
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driven by ambition: if the actual practice of the churches in our time fails to make the 
truth of the gospel potent and clear, then theologians, theoretical shepherds of the 
speculative grasp, shall. But this ambition is not Augustinian; it is, I would submit, a 
quintessentially modern ambition. (Reno 2000, p. 43) 
 
I have been presenting the claims of theologians who argue from a performative, Christian 
public witness rooted in the historic practices of the church as the basis for their public 
discourse, with a corresponding schooling in the virtues of Christian discipleship as the 
foundation for active citizenship. There is no reason, however, why the integrity of that has to 
be protected solely through the segregation of such mores from anything deemed secular, 
modern, liberal. There will, inevitably be correlation and overlap between Christian and non-
Christian mores, just as there may be strategic partnerships between religious and non-
religious stakeholders.  
 
There can never be translation ―without remainder‖ … from one semiotic system to 
another, but there is no reason to reject that significant translation can take place back 
and forth in the process of conversation. If this can occur, then a minimal common 
ground (albeit contextual and perhaps tenuous) can be established and interchanges 
(apologetic, mutually critical) can proceed … There is no reason to rule out in 
advance the possibility of participants from different traditions of inquiry engaging 
each other in good faith, mutually critical dialogue and working toward at least 
moments of overlapping consensus. It happens already. (Kamitsuka 1999, p. 97) 
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In this chapter, I have traced the fault-line which divides those theologians who regard non-
theological disciplines as ‗objectively and demonstrably null and void, altogether lacking in 
truth‘ (Milbank 2009, p. 306) from those who articulate principles of common grace and the 
universality of reasonable discourse in the name of a ‗capacious God‘ (Atherton 2001 , p. 5). 
Whilst the objections of its critics are salutary, the liberal model is better suited to addressing 
a pluralist, post-secular context through its enduring principles of bilingualism, mediation and 
apologetics. It can learn some important lessons from post-liberals about where it speaks 
from and of whom it speaks: Jesus Christ as God‘s Word, God‘s ‗address‘ to the world, and 
the radical claims that entails. Where and how the implications of such claims are nurtured, 
and how the people of God inhabit the places from which to speak and act, will need further 
consideration, and here the emphasis of the post-liberals on the practices and everyday 
faithfulness of the Church as a kind of performative apologetics is an important new element. 
Yet although there remains a task to rejuvenate what may be meant by the terms, the projects 
of bilingualism, mediation and apologetics – to a world ever more fragmented, more religious 
and more sceptical – are not so easily dismissed. 
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5 
Crusades and Culture Wars: the Perils of Evangelical Identity Politics 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 charted the ‗new visibility‘ of religion in public, one manifestation of which was 
the extension of equality and diversity legislation in Europe to include ‗religion and belief‘. I 
hinted then at some of the difficulties inherent in balancing recognition of religious 
identification with greater tolerance of diversity of lifestyles: where the logic of equality and 
human rights comes into conflict with religious and conscientious freedoms. In this chapter, I 
want to consider this issue in more detail, by focusing on the emergence of a particular kind 
of confessional public theology which rejects many of the principles of the liberal democratic 
public square. It seeks to restore the ascendancy of Christianity in public life against 
perceptions that it is under threat from the dual forces of multiculturalism and secularism. 
The most prominent and contentious expression of this stance may be seen in the 
actions of a small number of conservative Christians who have brought high-profile legal 
cases in the UK against their employers, claiming to have experienced discrimination for 
wishing to express their faith. This has generally followed disciplinary action by their 
employers for being in breach of the various equality and diversity legislation introduced in 
the early years of the twenty-first century (see Chapter 1). The number of cases is small, and 
all but one of the appellants have seen their cases dismissed by successive hearings and legal 
authorities, including the European Court of Human Rights. However, they represent one part 
of a wider, if disparate, network of opinion, campaigning and public witness, which all go to 
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make what Richard McCallum calls the ‗Evangelical Christian micro public sphere‘ (2011, p. 
180).  
I will argue that the ‗discourse‘ emerging from this network rests on a number of 
strong themes or tropes which go to fuel a particular sensibility that may be characterized as 
‗evangelical identity politics‘. These themes articulate a sense of loss in the face of religious 
decline; a polarized view of the world and of the relationship between ‗Christ‘ and ‗Culture‘; 
a Biblicism that is suspicious of non-theological wisdom and cultural pluralism; and a vision 
of Christian public vocation as entailing a personal witness to objective moral truths. 
Confronted by the rise of secularism and increasing cultural and religious pluralism, the 
response of many conservative Christians has therefore been to ‗clarify challenging and ever-
changing moral ambiguities, provide answers to new moral questions, defend traditional 
view-points and establish fresh boundaries‘ (Hunt 2010, p. 188). In particular, liberalization 
of attitudes towards lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered and intersex (LGBTI) lifestyles 
within wider Western society, in which ‗a range of sexual and reproductive rights are 
increasingly wedded to expanding definitions of citizenship‘ (p. 184), has served as a 
particular lightning-rod.
12
  
 
The UK is essentially now a post-Christian society. Conventional moralities based 
upon a largely cultural-bound interpretation of Christianity have broken down and are 
continuingly challenged. Christian religion is now marginalised and largely confined 
to the private sphere. However, political developments in the secular world, typified 
by the developments of non-heterosexual rights, have increasingly drawn competing 
                                                          
12
 This has also been the case globally speaking in shaping the public stance of many 
conservative churches in Africa towards issues of homosexuality.  
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Christian groups into the public arena. A measure of the increasing secularisation of 
the UK is that such groups have to adapt themselves to democratic processes and 
discourse which, to one degree or another, secularises these constituencies themselves 
as part of a long-term process that now seems irreversible. (p. 197)  
 
Many mainstream Christian denominations struggle internally with matters of sexual 
morality and the legitimacy of ‗non-heterosexual‘ (2010) lifestyles. This includes questions 
of whether LGBTI persons can hold ministerial office in the Church and whether churches 
can conduct same-sex civil partnerships or marriages. Given the divisions within Christian 
traditions themselves – which often extend globally – it is perhaps no surprise that changing 
sexual mores in society as a whole should prove such a stumbling-block for many, more 
traditionally-minded, Christians. I wonder whether this represents another impasse between 
the seemingly irresistible force of implacable secularism and the immovable object of furious 
religion. In this instance, it is manifested in this debate between equality premised on liberal 
models of a neutral, non-partisan, agnostic public realm and sensitivity towards public 
displays of religious piety. Policy-makers are caught between the seemingly 
incommensurable hierarchies of equality, and how to adjudicate between rival sensibilities on 
religion. Furthermore, how are Christians to respond: are the allegations of persecution 
justified; what is the most appropriate form of Christian public witness in a post-secular 
society to be? 
 
The ‘micro public sphere’ of conservative religion  
When Pope Benedict XVI visited Britain in September 2010, he spoke of a culture of 
‗aggressive secularism‘, reiterating his conviction that Christianity is an essential part of 
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European civilization and the continuing significance of religion in public life. ‗As we reflect 
on the sobering lessons of the atheist extremism of the twentieth century, let us never forget 
how the exclusion of God, religion and virtue from public life leads ultimately to a truncated 
vision of man and of society and thus to a ‗reductive vision of the person and his destiny.‘ 
(Mackay 2010) 
Benedict‘s sentiments have been echoed by other Roman Catholic leaders, such as 
Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O‘Connor, Archbishop of Westminster, his successor Vincent 
Nicholls and Cardinal Keith O‘Brien, former leader of the Roman Catholic Church in 
Scotland. Much of the analysis is similar and entails an attack on ‗aggressive secularism‘ 
(which is seldom substantiated), a defense of the right of the churches to speak out on public 
issues and the dangers of multiculturalism (insofar as it fails to acknowledge the historic 
legacy of Christianity for British society) as a fragmentary and divisive influence (Addley 
2008). They have also attacked the British government‘s proposals to introduce same-sex 
marriage (under British law, same-sex civil partnerships are already legal, although not in 
places of worship. If same-sex marriage is permitted, religious leaders fear they will be 
required by law to conduct such ceremonies). O‘Brien condemned such trends in 
uncompromising terms, arguing that marriage reform went against natural law and would 
signal ‗the further degeneration of society into immorality‘ (Furness 2012). 
The public stance of the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church is thus highly 
critical of what it sees as disastrous liberalizing trends in Western society, linking the decline 
of Christendom with the loss of significant and binding moral values. This particular 
combination of that ‗declension narrative‘ with elements of traditional theology is also 
intriguingly evident in a more disparate network of protest in which a particular blend of 
social analysis and evangelical doctrine merge. 
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The term ‗micro public sphere‘ emerges from Jürgen Habermas‘ work on the 
development of a distinctive public sphere in Europe from the eighteenth century onwards. In 
response, commentators such as Nancy Fraser and Craig Calhoun have argued that the public 
sphere cannot be conceived of as homogenous and allowances must be made for a 
multiplicity of agents within a differentiated public sphere (McCallum 2011). The concept of 
a network of inter-connected, sometimes competing, ‗micro publics‘ is thus crucial for 
understanding the diversity of groups that comprise the public realm: the interaction of the 
local and national state, for example, or the diversity of civil society and the formation of 
public opinion. This is nowhere more relevant than a consideration of the mobilization of 
religious social capital (p. 177). In a post-Christian era, when Christianity is no longer the 
dominant force within the mainstream public sphere, the possibility of religious groups 
comprising one of a variety of ‗micro‘ spheres allows for a more nuanced understanding of a 
variety of forms of religious social capital, some of which may represent counter-cultural or 
minority perspectives. Such micro spheres may be networks of different constituent groups, 
sometimes transnational; a coalition of interest groups intertwined with a view to exerting 
wider influence which ‗processes, debates, and publicizes issues of mutual concern‘ (p. 179). 
McCallum argues that such a concept is especially pertinent to the representation of 
evangelical public opinion since historically, ‗Evangelicals often feel that their concerns and 
opinions are not adequately represented by the discourse of a larger established church and 
fear that their distinctive understanding of the Christian message is not fairly heard in the 
public arena.‘ (p. 184) 
Whilst McCallum is concerned for the ways evangelical public opinion has been 
activated over particular dimensions of Christian–Muslim dialogue in the UK, the concept 
also applies to those who are mobilizing around broader questions of religious identity in the 
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face of cultural diversity. It is possible to identify a coalition of interests, ranging from church 
leaders and academics, to lobbyists and lay people.  
 
Church Leaders 
The most prominent torch-bearers for the emergent conservative evangelical lobby have been 
Anglicans: George Carey, Archbishop of Canterbury between 1991 and 2002, and Michael 
Nazir-Ali, who retired as Bishop of Rochester in 2009. Other prominent figures include John 
Azumah of the London Institute for Contemporary Christianity, an evangelical ‗think tank‘ 
and Patrick Sookhdeo, CEO of the Barnabas Fund, which supports Christians who experience 
persecution around the world. The title of Nazir-Ali‘s recent book, Triple Jeopardy for the 
West: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islamism and Multiculturalism (2012), sums up the 
essence of their stance against the cultural marginalization of Christianity in the face of ‗an 
aggressive secularism that seeks to undermine the traditional principles because it has its own 
project to foster‘ (Beckford 2009). What is at stake, apparently, is a battle for the soul of the 
nation in the face of attempts to undermine Christianity as the basis of our civilization. As 
Patrick Sookhdeo argues: 
  
In the face of aggressive secularism and radical Islam, it is vital that Christians come 
together and speak up publicly and with confidence in Jesus Christ and the values and 
vision of society that issue from Him. If we fail to do so, we can expect our nation's 
Christian foundation to be eroded more quickly and the disappearance of the freedom, 
justice and compassion that so many take for granted. Our country could look very 
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different, very quickly, if we don't stand up for Jesus Christ in public life. 
(http://www.notashamed.org.uk/comments-churches.php) 
  
For George Carey, secularism and multiculturalism have ‗conspired‘ (2012, p. 53) to 
marginalize Christianity in Britain, working to fill the vacuum created by the decline in 
church attendance. Through a process of rapidly changing social values, including religious 
and cultural pluralism, changing family patterns and ‗the establishment of homosexuality as a 
social and sexual norm‘ (p. 44) of British culture ‗has taken a wrong turn‘ (p. 151). 
Paradoxically, legislation to extend greater tolerance towards minorities has resulted in 
greater intolerance towards those who dissent from the liberal consensus, which for Nazir-Ali 
and Carey, means those who hold ‗traditional‘ values: ‗Can they any longer state traditional 
Christian views on the uniqueness of Christ without risking the charge of being prejudiced 
against those of other faiths? Is it possible to defend Christian marriage without being abused 
as ―homophobic‖ and worse, arrested for inciting hatred?‘ (p. 17, my emphasis). 
 
Legal Cases 
Another manifestation of the sub-culture of evangelical identity politics involves a number of 
individuals who have pursued high-profile legal cases that invoke equality and diversity 
legislation. In January 2013, the European Court of Human Rights released its verdict on the 
cases of four Christians who had all appealed against earlier verdicts of Employment 
Tribunals in the UK, all of which to some degree concerned the extent to which they had 
experienced discrimination at work because of their faith. They were appealing on the basis 
of Articles 9 and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (British Broadcasting 
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Corporation 2013). Of the four appeals, only one – that of Nadia Eweida – was upheld. Ms 
Eweida, a check-in clerk for British Airways, was sent home in October 2006 after being told 
that her necklace cross contravened uniform regulations. BA subsequently changed the policy 
in 2007, but on returning to work Ms Eweida sued on the grounds of religious discrimination. 
She lost her case at the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal, but EHRC 
found in her favour on the grounds that no harm was done to BA by allowing staff to wear a 
cross.  
The other appellants all lost their cases: Lillian Ladele, a Registrar of Births, 
Marriages and Deaths for Islington Borough Council in London, took her employers to court 
on the grounds that they were subjecting her to direct and indirect discrimination by requiring 
her to conduct same-sex civil partnerships, in contravention of her conservative evangelical 
Christian beliefs. The Employment Tribunal found in her favour, on the grounds of 
harassment in terms of religion or belief, as well as direct and indirect discrimination (Malik 
2011, p. 30). This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal, on the basis that due 
accommodation was available, and that Ladele could have ‗contracted out‘ of her obligations. 
In a similar case to that of Ms Eweida, Shirley Chaplin, a nurse employed by the Royal 
Devon and Exeter Foundation National Health Service Trust, refused a request from her 
employer to conceal her cross beneath her uniform on grounds of health and safety. This was 
upheld by the EHRC. Gary McFarlane, a counsellor with the national relationship counselling 
charity Relate, was dismissed in 2008 for refusing to offer sex therapy guidance to same-sex 
couples. His views emerged in the context of a staff training event, where he stated that his 
Christian beliefs would not permit him to promote gay sexual activity. 
At the appeals stage, and at the hearings before the European Court, the judgements 
reflected considerations of whether employers had attempted to reach ‗reasonable 
accommodation‘ with the appellants. The verdicts also reflected the various courts‘ view that 
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discrimination directly on the grounds of religious conviction was difficult to prove, given 
that Christians themselves vary to the extent to which aspects of external observance are a 
compulsory facet of their core convictions. Even in the case of Ms Eweida, the issue turned 
on the question of whether it was a mandatory requirement for Christians to wear a cross. Ms 
Eweida‘s counsel was unable to produce any witnesses prepared to argue that such a practice 
was any more than a personal preference, or that her Christian faith, no matter how profound, 
required it. The Tribunal also took testimonies from other practicing Christians, who all 
affirmed – as did the claimant herself – that they did not consider visible display of the cross 
to be mandatory. The evidence from the British Airways Christian Fellowship put it this way: 
 
We consider the campaigns instigated by some Christians and churches to be 
disproportionate and do not conform to the principles of grace found in the Kingdom 
of God. It is the way of the cross, not the wearing of it, that should determine our 
behaviour. 
We would hold that, in Christianity, outward signs of a cross are simply an exterior 
representation of what should be in the heart. Outward physical expressions are not in 
themselves essential to demonstrate inner faith.‖ http://www.out-law.com/page-10758 
[11 June 2012]. 
 
James Eadie QC, defending at the ECHR hearing, argued that the law could not force 
employers to alter terms and conditions to accommodate employees‘ religious practices 
unless the burden of proof indicated otherwise. ‗Individuals should be free to manifest their 
religion or belief unless a restriction can be justified. That does not mean, however, that states 
should require employers to recognize an enforceable right of employees to practise their 
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religion or beliefs at work.‘ (Judd 2012) Ultimately, however, the European Court verdict 
was not based on the question of whether it was a requirement of Christian commitment to 
wear a cross, merely that British Airways had acted unreasonably in over-ruling Ms Eweida‘s 
preferences.  
In some instances, Christian professionals have been censured by their own 
professional associations. A practising psychotherapist, Lesley Pilkington, was the subject of 
a ruling in January 2011 by the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy that 
she had ‗failed to exercise reasonable skill and care and was thus negligen.‘ (Davies 2012). 
This followed a consultation with an investigative journalist, posing as a Christian seeking 
treatment for same-sex attraction. The ruling emphasized that this was not a judgement upon 
Mrs Pilkington‘s religious beliefs, but a matter of her having recommended a certain course 
of treatment, based, in the adjudicators‘ view, on over-hasty conclusions regarding her 
client‘s situation and the appropriateness of so-called ‗reparative therapy‘ to rid him of his 
unwanted feelings. 
 
Lobbyists and Campaigners 
Such cases have been well-backed by independently-funded conservative Christian groups 
which hire Christian lawyers on a pro bono basis. The main sponsoring body is Christian 
Concern, which used to be called Christian Concern for Our Nation, founded in 2004 by an 
organization called the Lawyers‘ Christian Fellowship (http://www.christianconcern.com). 
Christian Concern promotes campaigns such as ―Not Ashamed‖, which urges its supporters 
to wear crosses and other Christian symbols visibly in solidarity with those disciplined by 
employers for doing so. It also encourages evangelical Christians to stand up and speak out 
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for their faith and values, and carries endorsements from Christian leaders, local churches and 
campaigners [http://www.notashamed.org.uk/]. 
Christian Concern also has links to the Conservative Christian Fellowship, a 
parliamentary group which claims to represent evangelical Christians in politics. One of its 
members, Nadine Dorries MP, sponsored a private members‘ bill in May 2008 to restrict the 
upper limit for legal abortions under the 1967 Abortion Act from 24 weeks to 20, a campaign 
managed on her behalf by Williams and CCFN (Hundal 2010). 
Williams also heads CCFN‘s sister organization, the Christian Legal Centre, which has 
supported a number of individuals involved in legal cases claiming religious discrimination, 
and is linked through her to other campaigns against embryology research, access to abortion, 
same-sex partnerships and anti-discrimination legislation (Adams 2010; Hundal 2010; 
Modell 2008). The Christian Institute (‗Christian influence in a secular world‘) campaigns 
against permissive legislation on matters such as abortion, euthanasia and gay rights. It has 
instigated a number of campaigns opposing pieces of legislation to end discrimination against 
LGBTI persons, including rights of adoption and the equalization of the age of consent. It is 
funding the legal costs of Lillian Ladele and Peter and Hazelmary Bull, two Christian 
hoteliers who were prosecuted for refusing to let a double bedroom to a gay couple (Adams 
2010). One of the Christian Institute‘s publications, entitled Religious liberty in the 
workplace: a guide for Christian employees, asks:  
 
 Can I send Christmas cards to my colleagues? 
 Should I be allowed time off because of Church Services/Christmas/Easter? 
 Can I wear a cross? 
 Can I share my faith in the workplace? 
216 
 
 Can I give a Christian opinion on controversial topics? (Jones, 2008, p. 3)  
 
The Christian Action Research and Education group began in 1971 as the Nationwide 
Festival of Light. CARE‘s eight-point doctrinal basis reflects classic evangelical doctrine, 
from the sovereignty of God, to the fallenness and universal sinfulness of humanity, to 
substitutionary atonement.  
 
 Our mission: to declare Christian truth and demonstrate Christ’s compassion in 
society. 
Our goals: 
 Promote Christian action, research and education to support children, single people, 
marriage and family life effectively. 
 Encourage Christians to pray for society and to recognize the dignity and worth of 
every individual person from fertilization to life‘s natural end. 
 Assist Christians to understand social and moral issues in public policy, education and 
the community. 
 Challenge Christians to become actively involved in the democratic process, to be 
effective salt and light where there is a need for truth and justice. 
 Equip Christians to show the love of Christ in their communities through practical 
caring. 
http://www.care.org.uk/about/who-we-are  
 
217 
 
The Discourse of the Evangelical Micro Sphere 
These individuals and groups represent a loose coalition which is characterized by some 
cross-fertilization of personnel but, more significantly, shares a common language or 
‗discourse‘. The concept of discourse, best associated with the work of Michel Foucault, is a 
useful theoretical framework with which to elaborate this, since it is effectively an analysis of 
the way language works to create a world of meaning that elicits in its audience a certain set 
of attitudes and responses. Discourse thus serves to order the world in particular ways that 
serve to convince by their seeming naturalism: in establishing the impeachability of expertise, 
in demarcating the boundary between truth and falsehood, normality and deviance. . Inherent 
in any analysis of discourse are the seeds of its exposure as contingent and unstable: ‗how 
that-which-is has not always been‘ (Foucault 1983, p. 206). Approaching evangelical identity 
politics as a discursive phenomenon, therefore, constituted through particular linguistic 
tropes, may enable us to examine more closely the theological world-view that is constructed 
and rendered axiomatic as a result. 
Firstly, we have the trope of ‗aggressive‘ secularism, polarization and hostility: ‗At 
times it seems a ―crusade‖ is being waged by the militant wing of secularism to eradicate 
religion in general – and Christianity in particular – from any role in public life.‘ (Carey 
2012, p. 9, my emphasis). Michael Nazir-Ali articulates the same threat and, like Pope 
Benedict, links the rise of secularism – aggressive or otherwise – with the erosion of an 
historic Christian legacy. The Christian Institute‘s website couches it in highly adversarial 
terms: 
 
Never have there been more ‗equality and diversity‘ laws. Yet the marginalization 
faced by Christians is increasing at an alarming rate. In many instances equality and 
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diversity laws are actually being used as a sword to attack Christians rather than a 
shield to protect them. (Christian Institute 2009, p. 71, my emphasis). 
 
Secondly, the vision of Christianity under attack is coupled with a narrative of 
persecution. Writing about the Christians who have gone to law against their employers, 
George Carey argues that ‗it is entirely natural for them to feel that their experience is one of 
―persecution‖‘ (Carey 2012, p. 16). He admits to a deep sense of unease at the ‗deep malaise‘ 
regarding religion in public life. Whilst he acknowledges that it is probably inappropriate to 
use terms like ‗persecution‘ to describe what is happening, and that Christians should 
‗downplay the language of spiritual warfare‘ (p. 123), some of his own language is 
intemperate: employers are ‗hostile to faith claims‘ (p. 121); Christians who express 
traditional values ‗have now reached the status of social pariahs’ (p. 109). His intention is ‗to 
salute the few brave Christian souls who have had the courage to stand up against bullying 
tactics and, as a result, have lost employment. But what they have lost exactly is even more 
precious than jobs – they are the victims of injustice, for to hold to principles central to 
biblical Christianity is now being increasingly seen as unacceptable.‘ (Carey 2012, p. 9)  
On one level, this prompts a renewed commitment to the public nature of Christian 
witness: 
 
For Christians the whole of life is indivisible. We cannot retreat to a privatized ghetto 
because the gospel concerns the whole of life. There is no ―privatized‖ morality 
because the whole of life is based on morality. Faith is necessarily public. The 
concerns of the Bible and theology through the ages have always been public and 
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political … Believers cannot simply divest themselves of their faith when they enter 
politics or engage in public debate. (Carey 2012, p. 78) 
  
Filtered through a conservative evangelical sensibility, this becomes an act of personal 
witness to an objective, God-given moral order that has been fatally disrupted. In the face of 
such ‗persecution‘, Christians cannot remain silent; so the role of the Christian in public life 
in the face of the erosion of their rights and freedoms becomes essentially a moral ‗crusade‘, 
premised on the objective truth of humanity‘s sinfulness and the saving work of Christ 
crucified: 
  
The Christian Institute wants to help Christians answer the challenges of living in an 
increasingly secular society. We want to help Christians understand and respond to 
the major moral and ethical issues of the day. The work of the Institute supports 
Christians in speaking up for what they believe. 
There is a great deal of secular research which shows the consequences of rejecting 
God‘s moral law. This ought not to be a surprise. The God who created this world 
knows what is best for this world. His laws are for everybody’s good at all times. 
Therefore, The Christian Institute highlights the most useful research - pointing 
people to the wisdom of God‘s law. 
In a democracy we must argue the Christian case publicly. Our nation‘s problems are 
not primarily political or economic. They are moral and spiritual. Economic and 
political issues are very important and it is right for Christians to be involved in these 
areas. But how can our nation flourish when we are ignoring the moral basics? For too 
long Christians have failed to speak out. We must stand up for what we believe. 
(Christian Institute 2007, my emphasis). 
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In this context, the wearing of a cross (one of the acts which has brought some individuals 
into conflict with the law) is thus not simply a mark of identity but an act of evangelism: 
 
It may be important for an employer to understand that, for a Christian, whilst an 
outward expression of their faith through specific clothing or jewellery may not be 
prescribed in the Bible, it is a tenet of their Christian faith to share that faith with 
others. They may choose to do this by wearing certain jewellery, publicly displaying 
to their colleagues the convictions they hold … If the employer‘s stance is that no 
such expressions are permitted then it is important that they understand the 
disproportionate impact this will have upon Christians who may feel that it is their 
duty to bear Christian witness. (Christian Institute 2007) 
 
Other studies of contemporary evangelical discourse reveal similar tropes. Anna 
Strhan‘s research tests out the opinions of ordinary members of a large metropolitan Anglican 
evangelical church in London and the extent to which they represent what she terms an 
‗instauration of secularism‘ (Strhan 2012, p. 200) or the representation of a general argument 
(to do with the encroachments of secularism in society) through concrete examples, such as 
personal anecdotes or media reports. By combinations of linguistic markers – secularism is 
always ‗aggressive‘, Islam is always ‗militant‘, liberalism is covertly ‗totalitarian‘ and 
‗intolerant‘, a Foucauldian episteme is constructed whereby such trends are inherently – 
ontologically – antipathetic to evangelicals‘ ability to live their faith freely and authentically. 
Strhan describes a cycle of discourse, which works as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy; once 
the concept of intolerant, anti-Christian secularism begins to circulate, it gathers to it concrete 
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examples, which generate a climate of expectation – what Bivins in another context (2007) 
describes as a culture of fear – which then serves to reinforce the original point of view. 
(Strhan 2012, pp. 213–14) ‗Secularism‘ is only ever experienced – and named – as 
antipathetic to genuine Christian identity, thus exercising a powerful agency that goes beyond 
words or concepts, consolidating into ‗modes of relationship and constellations of practices‘ 
(p. 213) that definitively shape the everyday sensibilities of church members. 
Similarly, in her analysis of the New Christian Right in the US Sara Diamond posits a 
strong link between the rhetoric of its proponents and its ability to campaign effectively at the 
grass-roots. Crucial to their effectiveness in mobilizing support is what Diamond terms 
‗framing processes‘, or the ability to construct a discourse which creates a convincing 
narrative of shared grievances against prevailing cultural and political norms, and a 
corresponding agenda for change (Diamond 1998).  
 
Evangelical Identity Politics 
Essentially, then, what is at stake are not the facts of the matter, but the construction of a 
particular narrative or discourse of suffering in the face of persecution that serves to reinforce 
a particular kind of evangelical identity. In fact, evangelicalism has always demonstrated a 
consistently ambivalent attitude toward its surrounding culture (Dyrness 2007, p. 145). Is it 
appropriate, or useful, to think of this phenomenon in terms of ‗identity politics‘? 
The terminology of ‗identity politics‘ emerged out of the progressive social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s as a result of processes of consciousness-raising and 
campaigning to end exclusion, as well as the assertion of rights and recognition based on the 
experience of collective as well as individual subjectivity. It began to emerge in the 1970s as 
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part of movements for minority recognition and empowerment, such as feminism, civil rights 
and (as it was known) ‗gay liberation‘. Rather than universal or generic rights, identity 
politics claims a political agency on the basis of difference and specificity. Its model of 
political mobilization is based not only on abolishing material injustices, such as economic 
inequalities or legal discrimination, but on articulating a distinctive set of political self-
interests and alignments that went unacknowledged by liberal political understandings of the 
‗neutral‘ citizen.  
As Nancy Fraser argues, alongside the traditional ‗politics of redistribution‘, 
organized possibly alongside socio-economic factors such as income and equality of 
opportunity, this is a new phenomenon, embodying what she calls the ‗politics of 
recognition‘ (1996). They correspond, broadly, to divisions within second-wave feminism 
between those wishing to acknowledge universalist feminist politics, or women‘s ‗equality‘ 
with men and differentialist perspectives, wishing to celebrate women‘s distinctiveness from 
men. Such movements seek to give visibility and political agency to groups who regard the 
recognition of difference – expressed, perhaps in the recovery or creation of a particular 
culture, such as African–American women‘s religious and literary heritages – as an integral 
part of, rather than an impediment to, political empowerment. A feeling of exclusion and 
difference from the cultural ‗mainstream‘ thus becomes both the source of resistance and 
reconstruction. Despite accusations of essentialism and the dangers of fragmenting any 
coalitions of progressive politics (p. 10), identity politics represents a powerful blend of the 
personal and the political, of regarding personal experience as the well-spring from which a 
more public political set of convictions can arise.  
Identity politics generally connotes progressive campaigns towards a more inclusive 
and less monochrome account of citizenship and the body politic, although it can be claimed 
by those wishing to reassert a more reactionary account of political allegiance. Hence, recent 
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years have seen the rise of far-right political movements and parties, especially in Europe, 
appealing to forms of ethnic superiority and White nationalism. In the face of mass 
immigration and multi-cultural or integrationist policies, such groups portray migrants as 
‗engulfing‘ indigenous populations, threatening established ways of life, undermining job 
prospects or claiming privileges perceived as not available to the host community. Whilst 
resistance to incomers – and particularly perceptions of economic, religious and cultural 
threat – is not new, especially amongst communities already under pressure, the rhetoric of 
identity politics becomes a new vehicle of defensive and exclusive rejection of pluralism.  
As George Lipsitz comments in relation to White identity in reaction to African–
American civil rights, ‗successful political coalitions serving dominant political interests have 
often relied on exclusionary concepts of Whiteness to fuse unity among otherwise 
antagonistic individuals and groups‘ (1995, p. 370). Lipsitz‘s point is partly that, despite itself 
being highly ethnically diverse, ‗White‘ America had to find various political, scientific and 
cultural reference-points – from segregation, eugenics and Western movies – from which to 
articulate a narrative of White superiority and solidarity. Rather than a means of securing new 
minorities a space within a pluralist public realm, reactionary identity politics becomes a 
means of inverting the values of multiculturalism and equal rights back on themselves. Race, 
gender, sexual orientation and other markers of identity can then be viewed belligerently as 
themselves assertions of bias or discrimination, rather than, as originally deployed, the 
sources of pride and social empowerment. 
There are certainly affinities here with the way in which the New Christian Right 
emerged in the 1980s as a reaction to many of the liberal political movements of earlier 
decades, and the way in which these protagonists found it expedient to talk of ‗culture wars‘ 
and to frame a discourse of struggle between ‗traditional‘ American values and progressive 
forces as an epic battle for the nation‘s soul. This was not a polarization of the United States 
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along traditional lines of class, race or ethnicity or region, but along an ideological divide 
driven by a particular conservative evangelical world-view.  
However, such an analysis can be quickly refuted by considering what in anti-racist 
and progressive masculinist studies has sometimes been termed a ‗false parallelism‘ 
(Schwalbe 1996; Hearn 2004). In responding to campaigns for equality of one group, another 
group claims a (spurious) equality of disadvantage; so white people claim a parallel 
experience of racism and claim they have been victimized by affirmative action policies; or 
men report feelings of disadvantage when discouraged from pursuing careers in female 
dominated fields. Such charges of parallel or equivalent discrimination are deemed false, 
however, because they fail to take the structural, material and systematic nature of 
discrimination against Black and ethnic minority people, women or LGBTI individuals into 
account. In assuming that all injustices are equivalent to one another, it neglects any factors 
such as inequalities of power or material inequity, and opts for an individualistic rather than 
structural–systemic analysis. 
 
The logic of individualism has structured the approach to multiculturalism in many 
ways. The call for tolerance of difference is framed in terms of respect for individual 
characteristics and attitudes; group differences are conceived categorically and not 
relationally, as distinct entities rather than interconnected structures or systems 
created through repeated processes of the enunciation of difference. (Scott 1992, p. 
17) 
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Drawing false parallels is a way of writing history as a kind of zero-sum game in which the 
gains of minority traditions must somehow inevitably mean the diminishment or 
disenfranchisement of the privileged ‗majority‘. Like Samuel Huntington‘s thesis purporting 
a ‗Clash of Civilizations‘, there is a danger that this becomes a portrayal of cultural pluralism 
as a threatening incursion of difference which inevitably descends into conflict and a struggle 
for survival. 
 
Evangelical Identity Politics in Historical Perspective 
I have identified some of the hallmarks of contemporary evangelical identity politics as they 
manifest themselves in a post-secular context. These include the importance of conscience 
and conviction, even to the point of persecution, as well as a tendency to polarize the things 
of ‗Christ‘ and the ways of ‗culture‘ and the tendency to regard social transformation as a 
moral crusade. However, these traits also have continuity with an historic evangelical world-
view, which has its roots in the European Reformation and in the revival and missionary 
movements of Europe and North America in the eighteenth century. In his history of 
evangelicalism, David Bebbington locates the origins of the movement as follows: 
‗Evangelical religion is a popular Protestant movement that has existed in Britain since the 
1730s … evangelicalism was a new phenomenon of the eighteenth century‘ (1989, p. 1). It 
emerged out of the ‗cross-pollinating revivalistic and evangelistic atmosphere‘ prevailing in 
the 1730s across Europe, Britain and North America. 
Whilst its main genesis was in the Great Awakening of the eighteenth century, there is 
a continuity from the fourteenth-century legacy of John Wyclif, the Bible translators and the 
Reformation, with their emphasis on the preaching of the gospel, personal conscience and the 
authority of the Bible. Martin Luther‘s influence was crucial, with his emphasis on the 
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mediation of grace through Word of God and personal relationship with the Saviour, rather 
than authority of Church; of justification by faith; and the essentially experiential character of 
religion, albeit tested through evidence. 
From the Reformation, evangelicalism drew a tripartite set of influences: Luther, who 
located the transformative power of the Gospel primarily in the human heart and individual 
conscience; Calvin, who believed that the word of God spoke to structures and institutions as 
well as individuals; and the Anabaptists, who taught that commitment to Christ entailed a 
decisive eschewal of worldly power. All shared the iconoclasm of the Reformation which 
taught that temporal powers and institutions were incapable of revealing the saving work of 
Christ, and that the people of God were to be shaped by the word of God as set forth in 
Scripture, and not reason or natural law. 
In reaction to the stress on reason amongst Enlightenment philosophers, 
evangelicalism evolved as a religion of the heart, expressed in personal piety and the 
elevation of feeling, evident in the writings of Wesley, Edwards and Schleiermacher. Yet it 
shares with Enlightenment philosophy (especially Romanticism) a mistrust of authoritarian 
dogma at the expense of inductive, evidential truth (D. Smith 1998). Normally, 
Enlightenment rationality is seen as the antithesis of evangelicalism, with its Deist 
tendencies, an emphasis on empiricism and reason rather than experience, its opposition to 
revealed religion and its encouragement of textual and historical criticism of the Bible. 
However, early evangelicals such as John Wesley always believed reason and revelation went 
together. There was in fact a strong interest on empiricism and science amongst evangelicals, 
with emphasis on ‗experimental religion‘ as something that must be verified by personal 
experience rather than obedience to convention or tradition. Those empiricist tendencies are 
apparent in evangelicalism‘s view of the Bible as affording evidence of faith and 
corresponding to an objective, verifiable truth. However counter-intuitive it may seem, 
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literalism towards the Bible was an outworking of modernity, with its rationality and 
empiricism. Whilst early evangelicals dwelt on the homiletic and devotional uses of 
Scripture, the emergence of higher criticism in the early nineteenth century provoked a 
reaction which proclaimed the inerrancy and divine inspiration of the Bible. Such literalism 
was facilitated by a particular kind of pragmatism, especially strong in the United States, 
which argued that God had placed evidence within Scripture in such a way that human reason 
could apprehend it, much in the way that scientists argued that empirical investigation of 
nature was accessible to human understanding. 
The nineteenth century saw the fragmentation of evangelicalism and increasing 
pressure from some quarters to establish doctrinal test to establish clear line between 
evangelicals and non-evangelicals. As historians such as Bebbington and David Smith record, 
there appeared a tension within the evangelical movement after around 1790 between those 
stressing ecclesiastical order – and priority of Anglican ecclesiology – and those seeking new 
avenues of evangelism beyond Established structures. Evangelicalism gradually became more 
respectable within the Church of England and its membership shifted from being 
predominantly working-class in favour of more educated, wealthy groups. In order to do that, 
preachers had to remove fear that it was socially revolutionary and that spiritual levelling 
might imply social levelling. Wilberforce‘s Practical View (1797) argued that religion did 
make the privations of poverty more palatable to the lower orders. Methodists were less 
comfortable with this, however, and Methodist preaching and evangelism acknowledged the 
changing social circumstances of industrial society, and argued for the active evangelization 
of emergent working classes through the adoption of innovative patterns of preaching, 
worship, spirituality and church organization. 
David Smith‘s thesis is that during the nineteenth century, evangelicalism lost sight of 
its original social teaching, becoming inappropriately focused on personal conversion and a 
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spiritualized gospel, at the expense of issues of corporate, structural justice. ‗The call to 
personal spirituality eclipsed any wider responsibility to public life, beyond evangelization‘ 
(Dyrness 2007, p. 150) There was increasing emphasis on the defence of the inerrancy of 
Scripture in face of emerging biblical scholarship in the early nineteenth century. Similarly, 
in social teaching, ‗Optimistic postmillennialism now gave way to a new eschatology 
involving a far more apocalyptic view of history.‘ (C. Smith 1998, p. 27) Rather than viewing 
the world as ‗the theatre within which the redemptive purposes of Christ were to be 
increasingly realized and manifested‘, evangelicals saw ‗dark, demonic powers at work in 
history and if Christ‘s ultimate triumph were to be assured, then it had better be relocated 
outside this world‘ (p. 28). 
Its initial energy – in Bebbington‘s terms, its activism – was ‗world-transformative‘ 
(C. Smith 1998, p. ix), which was not limited only to personal salvation, but extended to the 
restoration of God‘s dominion throughout all creation. Sadly, argues Smith, this tradition 
gradually became marginalized, and from the nineteenth century onwards, and culminating in 
the emergence of the New Christian Right in the 1970s in the United States, a conservative, 
rather than radical, evangelicalism, has come to dominate. 
Whilst evangelicals played a leading role in social reform in the nineteenth century, 
by the early twentieth century the trend was much more towards a withdrawal from social 
and cultural engagement, on the defensive in the face of higher criticism, Darwinism and 
industrialization. The twentieth century saw a greater polarization between the options of 
‗accommodation to the trends of secular society or resistance to them‘ (Bebbington 1989, p. 
227). The former were represented by works such as T. Guy Rogers‘ Liberal Evangelicalism 
(1923), which acknowledged the impact of modernist thought and extent to which ‗secular‘ 
reason could offer new sources of revelation. ‗For them the refashioning of the tradition was 
imperative if it was to survive and stand a chance of claiming the allegiance of thinking 
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young people in the twentieth century.‘ (C. Smith 1998, p. 80) In the US, the latter were 
epitomized by Fundamentalists, setting their faces against modern culture in all its forms. 
There was, therefore, a growing division between conservative and liberal 
evangelicals by 1920s. In the US, this was exemplified by disputes between Fundamentalists 
and Modernists, mainly on the question of the inerrancy of the Bible. Gradually, as 
Bebbington puts it, there was ‗a parting of the ways‘, between ‗those who gave a 
discriminating welcome to new agencies of popular culture and those who viewed them with 
horror‘ (1989, p. 209). 
Up to the 1960s, American evangelicals with their populist and ameliorative views, 
were as likely to be Democrats as Republicans. After that, however, evangelical political 
allegiance shifted radically to the right, although the common features of activism, Biblicism 
and populism (with increasing attention to the use of cutting-edge communications and 
campaigning techniques) endured. Evangelicals were drawn towards Republican values 
insofar as they were regarded as upholding small-town, traditional ways of life against 
cosmopolitan, centralized politics. Fundamentalists and Pentecostals constituted the core of 
the re-emergent Christian Right of the 1980s. They were not part of the political or cultural 
mainstream, but felt disenfranchised by the growing liberalism of America during the 1960s 
and 1970s. In the mid-1970s, a number of organizations were founded which articulated 
religious support for conservative political causes, with the explicit intention of training and 
organizing evangelical Christians as effective lobbyists and campaigners in mainstream 
politics: Focus on the Family (1977); Christian Voice (1974) and the Moral Majority (1979). 
Such political activity is regarded as having played a particularly influential role in the 
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, whose administration increasingly reflected the 
sensibilities of its conservative evangelical constituency on matters such as abortion, foreign 
policy, prayer in schools and the teaching of creationism. Despite the election of the Clinton 
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administration, this momentum and associated organizational funding and infrastructure 
continued through the 1990s. Various organizations broadened the traditional concerns of the 
Christian Right to promote conservative approaches to matters such as healthcare, economics, 
education and criminal justice. 
The Christian Right has been marked by its dense network of local and national 
organizations, and especially by its adept use of broadcast media. It has adopted many of the 
strategies of the civil rights movement of the 1960s in its emphasis on voter registration and 
education, through organizations such as the Christian Coalition (founded 1992), the Family 
Research Council and the Home School Legal Defense Association. Since Roe vs Wade 
(1973), the Christian Right has intervened actively in anti-abortion campaigns, and its stance 
on medical and reproductive issues has more recently encompassed opposition to stem-cell 
research and euthanasia. 
This has proved highly successful in framing a political discourse and building a 
comprehensive network of lobbies, organizations and campaigns. Putnam‘s analysis of 
religion as rich in social capital – the ability to mobilize human resources, forge social 
networks and sustain alliances – is pertinent here. But evangelicalism‘s other emphases on 
clear belief, personal conviction, proselytizing and biblical certainty also constitute a strong 
‗elective affinity‘ with political activism: ‗Evangelicals are encouraged to put aside their 
shyness when approaching newcomers with controversial ideas, and the missionary mindset 
encourages an attitude of tenacity in waiting for the fruits of one‘s labor to pay off.‘ 
(Diamond 1998, p. 9) 
 
Evangelical World-Views 
Evangelicals care deeply about the state of culture: they seek its redemption. But 
overall Evangelicals address culture: they do not listen to it. (Dyrness 2007, p. 157) 
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Bivins argues that the defining paradigm of evangelical engagement with culture is one of a 
‗declension narrative‘, which equates contemporary social ills with a nation‘s abandonment 
of Christian – defined as traditional, conservative moral – values. It is premised on ‗a need 
for the demonic … other whose presence facilitates the assertion of the orthodox self‘ (2007, 
p. 100). Elements of this attitude can be seen in the pronouncements of the individuals and 
organizations, surveyed earlier, who lament the contemporary ‗persecution‘ of Christianity. Is 
evangelical identity premised, therefore, on a need to maintain strict boundaries against 
prevailing culture? This is part of the construction of their identities, and ‗serves as an 
ongoing strategy by which conservative religious groups shape their subcultures and forge the 
boundaries of their identity … That is, they thrive by keeping modernity out.‘ (Guest 2007, 
pp. 7–8) There has always been a thread of resistance to the worldliness of prevailing culture 
within conservative evangelicalism, ‗whose doctrinally conservative, vehemently defended 
beliefs are constructed in opposition to a vision of western culture as morally and spiritually 
bankrupt.‘ (Guest 2007, p. 3)  
There are a number of reasons for this ambivalence, all deeply rooted in the theology 
of evangelicalism. Historically, there was the influence of Romanticism – ‗to flee the 
everyday world of strife in order to discover the secret of harmony‘ (Bebbington 1989, p. 
170). The 1870s onwards saw ascendancy of holiness teaching, or sanctification by faith. 
‗The holiness movement ushered in a new phase in Evangelical history.‘ (p. 179) Holiness, or 
distinctive life of discipleship, resulted from conversion but was visible outworking of 
spiritual power of God in human affairs. ‗Holiness was so much an internal matter of 
personal consciousness, a trysting of the elevated soul with its God, that the practicalities of 
everyday living were generally passed over in silence.‘ (p. 175) 
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In his history of evangelicalism in Britain, David Bebbington has advanced a 
‗quadrilateral‘ of defining and foundational traits, which has occupied centre stage in the 
literature ever since.
13
 Each of these four themes inform the sensibilities that are shaping 
contemporary evangelical identity politics. Firstly, Bebbington identifies conversionism, or 
‗the belief that lives need to be changed‘ (1989, p. 3). An emphasis on a religion of the heart 
has always been central to evangelicalism: a faith not bound by the cool empiricism of reason 
but warmed by the currents of feeling, of dependence, forgiveness of sins and the indwelling 
of the Holy Spirit. The consecrated self was the focus of the redemptive work of Christ, and 
the immediacy of experience and the life-changing crisis of conversion became touchstones 
for the walk of faith. If social reform was to happen, it emanated from this energy of ‗the 
ravished individual as agent of change and focus of creativity‘ (Dyrness 2007, p. 149). 
Conversion as psychological release and sanction for withdrawal from social engagement 
leads not to conversion of culture but the greater assimilation of Gospel with culture – by 
default. For many critics, then, contemporary evangelicalism has allowed its message to be 
privatized and domesticated, ‗leaving it unable to recognize the extent to which it has become 
ensnared in the worship of the idols which dominate western culture, is itself in need of 
radical conversion‘ (C. Smith 1998, p. 124). That is to renege on the traditional evangelical 
commission by failing to take a world-transforming route in relation to surrounding culture. 
In other respects, however, contemporary evangelical identity politics retains its 
strong sense of a mission to a failed culture in need of conversion, accompanied by adopting 
                                                          
13Noll offers as a version of Bebbington‘s quadrilateral the principles of activism, intuition, 
populism and biblicism (1994, p. 8). Mathew Guest defines Protestant evangelicalism in 
terms of the ‗centrality of scripture, strict moral codes and a passion for the conversion of 
others‘ (2007, p. 1).  
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a highly polarized understanding of the Gospel under attack. Michael Nazir-Ali reprises the 
discourse of ‗aggressive secularism‘ thus:  
 
There are a number of dangers that are facing the Western world. We are seeing more 
and more examples of aggressive secularism not only in the press but actually in 
legislation where Christian conscience, for instance, is not being adequately 
recognised … I think what I‘m after in the end is a renewal of the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition in the West. Not just in terms of people‘s personal faith… but in terms of 
public policy and in how the West sees its destiny. 
(http://www.christianconcern.com/our-concerns/bishop-michael-nazir-ali-launches-
latest-book) 
 
This leads into Bebbington‘s second motif, that of activism, or the expression of the gospel 
through personal evangelism and philanthropy. In ecclesiastical terms, it generated a renewal 
of the pastoral ministry, with its attention to preaching God‘s word, proselytization and good 
works, although the Lutheran themes of the priesthood of all believers and justification by 
faith served to energise an active laity, which continues within evangelicalism of all kinds to 
this day. The influence of Calvinism on evangelicals meant there was an implicit 
understanding of the significance of the secular calling of the believer; this also influenced 
the Holiness tradition, in which the distinctive behaviour and identity of the Christian 
comprised a worldly witness to the Gospel. 
Yet as all historians of evangelicalism agree, ‗activism‘ extended far beyond personal 
evangelization or individual piety to embrace programmes of social reform and political 
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vocation. Whilst this translated powerfully into the public domain, however, there was a 
sense in which it remained a strongly moral imperative, which is present in much of the 
identity politics today. Political intervention is powerfully motivated by a concern to 
eradicate sin, interpreted as anything that prevented a person hearing the gospel. ‗One 
consequence [of such hostility to sin] was that Evangelicals were committed to a negative 
policy of reform. Their proposals were regularly for the elimination of what was wrong, not 
for the achievement of some alternative goal … Evangelical reform movements were 
designed to condemn features of existing policy.‘ (Bebbington 1989, p. 135) 
This energy of moral conviction translated into social activism is apparent in Sara 
Diamond‘s study of the grass-roots political organizing of the new Christian Right. It is 
solidly rooted in the grass-roots of conservative evangelical Christianity and exercises its 
influence in the activism of publishing and broadcasting, home schooling movements, 
research and legal reform. Behind that, however, is a strong theological conviction about the 
conversion of the world in line with biblical values. ‗The motivation is to preach the Gospel 
and save souls, but also, with equal urgency, to remake contemporary moral culture in the 
image of Christian scripture,‘ with the aim of securing ‗dominion over secular society,‘ 
(Diamond 1998, p. 1) Whilst political and legal measures may be means to an end, the vision 
of change is at heart one of – characteristically evangelical – moral transformation: ‗best 
understood as a series of efforts by a religiously inspired political force to make the rest of 
society conform to its ideas of correct belief and behaviour‘ (Diamond 1998, p. 3). 
Thirdly, there is biblicism, a particular devotion to the Bible as divinely-inspired. The 
Bible is central to evangelicals‘ theology: as a source of doctrine, and to their practice, in 
terms of daily reading, devotion, corporate study and preaching as scriptural exegesis and 
exposition. The stress on the primary authority of the Bible had been a feature of Protestant 
faith since the Reformation and contrasted with those who stressed authority of Church 
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tradition, magisterium or reason. All this proceeds from sola Scriptura and a conviction that 
the Bible is uniquely divinely inspired and authoritative: ‗there is strong, confident, uniform 
Evangelical consensus on the inspiration, authority, uniqueness, and sufficiency of Scripture, 
as well as on its complete trustworthiness in matters of Christian faith and practice‘ (Larsen 
2007, p. 8). The publicity of the Christian Institute strongly reflects such a biblical 
perspective: 
 
We are committed to the truths of historic, biblical Christianity including … 
The inspiration of the Holy Scripture in its entirety by God‘s Spirit through the human 
authors, and its revelation of God‘s truth to humanity. The Bible is without error not 
only when it speaks of salvation, its own origins, values, and religious matters, but it 
is also without error when it speaks of history and the cosmos. Christians must, 
therefore, submit to its supreme authority, both individually and corporately, in every 
matter of belief and conduct. (Christian Institute 2012) 
 
Finally, Bebbington highlights crucicentrism, stressing reconciliation with God through 
substitutionary atonement of Christ‘s crucifixion. Justification or forgiveness of sins takes 
place through the death of Christ, who is understood to stand in for sinful humanity in 
appeasing the anger of God. At the heart of the evangelical gospel is that human beings, once 
sinful, have been forgiven and reconciled through the atoning work of Christ on the cross, 
which locates the individual believer in an autobiographical narrative of ‗ruin, redemption 
and regeneration‘ (1989, p. 3). Evangelicalism thus stresses the renewal of fallen human 
nature through acceptance of Christ as personal Saviour and a strong doctrine of justification 
by faith, but also shapes a theologically-informed world-view of original sin, the degenerate 
nature of a fallen world and the necessity of personal (and social) renewal. 
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One consequence [of such hostility to sin] was that Evangelicals were committed to a 
negative policy of reform. Their proposals were regularly for the elimination of what 
was wrong, not for the achievement of some alternative goal … Evangelical reform 
movements were designed to condemn features of existing policy. (p. 135) 
 
As Bivins argues, then, conservative evangelical politics is an outworking of their theology, 
their mobilization a call to defend divinely-revealed truths and an objective moral order as set 
down in the enduring authority of Scripture (2007, p. 92). How far does the construction of 
such a discourse explain the process by which another brand of political Christianity, the 
New Christian Right in the United States, was constructed in the 1980s? There are certainly 
common factors: a sense of alienation and disenfranchisement from what were regarded as 
invidious cultural trends; a felt need to challenge the political direction of a nation, but cast in 
terms of a moral campaign; a call to activism that mapped perfectly onto an evangelical 
sensibility forged from the theological principles of personal conversion and transformation – 
that took the private convictions of evangelicalism and transposed them into the public realm.  
The new Christian Right in the US has proved remarkably effective both at what 
Jason Bivins terms a ‗political pedagogy‘: of constructing a world-view (in Bivins‘ view, one 
of fear of the Other) and channelling this into sustainable forms of public activism and 
political rhetoric. Based on a narrative of cultural decline and imminent threat, or ‗declension 
narrative‘, which blends classic theological motifs of ‗a stark moral universe, an enduring 
sense of embattlement, and a highly politicized religiosity‘ (p. 93), which are adroitly applied 
into creating a discourse of traditional values under siege and the urgency of moral and social 
redemption. Once again, therefore, we can see a dualist world-view in which the staple values 
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of traditional Christianity are ranged against a degenerate culture, and from which a political 
manifesto, largely based around reversing liberal or progressive social reforms, is articulated. 
There is an objective moral order (sanctioned by God) to which all society must conform.  
However, despite some successes within the American political system, in assessing 
the long-term sustainability of the New Christian Right and its political ambitions, many 
commentators argue that the very theological principles that provide its energy also inhibit it 
from moving from the margins into the mainstream – both ideologically and strategically. 
They are, essentially caught on the horns of the Rawlsian dilemma: what happens if they 
attempt to deploy religious reasoning in a secular context? Klemp‘s study (2007) of one 
campaign group, Focus on the Family, suggest that in the face of the Rawlsian ‗firewall‘ 
forbidding explicit religious reasoning in the public domain, are confronted with a crucial 
choice. They can ‗either use esoteric religious reasons in public debates – thereby giving up 
all hope of mainstream influence – or they can dilute their religious message as a strategic 
means to forming a broader, more politically powerful, coalition‘ (p. 523). Yet the language 
involved has to be different, with one set of rhetoric directed at the faithful, and another for 
its public outreach. It means, however, that the wider public is not offered a fully Christian 
rationale; and Klemp deplores the double standard of its ‗use of … liberal forms of discourse 
to advance religious and illiberal political ends‘ (2007, pp. 539–40). 
Against all the convictions of the New Christian Right not to compromise their core 
principles in facing up to a degenerate public square, then, Focus on the Family is faced with 
no alternative but to allow itself to be accommodated to liberal democratic mores. Whilst 
some Christian Right insiders can rationalize such ‗camouflaging‘ (Klemp, 2007, p. 539), the 
result is the maintenance of two separate discourses, internal and external, with the latter 
severely attenuated and – if the sleight of hand is spotted – discredited. Yet it nevertheless 
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represents not the abolition (through conversion) of the dualism between Christ and culture 
for which, ultimately, the New Christian Right is working, but its very reinforcement. 
Similarly, the theological exclusivism that constitutes the firm foundation on which 
conservative evangelicals‘ political activism is founded becomes a liability when searching 
for campaign allies, even amongst other Christians. How can one judge whether other 
conservatives, religious or non-religious, are to be trusted? Once again there is a 
contradiction, unresolved, between the theological and the political: 
 
The NCR asked them to get involved in politics to defend their religiously inspired 
culture and then asked that, in order to do politics, they leave behind their religion. On 
Sunday they believed that Catholics and Jews were not ‗saved‘ and the Mormons 
were a dangerous cult; on Monday they had to work with Catholics, Jews and 
Mormons in defence of our ‗shared Judaeo-Christian‘ heritage. (Bruce 1990, p. 483)14 
 
Contemporary evangelicalism is divided between sophisticated critical dialogue with, and a 
‗parochialism‘ toward, culture. Paradoxically, its success in the modern era has been to 
harness the tools of modernity, such as media, in order to build communities founded on 
secure boundaries and a literalist message. If evangelicalism is perpetually identifying new 
challenges in the culture around it, it is also continually delineating boundaries in opposition: 
‗evangelicalism … thrives on distinction, engagement, tension, conflict, and threat. Without 
                                                          
14
 This may have had particular relevance for the 2012 Presidential Election in the US, where 
many conservative Evangelicals, who might be natural Republicans, baulked at supporting 
their party‘s candidate, Mitt Romney, on account of his Mormon beliefs.  
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these, evangelicalism would lose its identity and purpose and grow languid and aimless.‘ (C. 
Smith 1998, p. 89) 
 
‘Classically Evangelical, World-affirming’ 
Nevertheless, there are signs of mellowing towards contemporary culture, such as tolerance 
of non-Christians, more flexibility of doctrine and openness to popular entertainment. Once 
again, modernity itself – geographical mobility, mass education, globalization, mass 
communications – have expanded horizons. Indeed, some of the fastest-growing parts of 
evangelicalism such as Vineyard and Emerging Church, thrive through an openness to culture 
– or at least a willingness to harness it to their ends. This is ‗a creative … negotiation with 
modernity‘ (Guest 2007, p. 12). 
Francis Schaeffer is credited with having led a revival of evangelical cultural 
engagement around the middle of the twentieth century. Dyrness draws analogies between 
Schaeffer‘s call to open the windows of evangelicalism on the world with John XXIII‘s 
efforts to do the same for the Roman Catholic world via the Second Vatican Council in the 
early 1960s. Similarly, the Lausanne conference of 1974 signalled a greater seriousness 
towards the global diversification and multiculturalism of evangelical Christianity and a 
greater identification with struggles against social injustice and poverty in the two-thirds 
world. This in turn awakened questions of the legacy of missionary movements and the need 
to inculturate the gospel. The Keele National Evangelical Congress (1967) also signalled a 
greater openness to social activism and inaugurated a greater widening of horizons. It was 
succeeded by a number of initiatives that signalled a deeper and more positive engagement 
with popular culture such as Greenbelt (1974), TEAR fund (for aid and international 
development) and the Evangelical Coalition for Urban Mission (Bebbington and Jones 2013). 
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In the twenty-first century, a new generation of evangelical leaders has emerged, 
especially in the United States, many of whom are associated with the ‗Emergent [or 
‗Emerging‘] Church‘ movement. They are politically engaged, socially liberal and 
theologically progressive. Metaphors of ‗pathways‘, ‗journeying‘ and ‗growth‘ rather than 
conversion appear to find greater resonance for these Emergents, who are also looking 
beyond Scripture for spiritual resources within patristic, Celtic and monastic traditions 
(Emergent Village 2012). A number of these leaders have courted controversy by questioning 
staple evangelical doctrines such as penal substitutionary atonement, whilst many (such as 
Brian McLaren in the US and Steve Chalke in the UK), have been outspoken in supporting 
same-sex relationships. 
This represents a turn from an individualistic faith to a more corporate understanding; 
from a word- or logic-centred faith to one which is liturgical and sacramental; from a 
pragmatic, methodological faith to one based on mystery and process. ‗For Jesus truth was 
not propositions or the property of sentences. Rather truth was what was revealed through our 
participation and interaction with him, others, and the world.‘ (Sweet 2000, p. 157) Just as 
society is moving in late modernity from ‗solid‘ to ‗liquid‘ so too much the Church – more 
flexible structures, informality, emphasis on networking, on ‗doing‘ and ‗being‘ rather than 
‗believing‘ and ‗belonging‘ (Ward 2002). The matter of engaging with culture constructively 
and critically is part of the pilgrimage of faith. There is an altogether greater willingness to 
engage in dialogue with non-Christian sources than more conservative factions. Brian 
McLaren advocates a post-modern, post-colonial form of evangelicalism that recasts 
Christianity as ‗a way of believing‘ rather than a ‗system of belief‘ (McLaren 2011, p. 8). 
Typically, this wing of evangelicalism is less nostalgic for the return of Christendom, 
or anxious to proclaim Britain or the US as a ‗Christian nation‘. For the British Anabaptist 
Stuart Murray Williams, post-Christendom represents a challenge for the Church‘s mission 
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but also an opportunity to recover ‗a way of being Christian that is more authentic, is more 
radical, is more faithful‘ and of ‗disconnecting from wealth, status, power and violence‘ 
associated with established or state-oriented religion (Johnson 2012).  
Jim Wallis, one of the leaders of the Sojourners community, which emerged out of 
urban politics in Chicago has been prominent in reconnecting evangelical politics with a 
more egalitarian and socially progressive agenda, openly supporting Democratic candidates 
for US President. He regards himself and his allies as seeking to recover the political activism 
of the nineteenth century by realigning evangelical politics with a form of revivalism that is 
social as well as spiritual: ‗Politics is failing to solve the big issues. When that happens, 
social movements rise up to change politics. And the best social movements always have 
spiritual foundation. That's what revival is.‘ (Tippett 2007) 
In contrast to the more isolationist tendencies of conservative evangelicalism, 
epitomized in the demeanour of twentieth-century fundamentalism, then, these emergent 
trends point towards a new style of evangelicalism, of ‗engaged orthodoxy‘ (Guest 2007; see 
also Greggs 2010, which engages with secular and non-Christian culture, albeit with a view 
to its reorientation). As Christian Smith and others have argued, this is particularly evident 
amongst a younger generation in the United States (1998), which has rediscovered its historic 
roots of cultural engagement and social activism. There is still a strong sense of 
distinctiveness and maintenance of strong symbolic, moral and cultural boundaries, but this is 
achieved not through withdrawal but engagement and thus represents a negotiated and fluid, 
rather than absolute and fixed, identity. Guest characterizes such an approach as 
‗entrepreneurial‘ in its openness to regarding cultural engagement as an opportunity rather 
than a threat. ‗New-paradigm churches are not about cultural warfare; they are about religious 
experience, personal transformation, and community.‘ (Shibley 1998, p. 85) Rather than 
precipitating decline, such engaged evangelicalism seems to draw vitality from its forays into 
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culture – it is ‗harnessing‘ (Guest 2007, p. 206) rather than eschewing, culture. Yet 
inevitably, evangelicalism will be subtly reshaped as it absorbs – as well as resists – the 
prevailing Zeitgeist of late modernity (pp. 205–6). 
I have focused on the phenomenon of conservative (theologically and politically 
speaking) evangelicalism since it seemed to exemplify a sharp dilemma for post-secular 
society, of how to balance religious voices and secular trends in an increasingly disparate and 
fissiparous public square. But the prospects for alternative evangelical public theologies are 
also worthy of consideration. Recent research by the Evangelical Alliance in the UK provides 
interesting insights into emergent identities and suggests that, evangelical Christianity may be 
moving further towards the political mainstream whilst retaining a characteristic commitment 
to activism. A survey of 17,000 evangelicals, recruited through local churches, festivals and 
other networks, offers a picture of a culture steeped in the tropes of personal transformation 
and biblical authority and yet increasingly allied with socially progressive causes, especially 
in areas such as economic policy, poverty and world development. As the report, published in 
September 2011, summarizes, ‗These Evangelicals are solidly committed to orthodox 
Christian beliefs about the Cross and the resurrection of Jesus Christ. These beliefs in sin 
forgiven and the hope of eternal life are the bedrock of their personal faith.‘(S. Clifford 2011, 
p. 2). 
Whilst the campaigns of Christian Concern, the Christian Institute and the discourse 
of a beleaguered remnant of traditional Christians may have gained prominence, this research 
paints a picture of an alternative picture of an evangelical political identity that is more 
affirming of culture and less concerned to maintain distinct boundaries between itself and a 
hostile world of ‗aggressive secularism‘. However, this is not to say that such an identity is 
not distinctively evangelical in its theology or not rooted in a set of recognizable historic 
characteristics. But it does suggest that evangelical political behaviour, seen across a broader 
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spectrum, is less predictable and less easy to pigeon-hole according to traditional left-right 
polarity. Theological conservatism tends to be represented in attitudes towards personal 
morality (such as abortion, same-sex partnerships and the family) and national identity (such 
as identifying the UK as a ‗Christian‘ country), but there are signs of a greater radicalism 
when it comes to other questions of social justice and international affairs. Similarly, a 
preference for personal moral transformation at the expense of structural change, and a 
disinclination to work across confessional boundaries, also appear less apparent than perhaps 
they might a generation or so ago. 
However, whilst views on homosexuality, marriage and abortion were in the main 
more conservative than the mainstream population, these evangelicals‘ activism was often 
pursued in partnership with non-evangelical churches or even non-Christian groups. The 
group surveyed were regular churchgoers, active in evangelical organizations, committed to 
the core tenets of the classical Bebbington quadrilateral: Ninety per cent subscribed to the 
doctrine of substitutionary atonement; a similar proportion believed that Jesus was the only 
way to God and that the Bible was ‗the inspired word of God‘. Two-thirds attended church at 
least once a week, seven out of ten prayed every day and over half read the Bible every day. 
Views on abortion, women in leadership and evolution were evenly spread across a spectrum, 
although opinions on homosexuality tended towards the more conservative. In terms of social 
activism and voluntary service, however, there were no signs of an aversion to engaging in 
worldly politics: nearly 60 per cent volunteered at least once a week; 80 per cent recorded a 
community partnership with another church and 70 per cent some collaboration in the 
community with a group of another faith. 
One of the defining characteristics of a more conservative evangelical identity politics 
– indeed, at times its very raison d’être – was a concern that Christianity was increasingly 
under attack in contemporary society. Amongst this survey, there was evidence that a broad 
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section of the sample was exercised at the marginalization of Christianity from public life. 
Nevertheless, it was never articulated in terms of persecution or victimhood (Evangelical 
Alliance, 2012, p. 16) despite being a notably more prominent preoccupation amongst 
evangelicals than the non-evangelicals in the survey. The historic stress on personal witness 
and distinctive identity, coupled with a more exclusivist attitude towards other faiths, is still 
therefore a defining mark of this community, but speaks less of an identity politics based on 
defensive reassertion of distinctive boundaries than of Guest‘s ‗engaged orthodoxy‘, or a kind 
of conviction politics. It is consistent with Brian Harris‘ anatomy of postmodern evangelical 
identity, which holds fast to much of the spirit of the Bebbington Quadrilateral, but is 
gradually embracing a more holistic and inclusivist agenda. This is particularly apparent 
when it comes to engaging with culture and a shift away from personal piety towards 
structural transformation: ‗Instead of salvation from the world, we are also saved for the 
world, including the poor, the oppressed and the environment.‘ (Harris 2008, p. 204) What 
remains constant is a characteristic commitment to a transformative encounter with Christ, 
but the sources and methods by which this is mediated are more open to question. Harris also 
contends that globally evangelicalism is moving more into the denominational mainstream 
and no longer has a self-image of itself as ghettoized, persecuted or misunderstood. ‗In short, 
as a popular movement evangelicalism has learned to be adaptable. Thus, for example, while 
in modernity evangelical apologetics could deal in certainties and sure proofs, in a 
postmodern era, a relational apologetic has been birthed … Piety remains, and it is passionate 
piety.‘ (pp. 212–13, my emphasis). 
 
Conclusion: Christ and Culture  
In considering how Christian public witness is to be conducted in relation to secular culture, 
George Carey invokes H. Richard Niebuhr‘s classic study of the relationship between 
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Christian practice and tradition and contemporary culture, defined as ‗the total process of 
human activity‘ (Niebuhr 1951, p. 32). Carey favours ‗Christ the transformer of culture‘, in 
which the things of the world are affirmed as part of creation which is nevertheless in need of 
‗conversion‘. In contrast to other models, such as ‗Christ of culture‘, in which the gospel is 
the fulfilment of human achievement – a relationship of conformity or identification – this 
sees nature as necessarily perfected by grace. The things of the world are to be affirmed, not 
rejected, by means of ‗a practice of responsible engagement which nevertheless recognizes 
that the kingdom is quite different from anything we create‘ (Gorringe 2004, p. 15).  
 Although Carey may identify this as an essentially ‗conversionist‘ stance, however, 
many aspects of evangelicalism over the years appear more like another of Niebuhr‘s types, 
that of ‗Christ against culture‘. This places the gospel and the world in opposition and draws 
an absolute distinction between revelation and reason. The tradition (be that Scripture or 
Church teaching) is sufficient for all that is needed for salvation. Historically, the 
sectarianism and absolutism of fundamentalism and the withdrawal from social activism in 
the nineteenth century expressed the qualities of world-denial; and similarly, in its narrative 
of cultural declension and Christianity‘s dispossession in the face of an alien culture, 
contemporary evangelical identity politics sets its face against the kind of ‗engaged 
orthodoxy‘ to which I alluded earlier. 
 The experience of martyrdom and persecution is a powerful part of the corporate 
memory of this part of the Church. The question is, however, whether the construction of a 
discourse of persecution at the hands of aggressive or militant secularism is justified; and 
whether the corresponding reaction, and especially recourse to the law, is the best way of 
upholding one‘s faith in public. Whilst some individuals have suffered material and 
psychological disadvantage, it seems that the resulting legal actions were prompted more by 
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the particular dynamics of evangelical theology of a persecuted remnant than by conclusive 
evidence of widespread discrimination. 
The question is, whether such a discourse of persecution and moral crusade is actually 
justified. Individuals are entitled to feel threatened if they believe they are not allowed to 
express their faith as their conscience dictates. However, the evidence suggests that the 
perception amongst British evangelicals is largely unfounded. In 2012, a group of MPs, 
‗Christians in Parliament‘ conducted an enquiry into this very phenomenon. The report, 
Clearing the Ground, referred to a ‗hierarchy‘ of equalities, and conceded that Christians in 
the UK may have grounds to feel marginalized, on the basis that ‗the frequency and nature of 
the [legal] cases indicates a narrowing of the space for the articulation, expression and 
demonstration of Christian belief‘ (Christians in Parliament 2012, p. 5, my emphasis). We 
may regard this as broadly consistent with the ambivalent position of religion in a post-
Christian, post-secular society; but despite this, the Report refuses to support anything 
approaching ‗persecution‘: 
 
In the United Kingdom Christians do not risk their lives to meet to worship, are not 
prevented by the law from preaching and do not face the death penalty if they have 
converted from another faith. Whatever difficulties may be experienced by Christians 
in the UK, they are not comparable with those encountered by fellow believers in the 
world. (p. 10) 
 
Indeed, by assuming a mentality of victimhood, conservative evangelicals risk a self-
fulfilling prophecy by further alienating public opinion and placing themselves further to the 
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margins of society. The publicity generated by unsuccessful legal action certainly facilitates a 
particular kind of Christian public witness and enables individuals to ‗stand up for Jesus 
Christ in public life‘ (Not Ashamed, http://www.notashamed.org.uk/comments-
churches.php). However, this perpetuates a perception that such campaigns are more 
interested in defending lost privilege – to the point of deploying the very legislation that is 
believed to have caused the dispossession in the first place – than any agenda of social justice 
in the name of the common good. 
 
On some occasions we perceive that campaigning becomes inflammatory or even 
counter-productive to Christian freedoms … Making noise is not the same as having 
influence, and … the campaigning approach of choosing cases to lose valiantly is not 
conducive to affecting political and social change … We also acknowledge that 
through poor campaigning strategies, some Christians may be inadvertently 
generating and sustaining the very problems they are trying to highlight and resist. 
(Christians in Parliament 2012, p. 24) 
 
The Report also commends the terminology of ‗reasonable accommodation‘ of religious 
beliefs and practices as appropriate and proportional response to the task of balancing 
religious freedom with public sensibility. It takes a relatively Habermasian route, in terms of 
advocating greater latitude for the expression of faith whilst still demanding conformity to the 
conventions of consensus and rational negotiation. As it argues, extending the measures to 
test whether organizations can show they have made ‗reasonable‘ attempts to meet the needs, 
for example of people with disabilities, might have obviated many of the legal cases brought 
by Christians against their employers. However, the Report acknowledges that it is one thing 
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to demonstrate that accessibility issues have been reasonably addressed in a listed building, 
and another to evaluate against norms of fair expression of religious identity. Furthermore, 
they do insist that any such accommodation should be mutual: ‗acknowledging that certain 
activities might condone behaviour contrary to their beliefs, it might also be necessary for the 
employee to show they were willing to accommodate the values of those who disagreed with 
them‘ (p. 36). 
Rather than lamenting society‘s indifference to ‗biblical values‘ or Britain‘s descent 
into post-Christian multiculturalism, Clearing the Ground argues that Christians should place 
more emphasis on making a positive contribution to public life. ‗It is essential‘, says the 
Report, ‗that Christians once again provide hope and a vision for society that goes beyond 
defending their own interests and includes the good of all‘ (p. 45). In particular, it suggests 
that the root of misunderstanding between Christians and employers or public authorities is 
often merely a lack of religious literacy rather than deliberate hostility: ‗we see in the actions 
of government, public bodies and employers an inadequate grasp and inability (or 
unwillingness) to accommodate belief‘ (p. 17). Christians should express a faith that is 
‗neither private, nor privileged‘ (Spencer 2008), which contributes constructively to helping a 
post-secular society reach an equitable settlement for expressions of religion in public. 
Whilst coming from a perspective broadly sympathetic to evangelicalism, therefore, 
Clearing the Ground eschews narratives of persecution and highlights the self-defeating 
nature of a discourse of dispossession and marginalization. Instead, it begins to articulate an 
alternative evangelical public theology premised on a positive, if critical, embrace of cultural 
pluralism. A number of key points emerge from this debate, therefore. Firstly, there needs to 
be a degree of realism about the end of Christendom and how best to exercise Christian 
discipleship in relation to the civil and legal authorities. Secondly, rather than seeking refuge 
in a ‗false parallelism‘ of grievance, Christian public vocation can do a lot proactively to 
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cultivate positive virtues of citizenship premised on justice, conviction and concern for the 
common good. Thirdly – as Clearing the Ground points out – there is a deficit of religious 
literacy within the public at large, matched in no small degree by a lack of ability on the part 
of Christians themselves to ‗speak truth with grace to an ailing culture‘ (Christians in 
Parliament 2012, p. 43). Christians may owe it to themselves as much as others, therefore, to 
foster a greater skilfulness and articulacy in public life: to earn the right to be taken seriously, 
and to be willing and able to justify their moral, social and political convictions in terms 
which speak intelligibly into the public square. The task is to nurture effective ‗ambassadors 
for Christ‘ (2 Cor. 5.20) who are capable of engaging effectively in Christian apologetics. 
I have been arguing that when it comes to a vision of ‗Christ‘ and ‗culture‘ 
conservative evangelical identity politics draws its energy from a discourse of a biblically-
inspired crusade against degenerate culture. By way of contrast, Niebuhr‘s characterization of 
‗Christ the transformer of culture‘ urges Christians not to shun the world for fear of losing 
their identity but to operate constructively (and incarnationally) for its redemption. This 
resonates with his brother Reinhold‘s embrace of what he called ‗Christian Realism‘ (Lovin 
1995; Niebuhr 1953), in which Christians are called to work for the transformation of society, 
despite its fallenness and ambiguity. Christian Realism may be contrasted with idealism (or 
the premise that human nature and history are perfectible) by its acknowledgement of the 
ubiquity of sin, thereby tempering over-optimistic views of humanity‘s ability to fulfill the 
moral good. Whilst Christian Realism does not give up on the possibility of social justice in 
this world, it also recognizes that ultimate redemption is a gift of God, and never entirely a 
human achievement. Nevertheless, it retains a visionary dimension and an accompanying 
transformative energy – what later theologians were to call a theology of hope – that with the 
help of God‘s grace, God‘s will may be done ‗on earth as it is in heaven‘.
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Part 3: Public Theology as Christian Apologetics 
  
251 
 
6 
Jews, Pagans, Sceptics and Emperors 
Public Theology as Christian Apologetics 
‗Travel everywhere, preach the gospel, use words if you have to.‘ 
(Attributed to St. Francis of Assisi) 
 
The time has come to explore the thesis that in a post-secular context, public theology must 
claim an identity as a form of Christian apologetics, in which the Church not only contributes 
critically and constructively to public debate but must make a reflexive and transparent effort 
to articulate the theological well-springs of its commitments. As I have already argued, what 
has raised the stakes is the emergence of a post-secular context characterized by a growing 
gulf between people of faith and others, and the concomitant deficits of religious literacy, and 
in the face of reasoned sceptics who question the very legitimacy of religious voices in 
public, let alone the benevolence of faith-based interventions. 
Traditionally, apologetics has been framed as a rational defence of the Christian faith 
to sceptics and unbelievers, originally in the face of persecution by the Roman authorities. 
Apologetics is ‗the attempt to defend a particular belief or system of beliefs against 
objections‘ (Beilby 2011, p. 11). The first-century epistle 1 Peter summarizes this imperative 
as follows: Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the 
reason for the hope that you have. (1 Peter 3.15, NIV). An apologia was also the summary 
speech for the defence in a court of law. In the New Testament, apologia denotes an answer 
or defence given in response to an accusation, such as Paul addressing a hostile crowd in 
Jerusalem (Acts 22.1). The appellation ‗Christian‘ (Christianos) is only established around 
time of Ignatius (early second century C.E.) and it is a Latinism transliterated into Greek. 
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This would suggest it was coined by Roman officials in their dealings with them, specifically 
in trials and legal actions against them. 
Throughout Christian history apologists have produced a range of justifications, 
defences and explanations for this very ‗hope‘ that distinguishes them. So what is the value of 
this tradition to public theology, with its emphasis on giving an account of Christian 
essentials, positioned at the threshold of the sacred and secular, ecclesial body and body 
politic, at pains to render the fundamentals of faith accessible to those beyond the community 
of faith? At first glance, this seems axiomatic. As I have already argued, public theologians 
place a premium on their commitment to dialogue with non-theological perspectives. They 
acknowledge the significance of the pluralist public realm; they value collaborative 
partnership in practical programmes; and they recognize the necessity to make their own 
deliberations accessible to those beyond their own boundaries. The question is what is gained 
by adopting a more self-consciously ‗apologetic‘ approach? Why use the term? 
The consideration of public theology as apologetics is prompted largely by the work 
of the Reformed public theologian Max Stackhouse, who has consistently characterized the 
discipline in this way. However, this calls for further examination. Why does he not remain 
with the terminology of ‗translation‘, ‗mediation‘ and ‗bilingualism‘? How does the notion of 
apologetics help to resolve questions of post-secularity and the renewal of public theology? It 
has already been established that theology is always already ‗public‘ insofar as it must be 
accessible, not esoteric; socially relevant not individualistic or privatized. Isn‘t apologetics 
about evangelism and conversion; a form of reasoned argument in defence of the 
philosophical coherence of Christianity in order to convince the unbeliever? Is this not the 
province of the philosophy of religion, or in ecclesial terms, the task of mission and 
evangelism? What does this have to do with public theology? 
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As I shall argue, however, there is a significant tradition within the history of 
apologetics that pertains to a defence of the Church‘s relationship to public life. In his History 
of Apologetics first published in 1971, Avery Dulles groups Christian apologetics into three 
main genres, depending on the context and intended audience. ‗Religious apologists‘ argued 
for the superiority of the gospel over other religious or philosophical systems; ‗internal 
apologists‘ were concerned to correct error or heresy within the Christian community itself; 
but a third group, which Dulles terms ‗political apologists‘ developed their arguments in 
order to secure civil toleration of Christianity in the face of state persecution (p. xx). From 
biblical and patristic times, therefore, there has been an identifiable strand of apologetic 
literature which is not so much concerned with the ‗truth‘ of the gospel in a philosophical or 
propositional sense, as its ‗efficacy‘ as a form of practical wisdom that informs a Christian 
public witness. Whilst these apologists are certainly concerned to defend the intellectual 
coherence and scriptural provenance of such witness, their arguments are directed towards 
offering a theologically-reasoned rationale for the legitimacy of faith to speak truth to power 
and pursue a public vocation of active citizenship. This will help us examine Stackhouse‘s 
conjunction of public theology more closely, since this is clearly about justifying the moral 
and civic probity of communities of Christians as much as it is about defending the ‗truth‘ of 
the gospel and paving the way to conversion.  
In contemporary apologetics, the term has come to denote a justification by appeal to 
rational, propositional argument with a view to leading another to their own profession of 
faith. ‗Christian apologetics is the scholarly reflection on Christian apologetic witness and 
dialogue as the intellectual justification of the truth and relevance of the Christian faith.‘ (van 
den Toren 2011, p. 27) But one of the questions I want to explore in this chapter is how far 
the perception of apologetics as the debating of proofs of propositional belief might be 
revised. This is more than mere dialogue, as it is strongly associated with evangelical parts of 
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the Church which would insist on apologetics as entailing persuasion, a call to faith and 
personal evangelism.  
Similarly, whilst many evangelical apologists would acknowledge that Christian faith 
comprises more than intellectual assent to theological propositions (Beilby 2011, pp. 168–9), 
most of this literature assumes the primacy of belief, rather than practice, within the Christian 
life. Moreover, the resulting emphasis within contemporary evangelical apologetics on the 
rational plausibility of Christian doctrine has led to an epistemological dominance of 
rationalist, scientific and propositional proof-arguments, at the expense of more contextual or 
sacramental ways of knowing. To reconsider public theology as Christian apologetics offers 
the opportunity to reclaim some of these alternatives, along with notions of theology as a 
form of practical wisdom – theology is the discourse of faith that facilitates faithful 
discipleship; and public theology articulates that, in particular, in relation to the liminal space 
between private and public, sacred and secular, Church and world.  
This reflects important epistemological issues, of course, not just about the nature of 
knowing but the very nature of revelation. Historically, apologetics has assumed in some 
respect that human culture does possess some kind of common ground of shared norms and 
meanings. The emergence of neo-orthodoxy in the twentieth century posed a radical 
challenge to the very possibility of apologetics; as Edward Oakes remarks, ‗Indeed, what is 
―neo‖ about neoorthodoxy is precisely this refusal to consider the apologetic task‘ (1992, p. 
41). Barth‘s reaction against the Kantian and Schleiermacherian elevation of experience as 
the universal grounding of revelation and theological apprehension was absolute: by stressing 
the unknowability of God independent of God‘s self-revelation he was not concerned to 
demonstrate how, even by analogy, the world thus revealed inhabited similar space to that of 
other forms of knowledge. Rather, this takes the discourse of the ecclesial community as a 
priori; there is no common ground or shared rationality on which to establish an apologetics 
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which sees itself as a bridging or mediating discourse. The only apologetic is the enunciation 
of a systematic theology as God‘s saving word to sinful humanity.  
However, I am not convinced that contemporary apologetics, which is often focused 
around the debating of propositional and abstract doctrines concerning the existence of God 
and the historicity of the resurrection, does complete justice either to the historical legacy or 
to contemporary demands. Nor am I prepared to concede the eclipse of apologetic theology in 
the face of neo-orthodoxy. For example, it is clear that some of the most significant and 
foundational events and texts of early Christianity were apologetic in nature. But they were 
often also quintessentially pieces of public theology in that not only were they conducted in 
public assemblies, religious or civic, subjecting themselves to universal scrutiny, but they 
were also often petitions directed at the political authorities, and concerned the relationship of 
Christians to imperial and secular authority as well as matters of belief. So there is a sense in 
which apologetics has always been public and about more than a declaration of personal 
belief.  
A recent collection of essays, entitled Imaginative Apologetics, argues that in fact it is 
through the media of culture, literature, art and science that Christians should be defending 
and justifying their faith and that these discourses represent a very different way of 
conceiving the nature of Christian conviction, not least that apologetics may now be framed 
as an invitation to participate in a community of practice and to apprehend the Gospel as 
attractive, compelling and beautiful – and not just empirically or rationally ‗true‘. 
Unfortunately, this volume contains no reference to any kind of Christian engagement in or 
commentary upon matters such as economics, civil society, media or politics. I will close, 
therefore, with some concluding thoughts on whether imaginative, aesthetic and performative 
dimensions of apologetics might have any bearing on conceptions of public theology.  
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Public Theology as Christian Apologetics 
Max Stackhouse‘s work has been described as ‗tradition-based apologetic public theology‘ 
(Hogue 2010: 362): the normative task of public theology is also one of apologetics, insofar 
as (especially in a religiously pluralist, global context) it is expedient to articulate (and be 
prepared to defend) the values that inform Christian statements about, and interventions in, 
the public realm. In this respect, of course, Stackhouse is reiterating a commonly-held belief 
amongst public theologians of the essentially ‗bilingual‘ nature of the discipline: ‗Public 
theology must choose a language that can be understood by secular society without denying 
its theological origin‘ (Bedford-Strohm 2007a, p. 23). 
I have already identified Max Stackhouse‘s understanding of public theology as 
representative of those who resist the privatization of belief and some churches‘ withdrawal 
from public life under secular modernity, and his insistence on the transparency of 
theological discourse in the face of wider scrutiny (Chapter 3). Stackhouse also distinguishes 
between various modes of theology, which he has described at various stages as confessional, 
dogmatic and apologetic (2004); dogmatic, polemic and apologetic (2006); and confessional, 
contextual, dogmatic and apologetic (2007).  
 
Dogmatics seeks to clarify matters of faith and practice among those who already 
believe. Polemics attempts to unmask false teachings, to defeat opposing views, or to 
silence opposition. Apologetics seeks to speak in ways that can be grasped by those 
who doubt or do not share the faith. It thus tests the reasonability and morality of the 
faith and those who hold it by engaging those who are not already convinced. It 
acknowledges that if it is in principle impossible to make a case for the truth or justice 
of theology, others are under no obligation to take it seriously. (2006, p. 168) 
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Stackhouse refutes the claim of those theologians who deny that theology has any 
relationship to secular philosophy and is essentially ‗an articulation of revealed faith‘ (p. 167) 
with no need to justify itself to any external authority. Public theology as dialogical in that it 
must subject itself to public scrutiny on the basis of a shared global public square. Stackhouse 
defends the intellectual substance of theology against those sceptics who argue that it cannot 
be conducted as an objective discipline or subjected to critical scrutiny – in other words, that 
it cannot be ‗properly rational‘ (Ziegler 2002, p. 139) More than the legitimation of private 
conscience or a particular confessional tradition, theology must ‗transcend‘ sectional 
ideology to address a broader realm of public concern and rational debate (p. 140) and to 
‗help to identify the most universal human understandings of holiness, justice, truth and 
creativity‘ (Koopman 2003, p. 4). 
 
Public theology ... is one in which the motifs of theological discourse – the critical 
concepts that are basic to the faith – are held to be not esoteric ... Rather, what we are 
talking about can be discussed with nonbelievers and believers in other faiths. (Chase 
2001) 
 
Whilst public theology should be tradition-centred, Stackhouse rejects fideist or 
communitarian arguments that theological truth-claims are absolutely incommensurate with 
other forms of discourse. This reflects an underlying epistemology of dialogue in keeping 
with principles of natural law and common grace. By virtue of our common humanity, 
theology addresses universal issues in a spirit of shared moral reasoning (2007b, pp. 112–13).  
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From very early on one of the meanings of apologetics was that you enter into another 
person‘s vocabulary and worldview as best you can, and the very fact that we can do 
that in some measure suggests that there is some deep contact between humans. Some 
profound creational theology is behind that: we are all children of God, whether 
everyone acknowledges it or not, and we can enter into one another‘s vocabulary and 
begin to articulate the most profound things that we think are really true. (Chase 2001, 
p. ????). 
 
Public theology draws upon this dimension of apologetics, thereby redressing the prevailing 
preference for a dogmatic mode in much contemporary theology, as well as the assumption in 
most non-theological circles that theology is incapable of transcending its own particularity in 
the interests of wider dialogue. Stackhouse is critical of those who fail to move beyond the 
boundaries of their own tradition, remaining essentially within a fideist paradigm: 
 
They do not give a public account of their convictions because they believe that one 
should not; the content and quality of faith is and must be entirely self-authenticating 
to all because it seems so to them. ( 2006, p. 175) 
 
However, whilst theology has a concern for the common good and for contributing towards 
an overarching ‗metaphysical–moral vision‘ (Stackhouse), it remains rooted in the 
particularities of its tradition. The apologetic task is thus to make the case ‗for the truth of 
what [public theologians] are talking about in a way that might convince those not already 
convinced‘ (1984, p. 54) – note, ‗convince‘ but not ‗convert‘. So the outcome is not so much 
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to prove the internal coherence or doctrinal superiority of Christian belief; but to demonstrate 
the practical utility of its theological world-view. 
There are two dimensions to Stackhouse‘s adoption of ‗apologetics‘, therefore: one of 
dialogue, and one of persuasion. The first rests on his commitment to a shared realm of 
communicative reason and the collaborative task of forging a cohesive civil society; the 
second on the concern for theology to justify its right to be part of such a collaborative 
enterprise. If it cannot bear the critical scrutiny of non-theological conversation partners, it 
cannot hope to contribute to the substantive work of public debate. However, Stackhouse is 
also adamant that this is a mutual accountability, since by virtue of subjecting itself to 
dialogue public theology is entitled to expect other disciplines to reciprocate. In the case of 
non-theological disciplines that do not, it may be ‗doubtful about the intellectual and moral 
integrity of any position or discipline that does not take theology into account.‘ (2004, pp. 
191, n. 2) 
Indeed, at the heart of Stackhouse‘s own apologetic lies a conviction that it is 
precisely theology‘s ability to transcend the immediacy of contingent existence, its 
orientation to a divine horizon beyond human self-interest, which constitutes its unique 
contribution: 
 
Those of us who today claim the legacy of public theology point out that the ―logos‖ 
… of philosophical thought, social analysis, and moral judgement is unstable by itself. 
It bends easily to the unscrupulous interests that lurk in the very heart of the best of us 
if it is not rooted in a holy, true, just creativity that is greater than we humans can 
achieve in our subjectivity. Indeed, it tends always to be distorted if it is not 
ultimately grounded in God, for the human wisdom of philosophy, the ordering 
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systems of societies, and the ethical judgements of individuals may express the 
irrational elements of human fantasy no less than does private religion, and all of 
them need to be seen as subject to standards, purposes, and an unconditioned reality 
greater than our wisdoms, systems, judgements and religions can generate or discover 
alone. ―Logos‖ requires ―theos‖. Theology is required. (2006, p. 170)  
 
Secular critics of public theology may express surprise that, for Stackhouse, it is non-
theological reasoning that may fall prey to ‗irrational elements of human fantasy‘, since that 
is a frequent charge directed at religious reasoning; but Stackhouse argues that it is 
increasingly the claims of modernity in relation to the inevitability of progress, the 
transparency of reason and the axiomatic nature of morality which are being called into 
question (pp. 170–3). 
Public theology returns to the foundations of modernity and seeks to re-contextualize 
them, it is clear that they have religious roots, such as a belief in the innate dignity of all 
human beings. Certainly, globalization exposes the core convictions of Western modernity to 
renewed scrutiny, but what endures and continues to be upheld is a commitment to a 
universal humanity and objective moral laws. Whilst this may, historically, have emerged 
from the particularities of Judeo-Christian culture, it can nevertheless be discerned within, 
and upheld by, many other global religious and philosophical systems (p. 179). Public 
theology in apologetic mode – for Stackhouse, its strongest and most comprehensive 
manifestation – thus ‗claims that the most profound presumptions of the faith are, and can be 
shown to be, as reasonable, as ethical, and as viable for authentic, warranted commitment as 
any other known religion or philosophy and, indeed, indispensable to other modes of public 
discourse.‘ (2004, pp. 191, n.2) 
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The apologetic dimension of public theology for Stackhouse, then, appears to be one 
of defending the right of religious discourse in general, and Christian theology in particular, 
to be a legitimate voice in the public square. In other words, for a theology to be public, it has 
to go public: ‗if a theology is to be trusted to participate in public discourse it ought to be able 
to make a plausible case for what it advocates in terms that can be comprehended by those 
who are not believers ... It should be able to articulate its core convictions in comprehensible 
terms across many modes of discourse, explaining its symbolic and mythical terms ... in ways 
that expose their multiple levels of meaning.‘ (2007b, p. 112) 
This is the point at which public and practical theology converge, says Stackhouse. 
Insofar as the latter focuses on ‗the development of theologically based practices of ministry 
in the church and for the people of the faith‘ (2007, p.107), nurturing the ‗habits‘ of 
discipleship, virtue and spirituality, Christian practice and discipleship is formed and fostered 
‗within the traditions of accepted confessional, contextual, or dogmatic theology‘ (p. 107). If 
this locates practical theology within a cluster of pedagogical disciplines directed towards 
formation and practice, then for Stackhouse, the emphasis of public theology within the 
panoply of approaches to theology, lies much closer to the discipline of apologetics. Whilst 
dogmatic and practical theology (as far as Stackhouse is concerned ) begin with the ‗classical 
sources‘ of Christian faith, thematizing and articulating strands of the tradition and pointing 
towards their practical implications, in the interests of building a sustainable and broad-based 
civil society, public theology must step beyond the parameters of its own tradition and 
engage in conversations with non-Christian (religious and secular) world-views and 
demonstrate how and why Christian sources and norms are capable of contributing 
constructively to the process: ‗it has to show that it can help shape viable institutions in all 
the spheres of complex global interactions‘ (p.109).  
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Fundamentally, however, this is an affirmation of the enduring thread within public 
theology – already highlighted in Chapter 3 and clearly present in Stackhouse‘s work – which 
insists on the importance of Christian reasoning being publicly accessible to those beyond the 
institutional Church. Whether in the name of natural law or common grace, this represents a 
strong affirmation of the role of reason as well as revelation. It must test its claims against 
competing and complementary frameworks; but having done so, it completes its task by 
contributing to the shaping not just of lives of believers but the common life of all humanity.  
 
Apologetics in Historical Perspective 
To what extent can the documents of the New Testament be considered ‗apologetic‘ 
texts? Avery Dulles argues that their intention was ‗to tell a story rather than to prove a case‘ 
(1971, p. 16), although insofar as their objective was to bear witness to the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, early Christian texts were undoubtedly testimonies of faith. 
Dulles‘ point is more, however, that the Gospels did not develop with the explicit intention of 
persuading non-believers outside the Christian community, but rather to consolidate Christian 
identity and address the doubts of believers. As Christian communities became established 
and dispersed around the Graeco-Roman world, however, so the challenges of interpreting 
and commending the faith to pagan cultures became more pressing.  
Apologetics  is a history of the way successive Christian generations have given 
accounts of ‗the hope that you have‘ (1 Peter 3.15, NIV). From the beginning, this arose in 
response to a variety of needs. Writing about the emergent Christian literature of the second 
and third centuries, commonly known as ‗the Apologies‘, Helen Ree notes that such writings 
comprised the ‗self-definition and self-representation‘ of early Christianity, in response both 
to the external pressures of pagan hostility and the internal challenges of heterodoxy and 
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disunity (2005, p. 1). As Ree points out, however, in Niebuhrian terms, the ‗culture‘ against 
which Christians defined themselves could be either philosophical or political; and, in 
confirmation of Niebuhr‘s five-fold typology, the extreme poles of accommodation and 
resistance contained a range of strategies. Furthermore, within each genre there were many 
different literary and rhetorical tropes through which an apologist might construct their 
argument, as well as a mind to a potential audience (pp. 3–4).  
As a corpus, therefore, they provide definitive insight into the process of early 
Christian identity under construction; and they offer an opportunity to ‗recontextualize‘ the 
nature of apologetics as a form of emergent public theology conducted – necessarily, as a 
means of engaging defensively and constructively with the surrounding culture – at the time. 
The very act of articulating reasons in response to opponents actually prompted the 
development of theology itself, either for the purposes of internal boundary-keeping, nurture 
of converts or for communication with pagan culture and philosophies (Graham, Walton and 
Ward 2005). Indeed, it is Avery Dulles‘ contention that the contextual history of apologetics 
reveals that apologetic questions actually contributed to the formation of Christian doctrine, 
rather than the other way around (1971, pp. 1–25).  
Apologists also used a variety of reasons or evidence, as well as different methods 
which reveal differential approaches to the relationship between reason and revelation. From 
the day of Pentecost (Acts 2) and Paul‘s appearance in Athens (Acts 17.16–33) the 
effectiveness of those preaching the Gospel rested on the adoption of the cultures and 
philosophical assumptions of their listeners. Acts of the Apostles records how on the day of 
Pentecost, Peter‘s sermon was addressed predominantly to a Jewish audience, and proclaims 
the significance of Jesus as Messiah, prophet of Israel and fulfilment of the Hebrew 
Scriptures (Acts 2.14–36). Acts 17 relates Paul‘s journey to Thessalonica, where he preached 
in a synagogue, reasoning from the Jewish Scriptures and prophets. Despite not encountering 
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any prior hostility, this is sufficient nevertheless to provoke a backlash (Acts 17.1–9). Later, 
in Athens, Paul visits the synagogue, but concentrates on debating with pagan philosophers at 
the Areopagus, where he preaches the Gospel as the fulfilment of extant hidden wisdom 
(Acts 17.16–34). Similarly, in Acts 24.10–21, Paul has to defend himself against the charges 
brought against him by the orator Tertullus (Acts 24.1–8), and he does so according to the 
conventions of Roman legal convention, appealing not only to Jewish tradition and the 
Scriptures but to Roman protocols of evidence. 
In Stackhouse‘s terms, therefore, the dialogical nature of apologetics, of the need to 
adopt the thought-forms and vernacular of one‘s interlocutors, has been paramount. Thus, 
Justin Martyr saw anticipations of the Gospel in Platonic philosophy, and couched his 
arguments in terms his audience would understand. Immersed in his culture, Clement of 
Alexandria used extant philosophies and myths to communicate a new truth. Athanasius was 
critical of the pagan myths around him but demonstrated their inherent wisdom in pointing 
the way to Christianity. Thomas Aquinas argued that nothing in the world of human reason, 
having been created by God, would contradict the truths of revelation. In more recent times, 
Paul Tillich‘s model of ‗critical correlation‘ was explicitly founded on a liberal theology in 
which ‗secular‘ culture – in his case, visual arts and modern psychotherapies – posed 
existential questions to which Christian theology had to find answers.  
But there have been tensions too, in terms of the extent to which non-Christian culture 
has been held to have carried the seeds of God‘s Logos, and there being ‗some manifestation 
of this God-given rationality also outside the circle of those who had the knowledge of God‘s 
revelation in the Scriptures‘ (Skarsaune 2010, p. 129), or whether fallen humanity must await 
the sovereign Word of God irrespective of culture. This concerns the relationship between 
reason and revelation: how far God‘s Word is accessible to human understanding, and how 
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far it rests exclusively on God‘s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, who is both the fulfilment and 
the supersession of the Law and the Prophets.  
Acts of the Apostles records Paul‘s journey to Thessalonica, where he preached in a 
synagogue, reasoning from the Jewish Scriptures and prophets. Despite not encountering any 
prior hostility, this is sufficient nevertheless to provoke a backlash (Acts 17.1–9). In Athens, 
Paul visits the synagogue, but concentrates on debating with pagan philosophers, and 
preaches the Gospel as the fulfilment of extant hidden wisdom (Acts 17.16–34).  
Similarly, Clement of Alexandria commends the benefits that Christian scholarship 
has brought to that city, as well as emphasising the potential of all cultures to acknowledge 
and understand Christ as the Incarnate Word of God. Against charges of immoral conduct, 
other apologists such as Aristides (Apology, 125 C.E.), defend the probity of Christians, as 
well as contrasting their worship of the living God with that of their fellow citizens‘ 
allegiance to false idols. Continuity with Hebrew Scriptures, affinity but ultimate superiority 
over pagan world-views, were combined with assurances of the civil and moral integrity of 
Christianity.  
 
Exemplary Holiness in the Face of Suffering: 1 Peter 3.15 
Who is going to harm you if you are eager to do good? But even if you should suffer 
for what is right, you are blessed. Do not fear what they fear; do not be frightened. 
But in your hearts, set apart Christ as Lord. Always be prepared to give an answer to 
everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have. But do this with 
gentleness and respect, keeping a clear conscience, so that those who speak 
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maliciously against your good behaviour in Christ may be ashamed of their slander. (1 
Peter 3.13–17). 
 
The first letter of Peter is frequently quoted in discussions of apologetics. In particular, it 
provides a good example of how Christian identity was shaped, firstly in relation to reading 
of Hebrew Scriptures; and secondly, in terms of confronting opposition and hostility from the 
outside world. In other words, in dialogue with Jewish sources and Imperial power. However, 
given that the letter as a whole contains advice that advocates conformity with the ruling 
powers, obedience of wives to husbands and slaves to masters, so is this epistle evidence of 
‗indifference to secular culture‘ (Achtemeier 1996, p. 65), and thus of little use to Christians 
today looking for a public theology of active citizenship and social engagement? David 
Horrell concedes that 1 Peter ‗leaves an ambivalent legacy, offering positive resources to 
contemporary theology and ethics, but also requiring nuanced and critical appropriation‘ 
(Horrell 2008, p. 112) Any reading of the text will need a recontextualization to understand 
both the overall tenor of the epistle and the implications of the imperative to ‗give an 
answer‘. 
As we will see, however, whilst it may seem to speak from a very different world to 
that of many Christians, what stands at the heart of this text is the question of witnessing to 
Christ amidst a hostile world. If it is ambivalent, that is because it is grappling with the 
complexities of Christian identity. In its attempts to steer a path between conformity and 
resistance; or, indeed, how to manage the demands of ‗Christ‘ and ‗culture‘, it provides a case 
study in contextual theology as we see the writer struggling with the challenges of Christian 
identity in a complex world. It also offers glimpses into the nascent Christology of the first-
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century church and how it engenders a practical theology of discipleship from the sources of 
its Jewish heritage and in interaction with Imperial powers. 
The text can be dated to end of the first century (c. 70–95 CE), possibly after the fall 
of Jerusalem in 70 CE. Hence the reference to ‗Babylon‘ as referring to Rome, denoting two 
imperial centres that overthrew Jerusalem. 1 Clement (96 CE), Polycarp (mid-second 
century) and Irenaeus (late second century C.E.) all seem aware of it. Whilst there has been 
some support for apostolic authorship, the most likely conclusion appears to be that the text is 
pseudonymous, taking the name of Peter in order to establish legitimacy for its teaching. It 
was addressed to a mixed Jewish and Gentile audience in Asia Minor, comprising a range of 
social classes. This is reflected in the allusions to the Hebrew Scriptures and the history of 
Israel as a nation in diaspora and exile. Connections are also drawn between Christ as the 
sacrificial lamb and Exodus accounts of Passover. This suggests that many readers would 
have been familiar with the Hebrew Scriptures, and that references to Israel as a covenant 
people, faced with recurrent temptations to assimilate, resonated with this particular 
community (Achtemeier 1996. p. 69). Notwithstanding, however, 1 Peter also addressed itself 
to a community that contained a substantial proportion of Gentile converts, who may 
formerly have been ‗God-fearers‘ or Jewish-identified synagogue-goers. Note references to 
their ‗former ignorance‘ (1.14) and ‗not a people ... now God‘s people‘ (2.10), and the 
significance of taking on a distinctive lifestyle (which would have been a novel idea for 
Gentiles but not for Jews).  
The main preoccupation of the epistle is the question of suffering, and its providential 
and salvific nature. 1 Peter argues that salvation is brought through the suffering, death and 
resurrection of Jesus, and discusses how this sets the pattern for God‘s suffering and 
persecuted church today. The crisis or hardship afflicting the community in the present is 
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contrasted with the promise of redemption in the future; but in the interim, Christians are 
called to demonstrate lives of discipline and obedience, marked by outward signs of holiness. 
It is clear from the New Testament and other early Christian literature that the first 
generations of Christians experienced hostility from their neighbours. Whilst for some this 
would take the form of state-sanctioned persecution, such as unjust charges of sedition 
leading to criminal prosecution, for the audience of 1 Peter it appears to have been negative 
attitudes and everyday gossip within the wider community. Whilst there may have been 
formal opposition from the authorities, these Christians also seem to have been ostracized 
socially and possibly suffered loss of business. For those who were slaves, they had the added 
difficulty of conforming with their household‘s codes of conduct, which may have included 
veneration of civic deities, which would have risked arousing suspicion (Achtemeier 1996, 
pp. 34–6). It appears, therefore to have been a combination of their treatment by neighbours 
and imperial authorities, sometimes resulting in formal sanctions, other times simply sharp 
words or punishments. But overall, the situation of these readers is one of encountering 
privation in their domestic, economic, religious and civic lives. Their personal conviction was 
bound to have ramifications for their ‗public‘ activities – and arguably, the less power they 
had, the worse it could, potentially, be for them. 
How, then, did the author of 1 Peter expect their readers to manage hostility and 
persecution? Is the stance one of compliance or resistance? What might that tell us about the 
text‘s understanding of Christian public identity? 1 Peter offers an elaboration of Christians 
as ‗resident aliens‘ (paroikoi), exemplified by a holiness of lifestyle, both personal (in 
behaviour) and social (in terms of relationships to secular powers). The epistle thus offers 
advice to believers on conducting their relationships to family, household (including between 
masters and slaves) and the civil authorities. The basis of such hope is the resurrection, since 
it shows that redemption was achieved through the Cross. Christ‘s suffering ensures 
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humanity‘s salvation, and the Church is encouraged to hold with confidence to the promises 
of the resurrection in the face of persecution – indeed, to see suffering as the very essence of 
God‘s saving activity. Steadfastness and hope in the face of adversity nurtures a distinctive 
Christian identity from which stems a spirit of endurance. Thus, the Church must cultivate a 
collective lifestyle that strengthens community (1 Peter 2.10), such as generosity of spirit 
(4.8–11) and good leadership (5.1–4). This is individual and collective: the disciplined life is 
an outward sign of holiness and an expression of solidarity with the suffering community. By 
living distinctive and exemplary lives, refusing either to succumb to persecution or conform 
to ungodly cultural ways, Christians are declaring their allegiance to Christ‘s salvific 
suffering and pledging their hope in the ultimate victory of the Cross. 
So does 1 Peter commend conformity and convergence with pagan/secular lifestyles; 
or resistance to the temptations of assimilation? To contemporary eyes, some of the detailed 
advice seems remarkably quietist. Believers are encouraged to ‗do good‘ in order to answer 
their critics. This means being subject to temporal authorities of state and household: paying 
honour to the emperor, obeying one‘s husband and showing respect to one‘s master.  
‗... what 1 Peter means by ―good‖ conduct is, to a considerable extent, behaviour 
which is socially respectable: honouring the emperor, submitting to masters and husbands, 
not provoking trouble or conflict.‘ (Horrell 2008, p.83) Such external conformity would, 
however, cloak an inner, alternative loyalty to Christ. Yet by referring to Rome as ‗Babylon‘, 
the writer reminds readers of Israel‘s time in exile; and the language of ‗resident alien‘, 
similarly assures Christians that their current situation was not permanent. In continuity with 
the other covenant people of Israel, the Church endures its time of exile by reasserting its 
distinctiveness; it will not assimilate. Just as the Jews in exile observed the practices, customs 
and laws that kept them a holy people, so too the Church will by its outward character declare 
its identification with the suffering Christ. 
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‗The call is thus not to reform the social order but to exhibit true goodness within it, in 
the conviction that such behaviour will then be recognized as positive rather than threatening 
to the best of pagan values.‘ (Achtemeier 1996, p. 38) Note the significance of Christian 
character as constituting its own apologetics. It was important to uphold exemplary behaviour 
that was pleasing to the authorities on the basis that such goodness would draw approval 
rather than opprobrium. 
There is notional loyalty to the institution of Empire, but this is conditioned by the 
infinitely more binding claims of faith. This ‗critical distance‘ is evident in 1 Peter 2.13–17: 
urging loyalty to ‗human institutions‘ – scotching any ideology of the emperor as divine; 
calling Christians ‗free people‘ – rather than subjects of Empire; exhortation to ‗honour‘ 
temporal powers but to ‗fear‘ God – all suggest where true priorities lie, and which of the 
temporal or heavenly powers are deemed the true objects of worship. The superficial 
impression of quietism is subverted. It all suggests that 1 Peter is advancing ‗a measured but 
conscious resistance to imperial demands‘ (Horrell 2008, p. 88). 
So whilst Christians are exhorted not to be the cause of slander or hostility on the 
grounds of committing crime or moral misconduct, equally they should not be ashamed to 
profess their faith. If to be a ‗Christian‘ is thought a crime, it is one that the Church confesses 
with pride, thereby turning the normal processes of justice on their head, since in a normal 
trial one pleads innocent in the face of pressure to confess. Despite the ethic of suffering and 
resilience, however, the strategy is not one of withdrawal or capitulation but robust self-
justification. Hope is the foundation of Christian behaviour as the eschatological fulfilment of 
the world to come, but it is that vision which serves as the well-spring of alternative values 
that surpass and relativize any current sufferings: 
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But in your hearts, set apart Christ as Lord. Always be prepared to give an answer to 
everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have. (1 Peter 3.15, 
NIV). 
 
Truth to Power: Apologetics in the Patristic Era  
The designation ‗apologists‘ is a recent one, dating from the nineteenth century (Skarsaune 
2010, p. 121). The term refers to those Christian writers of second century who wrote 
treatises defending the faith from detractors. The most prominent of these were Aristedes of 
Athens (Apology, c. 125–150 C.E.), Athenagorus of Athens (Plea on Behalf of Christians, c. 
177 C.E.), Justin Martyr (1 and 2 Apology, c 150–155 C.E.), Tatian of Syria (Oration to the 
Greeks, c. 170) and Tertullian (Apology, c. 198–217 C.E.). Taken together as a corpus, such 
literature originated from the Greek-speaking regions of Greece, Asia Minor, Egypt and Syria 
and Latin-speaking regions of North Africa. 
There was also an apologetic purpose to many Christian martyriological texts, dating 
from the same period and including such works as The Martyrdom of Polycarp, The 
Martyrdom of Carpus, Papylus and Agathonicê, The Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas, 
The Acts of Justin and Companions and The Martyrs of Lyons and Vienne. Such literature 
would have had a significant ‗public‘ dimension since they often contained accounts of the 
martyrs‘ trials, thereby portraying accounts of exemplary Christian behaviour in the face of 
persecution. Such literature maintains themes in the first letter of Peter, striking a continuity 
between the passion of Christ and the public demeanour of the faithful, in portraying a world 
in which ‗the blood of martyrs watered the seeds of hope implanted in the world by Christ‘s 
rising from the dead‘ (Dulles 1971, p. 80).  
272 
 
Whilst ‗apologist‘ may be of modern provenance, the term ‗apology‘ appears to have 
originated with the early-fourth-century writer Eusebius of Caesarea, to denote works 
addressed to the Roman Emperor. By this definition, that means Tertullian, Athenagoras, 
Quadratus, Aristedes and Justin, all from this period, qualify as ‗apologists‘ or writers of 
apologies that were not addressed to fellow Christians (such as 1 Peter) or simply to peers, 
such as philosophers or pagan believers, but were directed at the public authorities. Skarsaune 
(2010) argues that this tradition is pioneered by Justin Martyr‘s first and second Apology, 
dating from the mid-second-century, and effectively comes to an end with Tertullian. As 
Skarsaune notes, these were therefore justifications for the Christian faith that reached 
beyond the Church itself to the wider society – furthermore, to the highest Imperial powers of 
all.  
Unlike the message of 1 Peter, therefore, which taught endurance in the face of 
secular opposition – albeit as an outworking of the Church‘s identification with Christ‘s 
passion – and which saw it as incumbent upon a Christian to endure, but never challenge, 
civil and domestic authority, this later generation of writing was prepared to speak up. The 
basis of the argument was philosophical in nature, as a defence of the logical coherence of the 
faith.
15
 Nevertheless, the substance of the apology concerned the public position of 
Christians, protesting against the injustice of the legal charges levelled against them. Justin 
pleads for an end to the prosecution of Christians who, it would seem, are being indicted 
simply for their beliefs, and not for any legal offence or political disloyalty. As Skarsaune 
argues, therefore, such apologies were effectively a ‗petition‘ to the Emperor (2010, p. 123). 
                                                          
15
 Skarsaune argues that this was conditioned by the emergence of a new generation of rulers 
who prided themselves on their philosophical credentials, as well as their political position 
(2010, p. 123). 
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The opening paragraph of Justin‘s first Apology illustrates this well: the imperial leadership 
are addressed as men of learning, certainly; but in appealing to them in concert with other 
civil powers, and in introducing his own patrimony and citizenship as a representative of all 
the ‗nations‘ who suffer persecution, Justin cements together the political and philosophical 
dimensions of his defence:  
 
To the Emperor Titus Aelius Adrianus Antoninus Pius Augustus Caesar, and to his 
son Verissimus the philosopher, and to Lucius the philosopher, the natural son of 
Caesar, and the adopted son of Pius, a lover of learning, and to the sacred senate, with 
the whole people of the Romans, I, Justin, son of Priscus and grandson of Bacchius, 
natives of Flavia Neopolis in Palestine, present this address and petition in [sic] behalf 
of those of all nations who are unjustly hated and wantonly abused, myself being one 
of them. (Bush 1983, p. 5)
16
 
 
Similarly, the persecution of Christians often arose because they refused to take part in the 
public acts of veneration to the Emperor – arising, naturally, from their allegiance to the 
Christian God – but nevertheless the accusation is levelled in terms of their refusal to 
participate in the Imperial cult; and this is what Justin is concerned to argue. Christians 
cannot be accused of irrationality in their preference for God over the emperor, and here, 
Justin advances arguments from the Scriptures and pagan philosophers – especially 
injunctions against idolatry – to make his point. So, in effect, Justin was defending his fellow-
                                                          
16
 See also the opening citation of the apology of Athenagoras, c. 177 C.E. (Athenagoras, 
1983, p. 35). 
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believers both on political and philosophical grounds: they were the victims of legal 
malpractice and misinterpretation; and they were not as out of step with ancient teaching as 
their detractors might suggest (Skarsaune 2010, pp. 125–9). Why would Justin do this if he 
were simply concerned to prove the logic of Christian belief, or merely preoccupied with the 
ordering of a holy people as disciples first and foremost, without some interest in the public 
standing of the Church and the legal fate of his fellow-Christians?  
In his apology, Athenagoras (c. 177 C.E.) appeals to the Emperors Marcus Aurelius 
and Lucius Aurelius (‗conquerors … and more than all, philosophers‘, p. 35) for the civil 
liberties of Christians, reminding them of the pluralism of the Empire and the practice of 
freedom of religion granted to its many peoples (Chapter 1, pp. 35–6). He pleads that such 
consideration be extended to Christians, who are suffering public harassment. Like Justin, 
Athenagoras asks that Christians be given a fair hearing, one based not on hearsay but on 
fact: 
 
If I go minutely into the particulars of our doctrine, let it not surprise you. It is that 
you may not be carried away by the popular and irrational opinion, but may have the 
truth clearly before you. For presenting the opinions themselves to which we adhere, 
as being not human, but uttered and taught by God, we shall be able to persuade you 
not to think of us as atheists. (p. 43)  
 
Athenagorus offers testimony to Christians‘ worship of God as Trinity, arguing (like Justin) 
that this is consistent with the insights of the ancients. Charges of atheism are groundless, 
therefore; but so are those of immorality and sedition. He therefore petitions the authorities to 
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relieve his community of such slander and, as a result, grant them relief from persecution 
(Chapter II). However, if Athenagorus and theology fails to convince, then let the humble 
integrity of the community of the Church speak for itself: 
 
But among us you will find uneducated persons, and artisans, and old women, who, if 
they are unable in words to prove the benefit of our doctrine, yet by their deeds 
exhibit the benefit arising from the persuasion of its truth: they do not rehearse 
speeches, but exhibit good works; when struck, they do not strike again; when robbed, 
they do not go to law; they give to those that ask of them, and love their neighbours as 
themselves. (p. 44) 
 
So Athenagorus is confident that by making the theological and philosophical case to such 
learned (and benevolent) rulers, he can be assured of a fair hearing:  
 
But as they [Pythagorus, Socrates and other philosophers] were none the worse in 
respect of virtue because of the opinion of the multitude, so neither does the 
undiscriminating calumny of some persons cast any shade upon us as regards 
rectitude of life, for with God we stand in good repute. Nevertheless, I will meet these 
charges also, although I am well assured that by what has already been said I have 
cleared myself to you. For as you excel all men in intelligence, you know that those 
whose life is directed towards God as its rule, so that each one among us may be 
blameless and irreproachable before Him, will not entertain even the thought of the 
slightest sin. (p. 57) 
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Similarly, Tertullian (197 C.E.) rebuts the charges of atheism, immorality and treachery 
against Christians, and rejects the claim that their refusal to observe the public cult of the 
Emperor has destabilized the State. He points out that no other group apart from Christians is 
singled out for such harassment. So he, too, appeals to the State to extend justice to Christians 
and develops his philosophical defence accordingly. In distancing themselves from the 
excesses of Emperor worship, he argues, Christians actually protect the equilibrium of the 
Empire. But if they are called to martyrdom, then they do so voluntarily out of their love for 
God, and their virtue is a living testimony to their very persecutors (Chapter 50). 
The logical coherence of Christianity is argued lucidly and at length by apologists 
who assume that, by virtue of their higher learning, their Imperial addressees will appreciate 
its authenticity. Yet they are making these pleas to effect a greater freedom of thought and 
practice for their fellow-believers: to achieve some civil liberties which they see as being 
frequently withheld or breached. Yet their argument is that on philosophical grounds this is 
unreasonable. But the point is, the justifications for faith are advanced in order that public 
disapproval may be quashed – so the apologetic literature of this era assumes a number of 
things: firstly, that the Christian faith can be defended by use of appeals to non-Christian 
sources; secondly, an appeal to natural justice in the style with which Imperial power is 
exercised; and thirdly, that the public demeanour of the Church is beyond reproach. The 
apologies are therefore a form of public theology, insofar as they advance a theological 
argument in public for the right of Christians to live as citizens within the body politic 
without fear or hindrance.  
Whilst not addressed directly to Imperial powers, Augustine‘s City of God (413–27 
C.E.) was certainly prompted by the political situation. When Rome fell to the Goths in 410, 
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recrimination turned to the Christians, who were held responsible for the Empire turning its 
back on the old faith. Quite the contrary, argued Augustine: during the fighting, the 
Barbarians respected the churches which provided sanctuary (Chapter VII). While the 
suffering of pagans caused them to doubt their faith, Christians displayed a greater resilience 
through their trust in the Cross and Resurrection (Chapter XXIX). All of this is informed by a 
belief in God‘s providence which will sustain the Church in suffering ‗until the world which 
had persecuted in frenzy now followed in faith‘ (Augustine 1984, p. 1033). Augustine is 
therefore able to use a political crisis to set out a sophisticated Christian theology of public 
life and to commend the superiority of a social order sustained by divine providence. More 
than any of his predecessors, Augustine integrates his response to particular events or 
detractors (in his case, the account of the fate of Rome) into a comprehensive theology of 
history. 
In terms of their cultural contexts and their intended audience(s), So the ‗apologies‘ of 
the pre-Constantinian period may be seen as a form of public theology, insofar as they 
advance a theological argument in public for the right of Christians to live as citizens within 
the body politic without fear or hindrance. They were always conditioned by questions of the 
relationship between Christian identity and civic loyalty, whether that was one of opposition 
or agreement. Apologetics begins as personal testimony and ends in theology. Such 
utterances ‗speak truth to power‘, aware both of the significance and reality of such powers 
for the everyday welfare of the world, and yet, in mounting a defence, point to a higher or 
alternative power. Whether Christianity was to be commended for its philosophical 
coherence, its moral probity or its political impact, whether it resulted in Christians 
portraying themselves as exemplary citizens of this world or one to come, within the diversity 
of forms and genres, the public and political nature of the literature cannot be denied, 
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‗prompted by the need to define and defend their own understanding of Christianity in the 
given harsh historical and culture [sic] reality‘ (Ree 2005, p. 8).  
 
Later Apologists 
During the medieval period in Europe, there was less imperative to defend the status of 
Christianity against civic opposition, since in many respects Church and State were one. 
After Aquinas, the continuity of classical culture and Christian theology was axiomatic. The 
focus of apologetic writing was therefore not philosophical doubters or legal sanctions, but 
the challenges of unbelievers such as Jews and Muslims. Yet many apologists, such as 
Anselm, Nicholas of Cusa, Bonaventure, Abelard and Aquinas himself found wisdom in 
these traditions, such as the recovery of the lost heritage of Aristotelian thought through 
interaction with Arab philosophers.  
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were dominated by the religious disputes of 
the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Dulles does not regard this period as particularly 
outstanding for the history of apologetics (p. 145). Despite controversies regarding the 
relationship between Church and State and the role of Protestant dissenters within the 
political order, few theologians used directly apologetic arguments to defend their 
allegiances, although some Catholic polemicists of the Counter-Reformation were concerned 
to defend papal authority. In their theological treatises, many Protestant reformers 
emphasized human sinfulness and the importance of Scripture as the living revelation of God. 
Calvin‘s notion of ‗common grace‘, held that human reason was potentially capable of 
apprehending the truth, but demonstrating the truth through apologetics alone was impossible 
without the aid of Scripture as transcending and correcting the limitations of human finitude.  
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The Enlightenment 
Apologists from the eighteenth century faced challenges to the magisterial authority of the 
Church and to the literalism of biblical worldview from a rising tide of scepticism which 
rallied around humanist principles of reason, critical enquiry and empiricism. Apologists 
sought to reconcile faith and reason and looked increasingly to natural theology. Friedrich 
Schleiermacher stood between the Pietism of his upbringing and a more cosmopolitan society 
of Berlin (1996). He accepted criticisms of the outward ephemera of religious dogmas but 
defended the reality of religion as the expression of an enduring, universal feeling of absolute 
dependence. The impact of the Enlightenment may have caused apologetics to concentrate on 
debating the truth of Christianity as rational belief and existential feeling at the expense of 
defending the practical virtues of Christianity. Whilst apologetics is primarily a defence of 
the faith, the question becomes, of what kind of faith and what weight is given to public, 
pluralist discourse; and how far non-Christian world-views are seen as potential bearers of 
truth and thus apologetics a shared journey or conversation.  
 
Contemporary Apologetics 
By the twentieth century, the fault-lines widened between styles of apologetics which 
emphasized the discipline as a defence of received tradition and evidence as argument to 
prove its truth, and more revisionist approaches which stressed the commonality of human 
experience and the religious quest and sought to mediate between the metaphors and thought-
forms of different traditions in order to find points of correspondence and analogy (Dulles 
1971, p. 371). Apologetic literature from this period nevertheless had to struggle to maintain 
its place in contemporary theology, due largely to the influence of neo-orthodoxy from the 
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middle of the twentieth century. The influence of Barthian theology made itself felt in 
arguing that apologetics is impossible, since God is not susceptible to human reason, but 
apprehended through God‘s self-revelation in Jesus. There is no common ground or shared 
rationality on which to establish an apologetics which sees itself as a bridging or mediating 
discourse. The only apologetic is the enunciation of a systematic theology as God‘s saving 
word to sinful humanity. Earlier, I stressed traditions which based Christian apologetics in an 
appeal to universal religious experience. Contemporary evangelical writers tend to look more 
to the historical facticity of Scripture and the life of Jesus. Some of the language of 
contemporary apologetics signals the eclipse of universalist or eirenic perspectives in favour 
of more adversarial approaches. In the face of new cultural opponents, Christians need 
‗upgraded apologetic weaponry‘ (Milbank 2011: xiii); Tacelli and Kreeft talk about ‗the 
battle of arguments‘ (2003, pp. 10, 139); and William Lane Craig claims, ‗We‘ve got to train 
our kids for war. How dare we send them unarmed into an intellectual war zone?‘ (2010, p. 
20) 
The emphasis on working out of doctrinal tradition into practice is also apparent. 
Bush (1983) characterizes a number of types of contemporary apologetics: rationalism, or 
arguments from the laws of logic; empiricism or experientialism, which finds evidence in 
nature or religious experience; fideism or presuppositionalism which argues that the nature of 
revelation is such that it can only be self-authenticating within an a priori commitment to the 
paradigm of faith; and evidentialism, which looks for historical or scientific proofs. 
‗Apologetics, in the broad sense, is what all theologians use when they commend their views 
to those unbelievers who might listen to them.‘ (1983, p. 375). Another leading contemporary 
writer in apologetics is William Lane Craig (2008), who argues that apologetics is essentially 
a rational justification or exposition of the truth-claims of Christianity. It is distinctive from 
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evangelism, in that apologetics is ‗a theoretical discipline that tries to answer the question, 
―What rational warrant can be given for the Christian faith?‖‘(p. 15). 
Apologetics may have a number of functions, from helping to shape culture, to 
building up the faithful and the evangelization of unbelievers (p. 23). The first of these 
options appears to connect with my earlier discussion of apologetics intra- and extra-ecclesia, 
and potentially speaks of a public dimension. It may also relate to the approach of liberal 
theologians of the twentieth century such as Paul Tillich, who argued that the apologist 
should listen to contemporary culture for what it reveals about our desires and preoccupations 
– this is what Tillich did with visual arts and the modern psychotherapies. However, when 
Craig speaks of engaging with culture, this does seem to be as a prelude to evangelism, rather 
than, for example, a justification of the civil or moral credentials of Christianity with 
concomitant implications for the public contribution of the Church. Engagement with culture 
for Craig is directed towards giving people ‗the intellectual permission to believe‘ (2008), 
rather than to establish a common dialogue. Culture is the strategic vehicle of proclamation 
but not a site of revelation. ‗It is the broader task of Christian apologetics to help create and 
sustain a cultural milieu in which the gospel can be heard as an intellectually viable option for 
thinking men and women.‘ (p. 17)  
 
Emergent Voices: Contextual, Imaginative, Cross-Cultural 
Whilst apologetic literature tends to be dominated by evangelical writers who stick with a 
traditional defence of propositional truth, there are signs of new trends amongst evangelicals 
as well as good examples of robust debate within wider public forums. There is a shift away 
from a reliance on pure reason towards an engagement with cultural forms as the spaces of 
shared meaning – with motifs such as narrative, imagination and performativity taking the 
place of rationalist, propositional methods. An examination of such trends may give us clues 
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for the shape of an apologetic public theology, and how opportunities for this to take place 
might be created. 
Writers such as Benno van den Toren (2011) are moving to embrace a wider cross-
cultural approach, prompted by the emergence of postmodernity. He sees the limitations of 
contemporary Christian apologetics, especially in evangelical mode, in having been directed 
towards relating Christianity to the modern mind-set, through its emphasis on empiricism and 
rationalism. Postmodernism exposes Christian apologetics to religious, spiritual and 
philosophical pluralism, but eschews any notion of objective, universal truth. The ‗project of 
trying to ―prove‖ God‘s existence and the truth of the Christian faith, according to supposedly 
―pure‖ reason‘ (Hughes 2011, p. 5) is exposed as an accommodation to modernism. Instead, 
van den Toren discards evidentialist, propositionalist and rationalist arguments in favour of 
cross-cultural dialogue and ‗dialogue aimed at persuasion‘ (van den Toren 2011, p. xi). 
Echoing movements in missiology which turned to the language of ‗inculturation‘, he 
concedes that cultural context conditions the way in which the Christian Gospel must be 
presented. ‗Christian apologetic dialogue and witness should address people not as free-
floating individuals but as members of a community and embedded in a tradition.‘ (p. 211) 
Any commendation of Christianity must be contextual and speak to the conditions of its 
audience:  
 
In terms of this model, the basic task of the apologist is no longer to provide a 
supposedly universal and cultural-independent foundation of knowledge. His [sic] 
task is to compare different ways of reading reality and to defend the adequacy and 
relevance of the Christian reading in relation to the specific alternative readings 
offered. (pp. 45–46, my emphasis) 
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Note the emphasis on reading: the text of the world in the light of the text of Christian 
tradition, such that the Church is cast as ‗a hermeneutic of the Gospel‘ (p. 33). The question 
is whether the privileged reading is Christian and biblical, and the extent to which non-
theological texts and contexts are included in interpretative process. Nevertheless, this is a 
model of apologetics which commends the ‗truth‘ not as correspondence with propositional 
knowledge but as exemplary life-style, as a world into which another is invited, in the 
understanding that cultural context conditions a response. As van den Toren argues, 
apologetics cannot be judged by universal, abstract criteria of correspondence to idealist 
truth. It requires attention to the cultural and philosophical context in which all participants in 
the conversation are immersed. Such an understanding of apologia roots it firmly in its 
context and in the immediacy of experience and narrative. ‗The reasonableness of the 
recommendation for a life well lived must be assessed in light of the necessarily temporal and 
circumstantial character of that sort of human life.‘ (Werpehowski 1986, p. 287) Apologetics, 
historically, has never proceeded from abstraction or from a neutral place, since – whether in 
the legal or theological sense – it is first and foremost a testimony: ‗... any successful exercise 
of apologetics ... must contain a strong confessional element which convinces precisely 
because it persuades through the force of an imaginative presentation of belief.‘ (Milbank 
2011, p. xiv)  
Contrast van den Toren‘s attempt to shift the ground of evangelical apologetics, 
however, with another contemporary contribution to ‗postmodern‘ apologetics, which 
resolutely sticks with the doctrines of propositional truth and universal rationality: 
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How do we convince postmodernists of the truth of the gospel? Is apologetics still 
possible in a society that no longer believes in objective truth as demonstrable by a 
predefined standard of rationality? How do we persuade others of the truth of the 
gospel in a culture where a variety of rationalities co-exist? (Phillips 1995, p. 11) 
 
Phillips and Okholm also criticize those who ‗are more concerned to convince ―cultured 
despisers‖ of the relevance of the church than the truth of the gospel‘ (p. 11). 
 
‘Imaginative Apologetics’ 
The very epistemology of apologetics, and the inadequacy of pure reason to communicate the 
nature of faith, is increasingly coming under scrutiny. A collection of essays, Imaginative 
Apologetics, is attempting to move beyond the rationalist, modernist paradigm which insists 
that:  
 
... the only ―reason‖ which discloses truth is a cold, detached reason that is isolated from 
both feeling and imagination, as likewise from both narrative and ethical evaluation. 
Christian apologetics now needs rather to embrace the opposite assumption that our most 
visionary and ideal insights can most disclose the real, provided that this is accompanied 
by a widening in democratic scope of our sympathies for the ordinary, and the capacities 
and vast implications of the quotidian ... (Milbank 2011, p.: xxii) 
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The premise behind Imaginative Apologetics, therefore, is partly that the kind of apologetics 
familiar to Irenaeus, Schleiermacher or Bishop Berkeley is not appropriate for the 
contemporary world. Not as well as facing new kinds of scepticism and pluralism, but it may 
need to reconsider adopting new strategies and forms of discourse, which shift apologetics 
away from a particular kind of abstract, propositional argumentation and concentrates on 
harnessing the imagination in pursuit of its aims. The editor himself argues that, ‗Throughout 
this collection there is an enquiry into the nature of reason and the role, within it, of the 
imagination‘ (Davison 2011, p xxv). Similarly, in his Foreword, John Milbank maintains that 
‗it is the true exercise of the imagination which … guides and cautions our discursive 
judgement.‘ (p. xxiii) Apologetics is presented as kind of contextual theology, entailing a 
reading of the signs of the times as revealed through popular culture, the arts and humanities:  
 
It is not possible to discover how the Christian faith, and the Church, can speak 
meaningfully into a secular world unless efforts have first been made to understand the 
shape of this world itself: its values, assumptions, prejudices, cravings; especially as these 
reveal where the veil is thinnest between secular and religious concerns, and where, in 
fact, the Spirit may be going before those who already belong to faith, made manifest in 
places beyond the confines of the institutional Church. (Lazenby 2011, p. 46) 
 
This, of course, is entirely consistent with the sensibilities of the earliest evangelists for the 
Gospel, who knew well the importance of addressing their audiences on their own terms, 
using concepts and arguments that would connect directly with their concerns, in terms 
familiar to their indigenous world-view. Another contributor, similarly, speaks of making 
Christianity attractive and compelling by virtue of its ‗inherent beauty and goodness.‘ 
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(Hughes 2011, p. 9) According to this model, then, apologetics is not interested in 
propositional truth (although any representation of faith will be intellectually robust), so 
much as something that excites our desires. By the same token, an engagement with things 
like visual arts, literature, film and material cultures constitutes a significant arena for 
apologetics, since these are the places where questions of truth, beauty, goodness are 
encountered; they are ‗‖diagnostic spaces‖: places here the relationship between religion and 
the wider world is being clearly played out‘ (Lazenby 2011). 
Such an understanding of apologetic discourse sees it as the articulation of something 
that necessarily defies conceptualization; as a journey from religious experience into public 
proclamation. Karen Armstrong frames this in terms of the tension between logos and 
mythos: the former as pragmatic, rational and instrumental, and the latter pertaining to 
experience that is altogether more ineffable and mysterious (2009, pp. 2–3). That translation, 
from mythos to logos, describes the passage of apologia: the immediacy of conviction must 
be in some way systematized, and cannot remain at the level of feeling but must be put into 
words. This does beg the question whether the experience of the divine and God‘s own 
nature, necessarily exceeds any attempt to put it into language – which may put some 
elements of apologetics into perspective, and invites apologists to consider alternative modes 
of knowing which are not straight-jacketed by rationalism and positivism but attempt to do 
justice to ‗the more elusive, puzzling and tragic aspects of the human predicament that lay 
outside the remit of logos‘ (Dulles 1971).  
Similarly, Edward T. Oakes surveys the popularity of narrative as a ‗privileged locus for 
doing theology‘, lamenting the way in which theology has been ‗robbed of its rich and storied 
character by the too ready assumption … that [it] must work in the manner, if not of science, 
at least in that Cartesian style characterized by rigor and the search for self-evident principles 
– that is, propositionally‘ (1992, p. 57). Narrative renders theological discourse ‗public‘ and 
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plausible in the face of Enlightenment challenges to the cognitive plausibility of Christian 
doctrine and its retreat into privatized, subjective belief. It no longer claims universal, 
objective status but as one way (amongst many) of rendering reality. Narrative enables 
theology to connect with literary and other imaginative genres, and relates to lived experience 
in ways that enable it to respond to pastoral and existential issues. Narrative also reminds us 
of the narrative nature of biblical literature and provides alternative to propositional, doctrinal 
approaches to theology. Narrative is not merely a dramatization of Christian doctrine but the 
very essence of its structure. This makes it easier to contextualise the history of doctrine and 
characterizes revelation not as ‗a surprising, heteronomous ―deposit‖ that landed on the 
human scene more or less literally out of the blue‘, but as something  ‗more easily seen as 
simply a more intense and clarifying narrative, one that structures and gives meaning to all 
the other narrative lines that make up a human life‘ (p. 38). 
We may belong to our particular narratives and world-views, but our inhabitation of these 
stories is what qualifies us to belong to a broader, more universal history as well. As homo 
narrans we find our place in the world through the specificity of language and context but 
that these are the ways we participate in what Paul Ricœur terms ‗the game of telling‘ 
(Ricoeur,1981, p. 294). Our very historicity comes to us by means of telling stories, and this 
is the way we gain access to that deeper experience of our own historicity. If ‗narrative is 
genuinely indicative of the world‘, says Edward Oakes, ‗then that implies that we are indeed 
all linked by the horizon of that world.‘ (1992, p. 51) The relating and sharing of narrative, 
then, may be a device by which different participants can converge within a pluralistic public 
realm in order to engage in dialogue and apologetics, similar to Tracy‘s ‗analogical‘ 
approach. 
There is still an echo of van den Toren‘s characterization of the Christian community as 
the ‗hermeneutic‘ of the gospel, but here is also a performative element – a habitus of faith 
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that is the ‗living human testimony‘ to a particular world-view. To translate that into 
Stackhouse‘s terms, that could take the form of a witness to the difference it makes to the 
civil responsibilities of the Christian – in providing an explanation to other citizens of the 
reasons behind a particular public stance. None of this discounts the significance of 
normative, theologically-grounded principles, but simply underlines that the arena of 
apologetics may best be exercised not in the adversarial combat of rational proof but the 
incarnational, sacramental spaces of artful, purposeful action. This is an epistemology of 
Christian reasoning that embraces both intellect and desire, truth and beauty: 
 
It is the work of the apologist to suggest that only in God does our wonder reach its 
zenith, and only in God do our deepest desires find their fulfilment. The apologist 
may labour to show that the Christian theological vision is true, but that will fall flat 
unless he or she has an equal confidence that it is supremely attractive and engaging. 
(Davison 2011, p. xxvi, my emphasis)  
 
Notwithstanding, there is a clear gap in this collection, and that is any kind of engagement 
with apologetics in the public realm beyond literature and the arts and science. Astonishingly, 
there is no discussion of the role of media; and nothing about public theology at all, as one of 
the most significant places in which the teachings of the Christian tradition engage with the 
everyday worlds of politics, economics or civil society. What is the reason for this omission? 
That we cannot exercise our imaginations in these areas of life? That Christian engagement in 
these fields to defend and commend the grounds for theological and ethical intervention – say 
in the area of poverty, or a discussion of how to cast one‘s vote or the nature of urban life and 
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faith (all familiar areas of discourse within public theology) – might not benefit from the use 
of imaginative apologetics?  
However, popular culture and media output of all kinds are some of the most 
innovative and creative arenas within which people explore questions of truth and meaning: 
what it means to be human, the beginnings and endings of life, the nature of difference, the 
future of the planet – and these are not simply aesthetic but political and moral issues too 
(Lynch 2005; Graham 2008). Similarly, performative and aesthetic forms of political or 
public protest could serve as alternative forms of theological expression, more engaging than 
official reports or the conventions of debating-chambers and political assemblies. Not to say 
that these dimensions of public life do not matter, but suggesting that there are alternative 
ways to shape civil society and public debate.  
Whilst this collection on imaginative apologetics promises an exciting alternative 
epistemology, none of the contributions is concerned with anything to do with public issues, 
social ethics or practical theology. This is an unfortunate omission, which fails to do full 
justice to the biblical and historical traditions of apologetics which framed themselves as 
defences of faith precisely within the realm of citizenship as one of the proper outworkings of 
the Christian calling. Yet it is impossible to believe that the commons of civil society would 
not also constitute the kind of shared space in which the kind of apologetic encounters 
commended by Davison and co. might take place. Nevertheless, is it possible to extrapolate 
and find points of connection between this vision and the claims of Stackhouse? For the work 
of the imagination in culture, literature and the arts, we might substitute opportunities to 
articulate the theologies of the ‗action-guiding world-views‘ which inform the churches‘ and 
individuals‘ public vocation of seeking the common good. It is to this task that I now turn.
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7 
The Apologetics of Presence: Public Theology after Christendom and Secularism 
Public theology needs institutional liberty over against the church, and a place in the 
open house of scholarship and the sciences. Today this liberty has to be defended 
against both atheists and fundamentalists. (Moltmann 1999, p. 5) 
 
In Christ we are offered the possibility of partaking in the reality of God and in the 
reality of the world, but not in the one without the other. The reality of God discloses 
itself only by setting me entirely in the reality of the world … (Bonhoeffer 1995, p. 
193) 
 
Introduction  
William Temple‘s book Christianity and Social Order (1942) is a classic of public theology. 
In Britain, it fed into a national debate about social and economic reconstruction after the 
1939–45 war, and was influential in forging, along with William Beveridge‘s report on 
welfare, the policies of the reforming Labour Government of 1945–51. Together with Faith 
in the City (1985) it is one of the high water-marks of modern Anglican social thought. 
Despite his public prominence, however, as leader of the Established Church of England at a 
time of strong Christian observance, Temple never presumed that the Church could claim an 
automatic or privileged voice. The chapter titles of Christianity and Social Order reveal his 
circumspection: ‗What Right has the Church to Interfere?‘ he asks. ‗How should the Church 
interfere?‘ and ‗Has the Church claimed to Intervene before?‘ He was well aware that the 
Church might be accused of straying beyond its proper jurisdiction if it was seen to ‗interfere‘ 
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in public life. Even so, without seeking to compromise the autonomy of the secular, Temple 
affirmed the necessity of the Christian community to contribute to the future direction of 
society. Yet it does so, he argued, from the well-springs of its own life, as an incarnational 
and sacramental entity, whose identity is shaped by the historical reality of Jesus‘ life, death 
and resurrection. From its Eucharistic calling to be the Body of Christ, broken and offered to 
the world, the Church is commissioned to ‗announce Christian principles‘ and relate them to 
the social order critically and constructively. But in addition, the Church must then ‗pass on 
to Christian citizens, acting in their civic capacity, the task of re-shaping the existing order‘ 
(Temple 1942, p. 58). So the public role of the Church is to equip those called by virtue of the 
citizenship bestowed on them by a secular (as in neutral) democracy to exercise a public 
vocation.  
 In many respects my attempts to articulate anew the contours of a post-secular public 
theology lead me back to the spirit of Temple‘s remarks. Religious voices today have no 
automatic or authoritative right to speak, given the nature of the secular, pluralist public 
realm. Public theology speaks into an increasingly contested and fragmented context, and is 
divided as to the nature of its address to the world: with what voice, from what sources, might 
the Church speak: how authoritative and binding are its own traditions and practices, and how 
far does that need to accommodate to a wider audience? Public theologians now find 
themselves in the kind of position that prompts Marion Maddox to ask, ‗What legitimacy can 
a theologically-based contribution claim where Christianity commands no automatic 
attention?‘ (2007, p. 82)  
 Faced with the paradoxical and unprecedented challenge of a post-secular society, 
then, I have continued to uphold the public vocation of the Church in a way which affirms its 
concern for the common good of society, and the individual calling of Christians to be 
faithful citizens as well as good disciples. I have drawn on Max Stackhouse‘s insistence that 
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public theology necessarily involves an apologetic function, in that it must always be 
prepared to ‗give an account‘ of its motives and values in a way that is accessible to its 
interlocutors. It is believed that this will afford Christians and the Church the best opportunity 
to make its influence felt, by engendering:  
 
a public theology that does not separate itself from the world into a self-sufficient 
counter-community with its own religious language, but knows how to speak the 
language of the world and how to be in dialogue with the world; a public theology 
that ... is grounded in Christ and therefore challenges the world to make God‘s way 
for the world visible, a prophetic theology that leads the world beyond its worldly 
ways. (Bedford-Strohm 2007b, p. 36) 
 
In the rest of this chapter, then, I want to pursue a number of themes I hope will be 
indicative of the tasks and scope of a post-secular public theology. I want to think first about 
the further ramifications of a public theology in which the praxis of discipleship is its own 
apologetic. The post-liberal theology of George Lindbeck reminds us that the test of faith is 
not its correspondence with propositional truth but its capacity to facilitate Christian 
performance. This is a valuable lesson about the community of faith as an ‗apologetics of 
presence‘ (Murphy-O'Connor 2009), and the Church as a sign and sacrament of God‘s 
redemptive presence in the world. I want to relate this to the insights of Latin American 
liberation theology, and the work of Gustavo Gutiérrez in particular, which also reminds us 
that an apologetic public theology is concerned less with words than actions, and that a 
defence of faith is to be found in its power to liberate and transform situations of injustice and 
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human suffering. As Gutiérrez has argued, theology as orthopraxy is called to identify not so 
much with the ‗non-believer‘ but the ‗non-person‘ on the periphery of the powers that be.  
This begins to point me towards further consideration of the nature of the ‗publics‘ to 
whom public theology might be accountable. In Chapter 3, I discussed the various ways in 
which public theologians have defined the nature of the public, and I highlighted the 
fragmented nature of public life in the West. Gutiérrez‘s commitment to a theology that 
proclaims good news to the poor in the shape of its practices of solidarity and liberation 
immediately locates public theology‘s accountability not in a generic public but preferentially 
towards those who have been marginalized and disempowered by global economic and 
political forces. This is given further theological weight by Jürgen Moltmann in his book The 
Crucified God, where he interprets the death of Jesus as an act which reveals the true nature 
of God, as one who humbles Himself in order that ‗all the godless and godforsaken can 
experience communion with him‘ (1974, p. 286, my emphasis). These categories of society 
denote respectively an existential separation from God and a material abandonment, or lack 
of hope. They resonate powerfully today with our contemporary situation, in which public 
theology has to make the case for the merits of religious contributions to its ‗cultured 
despisers‘ in a society that is comfortably functionally secular, but also stands in solidarity 
with the crucified God who identifies with the privations of all those who suffer.  
Finally, I will develop three motifs of post-secular public theology which have 
already appeared in my discussion, but which seem to gain new currency in the light of what 
I have argued so far. Firstly, public theology as Christian apologetics, above all, is concerned 
primarily with ‗the welfare of the city where I have sent you into exile, and pray to the Lord 
on its behalf, for in its welfare you will find your welfare‘ (Jeremiah 29.7). It is something 
conducted in solidarity with the secular, and concerned above all with the common good 
beyond the confines of the institutional Church. Indeed, part of the Christian public vocation 
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should be to nurture a pluralist, deliberative space of civil discourse in the interests of a 
healthy body politic.  
Secondly, in keeping with the early Christian apologists who regarded their defences 
of faith as petitions to the rulers, I consider what it means to promote public theology as 
‗speaking truth to power‘. This renews the historic commitment of public theologians to serve 
as advocates and speak prophetically into structures and institutions in the name of justice. 
Lindbeck‘s emphasis on the formation of the ‗skills‘ of the Christian community brings to the 
forefront the importance of a theologically-literate and confident laity as ‗Ambassadors for 
Christ‘ (2 Cor. 5.20). As my third motif, continuing that of an apologetics of praxis and 
presence, I want to advance a plea for greater attention to a neglected aspect of public 
theology: the secular vocation and formation of the laity. It summons the institutional Church 
to take very seriously the business of fostering a deeper and more extensive theological 
literacy amongst the laity. This returns us to the relationship between words and actions in 
apologetics: whilst the practices of faithful citizenship constitute a kind of first-order public 
theology, they may still need justification. ‗Giving an account of oneself‘ may be expressed 
in the praxis of care, social activism and active citizenship, but it must also mean being able 
to speak with conviction into a reasoned public debate.  
 
Praxis and Performance: Public Theology in Deed and Word 
In Chapter 6, I traced how new understandings of apologetics are displacing a modernist 
cognitive model which emphasizes the priority of assent to propositional truths, and positing 
the object of apologetics as an invitation to participate in a way of life. This epistemology of 
apologetics assumes faith as ‗habitus‘: a practical wisdom that gives shape to the world and 
orientates Christians in their actions and behaviours. So apologetics points not to 
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propositional, but transformational truth; the invitation is not to ‗believe‘ but to embrace a 
world-view which ‗unless it is also shown in action it is not adequately shown at all‘ 
(Davison 2011, p. 26). This takes us back to 1 Peter, in which the habitus of the community is 
a sacramental, embodied imitation of Christ, a ‗living human document‘ of Christ‘s passion, 
death and resurrection. Apologetics is at once a narrative of Christian imagination and a 
discourse of exemplary virtue. It does not so much require its hearers to think and believe in 
certain propositional truths – in the style of what has come to dominate contemporary 
apologetic literature – but to imagine and live according to a different kind of reality.  
This raises a question about the relationship of words and deeds in apologetics, and 
indeed in public theology. One of the most significant insights of post-liberal theology was its 
emphasis on the praxis of the Christian community as its own (self-authenticated) 
apologetics. George Lindbeck‘s distinction between ‗knowing how‘ and ‗knowing that‘ in the 
life of faith, draws a similar distinction between cognitive manifestations of Christian belief 
and a more ‗performative‘ dimension. The test of faith is not its correspondence with 
propositional truth (or, indeed, with putatively universal, religious experience) but its 
facilitation of the practices of discipleship. ‗In short, intelligibility comes from skill, not 
theory, and credibility comes from good performance, not adherence to independently 
formulated criteria.‘ (Lindbeck 1984, p. 131) In terms of the apologetic task of theology, 
then, Lindbeck‘s emphasis on nurturing ‗skilful‘ practitioners takes us, once again, into a 
realm where actions, not words, constitute the chief credentials of the Gospel in the public 
square.  
This is similar to what Hogue (2010) characterizes as ‗pragmatic‘ public theology. It 
engages with pluralism by starting from its own traditions and starting-points. It locates itself 
within fluid boundaries and identities and concentrates on building common spaces and 
projects as a means of facilitating dialogue. It seeks collaboration and solidarity as its core 
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objectives: the achievement of shared goals and values, even amidst pluralism, is preferable 
to rational debate. Thus it takes seriously Charles Taylor‘s characterization of modern 
consciousness as framed by reflexivity in the face of pluralism; but works actively and 
constructively within such a context as a site of religious exchange: 
 
The purpose of a pragmatic public theology ... is not to galvanize a singular 
metaphysical moral vision or to reinforce a singular normative worldview, but to 
facilitate and to nourish collaborative strategies around common moral tasks. (p. 366)  
 
Such an approach is inductive, because it begins with a concrete task, seeking to articulate 
‗the practically praise-worthy rather than a defense [sic] of beliefs‘ (p. 367). This does not 
discount the significance of normative, theologically-grounded principles, but simply 
underlines that the arena of apologetics is not to be found in the adversarial combat of 
rational proof but the incarnational, performative space of purposeful action. Davison and 
others pursue this point by associating apologetics with virtue ethics. ‗Apologetics is not an 
instrument to be deployed upon the person with whom we are speaking, not least because that 
fails to take each person‘s particular personhood sufficiently seriously. Rather, authentic 
Christian apologetics should resemble authentic Christian morality as portrayed within the 
‗virtue‘ tradition of ethics: the best Christian apologetics is the product of a thorough 
immersion in the Christian tradition combined with careful attention to the person with whom 
we are speaking and the context in which we find ourselves.‘ (Davison 2011, p. xxvi) This 
means that good apologetics involves learning how to live well as well as being able to 
reason convincingly. The true witness of the Church is ‗through its existence as a people 
formed by the gospel ... [The Church] will never be able to say anything more true than the 
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claims our living make.‘ (Hovey 2011, pp. 109–10) The primary expression of public 
theology, then, will be in practical demonstrations that authentic faith leads to transformation, 
as a matter not just of interpreting the world but changing it. This shifts the centre of gravity 
for public theology as Christian apologetics in the direction of theologies of liberation which, 
similarly, privilege orthopraxy over orthodoxy. 
 
Public Theology for the ‘Non-Person’ 
Gustavo Gutiérrez reminds us that for theologies of liberation the challenge is not a matter of 
belief but one of justice. Gutiérrez‘s indictment of first-world theology is that its attention to 
debating with the ‗cultured despisers‘ of religion has been at the neglect of attention to the 
suffering of the poor, oppressed and dehumanized. Gutiérrez argues that the missionary and 
apologetic task of the Church is not to convince the non-believer but to liberate the non-
person. For Gutiérrez, the task of apologetics is not to convince the non-believer, but to make 
the case for the right of theology to contribute to the quest for justice, to speak of God‘s 
preferential option as a matter of human, and not simply ecclesial, concern.  
 
A good part of contemporary theology seems to have arisen from the challenge of the 
nonbeliever. The nonbeliever questions our religious world, and demands a 
purification and profound renewal. Dietrich Bonhoeffer took up that challenge and 
formulated the incisive question we find at the origin of so many of the theological 
efforts of our day: How can one proclaim God in a world become adult, a world 
grown up, a world come of age? In Latin America, however, the challenge does not 
come first and foremost from the nonbeliever. It comes from the nonperson. It comes 
from the person whom the prevailing social order fails to recognize as a person—the 
poor, the exploited, the ones systematically and legally despoiled of their humanness, 
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the ones who scarcely know they are persons at all . . . Hence the question here will 
not be how to speak of God in a world come of age, but rather how to proclaim God 
as Father in a world that is inhumane. What can it mean to tell a nonperson that he or 
she is God‘s child? (1983, p. 57) 
 
Historically, Latin American Liberation Theology may have privileged economic 
marginalization, the impact of global dependency on the economies of the two-thirds world 
and the emergent revolutionary consciousness of class, but Gutiérrez would now argue that 
the poor are essentially those who are ‗the insignificant, that is considered a ―non-person‖, 
someone that is not fully acknowledged his/her rights as a human being‘ (p. 15). This may be 
due to lack of economic means, but also on account of skin colour, gender or belonging to a 
despised culture. The task of the apologist who preaches Christ crucified is to make the case 
for the Gospel in such a way that the non-person is able to take possession of his or her very 
humanity.  
This insight is fundamental in order to understand the development of liberation 
theology. Liberation theology is not just the political outworking of a moral principle, but is 
essentially a theological response to the Christian faith, which developed among the poor and 
constituted a profound challenge to the more traditional teachings of a hierarchical Church. 
The encounter with Christ takes place in an encounter with the poor, and thus solidarity with 
them is a Gospel imperative (p. xiv). It is impossible to understand liberation theology 
without taking notice to this ‗irruption of the poor‘ (p. 11). The poor now become agents of 
their own destiny and the subjects, not the objects, of theological reflection.  
What would it mean for Christian apologetics to address the non-person, to join the 
challenge of convicting them of their own humanity; and of public theology to articulate this 
as the core task of the Church‘s public role? If public theology is to recover a purpose as a 
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form of Christian apologetics, and if theological justifications are embodied in orthopraxy as 
much as orthodoxy – demonstrating through faithful practice as well as justifying in reasoned 
debate – then the Church‘s commitment to the poor becomes a vital test of any credible 
apology for Christianity. The Church is called to be in solidarity with the poor in that search 
for God‘s justice. The measure of its theology rests in its facilitation of transformative praxis. 
An apologetics of liberation involves enacting the Good News to the poor in a praxis of 
solidarity, and in speaking truth to power – a public theology validated through the exercise 
of solidarity, advocacy and prophecy. 
 
Public Theology for ‘the Godless and the Godforsaken’ 
How else might we conceive of the ‗public‘ with whom Christian apologetics might engage? 
For Gutiérrez, the Church‘s solidarity with the poor comes from its participation in the life of 
Christ crucified and risen. A similar emphasis on the Christological nature of the Church‘s 
praxis in the world comes from Jürgen Moltmann. Here, the kenosis or self-emptying of 
Christ is to be primarily understood neither as expiation for sins by which Jesus placates an 
angry God, or as some temporary assumption of vulnerability which is then cancelled out by 
the victory of the resurrection. Rather, Moltmann argues that Cross and resurrection are 
indivisible, since the suffering of the world is taken up into the very same God who acts 
redemptively through the resurrection. God on the cross enters into the condition of humanity 
that has become separated from God: ‗the sinners, the godless and those forsaken by God‘ 
(1974, p. 285). 
In Christ, God willingly enters into the finitude of the world; in Jesus‘ cry of despair 
and desolation on the Cross, humanity bears witness to the extent to which he assumes these 
qualities of ‗godforsakenness‘: abandonment, hopelessness and suffering. The isolation and 
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despair of Jesus at the point of crucifixion requires humanity to consider what the Cross 
means not only for their own destiny, but what it reveals about the very nature of God. It 
changes how humanity thinks of God – as the crucified one, who ‗is found most deeply and 
evidently to be with us, the godless and the godforsaken.‘ (Bauckham 2001, p. x) The 
promise of the resurrection is that the God who brings redemption, who repairs the separation 
between God and creation, is the same one who is in solidarity all along with the ‗godless and 
godforsaken‘. 
Insofar as the cross and resurrection defies worldly enthusiasms and ideologies, it 
confounds conventional trajectories of progress to reveal God‘s promise for the future. But 
this is complemented by a praxis of loving solidarity with the godless and godforsaken on the 
part of the Church. Moltmann speaks in The Crucified God of the Cross and resurrection as 
‗the ground for living with the terror of history and the end of history‘ (1974, p. 278). Like 
other German political theologians of his generation, Moltmann was confronting the false 
gods of materialism, complacency and affluence with the vision of the crucified God. 
However, these sentiments have very contemporary resonances. At the beginning of the 
twenty-first century we are familiar with a world dominated by terror and the ‗war on terror‘: 
of the kind of fear which pathologizes religion and cultural difference, but also an awareness 
of the pressing scale of human want and oppression. On the other hand, the ‗end of history‘ 
after the work of the political theorist Francis Fukuyama, which he meant as signalling an end 
to ideology, and a stripping out of narratives of meaning, might also speak to a contemporary 
condition of the loss of the ability to identify a purpose or soteriological end to human affairs. 
Moltmann identifies those with the ‗godless‘, those who are led to reject God in the face of 
the seemingly insuperable suffering of the world (2000, pp. 14–15). They are like Nietzsche‘s 
mad man, who rushes into the market place to announce the death of God, whom the forces 
of reason and enlightenment have liberated from bondage to irrational belief. Yet the 
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messenger also bears a terrible burden, to the detriment of his sanity: the prospect that, as 
traditional sources of authority and cohesion dissolved, humanity would be left fatally adrift. 
This, for Moltmann, represents what he calls ‗protest atheism‘ (2000, p. 15): the sceptic who 
sees no use for religion, or the one who sees in religion only violence and dogmatism. In that 
respect, the Cross confronts a post-secular world that finds itself no longer in need of the 
divine, yet nevertheless struggles to invest its public life with meaning and value. The old 
morality, based on subservience to an imagined higher power, is obsolete, but what will 
replace it? 
In Moltmann‘s opinion, to withdraw into a privatized spirituality or downplay the 
public nature of the Gospel in the face of the absence of God is simply to collude with the 
world‘s godlessness. Nor is it appropriate to try and turn the Church into an enclave or 
remnant that ‗abandon[s] ―the wicked world‖ to its godlessness … The withdrawal of 
Christian presence and theology from society‘s public institutions may – as it claims to do – 
preserve the purity of Christian identity, but it surrenders the relevance of the Christian 
message.‘ (p. 15) If the work of Christ is salvation for the ‗godless and godforsaken‘, then 
this is an account of the self-emptying, suffering God (in Christ), as the one who effects the 
reconciliation between God and a fallen world. This is essentially a dynamic of grace, not 
undertaken for those able to save themselves by their own efforts, since all humanity shares 
in the condition of sin, godlessness and godforsakenness. All Christians who are honest, 
argues Moltmann, will see in the ‗protest atheism‘ of the godless world a reflection of their 
own doubts in the face of suffering and evil, even though they may believe that the crucified 
Christ is the solution to such injustice. In a post-secular society, then, to assume solidarity 
with the godless does not mean a denunciation of those who declare themselves as having ‗no 
religion‘ and a determination to win them back to orthodoxy. It rests more in a realism 
towards the pluralism of the post-secular condition, which shares the doubts of those who 
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reject a God who appears to condone suffering. In solidarity with this ‗public‘ of the godless 
rest the beginnings, perhaps, of an apologetics that proceeds from the common purpose of 
overcoming injustice and realizing the opportunities (as well as the challenges) of a ‗world 
come of age‘:  
 
Those who recognize God‘s presence in the face of the Godforsaken Christ have 
protest atheism within themselves – but as something they can overcome …. So 
Christian theology does not belong solely in the circle of people who are ‗insiders‘. It 
belongs just as much to the people who feel that they are ‗outside the gate‘ … A 
Christian theologian must not just get to know the devout and religious. He [sic] must 
know the godless too, for he belongs to them as well. (p. 17) 
 
In Gutierrez‘s terms, the non-believer requires a particular kind of proclamation about the 
possibility of God in a world that appears to have outgrown faith. This can be seen as the 
equivalent of the address to Moltmann‘s ‗godless‘ world. In his category of the 
‗godforsaken‘, however, we might be encouraged to see the Gospel in its address to the non-
person: the solidarity of the crucified God with the privations of all those who suffer, due to 
oppression, famine, war, abuse or deprivation. When he was writing The Crucified God 
Moltmann‘s work connected powerfully, of course, with Latin American liberation theology, 
which equally saw the face of the suffering Jesus in the face of the dispossessed of its own 
context. Yet we cannot separate a crisis of meaning or morality from questions of material 
well-being (Sandel 2010). The promise of human flourishing is both a restoration of meaning 
and hope as an existential reality, and a fundamental repair to the ordering of God‘s world in 
terms of its economic and social organization. This is not primarily a message for the 
303 
 
comfortable or the secure, but for those who are alienated and abandoned; and so the Church, 
as the Body of Christ, continues to embody that preferential identification with the lost and 
marginalized. The solidarity of God in Christ with those whom human systems have 
abandoned or squandered prompts the Church to appreciate a praxis of faith that seeks not 
only to explain itself to a world without faith, but a world that seeks justice and right relation. 
This is a Gospel that represents both a restoration of meaning and hope as an existential 
reality, and a fundamental repair to the ordering of God‘s world in the name of our common 
humanity. 
 
‘Seek the Welfare of the City’: Public Theology in Solidarity with the Secular  
Public theology, as I understand it, is not primarily and directly evangelical theology 
which addresses the Gospel to the world in the hope of repentance and conversion. 
Rather, it is theology which seeks the welfare of the city before protecting the 
interests of the Church … (Forrester 2004, p. 6) 
 
As I have argued, one of the charges levelled against public theology has been that its 
commitment to dialogue and apologetics represents a capitulation to human autonomy, rather 
than authentic obedience to God. Whilst I have defended the bilingual and apologetic nature 
of public theology, I have also wanted to learn from these critics. For example, the 
differences between liberal and post-liberal theologies may simply be one of emphasis, 
reflecting the pluralism of relationships between ‗Christ‘ and ‗culture‘ (Niebuhr 1951) that 
have always existed within theology. The two positions are thus not antipathetic but 
complementary, in terms of ‗their different understandings of faithfully taking theology 
public – for one the task entails describing and living the Scriptural narrative authentically, 
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and for the other it demands continually attempting to explain that narrative and its 
implications and relate them to experience and other knowledge.‘ (Heyer 2004, p. 325) 
Postliberals are concerned with a ‗normative redescription of Christian communal beliefs‘; 
revisionists set out their stall according to a ‗fully critical theological reflection‘ and the 
apologetic exercise of defending Christianity‘s intellectual and rational credibility; 
liberationists judge theology by the standards of ‗solidarity with the oppressed‘ (Kamitsuka 
1999, p. 14). This returns us to questions about where to locate the weight of authority 
between competing sources and norms, and the criteria by which the authenticity of theology 
is to be measured. What is theology for; from where and to whom should it speak? How are 
the competing demands of Church and world, tradition and experience, margins and centre to 
be resolved? 
Another way of thinking about this debate is to see it as caught between the perennial 
tension between what I might call ‗authenticity‘ (to tradition) and ‗participation‘ (in the 
context of the ‗public‘ in which one finds oneself). Tony Harkness, writing from an 
Australian context about the theological foundations of Roman Catholic schools, talks about 
the tension between authenticity and inclusion: how the Church‘s education policy and 
provision can be true to tradition and the core values of the Church (‗Have a strong Catholic 
identity and Give witness to Christian values‘) yet reach out to wider constituencies (‗Be 
open and accessible to those who seek its values‘) (2003, p. 2). This will best be achieved, he 
argues, through a ‗God-centred rather than Church centred theology of mission‘. Mission, or 
involvement of Church in public policy, is not about ‗the work of the Church alone, exercised 
and directed through the powers and structures of the Church‘, but is driven by an 
understanding of ‗the work of the Holy Spirit calling forth all of creation‘ (p. 4). 
Harkness here draws on the work of Peter Phan, who has argued that the theology of 
mission in the Roman Catholic tradition since Vatican II represented a decisive shift away 
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from a church-centred model towards one of God at work in the world, and a focus on the 
Church in the world as an instrument or sacrament of God‘s mission. The Church is not an 
end in itself but a pointer to the way God acts in the world (Bosch 1991, p. 2). Phan criticizes 
pre-conciliar Catholic missiology in which ‗the center and heart of the missionary project is 
the church, and church understood primary in the institutional model‘ (2002), understood as 
‗unique, exclusive, superior, definitive, normative and absolute‘ (Knitter 1985, p.18). Hence 
the emphasis in post-conciliar Catholic theology (especially theologies of mission and 
contextual theologies of inculturation) about mission as involving the humanization of 
society as much as expansion of the Church. Crucially, also, it asks missiology to locate itself 
from a theological and apologetic vantage-point, rather than an ecclesiological (and 
ecclesiastical) one. For Phan, post-Vatican II missiology has restored the four elements of 
mission to their right order: ‗reign of God, mission, proclamation, and church‘ (2002). 
It is right, in one sense, for our theological reflection on such a matter to turn to the 
nature and calling of the Church, as exemplary ‗communities of trust and love and support‘ 
(Wells 2005, p. 30), whose distinctive practices of faith show forth the kind of human lives 
that are possible under God. It values and emphasizes the historic tradition of Church life as 
definitively the means by which the present witness of that Church continues to be shaped; 
and it is a shaping of dispositions, of virtues, of habitus. It is also a performative theology, in 
which the language of the Church‘s proclamation to the world is embedded and embodied in 
its actions. The praxis of the Church is its own first order apologetic. Yet what disconcerts me 
about the post-liberal and radically orthodox stances, as discussed in Chapter 4, is the 
exclusiveness placed upon the Church and the imputation that the salvation of the world is 
dependent upon the integrity of the Church. So, as Sam Wells argues, ‗the central question in 
Christian ethics … is simply put: does it build up the Church? … does it build up the 
common life of the body of Christ, fostering conditions in which trust, peace and 
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reconciliation may grow? And: does it appropriately display the common life of the Church 
in such a way as to demonstrate how that life is made possible by the servant lordship of 
Christ, and thus commend that life to those who do not yet share it?‘ (2005, p. 30) Is it really 
valid to suggest that the state of the Church is the central concern of Christian ethics or 
public theology? On the one hand, we are told that such a theology should not be interpreted 
as proposing ecclesial isolationism or triumphalism. The welfare of the world and the search 
for social justice are still to be honoured, but from a position of counter-cultural engagement 
rather than compliance with secular powers. Since nothing can and should replicate the 
sovereignty of Christ, then the last thing the Church should do is seek its own version of that 
in temporal terms, or to ‗impress upon those who do not share its faith an ersatz version of its 
life.‘ (p. 30) 
On the other hand, such an insistence on the self-sufficiency and primacy of ecclesial 
identity fails to convince in the face of the pressing needs of the world. Instead, I have been 
arguing that public theology is right not to lose its nerve in continuing to insist on the 
primacy of creation, incarnation and common grace, and look for signs of the Kingdom in an 
era after Christendom. The Church cannot be assumed to be immune from the considerations 
of religious freedom and pluralism, just as a secular humanity come of age is not indifferent 
to questions of morality, justice and truth. The salvation of the world, and not the survival of 
the Church, is and should be the guiding principle of public theology. Against the contention 
that any autonomous human reason capable of discerning God renders revelation redundant, 
we have the alternative view that human reason and culture, however flawed, are occasions of 
grace through which revelation is mediated. To look for God‘s becoming amidst the human 
and material is quintessentially an affirmation of the incarnational and sacramental nature of 
reality. Reason is fulfilled by faith, nature by grace: not in negation or antithesis (as if indeed 
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they were ever capable of separation) but in an unfolding process of repair and 
transformation. 
 
Mediation on the part of theology is often suspected from a post-liberal or radically 
orthodox perspective of being a compromising capitulation to culture. However, 
genuine mediation does not mean compromise and capitulation but balance and 
insight. By refusing mediation theologians cut off the possibility of prophetic wisdom 
arising from culture, and they are blind to the tyranny that is often still alive and well 
in the church. (Hodgson 2010, p. 9) 
 
I wonder, therefore, whether post-liberal theologies have succumbed to the temptation of 
privileging the work of the Church over the reign of God. Have they allowed their suspicion 
of secular liberal humanism in the name of authenticity to push them into a latter-day 
doctrine of extra ecclesiam nulla salus? It is one thing to acknowledge the ideological biases 
of secular reason (such as social sciences), but another to deny such disciplines or 
perspectives any legitimacy whatsoever. But in their quest for authenticity via rootedness in 
the specificities of Christian community, post-liberals drift further away from the lived reality 
of the public square. If they stick too closely to their principles, they may overlook the 
necessary compromises of Christian Realism. As Malcolm Brown argues,  
 
the problem of negotiating between radically different conceptions of justice is 
avoided by sidestepping the necessity for such trans-traditional encounter. Yet this is 
to see theology‘s task as concerned only with shaping ideals [of the ideal rather than 
the empirical church] and not with the ethical spadework of addressing the complex 
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confusions of a world in which, despite the inauguration of the Kingdom of God, the 
impact of the Fall continues to undo the best intentions of human endeavour. Even in 
closed Christian communities such as the Amish of Pennsylvania, the necessity of 
engagement with the wider economy is inescapable. (2007, pp. 54–5) 
 
Any theology of public life must begin with a recognition that the interaction between Church 
and world, or Christ and culture, is always one of ‗blurred encounters‘ (Reader 2005). Firstly, 
this is because it is an encounter with the diversity of the public square itself. It is hopeless to 
expect an imminent return to Christendom, so theology must learn to respect difference, hear 
the objections of the cultured despisers and learn to regard secular wisdom as more than its 
degenerate Other: 
 
It is true, of course, that engaging with public policy is not the only way of causing 
Christian faith to shape the world for good. Arguably, it is more important to foster an 
alternative ethos within the churches, which can show forth what salutary social and 
political life looks like. Nevertheless, the rest of the world is being daily misshapen by 
decisions about public policy, and Christian ethics should care to reserve some of its 
energy for engaging critically and constructively with those, too. (Biggar 2011, p. xvi)  
 
Secondly, following David Tracy, a concern with the pluralist, open character of theological 
discourse is held to protect theology from ecclesiastical control that limits freedom of enquiry 
or atrophies the evolution of tradition. It protects the very diversity within the Christian 
community, especially in terms of incorporating the voices of marginalized and excluded 
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voices. Such a public theology is built on the reality of common grace and our shared 
humanity by virtue of bearing the imago Dei, the possibility of reason as well as revelation as 
revealing the truth, and redemption being about transformation and renewal of creation rather 
than its being sanctified by a remnant. ‗The church is holy, but holiness is not separation from 
the world. Instead, the church‘s holiness is that of Jesus Christ himself, in its risky interaction 
with that world.‘ (Dackson 2006, p. 246) Fundamentally, it testifies to ‗the idea that God‘s 
truth – which of course, is absolute truth – is approachable by all human beings‘, as well as 
suggesting ‗that Christians should be looking for their God to be discovered in other people.‘ 
(Brown 2007, p. 63) 
Indeed, such participation in the movement of the Spirit in the realm of reason as well 
as revelation is not a betrayal but a full expression of theological orthodoxy. It is not a matter 
of demonstrating Christian virtues that are distinctive (in that they are exclusively the 
property of Christians, or set those who practise them apart from the rest of the world), but 
that Christian practice and character is authentic and faithful to the Gospel. It is not beyond 
the bounds of possibility, however, that similar values may not be present in other traditions, 
something which apologists from the apostle Paul have been quite prepared to acknowledge 
(see Chapter 6). In dialogue or collaborative action, then, Christians may look for moral 
consensus which extends beyond the boundaries of their own tradition without compromising 
the integrity of their core convictions. As I argued in Chapter 4 in conversation with the work 
of Luke Bretherton, it is in pragmatic pursuit of shared social goods – the common purpose 
found in seeking the welfare of the city – that people of different outlooks converge.  
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‘Truth to Power’: Public Theology as prophetic advocacy  
In retrieving an historic apologetic strand to public theology, I have traced how early 
apologists were concerned to render Christianity philosophically coherent and spiritually 
compelling, but how they also ‗spoke truth to power‘ in the name of a Gospel that was 
radically world-transforming. Apologetics was often a plea for tolerance in the face of 
persecution but also a demonstration of Christ‘s Lordship in all walks of life, including the 
civil, legal and political. In contemporary public theology, this imperative continues, whether 
it is in prophetic witness against injustice or constructive guidance to policy-makers.  
 
‘The 96’ 
A vivid example of ‗speaking truth to power‘ is that of the Church of England‘s involvement 
in a public enquiry, in which the synthesis of local presence and national influence worked 
powerfully to facilitate an important process of social justice. On 15 April 1989, a soccer 
cup-tie between the teams of Liverpool and Nottingham Forest at Hillsborough stadium in 
Sheffield, South Yorkshire, ended in tragedy when 96 Liverpool fans were crushed to death. 
Official reports subsequently blamed the fans themselves, but sustained campaigning on 
behalf of the victims‘ families eventually led to the appointment of a Hillsborough 
Independent Panel in 2009, chaired by the Bishop of Liverpool, James Jones. The Panel read 
400,000 documents and concluded that South Yorkshire police had conspired with other 
public officials and sections of the media to distort the official account of what happened 
(Conn 2012; Machray 2012).  
The release of HIP‘s report on 12 September 2012 was a moment of huge catharsis for the 
families of the dead and the entire city of Liverpool. For a church leader to have been so 
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closely involved surprised many, but it is actually a vivid expression of the Church acting in 
public life from a position of first-hand engagement in order to pursue the common interests 
of a community. Jones was closely involved in the pastoral care of the families and in 
anniversary memorial services for ‗the 96‘, but he was also active in lobbying government to 
support the Panel in its work. It was decided to hold the press conference to release the report 
in Liverpool Anglican Cathedral, and the chapter house was set aside as a chapel for the 
families of the 96. Once Jones‘ duties as Panel chair were completed, he accompanied the 
families to the chapel. ‗I went to remember the 96, and to pray for truth and justice to prevail 
in God‘s world … I strayed from my brief as chairman in that moment – but it was the end of 
the day.‘ (Conn 2012) 
This was a piece of public theology in action which willed ‗the welfare of the city‘ – a 
particular city whose people had been defamed, and who felt the slurs and injustices deeply. 
But it also exposed the scandal of police misconduct and delivered hard truths about 
corruption in high places – an insistence upon ‗speaking truth to power‘ in order to clear the 
names of 96 fans but also to hold the public authorities to account. The Hillsborough 
Independent Panel assumed an important symbolic role, as the guardians of trust in a context 
in which other parts of society had betrayed public expectations of transparency and the duty 
of care. To no small extent, the Panel restored people‘s faith that some of those in authority 
would act in something approaching ‗the public interest‘. Similarly, in his attention to the 
needs of the bereaved families, James Jones demonstrated a solidarity with the ‗godforsaken‘ 
at the heart of the process. In an interview, the Bishop commented, ‗‖The church sometimes 
colludes with a very parochial approach, that it should not stray outside its walls … It takes 
us away from engagement with society which I believe is our calling. I absolutely believe the 
church should take an active role in helping to frame a just society.‘ (Conn 2012) 
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As an historic Established Church, the Church of England may look increasingly 
anachronistic, but it is on these sorts of occasions that its actions and representatives show 
their worth. The combination of local presence in every neighbourhood (the ‗parochial‘ 
dimension of a national church in the best sense of the word) and the constitutional access to 
government granted by Establishment has, since Faith in the City, been one of the most 
powerful examples of contemporary public theology. It was embodied here in the blend of 
Jones‘ natural pastoral instincts for the Liverpool families with his determination to call the 
authorities to account. Like the original Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa, the Church brought a unique combination of attention to the deepest emotional and 
interpersonal processes of grief and forgiveness, and a resolute commitment that truth and 
justice should have their day.  
 
‘Ambassadors for Christ’: Christian Vocation and Public Theology 
I have been arguing that at the heart of Max Stackhouse‘s advocacy of the necessity of public 
theology is an apologetic defence of its potential for the common good, in terms of helping to 
articulate the values that underpin a thriving global civil society (Hainsworth 2010, pp. xiii–
xiv). Public theology ‗must show that it can form, inform and sustain the moral and spiritual 
architecture of a civil society so that truth, justice and mercy are more nearly approximated in 
the souls of persons and in the institutions of the common life‘ (Stackhouse 2007a, p. 107). 
These references to forming, informing and sustaining suggest a formational or vocational 
role for public theology, of capacity-building and shaping civic virtue amongst those of faith.  
This understanding of public theology may be an outworking of Stackhouse‘s own 
Reformed theology, which has traditionally held that Christian vocation is no longer 
restricted to religious institutions, but ‗secularized‘ into everyday pursuits. Public theology 
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may be more visible in the official statements of church authorities or the professions of 
politicians, but it is also vitally exercised in the everyday witness of ordinary Christians. It is 
in the exercise of responsible citizenship that the Gospel finds its most effective, but most 
under-rated, apologists in a post-secular age. Inevitably, then, building up the secular 
vocation of the laity ought to constitute a significant fulcrum of the churches‘ public 
engagement. Whilst theological education is concerned with forming Christians in a 
particular inherited tradition and fostering biblical and theological literacy, it should also 
inform and build them up to be ‗ambassadors for Christ‘, as representatives and messengers 
of the Gospel in the world. The terminology of ‗ambassador‘ is especially pertinent to our 
discussion of Christians in public life. Ambassadors are public representatives of a 
government or cause: when a citizen of one country meets an ambassador, they encounter not 
just an individual but the nation or organization in whose name they have been sent. An 
ambassador may be sent abroad, and therefore be on foreign territory, where the terms of 
engagement may not be of their making. The expectations of the role are those of diplomacy 
and advocacy on behalf of one‘s commissioning body, coupled with a respect for the context 
in which one finds oneself. Ambassadors and other diplomatic envoys are sent to build 
bridges, establish mutual benefit, facilitate cultural exchange: there are no grounds to assume 
a position of victimhood, or antagonism, therefore, but only to receive the respect and 
hospitality due to an honoured representative, and to reciprocate.  
This suggests that if we consider Christians as the most effective ambassadors and 
apologists for the Gospel, then this places a renewed onus on the Church to equip the laity to 
exercise such a secular calling effectively. It redirects the matter of Christian formation and 
education towards the practices of citizenship, and establishes a stake for public theology in 
fostering theologically literate persons. This is reminiscent of renditions of religious social 
capital as pointing to the enduring significance of local practices of faith as the well-spring of 
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any religious engagement with the public square. The best apologists are those fully 
immersed in the community of faith which is where the exemplary vision of truth and 
goodness is nurtured; but that implies a close link between apologetics and catechesis, to 
enable people to learn the skills of theological reflection and argument, as well as being 
attuned to contemporary culture. ‗To be an apologist is to accompany our fellow searchers as 
we consider whether the Christian faith, or atheism, or any other worldview, does or does not 
make sense of these matters.‘ (Davison 2011, p. xxvii) Note here the absence of adversarial 
language, the collaborative journey of shared enquiry and the epistemology of ‗making sense‘ 
– a practical wisdom that is credible intellectually and performatively.  
This might begin, for example, with Christians telling their stories. I touched in the 
last chapter on the way in which narrative theology might resolve the impasse between an 
over-particularistic, self-referential ecclesial discourse and the adoption of the lowest 
common denominator. In her work on public theology as narrative, Mary Doak argues it has 
the potential to constitute ‗a unified whole through attention to particularities‘ (2004, p. 3). 
Narrative is the means through which we realize our historicity, both specific and universal: 
‗careful attention to the structure and function of narrative suggests that it not only provides 
and reinforces a communal identity but is also a source of critique and transformation, 
enabling us to imagine possibilities for the future that are appropriate to the specific historical 
contexts providing the conditions and limits of our praxis‘ (p. 3). It allows the rhetorical 
power of theological tradition to be introduced into the public domain ‗with their religious 
roots clearly intact‘, whilst being sufficiently porous to create space for communicative 
exchange with the narratives and vantage-points of others (p. 15).  
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If, as political and liberation theologians argue, the central stories of our faith cannot 
be properly understood as less than universal in import, it is also the case that those 
political and universal claims cannot be divorced from the particular religious faith in 
which they are rooted, as the narrative theologians proclaim … At the same time, 
narrative theologians need to broaden their focus to account for the various narratives 
that form our identities, and to acknowledge that, despite their historical particularity, 
narratives are not immune to external evaluation and critique. The false dilemma 
demanding that we either accept that public life consists in a non-negotiable clash of 
narratives or engages in a discredited search for a universally accepted rational 
foundation must be rejected; only then will we develop a narrative theology adequate 
to the universal significance of Christian claims about the conditions for human 
flourishing. (p. 4)  
 
The primary nature of theology as a discourse of vocation and Christian practice reminds 
public theology that it must be directed towards facilitating the skills of everyday moral 
reasoning as well as issuing in the public pronouncements of church agencies and leaders. If 
Stackhouse‘s public theology acquires an apologetic, vocational strain, informed by his 
Reformed roots, then a similar emphasis may be found in other traditions. For example, the 
documents of Vatican II (1962–5) make similar connections between the role of the Church 
in relation to public (including cultural, technological and economic) life, and the vital 
significance of a laity which is charged with representing Christ to the world. So, for 
example, the conciliar document Gaudium et Spes diagnoses the challenges of modern 
atheism and agnosticism as essentially requiring missionary and apologetic responses. These 
seem remarkably resonant, 50 years later, with many of the challenges of the post-secular 
condition. As the document argues, those who fall short of an exemplary Christian life-style, 
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or who cannot put up a decent defence of the faith, are all complicit in the retreat of the 
Church from the everyday (secular) world. Nothing less than the everyday credibility of the 
Gospel is at stake:  
 
Without doubt those who wilfully try to drive God from their heart and to avoid all 
questions about religion … are not free from blame. But believers themselves often 
share some responsibility for this situation … Believers can thus have more than a 
little to do with the rise of atheism. To the extent that they are careless about their 
instruction in the faith, or present its teaching falsely, or even fail in their religious, 
moral or social life, they must be said to conceal than to reveal the true nature of God 
and of religion. (‗Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World‘ 
[Gaudium et Spes], in A. Flannery (ed.), Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post-
Conciliar Documents (Leominster: Fowler Wright, 1981), pp. 903–1014, at p. 919, 
para. 19.  
 
If Gaudium et Spes places high expectations on the laity, however, it may also be said 
that there is a corresponding onus on Church leaders to put renewed energy into basic 
Christian catechesis and adult formation so that ordinary Christians are better equipped to 
exercise that secular ministry. If the Church is to recover a stronger sense of its apologetic 
task, therefore, then the education of the laity, and their own ‗theological literacy‘ becomes a 
pressing missiological priority. Writing from the Brazilian context, Júlio Paulo Tavares 
Zabatiero suggests that if the rightful place for theology is in the public square, as a ‗public 
language for justice‘ (Tavares Zabatiero 2012, p. 66), then Church itself must be more 
strategic in fostering apologetic engagement amongst the laity. Much of the Christian 
education in the churches is focused on learning about doctrine – Lindbeck‘s ‗knowing that‘ 
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– but the tasks of ‗knowing how‘ and ‗knowing why‘ are also priorities in enabling lay people 
to become fluent practitioners and ambassadors for a public faith: as voters, employers and 
employees, consumers and neighbours. This requires the Church to cultivate intelligent, 
engaging and relevant programmes of Christian formation: ‗to enter the public square 
theology needs to be reinvented constantly, and to be reinvented theology needs to reoccupy 
the centre of training and reinvent theological education, so that people are capable of 
undertaking the work and the requirements of intellectuals in the public sphere‘ (Tavares 
Zabatiero 2012, p. 69). 
 
Conclusion: Public Theology as Christian Apologetics 
The paradox of Western post-secular society points to the simultaneous trajectory of 
continued secularism, resistance to ‗doing God‘ and deficits of religious literacy to be 
overcome, alongside a renewed currency of religious discourse and faith-based activism in 
public life. To its ‗cultured despisers‘, religion may still have a poor reputation but that will 
not be enhanced – quite the opposite – if they suspect a lack of transparency in relation to the 
true values and convictions of political thinkers poised to exert influence in the corridors of 
power, and dismiss theological contributions to public debate as mere ‗clandestine efforts … 
to veil religious aims in a public vocabulary‘ (Klemp 2007, p. 544). 
Even allowing for a growing gulf between the general population and the dwindling 
number of those who actively practise a religious faith, and however fractured and 
fragmented the public domain may be, the re-emergence of religion as a force in public life 
requires the voices of faith to consider how best to communicate the basis for their 
convictions. This sentiment underpins the ‗apologetic‘ stance to which public theologians 
allude. Yet this is not simply a matter of pragmatism, but comes down to the question of 
whether theology is a public discourse at all and whether it is answerable to non-theological 
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traditions of reasoning. In response to criticisms from post-liberal and postmodern traditions, 
public theologians of a more liberal, dialogical persuasion now acknowledge that theology is 
not a generic or universal language. However, this is still more a matter of being ‗rooted‘ in, 
without being ‗confined‘ to (Ziegler 2002, p. 142), its own historic traditions, whilst 
defending on theological grounds the prospect of common grace and a negotiated arena of 
shared reasoning. 
Public theologians have always advocated the essentially ‗bilingual‘ nature of their 
profession. As a discourse, it needs to be grounded in biblical and theological tradition but 
capable of being understood by those outside its own boundaries, appealing to reason and 
experience to show that the values of faith make good sense and better practice. This may 
involve a process of ‗translation‘ from confessional or dogmatic language into commonly-
understood concepts and values. This is what I have been tracing as constituting the heart of 
Christian apologetics, as a form of theology called upon to provide public justification for its 
reasoning. This will entail a deep sympathy with the integrity of the godless and a 
compassionate identification with the godforsaken, whilst willing their transformation in and 
through a process of critical ‗interruption‘ (Boeve 2008, p. 205).  
The primary nature of theology as a discourse of vocation and Christian practice 
reminds public theology that it must be directed towards facilitating the skills of everyday 
moral reasoning as well as issuing in the public pronouncements of church agencies and 
leaders. Actions may speak louder than words, but the nature of the post-secular condition 
suggests that whilst practical care and service constitutes the essential praxis of public 
theology, faith-based contributions must not be marginalized by their own hesitancy to speak 
of faith in public. Public theology is not only concerned to do theology about public issues, 
but called to do its theology in public, with a sense of transparency to those of other faiths 
and none. Whilst there may be times when the Church speaks and people do not listen, that is 
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never a reason for not speaking at all. I am calling, therefore, for public theology to retrieve 
an understanding of itself as Christian apologetics, a sharing of the motivations behind the 
practices of citizenship, as well as those of discipleship. The imperative to ‗give an account 
of the hope which is within you‘, has always been a function of Christianity‘s relationship 
with its cultural surroundings. It must continue to underpin the vocation of the public Church 
as it is called to speak truth to power and seek the welfare of the city, and as its people 
venture into the contested spaces of public deliberation as articulate and faithful ambassadors 
for Christ. 
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